Appeal No. EAT/1042/94

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 22 May 1995

	Before

	HIS HONOUR JUDGE C SMITH QC

	MR L D COWAN

	MRS P TURNER OBE

MR B GRAZIER	APPELLANT

EAST SURREY HOSPITAL AND	RESPONDENTS
COMMUNITY NHS TRUST

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY OR 
ON BEHALF OF
APPELLANT

For the Respondents	MR N PLUMPTON
Personnel Director
East Surrey Hospital
Three Arch Road
Redhill
Surrey RH1 5RH

	JUDGE SMITH QC:  We are satisfied that Mr Grazier has had sufficient notice of today's hearing of what is his appeal against a decision of the Industrial Tribunal which was made on 28 September 1994 when there was a unanimous decision of the Industrial Tribunal that the Appellant, Mr Grazier, had not been unfairly dismissed by the Respondent, East Surrey Hospital and Community NHS Trust.

	Mr Grazier had been employed as a food services manager by the Respondents and he was suspended on 25 April 1994 because there was an allegation that he had been guilty of sexual harassment of female employees of the Respondent in the course of his employment at the East Surrey Redhill Hospital managed by the Trust.  This was enquired into by the Trust and ultimately there was an investigation and a disciplinary hearing conducted by Mr Plumpton, who appears before us today on behalf of the Respondents, Mr Plumpton being the Director of Personnel.

	After holding the disciplinary hearing in circumstances as set out by the Industrial Tribunal, it was adjourned on the Tuesday, 21 June at 6 pm.  Mr Grazier was notified that he would receive the decision of the disciplinary hearing on Friday, 24 June 1994.  That was to enable Mr Plumpton to weigh up the evidence that he had heard and to reach his decision.

	What then happened, according to the evidence of the Respondents, which was accepted by the Industrial Tribunal, was that before the decision could be conveyed to  Mr Grazier, he  attended the hospital and handed in a resignation letter to his manager, Miss Kerr, the catering services manager and Mr Plumpton, having been informed of that the same morning, Thursday, 23 June 1994, took a decision, perfectly properly, that the Respondents would accept Mr Grazier's resignation.  Apparently, as appears from the documents namely the IT1 and so on, it was going to be Mr Grazier's case before the Tribunal that he had been forced to resign by the employing Trust so that he could, in that way, be given a reference.  That allegation was completely denied by the Respondents who called evidence before the Tribunal in rejection of that allegation by Mr Grazier and the Tribunal rejected that allegation completely and held on those facts, of course, that Mr Grazier had not been constructively dismissed or dismissed at all but rather that he had resigned.

	The grounds of appeal appear to be based upon the refusal of the Industrial Tribunal to grant him an adjournment.  The circumstances there have been outlined to us very clearly by Mr Plumpton this morning.  The notice of hearing had been set in the usual way by the Industrial Tribunal and no proper application for an adjournment was made within the time-limit specified by the notice of hearing.  The Appellant wrote a letter out of time on 19 September 1994.  He gave a variety of reasons as to why he wished the matter to be adjourned.  One reason was that his Union representative could no longer represent him.  The second reason was that he could not afford a solicitor.  Yet a third reason was that he apparently had to attend a medical examination on a particular day.  He did not turn up in front of the Industrial Tribunal to support his application for an adjournment and when enquiries were made by the Industrial Tribunal it was to discover that, far from attending a medical appointment, he was, in fact, elsewhere apparently engaged with some dental appointment or another.  One way or another, there were ample grounds, in our judgment, for the Industrial Tribunal rejecting the application for a postponement, which seemed to be construed, rightly in our judgment, by the Industrial Tribunal as an attempt to put this matter off.  The Industrial Tribunal were fully justified in refusing that application.

	We have also looked, of course, to see whether there could be any other way in which this decision could be shown to be erroneous in point of law but we are quite satisfied that, far from that, the decision was an entirely correctly one in every respect and for the reasons that I have already given in outline, there was ample evidence before the Industrial Tribunal that the matter had been perfectly properly handled in every way by the Respondent Trust.

	Accordingly, for those short reasons this appeal is dismissed.