United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

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IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER	Case No: UI- 2024-004684, UI-2024-004687, UI-2024-004689
	FtT No: PA /57364/2023; LP/02766/2024 PA/57368/2023; LP/02768/2024 PA/57371/2023; LP/02769/2024

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24 February 2025

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

 

Between

 

FF , AF, JF

(ANONYMITY ORDERs MADE)

Appellants

and

 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation :

For the Appellant: Mr Islam, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant

For the Respondent: Mr Thompson, Senior Presenting Officer

 

Heard on 6 January 2025

 

Order Regarding Anonymity

 

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

 

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

 

1.       The appellants appeal, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Atkinson) promulgated on 1 August 2024. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed their appeals on all grounds against the Secretary of State's decision dated 22 September 2023 to refuse their protection and human rights claim.

2.       The FtTJ did make anonymity orders, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that their rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know their identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. Two of the appellants are minors. The anonymity order is detailed above.

The background :

3.       The factual background can be summarised as follows. The appellants are nationals of Albania. The first appellant arrived in the United Kingdom with her children ( the 2 ^nd and 3 ^rd appellants) on 1 October 2020 and applied for asylum the following day.

4.       In his decision the FtTJ set out a brief summary of the factual background to the appeal at paragraphs 15 - 21 of his decision. The appellant grew up and lived in X where her family live. She was educated year 8 and left school following an illness. She has not been in paid work. She was married and the 2 children were born of that relationship. She had lived with her husband in the same household with her husband's parents and sisters and she was subjected to domestic abuse from her husband's mother and sisters and then from her husband. This took the form of being forced to do domestic work, limiting the amount of time she had with the baby to the extent that on one occasion she needed to attend hospital. She twice sought police protection, but no action was taken, and her parents did not help her. She had attempted suicide but decided not to because of the children.

5.       On 28 September 2020 one of her son's was admitted to hospital, she asked the taxi driver to take her 2 children out of the country. She arrived in the UK via a lorry on 1 October 2020 and claimed asylum following day. The respondent refused the claim in a decision taken on 22 September 2024 which led to the appeal before the FtT.

6.       In a decision promulgated on 1August 2024, the FtTJ dismissed the appeals.

The decision of the FtTJ:

7.       In his decision the FtTJ set out the evidence relied upon by the appellant between paragraphs 22 - 24. He conducted a review of the background material relevant to Albania between paragraphs 25 - 31, which included reference to the country guidance decision in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) The submissions of the parties were set out between paragraphs 32 and 42 and between paragraphs 43 - 74 he set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence.

8.       The FtTJ took into account the respondent accepted that the appellant was a victim of domestic violence. The FtTJ accepted that she provided a plausible account supported by the background materials and therefore made findings of primary fact based on those issues ( see paragraphs 43 - 46).

9.       As to the issue of risk and return, the FtTJ noted that the schedule of issues appeared to disaggregate the various elements of the definition of a refugee and as such it did not reflect the interaction between the various issues in a way that captured the holistic nature of the test. For example, the interrelationship between risk of harm, persecution and sufficiency protection is not made clear ( see paragraph 47).

10.   The FtTJ therefore made further findings "based on an holistic approach to the factual matrix in the case". The FtTJ found that the appellant had suffered serious harm at the hands of the family while living with them in Albania; that every aspect of her life had been controlled by her husband and his family including being treated as a source of household labour, reduced access to the children and being beaten on occasion. This happened over a period of several years with increasing severity. He therefore found that it could be characterised as amounting to coercive control, economic violence, psychological violence or physical violence and as such met the threshold of harm for the purposes of the Refugee Convention ( see paragraph 49).

11.   Whilst the FtTJ accepted that she had been a victim of domestic violence, he did not find on the evidence considered in its totality that she would not be at risk of harm on return to Albania and that if she were to return the evidence did not demonstrate that she would face a real risk of her whereabouts been discovered by the husband's family. The judge also found that even if that were the case, which he did not accept, the evidence did not show that her husband's family would be motivated to then target the appellant with a view to causing her serious harm, given the nature of the harm previously inflicted and the domestic circumstances that prevailed. Therefore although the FtTJ accepted that the appellant had suffered historic serious harm, he concluded that she would not face a real risk of serious harm at the hands of her husband's family if she returned to Albania ( see paragraphs 49- 54 of his decision).

12.   The FtTJ found that she would be returning to a home area where "the patriarchal cultural conditions were not as strong as other areas such as the North" where the expert report and background materials demonstrated there were entrenched patriarchal norms and social expectations. The FtTJ also referred to the materials indicating that there were instances of local organisations involved in domestic abuse cases who had made arrangements for women to live independently in those areas and the movement of individuals from such rural areas to the appellant's home area to avoid the discrimination that had occurred in rural areas ( see paragraph 57).

