Appeal No. PA/1114/94

	EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
	58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

		At the Tribunal
		On 3 February 1995

	Before

	THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)

	(AS IN CHAMBERS)

MR T D A STEVEN	APPELLANT

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT	RESPONDENTS

	Transcript of Proceedings

	JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	APPELLANT IN PERSON

	

	MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT):  This is an appeal against the refusal of the Registrar to extend the time for Mr Steven to appeal against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal held at Southampton on 5 March 1993.

	On 24 March 1993 the Industrial Tribunal sent to the parties and entered in the Register the full reasons for their unanimous decision that Mr Steven was not an employee within the meaning of s.153 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 and, accordingly, could have no entitlement to a redundancy payment from the Secretary of State for Employment.  His application for a redundancy payment was, therefore, dismissed.

	Under the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993, Rule 3, (and under the earlier 1980 Rules) the period within which Mr Steven should have instituted an appeal to the Appeal Tribunal from that decision was 42 days from the date on which the full reasons for the decision was sent to him.    

	The Appeal Tribunal has power to extend the time in appropriate cases.  Under Rule 37 the time prescribed by the Rules for the doing of any act may be extended, whether it has already expired or not.  The decisions of the Appeal Tribunal since it was established have laid down that the time-limit for appealing is to be strictly enforced.  As was said in one of the earlier cases, 42 days is 42 days.  It is a generous time-limit for appealing.  That time-limit is notified to the parties in covering documents sent to them with the full reasons for the decision.  The Appeal Tribunal will only extend the time for appealing if there is a good excuse given to the Tribunal for not having appealed within the time-limit.  Then, in exceptional circumstances, the Tribunal may extend the time.  In exercising the discretion, the Tribunal will take into account all the relevant circumstances.

	In this case, the notice of appeal was not received in the Appeal Tribunal until 1 November 1994, that is, over 18 months after the expiration of the time for appealing.

	Mr Steven sent to the Registrar with the notice of appeal a letter referring to the decision of the Industrial Tribunal and pointing out various passages in the decision with his comments upon them.  He referred, in particular, to some additional matters which he has argued today are relevant to his legal position.  First, the finding of the Office for the Determination of Contribution Questions at the Department of Social Security that he was an employee and a letter from the Inland Revenue stating that, as a director of the company, he was considered to be an employee and was taxed accordingly.

	He submits that because of those points and other matters that he refers to, the Industrial Tribunal misdirected itself in concluding that he was self-employed.  Their decision should, therefore, be set aside.  In a later letter, after he had been notified of the Registrar's decision refusing an extension, he expressed his disappointment, contended that the ruling defied logic and he, therefore, wished to appeal.  He asked for the matter to be treated urgently.  He was, accordingly, given an early date for the hearing, which has taken place this morning.

	In his submissions Mr Steven explained the position in more detail.  He emphasized that he had at all times acted in good faith.  He finds himself in a confusing legal position where, on the one hand, the Inland Revenue and the DSS regard him as an employee for the purpose of taking money from him and, on the other hand, he is regarded by the Secretary of State for Employment as self-employed for the purpose of declining to pay money to him.  I can well understand that he finds the situation bizarre.  He might reasonably think, as a layman, that all Government departments in relation to a matter of this kind would speak with one voice.

	It is not for me today to decide finally whether this appeal would succeed or not.  I have already expressed a provisional view to Mr Steven that his appeal is unlikely to succeed.  That is a matter which I put on one side in deciding whether he should be allowed to appeal out of time.  In deciding whether he should be allowed to appeal out of time, I ask what excuse was there for not appealing within the 42 days?  The excuse which Mr Steven has provided is that he was pursuing the matter of his status with the DSS.  He has given me a bundle of documents which contain correspondence with his MP, with the Department of Social Security, Office for the Determination of Contribution Questions, the Contributions Agency and with the Prime Minister himself.  

	In my view, the fact that Mr Steven was pursuing those lines of inquiry and action is not an excuse for failing to appeal within the six weeks allowed by the Appeal Tribunal Rules.  There was nothing to prevent him from both lodging a notice of appeal, in order to protect his right to appeal, and, at the same time, pursuing with others who might be able to help him, the question of his legal position for National Insurance and Revenue purposes.

	In those circumstances, my view is that, as no good excuse has been made for failure to comply with the Rules, I should not exercise the discretion to extend the time.  

	I should add this, that Mr Steven may be able to take-up the matter in other quarters.  He has already enlisted the help of his MP.  He has been informed that there are rights to appeal to the High Court in relation his National Insurance position.  If his MP thought it was appropriate, the matter could be raised by his Member of Parliament with the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, who may be able to look into such questions as inconsistencies by Government Departments as maladministrations in the handling of the citizens affairs.  It is not for me to express a view as to whether the Parliamentary Commissioner would be able to help.  What I am certain of is that there is nothing that this Tribunal can properly do.  It is clearly not a case for extending the time after such a long period has expired from the notification of the Industrial Tribunal's decision.

	The appeal against the Registrar in order will therefore be dismissed.

	Leave to appeal is refused.