Appeal No. EAT/430/91

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 3 November 1993

	Before

	THE HONOURABLE LORD COULSFIELD

	MR K HACK

	MRS T MARSLAND

MR A RICHARDSON	APPELLANT

DRAWFERN LTD	RESPONDENTS

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MISS H L PARKINSON
Solicitor
Messrs Whittles
Pearl Assurance House
23 Princess Street
Manchester
M2 4ER

For the Respondents	NO APPEARANCE BY OR
REPRESENTATION ON 
BEHALF OF THE
RESPONDENTS

	LORD COULSFIELD:  This is an appeal against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal dated 16 July 1991 under the Chairmanship of Mr J H Bellis at Manchester.  The Applicant had applied for a redundancy payment and the circumstances narrated in his application were that he had worked for the Respondents at Wigan but, when the Respondents moved their business to Kendal, Cumbria, he had worked for them there, for a period.  After some time, however he found that the arrangements for working in Kendal were not satisfactory and he ceased to work for the Respondents.

	When the matter came before the Industrial Tribunal the Tribunal took the view that there was no case of constructive dismissal made in the Applicant's IT1 and that, in order to found a case on the basis of constructive dismissal, it would be necessary to amend the application; and when an application to amend was made, the Industrial Tribunal decided to refuse it.  They then dismissed the application, purporting to proceed upon the basis that the Applicant had lost his right to a redundancy payment because he had not complied with the conditions of section 84(4) and (5) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.  

	Before us it was submitted that the Industrial Tribunal had reached a wrong conclusion because, for the purposes of an application for a redundancy payment, the Applicant can found either upon an actual dismissal or upon a constructive dismissal, as appears from the provisions of section 83(1) of the 1978 Act.  That is clearly a correct submission.   Further, in our view, the circumstances narrated in the application were clearly circumstances on the basis of which an argument could be advanced that the Applicant had been constructively dismissed.  It is not, in our view, necessary that an application should use the words "constructive dismissal" or otherwise make express reference to that concept to entitle the Applicant to argue that he has been so dismissed.  In the present case the narrative in the application clearly sets out facts upon which a submission could properly be made that the Applicant had been constructively dismissed.
   
	In these circumstances it seems to us that the appropriate course is to allow the appeal, without entering into any other questions which might arise in relation to the application.  We shall therefore allow the appeal and remit the case to be considered by a different Industrial Tribunal.