Appeal No.	 EAT/503/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 29 November 1996

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (P)
MR D J HODGKINS CB
BARONESS SYMONS OF VERNHAM DEAN

MR T VALE 	APPELLANT	
T/A UPPERCUT HAIR SALONS	

MISS M R CLARIDGE	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT	

			MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):   The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether there is any arguable point of law to be raised by the employers against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at Stratford on 25 April 1996.  By their decision sent to the parties on 9 May 1996, the Industrial Tribunal decided that the Applicant was entitled to a declaration that the employers had made an unlawful deduction of wages and to an order that the employers pay to her the sum of £56.

	There is no attendance before us by the prospective Appellants.  Such attendance is not required, and we have been assisted in arriving at our conclusion today by the terms of their letter of 7 May 1996, setting out their complaints about the decision.  

	By the decision, the Tribunal concluded that very shortly after Miss Claridge had reached her sixteenth birthday and had taken up employment as an apprentice hairdresser with the employers, she had a problem with her knees which swelled up; a condition which was exacerbated by the amount of time she spent on her feet.  She consulted an orthopaedic consultant who took X-Rays and who made a diagnosis.  She did not find that her knees responded to treatment and was advised to consider giving up her chosen career.  She accordingly informed her employers.

	The Tribunal said she was not physically able to perform the duties which were customarily required of her.  She reasonably believed that to continue would be to jeopardise her health and she considered that she was not required to give notice of termination, because she would not have been able to work during such period.  Having considered all the evidence, the Industrial Tribunal concluded that by a process of law, namely, the doctrine of frustration, the contract of employment was brought immediately to an end and released both parties from further obligations under it.  What remained to be paid was the balance of monies owing before that time, namely the £56.  It was the employer’s contention that under the contract of apprenticeship that if an employee left without giving proper notice, then they forfeited their notice term; all future references would be refused; they would automatically forfeit any holiday or monies owed, up to the equivalent of two weeks.

	By their letter dated 7 May 1996 the employers say that the Medical Certificate or Doctor’s letter from the consultants should have been provided to them, so that they could have confirmed that it was factual.  They say in addition to that, that as part of her job she could be contractually required to undertake other duties.  Since she had left Uppercut (the employers) they say that she stands and carries fruit and vegetables around for a greengrocery section of a large Kwik Save store in Dagenham.  

	For all these reasons they say the above information invalidates her claim and that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal be reversed.  Our jurisdiction is only to hear appeals on points of law.  It seems to us that none of the matters which have been raised by the employers amounts to a case in law.  The employers did not turn up before the Industrial Tribunal hearing on 25 April 1996 and wish now, in effect, to re-open the hearing by putting additional material before us.  That they are not allowed to do.  The law is that the place where facts are dealt with is in the Industrial Tribunal; we deal with points of law.  There are none.  Therefore this appeal will be dismissed.