Appeal No. EAT/863/93
	I N T E R N A L

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 26th January 1994

	Before

	HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC

	MR J R CROSBY

	MR J D DALY

DR R J HOLROYD	APPELLANT

CAMBRIDGE ENVIRONMENTAL	RESPONDENTS
 RESEARCH CONSULTANTS LTD

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

	PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	DR R J HOLROYD
(In person)

	JUDGE D M LEVY QC:  Dr Richard James Holroyd has launched an appeal against a decision of the Bury St Edmunds Industrial Tribunal heard on the 21st June 1993, when the Tribunal unanimously decided that the Tribunal had no power to consider the complaint pursuant to the provisions of section 67(2) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.

	There were two grounds mentioned in the Notice of Appeal.  One concerns the date of commencement of employment which Dr Holroyd, very sensibly, told to us today that it was not one on which he was going to pursue on any appeal.

	The second was that the Tribunal wrongly exercised its discretion to extend time to Dr Holroyd for commencing his proceedings.

	The relevant passage in the Tribunal's Reasons for decision is to be found at paragraph 8.  It reads as follows:
		"On the second issue, the applicant has to satisfy the tribunal that it was not reasonably practicable for the applicant to have presented his complaint before the end of the period of three months commencing 31 October 1992.  The applicant fails so to satisfy us for the following reasons:

			8.1  Within a few days of leaving the respondents' employment, the applicant was actively pursuing the question of a claim against the respondents arising out of the termination of his employment with them.

			8.2  In so doing, he sought advice from the Citizens Advice Bureau and from a solicitor at an Advice Surgery promoted by the Bureau.

			8.3  As a result of that advice he formulated a claim against the respondents but refrained from presenting it until 5 January, a delay of at least five to six weeks from receiving legal advice.

			8.4  By mid-January 1993, the applicant knew of his rights to present a complaint to the Industrial Tribunals for unfair dismissal and that there was a three month time limit for so doing from the end of his employment which he specified in his complaint as having taken place on 31 October 1992.

			8.5  He took a deliberate decision not to present his complaint until he had received a full response from the respondents to his claim submitted on 5 January 1993 and the reason for that decision was his belief that it would not be fair to the respondents to present his complaint until they did reply.

			8.6  None of the reasons for his delay satisfy the requirement for him to show that it was not reasonably practicable to have presented the complaint in the period of three months.  In any event, if he had acted with due despatch, he would still have been able to present his complaint within the period of three months following receipt by him on 29 January 1993 of the respondents' letter of 28 January rejecting his claim entirely.

		9.  The applicant contended that if the respondents' letter of 26 October was a dismissal without notice, then he was entitled to add the statutory period of notice, namely five weeks, to arrive at the effective date of termination for the purpose of Section 55(4) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 so that his time for presentation of the complaint would not begin to run until the expiration of the period of statutory notice.  This belief is ill-founded in law . . ."

The Tribunal explains why.

	There was an application by Dr Holroyd for the Industrial Tribunal to review its decision.  On the 20th August 1993 the Chairman of the Tribunal refused the application for review.

	In his address to us this morning, Dr Holroyd has stressed the difficulties he faced last October in that he misunderstood a pamphlet from the authorities, which he thought was misleading and he felt that as negotiations were in progress, it would have been fair if the discretion of the Tribunal had been exercised in his favour.  

	However, we have carefully considered the findings which I have read out.  We cannot say that they were wrong in law or that the decision of the Tribunal was exercised perversely.  It may be that a different tribunal might have reached another decision but that does not entitle us to interfere.

	It seems to us that this is an appeal which must be doomed to failure and in the circumstances we do not propose to allow it to go further and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.