 |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | |
United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
||
|
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Lloyd v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [1993] UKEAT 456_90_2904 (29 April 1993) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1993/456_90_2904.html Cite as: [1993] UKEAT 456_90_2904 |
||
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
MRS M L BOYLE
MR R H PHIPPS
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant NO APPEARANCE BY
OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): This a preliminary hearing of an appeal by Mrs Lloyd from a decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at Reading on the 18th June 1990 which dismissed her applications.
At a preliminary hearing we look to see whether there is a valid point of law which merits argument inter partes, that is with both the parties present, whereas on this hearing it is only the Appellant who would appear. Mrs Lloyd has been given notice of today's hearing but has written to us indicating that she does not wish to appear.
Her applications were the subject of two hearings before the Industrial Tribunal. The first was on the 3rd April 1990, and the second was on the 18th June 1990, as we have already said. It is necessary to understand the history by looking shortly at the first decision. In that first decision the Tribunal reached the conclusion, first that her application based on grounds of sexual discrimination and on the Equal Pay Act, could not proceed because in fact under the guidance of the Advisory Conciliation Arbitration Service (ACAS), and on advice, Mrs Lloyd had reached an agreement whereby all those issues were settled.
The agreement was thought by the Tribunal to have been somewhat loosely drafted as a result of which they took the view that certain claims, which they held to be under the Wages Act 1986 were not covered by that agreement and could therefore proceed to the second hearing. Those matters were set out in paragraph 8 of the first decision, which read, and it is convenient to read them at this stage of our judgment:
"`(i)They (the respondents) now will not pay me certain moneys due in respect of suspension until 13.9.89.
(ii)Overtime hours in excess of normal working hours.
(iii)Sick pay record adjustment for period up to 11.9.89.
(iv)They also promised to reconsider payment to me of amounts outstanding for sick pay on maternity leave (£2000 part-payment received) and this has not been paid.
(v)Nor has removal expenses which were also to be considered as part of the voluntary severance package . . . . all these items are payable under various regional trade union consultation agreements.'"
Her employers were Thames Water Utilities Limited who, therefore, had to face those claims at the second hearing. At the second hearing, with the same Chairman but different lay members, each of those matters were considered. There is a long and carefully reasoned decision, over some six pages, which clearly sets out all the issues that were to be decided. There were some further matters which Mrs Lloyd thought to introduce, namely, action short of dismissal; unfair selection for redundancy; victimisation and harassment arising out of trade union activities and other matters. They were all ruled out as not having been included in the Originating Application and we see absolutely no basis for criticising the Tribunal. It was clearly right in the view it took.
The Tribunal, therefore, then turned to look at those five matters which we have already recited and which were contained in paragraph 8 of the first decision. Each of them is carefully examined. The first head was dismissed. The second head the succeeding heads were considered in various ways, one of them was out of time, another was held to have been without jurisdiction, as being out of time, the other carefully considered items were all dealt with. They were not satisfied that there was a deduction under the Wages Act, and indeed the removal expenses were dealt with also. These were all questions of fact as to whether anything was due and owing under the Wages Act. There is no misdirection of law, there is only an appeal to this Employment Appeal Tribunal on a point of law, Mrs Lloyd has now had all her complaints and all her claims examined in the greatest detail, with great care, and seemingly with patience too, by the Industrial Tribunal.
There is no point of law here. This appeal must be dismissed at this juncture, which it is.