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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Mason v Maxi Haulage Ltd [1997] UKEAT 974_96_1902 (19 February 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/974_96_1902.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 974_96_1902

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR T GRACE Messrs Richard C Hall & Partner Crown Buildings 121a Saughall Road Blacon Chester CH1 5ET


 


JUDGE BUTTER QC: This is the Preliminary Hearing of an appeal by Mr Mason against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal at Liverpool on 3 July 1996. The reasons for their decision were sent out on 15 July. The unanimous decision of that Tribunal was that the Applicant had resigned and was not constructively dismissed and that therefore his application was dismissed. The Applicant had alleged that he was unfairly dismissed on 22 November 1995. He considered that he was justified in resigning and was therefore constructively dismissed. The employers contended that the Applicant had left his employment and resigned but was not dismissed constructively or unfairly.

In their reasons the Tribunal set out a number of facts in paragraph 3 to which it is unnecessary for me to make any specific reference, except that we should deal with what they said in paragraph 3(g) of their reasons:

"On 22 November 1995 the applicant worked at the Manchester depot and was asked by Mr Mackle in the presence of Mr Buttery to do a run to Heysham. The applicant did not object or refuse according to Mr Buttery, who stated nothing more was said in his hearing. The applicant contends Mr Mackle said he had to work overnight and "you will do as you're f...ing told". The respondents' Appearance (signed by the Chairman) admits the applicant "was instructed to carry out a journey in terms of his Contract of Employment which involved an overnight stay from home but he refused to do the work without giving a valid and proper reason and he continued to refuse, making allegations towards Mr Mackle"."

It is argued that before us today that as there was a conflict of evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal ought to have made certain express findings. It is said that in particular they should have decided whether Mr Mackle had abusively told the Appellant to work overnight, whether Mr Buttery had heard the abusive exchange and whether Mr Buttery chose to do nothing in circumstances when he should reasonably have come to the Appellant's assistance. Reliance is placed upon the well-known case of Levy v Marrable Co Ltd [1984] ICR 583 at page 587. It is said that the Tribunal has made insufficient findings and has failed to make specific findings on a material issue.

The Tribunal considered the law correctly under Section 55 of the 1978 Act and concluded in paragraph 5:

"We are unanimously of the opinion that the applicant decided to terminate his employment because of his belief that the nuisance 'phone calls to Mrs Coulton were being made by Mr Mackle and that it was incumbent upon the respondent Company to sort it out - in some way which the applicant never particularised. When he was required to undertake a journey which might or would involve an overnight stop he regarded it as the straw that broke the camel's back and he resigned forthwith." ....

The Tribunal then set out a number of further facts and matters. They dealt with the question of delay and in paragraph 6 criticised Mr Buttery. Nevertheless they came to the conclusion to which we have referred earlier.

It is not incumbent upon an Industrial Tribunal to set out all the facts and matters or to review every area of dispute, and although we accept it might have been better if they had made a specific finding on one or two of the matters to which reference has been made, we are not persuaded that it can fairly be said that they failed to make sufficient findings to enable us to know what was the true basis of their decision. Equally, we are not persuaded that there is any justification for the suggestion that the Tribunal acted perversely. In these circumstances and for these reasons we do not consider that there is an arguable point of law here which would go forward to a full appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.