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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Jasrai v State Of The United Arab Emirates [1996] UKEAT 1304_95_2005 (20 May 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/1304_95_2005.html Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 1304_95_2005 |
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At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD
MRS E HART
MRS M E SUNDERLAND JP
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MR S GILL
(of Counsel)
Southall Rights Legal Advice
Centre lTD
54 High Street
Southall
Middx UB1 3DB
MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD: This is an appeal against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal sitting at London (North) promulgated to the parties on 17 October 1995 dismissing the Appellant's complaint that he had been unfairly dismissed. The case is listed as a preliminary hearing in order to decide whether the notice of appeal raises a question of law which is reasonably arguable. This Tribunal only has jurisdiction to hear appeals from an Industrial Tribunal on a question of law. If the appeal does not raise a point of law that is reasonably arguable, no purpose is served by allowing it to go on to a full hearing at which both parties will be represented.
The essential thrust of the appeal is that the Tribunal erred in law in accepting the Respondent's explanation for his dismissal, that is to say, that his conduct was such that he could no longer be employed by them.
The Appellant had had a number of absences from his work as a chauffeur at the Respondent's Embassy and had received many verbal and several written warnings about his conduct. The incident leading to his dismissal was a further absence from work which occurred in late February 1994. That produced a final warning to the Appellant, advising him that there would be serious consequences if he did not take notice of the final warning.
The Appellant asserted that he had been unwell in relation to the absence provoking that final written warning. The Respondents did not believe him. The Appellant's case was that the Respondent had contacted the Appellant's general practitioner who had confirmed his illness in a letter written to the Respondent's. It was implicit, at any event, in the facts before the Tribunal that the Respondents did not accept that evidence.
The Tribunal hearing the case at which the Respondents were not represented, though they had put in a letter which was treated as a notice of appearance, asked the Appellant to produce his sick certificates or a copy of the letter. He failed to produce either and asked for an adjournment. The Tribunal rejected that request, holding that the evidence was fundamental to his claim as made in the originating application. The Industrial Tribunal did not accept the Appellant's evidence and did not find his story credible. They dismissed his complaint of unfair dismissal, finding that the dismissal was for conduct, that the Appellant had been treated with procedural fairness and that his conduct was in clear breach of earlier warnings.
It is first argued before us that the Tribunal erred in law in finding as they did and in refusing to grant an adjournment. The Tribunal were plainly entitled, having heard the Appellant, to refuse to grant the adjournment requested. It was, as the Tribunal observed, of fundamental importance to the Appellant's case for him to produce before them proper evidence of that for which he contended.
Before us Mr Gill, on behalf of the Appellant, has produced a letter dated 25 February 1994 purporting to come from a locum GP to Dr Qureshi addressed to the Charge d'Affaires of the Respondent's Embassy. He further produces a letter from Dr Qureshi himself, which produces a photocopy of that letter, the letter from Dr Qureshi being dated 25 October 1995.
The letter of 25 February 1994 could have been made available to the original Tribunal. The letter of 25 October 1995 could have been made the subject of an application for a review to the original Tribunal. In our judgment the Industrial Tribunal was perfectly within its rights not to grant an adjournment and we do not think there is anything in the point relating to the additional evidence now put before us.
Mr Gill succinctly puts a second matter before us. He says that the Industrial Tribunal had no evidence to conclude on what basis the Appellant had been dismissed, that there was no evidence to support the conclusion he was dismissed by reason of conduct and no explanation as to the reason for his dismissal. In those circumstances, the Tribunal was not entitled to conclude as they did, that his dismissal was on the ground of conduct, still less to conclude that that was a fair dismissal in all the circumstances.
Again, we do not agree. In the notice of appearance dated 13 June 1995, submitted by the Respondents, the Respondents informed the Tribunal that the Appellant had been warned verbally on many occasions and also been given written notices which were ignored by him. The last such written notice was dated 22 February 1994. The words:
"which were ignored by him"
carried a clear implication that the last written warning was, indeed, subsequently ignored. The Tribunal, having disbelieved the Appellant on every conceivable issue, no doubt also concluded that that was the reason why he was dismissed.
In our judgment, whilst the decision could have been expressed more fully, there is no error of law disclosed in the Tribunal finding as they did, still less any error in their refusal to grant an adjournment. For those reasons, this appeal is dismissed.