Appeal No. EAT/102/94

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 24 March 1994

	Before

	THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)

	MRS P TURNER OBE

	MISS D WHITTINGHAM

MRS S TURNER	APPELLANT

WHITEHOUSE GROUP LTD	RESPONDENTS

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

	PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR I K R WILSON
(SOLICITOR)
Messrs Dean-Wilson
96 Church Street
Brighton
East Sussex BN1 1UJ

	

		MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT):   This is the preliminary hearing of an appeal from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal held at Ashford on the 20th December 1993.  For reasons notified to the parties on the 29th December the Tribunal unanimously decided that the Applicant, Mrs Suzanne Turner, was not entitled, having regard to the time limit contained in Section 76(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, to rely, as substantive incidents of sex discrimination, on matters that had occurred before 13th April 1993.

	That decision was made in the context of a complaint of sex discrimination and victimisation presented to the Tribunal on the 12th July 1993.  

	The Tribunal went on to state that, in the exercise of its discretion, it did not consider that it was just and equitable to extend the time for the presentation of the originating application in respect of matters occurring on or before the 7th April 1993.

	The Tribunal added, however, that it was a matter for the discretion of the Tribunal which heard the case to decide whether it would hear evidence of incidents occurring before the 7th April 1993, (or, on one reading of the Tribunal's decision, incidents before the 13th April 1993), as relevant matters from which it can draw an inference that the dismissal of Mrs Turner by the Respondents, Whitehouse Prestige Cars (UK) Ltd on the 14th April 1993, was an act of discriminatory victimisation.  

	Mr Wilson appeared on this Preliminary Hearing on behalf of Mrs Turner.  He raised an initial point about a contradiction on the face of the Tribunal's decision as to whether it was referring to matters occurring before the 13th April 1993, as stated in paragraph 1 of the decision, or whether it was referring to matters occurring before the 7th April 1993, as stated in paragraph 5 of the decision.  

	We have considered that matter as a preliminary point.  It appears to us clear that what the Tribunal intended to refer to in paragraph 1 was the 7th April, not the 13th April.  We have come to that decision because it is clear on looking at the full reasons, in particular the last two sentences of paragraph 11 that the Tribunal were considering incidents which occurred on or before the 7th April.  They considered those separate from the act of discriminatory victimisation, alleged to have taken place in the form of dismissal on the 14th April.

	The main question is whether, on the substance of the decision, there is an arguable point of law which should proceed to a full hearing.  We are satisfied that there is an arguable point of law that the Industrial Tribunal erred in law in reaching its decision that time should not be extended for the presentation of the originating application.  We say no more about the merits of the point.  The Respondents are not represented.  The merits of the arguments will be fully investigated at a Hearing at which they are represented.  

	It is, however, necessary to say a little more about the unusual circumstances surrounding this preliminary hearing.  We deal with that so that there should be no misunderstanding, either on the part of the Industrial Tribunal or on the part of this Appeal Tribunal, if there is a full Hearing at a later date.  

	The unusual circumstances are these.  There is a document, dated the 19th January 1994, apparently signed by a representative of Mrs Turner and by Counsel for the Respondents, compromising the dispute.  It is stated in the manuscript consent order that it is agreed that Mrs Turner should withdraw her claim for sex discrimination and/or victimisation upon receipt by the Applicants representative of £500 within 14 days, and the Applicant confirmed that the settlement was on the basis that the Respondent did not admit any liability in the matter and had made the payment as a commercial decision, given legal costs involved.  The agreement also provided that the terms would include liberty to apply to the Tribunal to reinstate the application if there was a breach of the agreement.  Subsequent correspondence shows that there is a disagreement between the parties and their advisers, as to whether the claim has been effectively settled on the terms which I have read, or indeed on any other terms.  It is unnecessary to go into the details of that dispute since, pursuant to a direction given by the Chairman of the Tribunal, there will be a preliminary hearing on Wednesday the 6th April, limited to consideration of the issue, whether or not an agreement which satisfies the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 section 140, sub-section (2) to sub-section (4) has been concluded.  

	The issue whether there has been a binding compromise, or whether there has been a concluded agreement which satisfies those statutory provisions, are not matters before the Appeal Tribunal.  They are matters for the Industrial Tribunal.  We wish to make it clear that nothing that we have decided today impinges in any way on that dispute.  

	The position as we see it is this.  We have directed that this Appeal proceeds to a full hearing in circumstances where there is a dispute about whether the matter has been the subject of a binding compromise.  If the result of the further hearing before the Industrial Tribunal is that the matter has been compromised and that Mrs Turner has withdrawn her complaint, then there will be nothing left to appeal against.  The Appeal on which we have held this preliminary hearing will fall with the proceedings.  

	If, on the other hand, it is decided by the Industrial Tribunal, that there has been no concluded agreement then it will be in order for Mrs Turner to pursue this Appeal on the question of time limits, to a full Hearing.  So we make it clear that is an entirely separate dispute on which we have heard no argument, and on which we express no opinion.  The only order today will be that the matter proceeds to a full Hearing.  We will consider any other directions which Mr Wilson may wish to seek.