Appeal No. EAT/656/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 19 November 1996

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
MR J A SCOULLER
MS D WARWICK

PRIMA FRUIT JUICES LTD	APPELLANTS

MR M S STRIDE	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellants	MR ANTHONY KORN
(Of Counsel)
Messrs Lawrence Graham
Solicitors 
190 Strand
London
WC2R  1JN	

			JUDGE LEVY QC:   Prima Fruit Juice Ltd, “the Company”, wish to appeal against the decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at Hereford on 21 March 1996.  Then the Tribunal unanimously decided that the Applicant, Malcolm Sydney Stride, had been unfairly dismissed.  Put shortly, the Company, following a takeover of another company’s business changed the job of Mr Stride as a site manager at its plant at Hereford.  Mr Stride had been employed filling milk bottles as his job and had extensive experience in that line.  He had much more limited experience in the handling of fruitjuices, which he was following the takeover required to do by the Company in December 1994.

	The Tribunal held that he was insufficiently trained for the change of job by the Company and their excuse that he was incapable was not one that the Company was entitled to find on the facts.  When one has had submissions against that finding as charmingly and capably put as they are by Mr Korn, it is difficult to think that there must be something to go forward, when he submits that the Tribunal’s fact finding was wrong and/or that there was an error of law.  But in truth and in fact, it seems to all of us that this is a model decision; the Tribunal has gone carefully into the background, found facts on evidence and come to a decision to which it was entitled to come, namely that this is a case of where incapacity, having been put forward, was not proved to its satisfaction, and further that there was insufficient consultation, training, etc., given to Mr Stride before he was dismissed.  

	In these circumstances, it seems to us, that any appeal against the findings of fact, however they are dressed up as matters of law, are bound to fail.  In particular, Mr Korn has criticised in paragraph 5 of his Skeleton Argument the fact that there is no reference in the Tribunal’s Extended Reasons of certain criticisms which had been made of his performance.  This we consider to be nit-picking within the reasons and we find that the matters to which he draws attention, to which we have no specific reference, are in fact in the decision if it is considered in broad terms.  Mr Korn complains inadequate reasons were given, but we find that there is nothing in that submission.  

	Every case is extraordinary to those who are part of it, but they form a pattern of ordinariness both in the Industrial Tribunal and in this Tribunal.  Mr Korn submits that the Tribunal imposed its own views on views which the management might properly have held.  We do not think that is a case in which this has happened.  The Tribunal has perfectly properly found that this is an ordinary case where incapacity was not proved, and in those circumstances the appeal is bound to fail.  In these circumstances we must dismiss it at this stage.