13.   The FtTJ assessed the issue of the appellant returning as a lone woman with 2 children, and that she would face a degree of stigma but taking into account the background material showing that there were services working towards assisting victims of domestic violence ( there were 493 social services across the country of which 114 were available in her home area and nearby areas) while there were gaps in the service and more was needed to be done, there were also a number of voluntary organisations provided support and collaborated with the municipal authorities to ensure that survivors of violence receive the assistance they needed to be achieved for reintegration. Reference was made to the shelters and the national reception centre, and also the centres in Albania providing counselling and long-term services alongside the non-governmental organisations providing services and shelters with the capacity to provide support that varied ( see paragraph 58).

14.   On the facts of the present case the appellant had not taken any steps to make enquiries or avail herself of such services and that on return the appellant would be living in an area (the home area) where there was the greatest concentration of resources directed at providing assistance and reintegration ( see paragraph 59). The FtTJ therefore concluded that in those circumstances he found that the appellant had not shown to a reasonable degree of likelihood that she would not be able to avail herself of such services and that availing herself of such services would reasonably be likely to militate against any perceived risk of trafficking.

15.   The FtTJ considered factors personal to the appellant relevant to return. Whilst accepting that she effectively left school at the age of 13 and did not complete her education and had not previously been in paid work, and that such factors would make finding employment more difficult he found that such factors were mitigated to a certain extent by her present attendance at college, her willingness to learn and her study of English. He found they were matters "likely to be positive factors in her favour" in finding employment (see paragraph 60). As to the ability to obtain housing, the FtTJ took into account the expert report which referred to the national support mechanisms which provided 50-100% rent subsidies. The FtTJ set out that there were a number of challenges in accessing such subsidy to a large extent predicated on proof of tenancy and landlords requiring tenants being able to show they can meet the rent. However he found that those challenges in the appellant's case "may be mitigated to a certain extent by her availing herself services" that he had noted in respect of which she had not taken steps in the past access. He further took into account that she would be provided with additional financial support from the UK authorities ( see paragraph 61).

16.   The FtTJ also considered the medical evidence had been provided and that the challenges faced by the appellant were added to, to a limited extent, by her mental health condition. The FtTJ took into account the psychiatric evidence ( see paragraphs 23 and 63-64) but concluded that this evidence concluded that she was able to function relatively well. She was able to establish rapport easily, presented in speech with normal rate tone flow and volume. The appellant described her mood as slightly anxious and stressed but that she was in a happy place and her mood was seen to be reactive to events with no active thoughts to self -harm. He referred to the main stressor in the appellant's case to be the refusal of asylum claim and that the medical evidence referred to the appellant's history in Albania. The doctor described the appellant as in a relatively good state with regards to depressive symptoms and that she should access psychological therapy to manage trauma. The FtT concluded on that evidence that when placed alongside and in the context of the evidence of the whole showed that the appellant was a young woman in her late 20s with no physical disability and that she had a degree of resilience and being able to look after and care for her children, she was able to make arrangements to leave Albania and to relocate within the United Kingdom to the extent that she considered herself to be a happy place. Found this supported the view that she was not depressed and had the capacity to meet the challenges she would face on return despite the diagnosis and lack of family support network ( see paragraph 65).

17.   The FtTJ considered that the welfare of her children was her primary consideration and that the relationship between the appellant and the children was close and loving. They had settled into life in the UK but did not show they had any medical conditions or any particular special needs outside the range of needs of children without a medical condition. The FtTJ accepted that the removal of the family was likely to be an adverse childhood experience for the children but that it would only be undertaken with and at the same time as that of the appellant and that the impact of such events would likely to be ameliorated by the strength of their relationship with their mother and their mother's resilience ( see paragraph 67).

18.   The FtTJ therefore concluded that the appellant would not face a real risk of serious harm on return and therefore had not discharged the burden of proof to demonstrate that she had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason ( see paragraph 75 - 77).

19.   He further concluded that she had claimed to be at a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned ( relying on humanitarian protection) but in light of his factual findings an assessment in the previous paragraphs, that had not been made out and he dismissed the appeal on the grounds of humanitarian protection ( see paragraph 78 alongside paragraph 56 and the factual findings set out in his decision between paragraphs 55 - 69).

20.   By reference to the schedule of issues agreed by the parties, the FtTJ did not establish that there were any obstacles insurmountable or otherwise on return to Albania based on the various factors including her social status, education and well-being having found that they were such in the context of the social economic and financial circumstances she would find on return, and that she would be able to take steps to access advice and assistance from various sources and therefore would be able to reintegrate into society. The FtTJ found that the appellant could not meet Article 8 and there were no "exceptional circumstances" which would amount to a unjustifiably harsh consequences rendering refusal of leave leading to a breach of Article 8 rights ( see paragraph 69-70 and paragraph 81 - 82).

21.   The FtTJ assessed the appellant's Article 3 claim based on her medical condition ( both relating to her medical condition and risk of suicide) between paragraphs 71-74 and concluded that there was no breach of Article 3 for the reasons he gave by reference to the medical evidence.

