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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Wilson v Manchester Adventure Playgrounds Association [1997] UKEAT 984_97_0312 (3 December 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/984_97_0312.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 984_97_0312, [1997] UKEAT 984_97_312

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether Miss Wilson has an arguable point of law against two decisions of an Industrial Tribunal. The first on liability is contained in a decision which was sent to the parties on 3rd June 1997. The second on quantum is in a decision which was sent to the parties on 17th June 1997.

In relation to the second decision, it is to be noted that it is expressed to be summary form, but we are satisfied that the decision is sufficiently well reasoned for us to be able to review the decision by way of an appeal without inviting the Chairman to give extended reasons for it.

In essence, it seems to us, having had the opportunity of listening to Miss Wilson, that she has the following arguable points of law. The first relates to a general sense of unfairness and injustice which she feels as a result of her former employers, Manchester Adventure Playgrounds Association, presenting to the Industrial Tribunal witness statements which contained gratuitously, as we understand it, references to her ethnic origin and sexuality. It might have been a case where she was herself presenting a complaint alleging that she had been discriminated against on either or both of those two grounds, but the fact is that she was not making that complaint, and it was therefore wholly and completely unnecessary for the employers, so she says, to have adduced that material before the tribunal, which was calculated to and did have the effect of her being referred to in the national papers in a way which was offensive and demeaning to her. Thus, although the winner at the Industrial Tribunal in the sense that she proved that her employers had unfairly dismissed her, she says she has become the victim through the way that the employers have run the case.

The second point of law relates to the way in which the Industrial Tribunal was presented with witness statements from people who were not in fact called to give evidence, and of whom the applicant, Miss Wilson, never had an opportunity of asking questions. That relates also to the question as to the weight which the tribunal should have given, if any, to such statements if in fact the individual was available to give evidence but was not being asked to do so.

The third ground relates to the approach of the Industrial Tribunal to the question of contributory fault. Miss Wilson says that the first incident which took place in September 1995 was over and done with, in the sense that it gave rise to a final warning, and that she is in a sense being punished twice; once by way of final warning, and again by reason of the substantial reduction in her compensation which the tribunal made by reference to that first incident.

It seems to us that there may be an argument to be considered as to the approach of this Industrial Tribunal to question of contributory fault, having regard in particular to the time lapse between the date of the first incident and the date of the more minor incident which ultimately led to her dismissal.

Finally, it seems to us that there may be a question which will need to be examined at a full hearing in relation to paragraph 5 of the decision on liability where the tribunal say this:

"5. ... Furthermore, it is likely that the decision to transfer her would have been a decision that the respondents would still have taken."

In other words, they appear to be asking themselves the question: what would have happened had a fair procedure been followed, and to have concluded that she would have been transferred. It is to be noted, as we understand the tribunal's decision, that transfer was being used as part of the disciplinary process but was not an option which was contractually available to the employers. Questions will arise, therefore, at the full hearing as to the approach of the Industrial Tribunal.

For these reasons and on those grounds, we believe that this matter should go forward for a full hearing. I would like to retain this case for myself. It is to be listed as Category C. It should take no more than an hour and a half. We do not require the Chairman's Notes of Evidence.