Appeal No. EAT/523/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 15 October 1996

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE H J BYRT QC
MR L D COWAN
MR R SANDERSON OBE

WRIGHT UK LTD	APPELLANT

MRS T GREENAWAY
	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	MR ROY LEWIS
(of Counsel)
Messrs Eversheds
Solicitors
London Scottish House
24 Mount Street
Manchester M2 3DB	

	JUDGE BYRT QC:  This is a preliminary hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Tribunal sitting in Manchester on 8 February 1996 in a sex discrimination case where the issue solely related to quantum.  There were three matters relating to quantum dealt with by the Industrial Tribunal.  One was the actual financial loss suffered by the Applicant, the anticipated future loss she would suffer and thirdly there was a heading “Compensation for injured feelings”.  There is no appeal in respect of the computation of the actual or anticipated financial loss of this claimant.  The appeal relates solely to the quantum of compensation for injured feelings.

	In arguing this matter in front of us, Mr Lewis, for the employers, has raised a number of issues.  First, he says the issue of compensation for injured feelings was not raised at the Tribunal below, either by the Applicant who was unrepresented, nor by the Tribunal, nor by the representative for the Respondent.  He felt compelled to say that if this be the case, and he is only acting on instructions in saying that it was not raised, this claimant was entitled to no compensation for injured feeling.  That is a point we think should be looked at more closely by allowing the appeal to proceed to a full hearing of the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

	The second point, made by Mr Lewis, is that the award of £3,000 for compensation under this particular heading is out of all proportion to the median of awards of a like sort where the awards approximate to £1,000 - and so he says he Tribunal obviously have taken into account factors they should not have taken into account and that is manifest when one looks at the award they did make.  That is his second point .

	Thirdly, he says that the Industrial Tribunal, in recording its decisions, do not mention a whole range of matters that previous authorities have indicated they should take into account.  Thus, for instance, there is no mention of the period of employment.  In this case the claimant was only employed for 8 months before her dismissal.  Secondly, there is no reference to the fact that she had no difficulty in the labour market and this is a factor which should have been taken into account.  Thirdly, there is no suggestion made that this dismissal was tantamount to the end of this lady’s career.  Fourthly, there is reference to, but insufficient account is taken of, the fact that she was treated very well indeed, as the Tribunal found, until the act of discrimination.

	I have listed all the points raised by Mr Lewis here because when one looks at the notice of appeal it is, in our view, wholly inadequate to put the Respondents on notice as to the grounds  the Appellant is going to argue.  We do believe that the points, raised by Mr Lewis, are substantive matters suggesting an arguable case in law which should be ventilated at a full hearing of the Employment Appeal Tribunal.  Accordingly, we give the Appellants leave to amend their notice of appeal so that it incorporates all the points they wish to raise.  We also give leave for this appeal to proceed to a full hearing, limited to the issue what, if any, compensation should in this case be awarded for injured feelings.

	Last, we think it important in view of the contention advanced on instruction by Mr Lewis to the effect that there was no reference to compensation for injured feelings in argument before the Tribunal below that the notes of evidence of the Chairman relating to this particular heading of the claim should be secured for the full hearing, and we so direct.