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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Brown v London Borough Of Lewisham [1995] UKEAT 294_95_1610 (16 October 1995) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1995/294_95_1610.html Cite as: [1995] UKEAT 294_95_1610 |
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At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY
MRS T A MARSLAND
MR R H PHIPPS
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING - SUMMARY REASONS
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant THE APPELLANT IN PERSON
MR JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Miss Yvonne Brown was a part-time cook employed by the London Borough of Lewisham. In January 1994 she lost that job, as a result of which she went to her trade union, UNISON, for assistance in seeking compensation for unfair dismissal.
She has represented herself today before us, as indeed she did in the Industrial Tribunal. The background she describes is that she went to the union within a couple of weeks or so after being dismissed, and gave particulars of her circumstances to a full-time union official, called Cynthia Humble. After that she, on a number of occasions, sought further information from Cynthia Humble as to the progress of her claim. Unfortunately, for what ever reason, the union did not present a claim to the Industrial Tribunal within three months.
Miss Brown has described to us her subsequent discovery to the effect that Miss Humble herself became the subject of suspension by the union, and this may or may not explain the reasons for the delay.
The law requires complaints to the Industrial Tribunal to be presented within three months of the effective date of termination of employment. The effective date of termination in this case was 10th January 1994. Miss Brown's application was not presented until 19th August 1994, more than four months after the expiration of the three month time limit. When it was presented it was presented not by UNISON, but by the Law Centre in Deptford High Street, to which Miss Brown had gone as a result of her frustrations about the inactivity she describes on the part of the union.
In these circumstances it is understandable that the Industrial Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to see whether the case could proceed. Although there is a three month time limit, it is possible for the Industrial Tribunal to extend that period, pursuant to Section 67(2) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, if it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the applicant to present the application within the three month limit. On the information before it, and on the information before us, it is apparent to us that it was reasonably practicable to present the application within three months. If what Miss Brown tells us is correct, the reason why that was not done is really to do with the inactivity of the union acting on her behalf. The Industrial Tribunal found as a fact that it was reasonably practicable, and having considered the matter, we think that we cannot go behind that factual finding. Indeed, it seems to us, that the factual finding was correct in any event.
It follows that Miss Brown's appeal to us raises no point of law and we cannot process appeals except on points of law. In the absence of one, therefore, the appeal will have to be dismissed.
Before we leave it, we would like to say these two things. Firstly, we have considerable sympathy with Miss Brown as the result of these events. If her description of what happened at her place of work, and subsequently with her union is correct, then clearly she has had what may be colloquially described, as a `raw deal'. The second point is that, when her application was dismissed by the Indusial Tribunal, the Tribunal Chairman observed that Miss Brown may have a remedy in law against her trade union. Again, if what she says is reasonably accurate, that is our view as well. She may have a remedy against her trade union. We can put it no higher than that. But she may consider it worth her while to seek legal advice in respect of such a possible claim. Whereas she has not had the benefit of solicitors' advice hitherto, and not had the benefit of legal aid, if what she says is correct it may be possible, we put in no higher than that, for her to obtain legal aid for such a claim. In those circumstances she may find it helpful if she obtains a copy not only of the Industrial Tribunal's decision, but of our decision to show to any legal advisers whom she may approach.