22.   The FtTJ therefore dismissed the appeal on all grounds.

The appeal before the Upper Tribunal:

23.   The appellant applied for permission to appeal on 5 grounds. Permission was refused by a FtTJ but on renewal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman on 25 October 2024 who stated that:

"The appellants argue at Ground 2 that the judge failed to give adequate reasons at [53] for finding that the first appellant's husband and his family would not be motivated to target the first appellant were they to learn about her whereabouts. As a result of that finding, the judge finds it unnecessary at [55] to make findings on sufficiency of protection, internal relocation and whether the appellants falls within a particular social group. I am satisfied that this ground raises an arguable material error of law. "

24.    The hearing took place on 22 January 2025 by way of a remote hearing. The appellant was represented by Mr Islam, of Counsel and the respondent by Mr Thompson, Senior Presenting Officer. There were no difficulties encountered in hearing of the submissions made by each of the advocates or for the advocates to hear each other's respective submissions. Whilst the grant of permission related to ground 2 of the grounds, the FtTJ did not restrict the grounds of challenge, and all grounds are therefore to be argued.

25.   I set out below a summary of those submissions and address them when setting out an analysis and conclusions on the grounds of challenge.

26.   Mr Islam relied upon the grounds of challenge and supplemented them with his oral submissions.

Ground 1:

27.   In respect of ground 1 which is headed " Failure to consider material facts with anxious scrutiny", the written grounds referred to the factual findings of the FtTJ between paragraphs 51 to 53 where he found the appellant would not be at risk on return as the appellant's whereabouts would not be known to a husband. The ground submits that the FtTJ failed to consider background material facts with anxious scrutiny and refers to paragraph 50 where the judge was directed to background evidence but failed to consider relevant sections of the CPIN (Albania; Human Trafficking version 6 July 2024) which related to anonymity in Albania ( paragraphs 13.3.3 and 13.3.6).

28.   At the hearing Mr Islam did not seek to rely upon ground 1. He referred to the hearing taking place on 1 August 2024 but that the report detailed in the grounds was not put before the FtTJ. He confirmed that no particular CPIN was referred to by counsel at the hearing that dealt with trafficking. In the circumstances, Mr Islam submitted that there was difficulty in pursuing that ground in the circumstances.

29.   Mr Thompson on behalf of the respondent submitted that the FtTJ did have regard to the country guidance decision of TD and AD ( see paragraph 10 of his decision where that decision is referenced) and at paragraph 13 also indicated that the FtTJ was aware of the manner in which trafficking was relevant, and that the appellant's case is framed in part on the basis not that she is a victim of trafficking but there is a potential risk of re-trafficking. The FtTJ therefore did have an awareness of the risk of trafficking being put forward but that the CPIN that was the subject of ground 1 was not before the FtTJ and was not put on notice of this and there is no mention of that source. He agreed with Mr Islam that the document that referred to in ground 1 was not before the FtTJ.

Ground 2: Failure to give adequate reasoning

30.   The written grounds submit that The FtTJ at [53] found "...even if it were the case, which I do not accept, that her whereabouts subsequently came to light, that the evidence does not show that her husband's family would be motivated to then target the appellant with a view to causing serious harm, given the nature of the harm previously inflicted and the domestic circumstances that prevailed" . At [54] the FtTJ found "she would not face a real risk of serious harm at the hands of her husband's family, if she were to return to Albania".

31.    The grounds submit that the FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons when reaching the conclusion taking into consideration the following accepted facts: i) The A run away from her husband's family to save herself and the children; ii) The A previously attempted to commit suicide; iii) The R accepted that A was victim of domestic violence; iv) The A was unable to get protection from the authorities; v) The FtTJ found A's entire account to be consistent, plausible and credible; vi) It is a well-established principle in protection claims that past persecution is an indication of future risk. Therefore the FtTJ's findings at [53-54] is a material error due to inadequate reasoning in relation to A's risk on return.

32.   In his oral submissions Mr Islam submitted that this ground set out the " key issue" and that he relied upon the acceptance of the core facts are set out above but that the FtTJ failed to consider the totality of the evidence and give adequate reasons why the appellant's family would not look for her if she were to return.

33.   He submitted that this is linked with the decision in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) and headnote (b). This reads: Much of Albanian society is governed by a strict code of honour which not only means that trafficked women would have very considerable difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas on return but also will affect their ability to relocate internally. Those who have children outside marriage are particularly vulnerable. In extreme cases the close relatives of the trafficked woman may refuse to have the trafficked woman's child return with her and could force her to abandon the child.

34.   In this context is submitted that she had escaped from the family home with the children and the FtTJ failed to take account of the evidence relevant to risk on return from the husband's family.

35.   He submitted that following on from this ground, grounds 3 and 5 were relevant.

Ground 3: Failure to consider a material matter

36.   The written grounds set out that the FtTJ at [55] found "...I do not consider it necessary to make specific further findings on the issues of sufficiency of protection, internal relocation and membership of a particular social group. Those specific issues within the context of the refugee convention fall away, given my findings on risk on return."

37.   Mr Islam submitted that the FtTJ failed to consider the case law of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) and risk factors set out within the country guidance case, and this was a material misdirection.

