Appeal No.	 EAT/934/96

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 12 December 1996

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MRS T A MARSLAND
MR P A L PARKER CBE

UNIVERSAL FOOTWEAR LTD	APPELLANTS

MR N R TOWNS	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellants	MR P BROWN
(Company Director)
Universal Footwear Ltd
4-5 Eastlands Court
St Peter's Road
Rugby
Warwickshire
CV21 3QP	

	JUDGE PETER CLARK:   This is an appeal by Universal Footwear Ltd against a decision of the Leicester Industrial Tribunal following a hearing on 2nd April 1996, awarding the sum of £884.60 under the Wages Act to the applicant, Mr Towns. Summary reasons for that decision are dated 22nd April 1996.

	These proceedings commenced with an originating application which was presented to the Industrial Tribunal by Mr Towns on 20th October 1995. In that complaint, he names as his employer (1) Millennium Footwear (Wholesale) Ltd and (2) Universal Footwear Ltd.

	Mr Brown a director of Universal, presents this appeal on its behalf today. He tells us that he is a director of both companies, that is Millennium and Universal. We understand that Millennium was at the relevant time based in Kettering, and Universal was based in Saffron Waldon. However, apart from Mr Brown being a director of both companies and having an office at each business premises, Mrs Potter was the production director of Universal and also the personnel manager of Millennium.

	In answer to that originating application, a notice of appearance was filed on 8th December 1995 signed by Mr Brown and giving as the full name and address of the respondent Millennium Footwear (Wholesale) Ltd of Kettering. That notice of appearance contends that Mr Towns was at all relevant times employed by Millennium Footwear (Wholesale) Ltd.

	The matter was initially listed for a hearing and that hearing date was vacated on the application of the respondent, because Mrs Potter was abroad. The next hearing date fixed on 16th February 1996, was for the 2nd April 1996.

	On that occasion Mr Towns attended before the Industrial Tribunal represented by his trade union official, Mr Bayes. Nobody attend on behalf of the respondents.

	We see from the summary reasons that the Chairman, Mr Blood, sitting alone, heard evidence from the applicant and treated the respondent’s notice of appearance and documents filed with it, as written representations under Rule 8(5) of the Industrial Tribunals Rules of Procedure 1993. 

	Having heard the evidence of Mr Towns he concluded that the applicant had been employed at all relevant times by Universal Footwear Ltd and not by Millennium Footwear (Wholesale) Ltd. It now transpires that Millennium have gone out of business.

	A copy of the tribunal’s summary reasons dated 22nd April 1996 were sent to and received by Universal. However, no attempt was made to apply for extended reasons for the tribunal’s decision within 21 days of the summary reasons being promulgated, as required by Rule 10 of the Industrial Tribunal Rules of Procedure.

	Indeed, in due course a Notice of Appeal was lodged two days out of time by reference to the summary reasons. It was pointed out by the Registrar that under Rule 3(1) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 it was necessary for extended reasons for the tribunal’s decision to be lodged with the Notice of Appeal. In consequence, Universal applied to the Industrial Tribunal for extended reasons, and by letter dated 3rd July the Chairman replied that he would consider a request to extend time for providing extended reasons if it could be shown that his summary reasons were inadequate.

	That is the background to this appeal, which comes before us today on a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not there is an arguable point of law which ought to go to a full hearing before the Appeal Tribunal.

	The appellants face a number of difficulties. The first is that they have not obtained extended reasons for the tribunal’s decision. We might have been able to overlook that and proceed simply on the basis of the summary reasons. 

	However, the fundamental problem is that this appeal is out of time. It is well-established in this tribunal that appeals out of time will only be allowed to proceed if, among other things, a good excuse is shown for the matter being out of time. In this case there is no excuse, and indeed, looking at the cavalier way in which Universal have treated these proceedings, it seems to us that really no sympathy can be extended to them and no indulgence granted.

	Additionally, having looked at the summary reasons, we can see no merit in this appeal. The Chairman heard the applicant’s evidence; he accepted it. It was for the respondents to attend on 2nd April if their account conflicted. They did not do so.

	For all these reasons, it seems to us, that we should not allow an extension of time for this Notice of Appeal, and we shall dismiss the appeal here and now.