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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Simpson v Lincoln City Council [1997] UKEAT 716_97_2611 (26 November 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/716_97_2611.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 716_97_2611

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


JUDGE PUGSLEY: This is an ex parte application to consider the issue whether the appellant, Mrs Simpson, has an arguable point of law to proceed before a full hearing of this tribunal.

It is a sad case. Mrs Simpson, who was held in high regard in her employment, was the subject of an incident on Friday, 11th November 1994 when she attended a tenant's house to serve a possession notice. She was subjected to threatening and abusive behaviour. She was immediately thereafter on leave. That incident set off a period of protracted medically certified ill health on 28th November 1994. The person concerned was later convicted of an office in relation to that matter. Mrs Simpson suffered thereafter from a stress disorder referred to by medical advisers as severe depression and anxiety.

In what we can only describe as a comprehensive and careful decision the Industrial Tribunal mapped out the course of events which led ultimately to Mrs Simpson being compulsorily retired and receiving a pension due to ill health.

We have to say that in our view this decision was careful, sympathetic and sensitive to the situation in which the appellant found herself. It is quite clear that the tribunal made specific and clear findings of fact as to the evidence that they accepted and the evidence they rejected.

On the basis of that, they then made very detailed comprehensive statements of the law. They fully set out the terms of s.98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and then in paragraph 32 onwards they referred themselves to a series of decisions in which the higher courts have set out the general approach.

At paragraph 40 of their decision they came to the following conclusions:

"40. In the light of the facts which we have found above, and the principles of law to which we have referred, we find:-

(a) that the respondent did obtain and properly consider adequate medical advice in this case;

(b) that they did consult the applicant about that advice and give her the opportunity of obtaining a second opinion and obtaining her own advice and that consultation process was adequate in all the circumstances;

(c) that the period of ill health allowed before employment was terminated was reasonable in all the circumstances;

(d) that efforts were made to arrange a part-time return to work with a view to an eventual full-time return;

(e) that the opportunity of possible alternative employment was offered;

(f) that in all the circumstances, including those which had precipitated the applicant's illness, the respondent dealt with the applicant compassionately and reasonably."

In the light of those findings, they dismissed the application.

Before us in a letter dated 10th November 1997 the appellant has contended that there were errors of law. In particular, she has contended that the matters set out in paragraph 40(a) and 40(e) were not matters where there was evidence to justify the conclusion to which the tribunal came.

We have considered all the submissions that the appellant has made to us. The reality is that those matters are dealt with in the tribunal decision by findings of fact, which no doubt unpalatable to the appellant, were specific findings of fact that the tribunal made. In particular the tribunal made a finding of fact that the appellant had indicated to one of the respondent's employees that she did not see she had any future with respondent local authority. The appellant had, according to the findings of fact made by the tribunal, had indicated that she was satisfied with the medical advice that her employment should be terminated on grounds of ill health and that she did not want to take a further medical opinion.

We consider that in no way is Mrs Simpson in any way seeking to mislead us. She is obviously a person much effected by stress and perhaps it is significant that although in terms we sat earlier than would normally be the case after the short adjournment in order to enable her to attend and still to be able to catch her train, she has found it not possible to attend. We make absolutely no criticism of that. But it is clear to us she is a person who is looking to this tribunal to provide a balm for her hurt which is not in our power to give.

Having considered all the points she has made, and having looked at all the documentation, in our view there is no arguable point of law in this case and we therefore dismiss the appeal.