38.   The written grounds refers to the headnote of TD and AD that states that in general there is sufficiency of protection, but it will not be effective in every case. The FtTJ has not looked whether the protection in A's case would be sufficient to protect her. The TD and AD did not state that in every case the A would be safe.

39.   Mr Islam submitted that it was accepted that the appellant was not a victim of trafficking, but the FtTJ should have considered the country guidance decision because she would be returning as a single woman with 2 children and the risk she would face would be the risk of re-trafficking. The FtTJ failed to consider the country guidance caselaw.

Ground 4: Material misdirection in law:

40.   The written grounds set out that the FtTJ at [56] found "...issues of humanitarian protection based on consideration of whether or not the appellant would face inhuman or degrading treatment as a single mother who would be destitute. I note here that such matters are linked to article 8 issues concerning insurmountable obstacles to return and whether refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences."

41.   The grounds submit that his appears to be a fundamental error as the issue of humanitarian protection is completely separate than Article 8 issue of reintegration/ proportionality assessment of removal.

42.   In his oral submissions Mr Islam submitted that humanitarian protection and Article 8 were 2 separate issues; and that humanitarian protection would be relevant if the claim failed under the Refugee Convention and that article 8 related to very significant obstacles to integration. The FtTJ therefore made an error of law by putting those 2 matters together.

Ground 5: Failure to make a material finding

43.   The written grounds set out that the FtTJ at [57] found "...I find that on return to Albania she would be returning to a home area where the patriarchal cultural traditions are not as strong as in other areas such as the North."

44.   In light of ground 2 above and FtTJ's positive credibility findings, it is arguable that the A will not be returning to home area due to future risk. The findings at [57] therefore inaccurate or as argued above at ground [2] without inadequate reasoning.

45.   The FtTJ failed to make material findings under A's protection claim (Refugee Convention or HP) whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh on the basis of country guidance case law and background information.

46.   The FtTJ failed to consider, paragraph (b) of headnote and TD and AD which states: "Much of Albanian society is governed by a strict code of honour which not only means that trafficked women would have very considerable difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas on return but also will affect their ability to relocate internally."

47.   It is submitted that this is crucial when the FtTJ failed to consider whether A could relocate to a different area in particular whether the quality and safety of shelter are adequate (paragraph 39 of TD and AD) and lack of fundings and precarious nature of funding regarding shelters (paragraph 82).

48.   It is submitted that the FtTJ failed to consider further risk factors highlighted in the case of TD and AD.

"f) Once asked to leave the shelter a victim of trafficking can live on her own. In doing so she will face significant challenges including, but not limited to, stigma, isolation, financial hardship and uncertainty, a sense of physical insecurity and the subjective fear of being found either by their families or former traffickers. Some women will have the capacity to negotiate these challenges without undue hardship. There will however be victims of trafficking with characteristics, such as mental illness or psychological scarring, for whom living alone in these circumstances would not be reasonable. Whether a particular appellant falls into that category will call for a careful assessment of all the circumstances.

g) Re-trafficking is a reality. Whether that risk exists for an individual claimant will turn in part on the factors that led to the initial trafficking, and on her personal circumstances, including her background, age, and her willingness and ability to seek help from the authorities. For a proportion of victims of trafficking, their situations may mean that they are especially vulnerable to re-trafficking or being forced into other exploitative situations."

49.   The grounds acknowledge that the appellant was not a victim of trafficking. However, in her particular circumstances whether A would be a potential victim of trafficking on return to Albania following FtTJ's findings at [56] "...whether or not the appellant would face inhuman or degrading treatment as a single mother who would be destitute".

50.   Mr Islam submitted that the key fact was that the appellant cannot return because she ran away from the home where she had previously lived and could not return to the home area. The issue of shelters and protection is set out in the written grounds.

51.   Mr Islam further submitted that the grounds are paragraph 5.5 dealt with the 2 specific headnotes of TD and AD ( set out above) as to the inadequacy of the shelters ( f) and whilst he acknowledged that the appellant was not a victim of trafficking, when looking at the future trafficking risk as a single woman it was of relevance.

52.   He submitted that the FtTJ erred in law by not considering internal relocation. He further acknowledged that the CPIN 2024 was not before the FtTJ but that the judge did take judicial notice of the fact that Albania has a relatively small population of just under 3 million people ( see paragraph 52).

53.   The respondent had not filed a reply to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 . Mr Thompson made oral submissions in reply to the grounds.

54.   Mr Thompson made the following submissions. In relation to ground 1, his response is set out earlier. As that ground is no longer relied upon, it is not necessary to set out any further submissions made on this by Mr Thompson.

55.   In his submissions, Mr Thompson submitted that in relation to ground 2, the respondent did not accept that the FtTJ gave inadequate reasons for the conclusion reached that if the appellant returned to Albania she would face a real risk of a whereabouts been discovered by her husband's family. Furthermore that even if it were the case, which he did not accept, that her whereabouts did come to light that the evidence showed that a husband's family would not be motivated to then target the appellant with a view to causing serious harm given the nature of the harm previously inflicted and the domestic circumstances that prevailed ( see finding at paragraph 53). He submitted that the respondent acknowledged that the core of account was accepted but that did not in itself equate to an acceptance that she would be at risk in her home area on return.

