Appeal No. EAT/777/92

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 27th January 1994

	Before

	THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)

	MISS C HOLROYD

	MR R JACKSON

MR A A CHRISTIE	APPELLANT

NEI INTERNATIONAL COMBUSTION LTD	RESPONDENTS

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE OR
REPRESENTATION BY EITHER PARTY

For the Respondents	NO APPEARANCE OR 	REPRESENTATION BY
EITHER PARTY

	MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT):  The position disclosed by the papers can be briefly stated.  On the 4th November 1991 Mr Christie, a Site Construction Engineer and Safety Adviser with the Respondent, NEI International Combustion Limited, presented to the 
Industrial Tribunal a complaint that he had been unfairly selected for redundancy.  He had begun his employment with the Company on the 10th June 1985.  That employment terminated on the 9th August 1991.

	The employers put in a brief Notice of Appearance stating simply that Mr Christie had been fairly dismissed on the grounds of redundancy.  

	A hearing took place at the Industrial Tribunal held at Nottingham on the 17th July 1992.  Mr Christie presented his case "in person".  The Tribunal unanimously decided that Mr Christie had been fairly dismissed.

	The Reasons, which were notified to the parties on the 31st July 1992, were brief in the extreme.  They come to this:  that it was accepted by Mr Christie, before the Tribunal, that there was a redundancy situation.  The Tribunal held first that the selection was made by using fair criteria which had been applied in a fair manner.  Mr Christie had been given full notice of the intended redundancy and was told as soon as possible of his selection. As to lack of consultation it was held that no consultation that could have taken place could have helped Mr Christie in any way.  The Tribunal therefore stated in paragraph 7 of the decision:
"We are satisfied that the applicant [Mr Christie] was dismissed for redundancy, . .  We are further satisfied that the respondents have acted reasonably, having regard to equity and the substantial merits of the case, in treating that redundancy as the reason for dismissal."

	Mr Christie was dissatisfied with that decision.  A Notice of Appeal was presented dated 1st September 1992.

	The matter was set down for a preliminary hearing which came before this Tribunal on the 6th May 1993.  Mr Christie again appeared "in person".  The Tribunal ordered that the appeal should be allowed to proceed to a full hearing of this Tribunal.  The Tribunal also directed the Chairman to produce his Notes of Evidence.  These are now available. 

	Since the preliminary hearing there has been correspondence between the two sides in which they have agreed that this matter should be remitted to the Industrial Tribunal for a full re-hearing.  A letter has been sent by a firm of solicitors to the Registrar of the Employment Appeal Tribunal stating that there is a letter from the Engineering Employers' Federation agreeing to their application that this Tribunal should make an order remitting the case for a full re-hearing by an industrial tribunal.  

	We have a letter from the Engineering Employers' Federation, dated 20th September 1993, associating themselves with the application made on behalf of the Appellant.

	A fuller letter is sent on the 8th December 1993 setting out the reasons why, in the view of the Respondent, this matter should be remitted.  The letter states that in their view:
"The EAT, at a full hearing, is likely to find that the Industrial Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for its decision in this case. [as I have mentioned] Full reasons in this case are set on one page only."

Reference is made to a number of cases, in particular the case of Meek v. City of Birmingham District Council [1987] IRLR 250, which make it clear that a party to a proceeding before an industrial tribunal is entitled to be given sufficient reasons for him to know why he has lost or won the case.

	The submission by the Respondent is that there is a paucity of explanation in the decision;  and a paucity of reasoning and factual detail, such, that it would be very difficult for an appeal tribunal to ascertain whether or not there were errors of law in the reasoning of the Tribunal.

	We have considered the points.  The points by the Engineering Employers' Federation are agreed with by the solicitors for Mr Christie in a letter of the 8th December 1993.  We have decided that the appeal against this decision would, in all probability, succeed if the matter were argued out. The parties are willing for the matter to be remitted.  We will make that order.  In making the order we make it clear that we are not allowing the appeal simply by the consent of the parties.  As has been said on previous occasions, the parties have no right by agreement to reverse the decision of the Tribunal.  Only this Appeal Tribunal has the power to do that.  The Appeal Tribunal can, however, in appropriate cases, take into account the fact that both parties are dissatisfied with the decision.  If we are satisfied that there is, in all probability, an error of law in the decision of the Industrial Tribunal, we can remit it without requiring the parties to spend time and money to argue the matter fully.

	We shall make an order remitting this matter for re-hearing before a full Tribunal.  We direct that that hearing should take place before a different tribunal than determined this matter at Nottingham on the 17th July 1992.

	The appeal is allowed and the matter remitted.