United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

 

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2023-002899 First-tier Tribunal No: HU/59300/2022 IA/00070/2023

 

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 21 February 2025

 

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

 

 

Between

 

NAVNEET CHANDRADEV CHAUBEY

(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

 

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Respondent

Representation:

 

For the Appellant: Mr Winter

For the Respondent: Ms Arif, Senior Presenting Officer

 

Heard at Edinburgh on 5 November 2024

 

 

DECISION AND REASONS

 

1.       The appellant is a citizen of India who born on 30 April 1992. He entered the United Kingdom on a visit visa in 2010 and overstayed. His application to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of his private life was refused by the Secretary of State by a decision dated 17 November 2022. The First-tier Tribunal, in a decision promulgated on 23 June 2023, dismissed the appeal. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.

Ground 1

2.       The appellant argues that, as a consequence of his mental health problems (it was agreed by both parties that he has learning difficulties) there exist very significant obstacles to his integration in India. The appellant complains that the judge, although she accepted that the appellant has both mental and physical disabilities, did not mention the appellant's medical evidence at all in her decision.

3.       The Secretary of State in her Rule 24 letter argues that it was 'clear that the decision of the FTT was not made on the basis that the medical evidence was not accepted but that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that suitable arrangements could not be made for his care and on the basis that the sponsors could return with him either to make arrangements for him, or to look after him themselves in India.'

4.       In his oral submissions, Mr Winter submitted that the failure of the judge to engage with the medical evidence was a material error of law.

5.       I find that Ground 1 is without merit. I do not find that, having accepted the appellant's mental health difficulties as a fact, the judge was required to assess the medical evidence in detail give that, as the Secretary of State submissions, the issue was whether suitable arrangements for the appellant's care could be made in India. Given the judge's findings, in particular that summarised at [6] (v) below, there was no need whatever for the judge to analyse medical evidence which added nothing to the issues to be determined by the Tribunal.

6.       In short, the appellant's Article 8 ECHR appeal was defeated by reason of the fact that the appellant's care needs in India could be met thereby removing any very significant obstacles to his integration in India. The judge found that (i) the appellant had failed to show that no care facilities would be available to him in India (First-tier Tribunal decision [44]); (ii) the appellant's brother and sister in law have a property in India in which they could financially support the appellant and provide care [44]. The judge was unimpressed by the family's unevidenced assertion that 'it would be difficult to obtain staff that they can trust' [44] ; (iii) it had always been the intention of the family that the appellant should settle in India if he failed to do so in the United Kingdom [46]; (iv) the brother and sister in law visit India regularly and could 'either to help [the appellant] readjust to a new residential home or to obtain care in his own home [47] (v) most significantly, the appellant, brother and sister in law could 'all return to India on a permanent basis' thereby removing any possibility that Article 8 ECHR would be breached. On the evidence, those were all legitimate findings for the judge to reach and were determinative of the Article 8 ECHR appeal.

 

Ground 2

7.       At [45], the judge found:

It appears that the Appellant did have employment of sorts in India. Much has been made of the fact that he acquired this employment through his late mother and sister. I have now had sight of documents which seem to suggest that the Appellant was not actually capable of fulfilling the work required of him. If that is the case, then there was a clear attempt to deceive the United Kingdom authorities into thinking that the Appellant held a "genuine" job. In any event the brother-in-law in his oral evidence stated that the job description "was a genuine description in the school. "It seems to me that the sister and her husband could assist the Appellant in finding a suitable job since the sister has done so in the past.

8.       The grounds complain [8] that the 'In short, the Appellant's relatives provided honest answers to the direct questions asked. No deception was used. In finding that deception had been used [the judge] proceeded in a manner that was irrational and unreasonable. As such she erred in law.'

9.       Ground 2 is not made out. first, I am satisfied that the issue of deception was raised in the hearing and both parties had the opportunity to address the judge in respect of it. Consequently, no procedural unfairness arose. Secondly, as articulated in Ground 2, the appellant is seeking to do no more than disagree with findings which were manifestly available to the judge on the evidence.

Ground 3

10.   Ground 3 is without merit. The judge found that the Secretary of State's delay (1.5 years) in determining the appellant's application was irrelevant because the appellant had not integrated in the United Kingdom during that period. The grounds argue that the appellant had 'become accustomed to daily routines during his life in the United Kingdom that have become more entrenched during the period of delay. Due to his mental condition disruption to these routines (eg. by removal) could have particularly severe consequences for this Appellant.'

11.   I disagree. First, it not clear that, notwithstanding they may have been mentioned in the appellant's witness statement, this submission was made to the First-tier Tribunal. Secondly, there is no suggestion that those routines could not be replicated in India should the appellant return there to live with his , brother and sister in law (see [6] (v) above].

Ground 4

12.   At the initial hearing, Mr Winter said that he did not intend 'to push' this ground and made no submissions in respect of it. the ground is without merit. The ground complains that the appellant's counsel at the First-tier Tribunal hearing had been unable to make full submissions on the question of any international protection claim which the brother and sister in law may or may not have made as the judge had indicated that this was a 'weak point' raised by the respondent. I consider that the issue is wholly irrelevant to the Article 8 ECHR issues before the First-tier Tribunal and, in any event, there is no evidence at all to show that the judge curtailed the submissions of the appellant's counsel unfairly.

13.   In the light of what I say above and in particular the judge's finding which I summarise at [6] (5) above, this appeal fails and I dismiss it accordingly.

Notice of Decision

This appeal is dismissed.

 

C. N. Lane

 

Judge of the Upper Tribunal

Immigration and Asylum Chamber

 

Dated: 2 February 2025