56.   At paragraphs 53 to 54 the FtTJ made a number of clear findings that the evidence did not show that if she returned she would be at real risk of harm even if her whereabouts were discovered by her family. He found that the evidence did not demonstrate that the family would be motivated to target her. He submitted that paragraphs 53 and 54 should not be read in isolation and on the basis there was an inadequacy of reasons as the decision should be read as a whole including those findings made at paragraphs 60 - 61, where the FtTJ considered factors personal to the appellant (see paragraph 60) and being able to obtain housing / support on return (see paragraph 61).

57.   He submitted that it was clear that the FtTJ had regard to all potential assistance to the appellant upon return in the circumstances of a lone female with children therefore it could not properly be said there was inadequate or insufficient reasoning as throughout the decision the judge made clear and cogent conclusions that the appellant would not be at risk of adverse harm.

58.   As to any criticism that the FtTJ failed to have regard to the country guidance decision of TD and AD, expressly referenced that at paragraph 10 of the decision and when reading paragraphs 53 and 54 and 60-61 it is clear that the FtTJ did have regard to the key considerations of the social status of the appellant, level of education and her support network and they were key considerations as set out in the headnote of that decision. It was not asserted that she had been a victim of trafficking or that she had previously been trafficked. However the FtTJ looked at matters relevant to trafficking but still looked at the factual circumstances which were advanced by the appellant must risk on return, but he gave reasons for rejecting that risk.

59.   In respect of grounds 3 to 5 which Mr Islam had said was linked to ground 2, it was submitted that in respect of ground 3 the FtTJ was not required to consider sufficiency protection and internal relocation having concluded that the appellant was not at risk on return to her home area.

60.   As to ground 4, Mr Thompson submitted that the wording of paragraph 56 should be looked at carefully and that it cannot be said that the FtTJ made a misdirection in law. The FtTJ was not wrong to say that the issues were linked to the Article 8 issues. But in any event paragraph 56 should not be read in isolation as the FtTJ considered the issues relevant to humanitarian protection as he had already concluded from the Refugee Convention part of the protection appeal, that she would be at risk of harm on return to her home area therefore it was open to the FtTJ to consider the facts made under that section as to why she could not qualify for humanitarian protection ( see paragraphs 54 and 55). The FtTJ was not satisfied that there was a real risk of serious harm, and that was the wording for humanitarian protection case law. Therefore when the findings were read together the judge did not misdirect himself in law.

61.   Dealing with ground 5, Mr Thompson invited the tribunal to look at paragraph 57. He submitted that the FtTJ made findings open to him on the basis of the evidence and that notwithstanding the acceptance of the appellant's account of domestic violence the FtTJ did not find that she would be at risk of harm on return to her home area and that if her relations came to know of her he was not satisfied that there would be any motivation for them to cause her harm. He submitted that paragraph 52 referred to the populations of her home area and Durres and that both had large population's, and he was entitled to find that the appellant would be one person in nearly half a million people. He submitted that whilst this was a succinct reference at paragraph 52 it was a clear recognition that there were no factors relevant which would place her at an elevated risk. He submitted that the judge also considered living in Durres. The objective evidence relating to her home area demonstrated that there was a prevalence of women living there independently and the judge did make such a distinction of the differences from the other areas in Albania. He submitted that at paragraph 57, the FtTJ referred to the home area "where the patriarchal culture conditions were not as strong as other areas such as the North and therefore made it clear that there was a distinction in different parts of Albania. If the appellant choose to go to another area that was open to her, but the judge not find that was a necessity.

62.   Mr Thompson submitted that the FtTJ did not accept that there is a risk in her home area and therefore do not need to consider internal relocation.

63.   Mr Islam by way of response submitted that once it was accepted that the core of the claim was credible the country guidance caselaw was relevant showing that this is an honour-based society and there was a risk on return that the husband's family would look for her even if she were to relocate.

64.   He submitted that the future risk of re-trafficking was a risk factor along with being a single woman. The FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons as to why the family would not look for her and take action.

65.   He submitted that at paragraphs 53 to 55 the FtTJ did not consider internal relocation but at paragraph 56 he considered reintegration into Albania. The FtTJ needed to consider whether there was a risk on return and relocation and therefore needed to consider the country information and case law which was not considered in relation to internal relocation.

66.   He further submitted that paragraph 57 was problematic when considering the evidence in the round and returning to the home area. There was no reference to their being any undue harshness or unreasonableness relevant to relocation.

67.   He submitted the ground to was made out as the FtTJ erred in law as a decision fell short of considering matters appropriate to the case and should have considered internal relocation.

68.   At the conclusion of the hearing I reserved my decision.

Analysis and conclusions:

69.   I am grateful for the assistance given by both advocates when providing their respective submissions to the Tribunal. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, I take into account the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.

70.   When considering the adequacy of reasoning as an error of law, it remains as set out in R (Iran) and others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982. At paragraphs 13 - 14 of the judgement of Brook LJ, it was emphasised that reasons must be sufficiently detailed to show the principles on which a decision was made and why the ultimate decision was reached. Reasons need not be elaborate nor is it necessary to address each and every matter which might have had a bearing on the overall decision if those which are material to the reasoning of been articulated. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, albeit in the context of employment procedures, considered adequacy of reasons as an error of law. At paragraph 57 Popplewell LJ emphasised the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as a whole without being hypercritical. Restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. "Simple, clear and concise" reasoning was to be encouraged to enable the parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was thereby left out of account. While they are made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance to proceedings brought in the immigration and asylum context as they both are jurisdictions in which decisions are made by expert tribunals and the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny.

71.   Dealing with Ground 1, at the hearing Mr Islam did not seek to rely upon ground 1. He referred to the hearing taking place on 1 August 2024 but that the report detailed in the grounds was not put before the FtTJ. He confirmed that no particular CPIN was referred to by counsel at the hearing that dealt with trafficking. In the circumstances, Mr Islam submitted that there was difficulty in pursuing that ground in the circumstances.

72.   Having heard from the advocates, it is common ground that the document referred to in ground 1 was not made available to the FtTJ. Whilst the CPIN version 16 is dated 12 July 2024 and was therefore available at the time of the hearing on 1 August 2024, the position appears to be that neither party placed that report before the FtTJ nor had either party directed the FtTJ's attention to any part of that CPIN during the evidence or their submissions. As properly recognised by both advocates, the FtTJ could not be criticised for not taking into account a document neither party had sought to put before him or made submissions upon. There is no material error of law based on that ground.

73.   Dealing with ground 2, the grounds are premised upon the FtTJ failing to give adequate reasons when reaching his conclusion in the context of what the grounds referred to as the "accepted facts" which are then listed. However the listed factors set out in the grounds were not all accepted. The FtTJ accepted the circumstances relating to her leaving Albania and that the respondent accepted she was a victim of domestic violence were accepted as the FtTJ made clear in his decision. However the other factors that were not accepted were also made clear by the FtTJ which resulted in him addressing those issues. Insofar as it was argued that the FtTJ found the appellant's account to be consistent, plausible and credible, the FtTJ set out in his decision that he accepted that the appellant had suffered domestic violence, and that her account as it related to this had been consistent ( see paragraphs 42 - 45) and that she had suffered serious harm when in Albania which was sufficient to meet the threshold of harm for the purposes of the Refugee Convention ( see paragraph 49 of his decision). However the FtTJ did not accept, nor did he find from the evidence before him that she would be at risk of serious harm on return to Albania(see paragraph 47 when read with the findings made from paragraph 50 onwards. The FtTJ set out without any ambiguity the findings he made on the evidence and the evidence he plainly accepted and the issues that he did not.

74.   Whilst Mr Islam relied on the written grounds where it is argued that it is a well-established principle in protection claims that past persecution is an indicator of future risk, paragraph 339K also sets out that, "The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person's well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated." On the factual assessment made by the FtTJ, he plainly applied Paragraph 339K and whilst he accepted that she had been subject to serious harm in Albania he found that she would not be at risk on return therefore applied in his consideration that there were not good reasons to consider that the serious harm would be repeated as can be seen from his findings of fact made between paragraphs 50 - 70 of his decision.

75.   The grounds challenge the conclusion reached at paragraph 54 in this context. However as with any decision of a FtTJ it is necessary to read all the paragraphs in the decision in their totality. Mr Islam made 2 submissions. First, that the FtTJ did not give adequate reasons for saying that the family would not look for her on return and secondly, that the FtTJ had failed to take into account the headnote (b) of the CG decision in TD and AD (as cited).

76.   Dealing with the first point raised, the FtTJ addressed the issue of risk on return in the light of the submission advanced that if she were to return her whereabouts would become known to her husband and family due to lack of data protection and the extent of corruption on the part of the officials (see submissions set out at paragraph 50 of the decision). The FtTJ set out his reasoning on this issue between paragraphs 51-54. The FtTJ set out that he rejected that submission made and referred to the evidence which he accepted from the report of Mr Fezjulla ( also see paragraph 22) that there was a lack of data protection in Albania and also that corruption existed. However he found that, "these matters in themselves are not probative, to the relevant standard, or showing a causal link between the appellant's arrival in Albania and information of her arrival or whereabouts, being transmitted to her husband and family". The FtTJ concluded that on the evidence, the appellant's husband and family had no particular influence or profile in Albania. Nor that they would be in a position to make arrangements with officials, or nonstate actors, to be notified, in the event that the appellant were to return to Albania. That was in accordance with the appellant's evidence ( see question 88) when asked if her husband or his family had any profile or influence she said that she did not know and had no idea. Her evidence in a witness statement was that as soon as she arrived at the airport the information will be released and that they would call the husband's family. The FtTJ found that the family had no particular influence or profile and that they would not be in a position to make arrangements with any officials or nonstate actors, to be notified, in the event that the appellant returned to Albania. In addition at paragraph 52, the FtTJ consider the issue of the size of population in Albania. Whilst the FtTJ accepted that Albania had a relatively small population of just under 3 million people, he found that, "if the appellant were to return to her home region of X, she would be but one person in a city of nearly half a million people, and within a larger metropolitan region together with Durres, of 1 million". He therefore concluded at paragraph 53 that, "the evidence does not show to the requisite standard that, if the appellant were to return to Albania, she would face a real risk of her whereabouts being discovered by her husband's family." In addition, at paragraph 53 the FtTJ did consider that even if her whereabouts subsequently came to light, that the evidence did not show that her husband's family would be motivated to then target the appellant with a view to causing her serious harm, given the nature of the harm previously inflicted and the domestic circumstances that prevailed. " As Mr Thompson submitted the FtTJ addressed the submissions made and he gave reasons for his findings of fact. The FtTJ had accepted that she had been subjected to domestic violence, but that the FtTJ did not consider that on the evidence that the family would be motivated to find her or target her. The FtTJ was entitled to consider this in the context of the harm previously which was in the domestic setting of the appellant living with her husband's family. Her account (in interview) had been that the treatment that happened in the home she shared with the family and that family members have treated her like a servant (Q74) that all the problems being caused because of the family, especially the mother and sisters, who would make her work all day, do the cooking and work in the house (Q 77-78). The appellant had told the psychiatrist that her in-laws had placed a lot of demands on her forcing her to cook and clean and that her husband was out of the house working long hours. The finding made by the FtTJ at paragraph 53 has not been shown to be inconsistent with the evidence and it was open to the FtTJ to consider the previous circumstances in light of the factual findings made in relation to return.

77.   The submission made in the grounds and relied upon by Mr Islam is that ground too was linked to headnote (b) of TD and AD. This reads as follows: : Much of Albanian society is governed by a strict code of honour which not only means that trafficked women would have very considerable difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas on return but also will affect their ability to relocate internally. Those who have children outside marriage are particularly vulnerable. In extreme cases the close relatives of the trafficked woman may refuse to have the trafficked woman's child return with her and could force her to abandon the child.

78.   It was not advanced on behalf of the appellant that she had been trafficked in Albania or that she had been trafficked out of Albania. The FtTJ set out at paragraph 13 "that the appellant's case is framed in part on the basis not that she is a victim of trafficking but that there is a potential risk of trafficking". Contrary to the grounds (both ground 3 and ground 5) the FtTJ was clearly aware of the decision of TD and AD and expressly referred to it at paragraph 10 of his decision which he went on to apply but in the specific context of the appellant.

79.   The FtTJ considered the issue of return to Albania in the context of her circumstances as a lone woman with 2 children and at paragraph 57 considered her return to the home area which he found to be an area where the patriarchal cultural traditions( that is the social expectations and norms) were not as strong as other areas in Albania and took into account the country expert's evidence that there was a significant distinction between the appellant's home area and other places in Albania. The FtTJ referred to the country background material which referred to local organisations involved in domestic abuse cases making arrangements for women to live independently in the appellant's home area and that movement of individuals from rural areas to her home area had occurred to avoid "the greater discrimination that occurred in rural areas"(see paragraph 57). The FtTJ considered the issue of stigma as to her status and in this context considered the country material set out at paragraph 58. This took into account the background material in respect of the local services working towards assisting victims of domestic violence (and as set out in the CPIN ). The FtTJ recognised that there were gaps in the services but also took into account that there were a number of voluntary organisations available to provide support for women subjected to domestic violence and to provide those with assistance and integration. He referred to the background material relevant to shelters (paragraph 58) and long term services available. The grounds are therefore not made out that the FtTJ failed to consider relevant issues, and he took into account the issues of reintegration to the appellant's home area and was entitled to take into account at paragraph 59 that the appellant had not taken steps to make enquiries or avail herself of such services and that by returning to her home area she would be in an area "where there is the greatest concentration of resource directed at providing assistance and reintegration. In the circumstances, I find that the appellant has not shown to a reasonable degree of likelihood that she would not be able to avail herself of such services. I further find that availing herself of such services is really likely to militate against any perceived risk of trafficking". Therefore the FtTJ took into account issue of risk based on her individual circumstances.

80.   The FtTJ also made further factual findings in accordance with TD and AD where he considered factors personal to the applicant. At paragraph 60 the FtTJ took into account the level of education and prospects of employment but was entitled to consider that on the basis of also having attended college in the UK, and what he found to be her willingness to learn and her study of English. He found them to be "positive factors in her favour in finding employment" ( see paragraph 60). At paragraph 61 he addressed the issues of housing and additional support she would receive, and between paragraphs 63 - 64 the FtTJ took into account the medical evidence relating to her mental health. The grounds do not challenge the FtTJ 's assessment of that medical evidence. The FtTJ therefore concluded at paragraph 65, that he found that the evidence in place and in the context of the evidence as a whole shows that the appellant, "as a young woman in her late 20s with no physical disability, has a degree of resilience being able to look after and care for her children, to make arrangements leave Albania, and to relocate within the United Kingdom to the extent that she considers herself to be a happy place." The FtTJ went on to find that the appellant had the capacity to meet the challenges she would face a return despite her diagnosis and lack of family support network. He considered at paragraph 66 that the welfare of her children was a primary consideration and that she and the children had a close and loving relationship. The FtTJ took into account that the children had settled into life in the UK but found that it did not show that they had any medical conditions or particular special needs outside the range of needs of children without any medical conditions. He accepted that the removal of the family would be likely to be an adverse childhood experience but that it would only be undertaken with that of the appellant and that the impact of such events "is likely to be ameliorated by the strength of their relationship with their mother and their mother's resilience"( see paragraph 67). The summary at paragraph 69 of his decision was that there were no insurmountable obstacles to her return to Albania because the various factors that he took into account, which related to "her social status, education and mental well-being are such that in the context of the social economic and financial circumstances she would find on return, that she will be able to take steps to access advice and assistance from various sources that would enable her to reintegrate into society". Thus it is not established that the FtTJ failed to consider matters relevant to risk of trafficking but that the FtTJ considered the appellant's personal circumstances.

81.   It is also of note that whilst the written grounds ( see ground 3 and ground 5) refer to the FtTJ failing to make findings on sufficiency protection and internal relocation, it was not necessary to make any findings on those issues in light of his primary finding that the appellant had not demonstrated that there was a real risk of serious harm on return to Albania. At paragraph 53 the FtTJ stated that he did not consider it necessary to make "specific further findings on the issues of sufficiency protection, internal relocation and membership of a particular social group. Those specific issues within the context of the Refugee Convention fall away, given my findings on risk on return. " In any event, the subsequent findings he made related to her reintegration to Albania dealing with issues of support available as a victim of domestic violence in the context of return.

82.   Dealing with ground 4, there is no material error of law disclosed on the grounds advanced. Paragraph 56 has to be read in the context of the decision made as a whole. For the reasons he gave, the FtTJ did not find that the appellant would be at risk of harm in her home area. He also made findings of fact based on her personal circumstances and as a lone woman returning with 2 children following paragraph 56. The basis upon which the issue of humanitarian protection was advanced is the issue identified as set out at paragraph 12 (v) taken from the skeleton argument, " does the appellant qualify for humanitarian protection on the basis that she would face inhuman or degrading treatment as a single mother who would be destitute?" That was the assessment undertaken by the FtTJ.

83.   Further, there is no error of law material to the outcome where the FtTJ stated that such matters were linked to Article 8 issues concerning insurmountable obstacles to return and whether the return would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences. The consideration of return as a single woman was factually relevant to the issue of humanitarian protection ( see above and the issue identified at paragraph 12 (v)) but is also relevant to Article 8. There was no error of law in the FtTJ setting out findings of fact which he then applied to the relevant issues as set out at paragraph 68 onwards.

84.   As to ground 5, this is addressed above in relation to the other grounds. Insofar as there was a challenge to paragraph 57, where reference is made to returning to the home area where the "patriarchal cultural conditions were not as strong as other areas such as the North", that was a finding open to the FtTJ on the evidence. It was also a finding that should be read with the factual findings made as a whole where the FtTJ set out his reasoning as to return to Albania based on the specific circumstances of the appellant and his assessment that she would not be at real risk of harm on return.

85.   The FtTJ also addressed return based on Article 3 ( risk of suicide) between paragraphs 71 - 74 and that assessment is not challenged in the grounds. Nor is the assessment made on article 8 challenged. In conclusion, when analysed, the grounds of challenge are not made out and amount to no more than a disagreement with the decision. When addressing the grounds advanced as to adequacy of reasons, adequacy means no more nor less than that. It is not a counsel of perfection, and it is not necessary to provide "reasons for reasons ". Still less should it provide an opportunity to undertake a qualitative assessment of the reasons to see if they are wanting, perhaps even surprising, on their merits.   I remind myself of  Sicwebu v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 550 at [49]: "Appeals to this court from the Upper Tribunal are limited to appeals on a point of law: see section 14(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Absent an error of law, the appeal must be dismissed. Furthermore, as a specialist fact-finding tribunal, this court should not rush to find an error of law in the decision of the tribunal simply where it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts: see  AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2007] UKHL 49 ,  [2008] 1 AC 678  at paragraph 30. Appellate restraint should be exercised when the reasons a FtTJ gives for its decision are being examined; it should not be assumed too readily that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out in it. The purpose of the duty to give reasons, is in part, to enable the losing party to know why he or she has lost, and that has been done by the FtTJ in his decision. Having considered the decision reached, and on the basis of the general considerations relevant to assessing the decision of the FtTJ and errors of law, it has not been established that t he FtTJ gave inadequate reasons for his decision or that he misdirected himself in law.

86.   Consequently for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ's decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision:

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law; the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

 

 

17 February 2025

 

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

 

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds