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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Browne v London Underground Ltd [1998] UKEAT 1432_97_0402 (4 February 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1998/1432_97_0402.html Cite as: [1998] UKEAT 1432_97_0402, [1998] UKEAT 1432_97_402

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): This an appeal against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at London (North) on 30th October 1996. The Industrial Tribunal, presided over by Mrs Prevezer, unanimously decided that the application for a review should be refused. That decision was dated 5th November 1996.

The case in question was an application brought by the applicant against his former employers alleging constructive dismissal. London Underground Ltd, the former employers, denied that they had unfairly dismissed him. His period of employment was from 1989 to September 1993.

A notice of hearing was sent to the parties on 3rd November 1995 indicating that the case would be heard on 1st and 2nd April 1996. The applicant did not present himself at that hearing. Accordingly, his application was dismissed. It was against that decision that the application for a review was made.

The Industrial Tribunal concluded, having heard the evidence from both the applicant and his father, that they had been receiving correspondence from the Industrial Tribunal sent to their address in Dublin and that they admitted receiving a letter on 8th and 15th September 1995.

They also heard evidence from the father to the effect that even if he had received the letter of 3rd November giving the hearing date, he would have thought that a reminder would have been sent by the tribunal about 14 days before the actual hearing in case people had forgotten.

Having reviewed the evidence, and seen and heard the witnesses, the Industrial Tribunal were satisfied that all the correspondence had been sent to the correct address and therefore the notice of hearing had been received. Accordingly, the appellant had the opportunity to appear on 1st and 2nd April for the hearing but did not avail himself of it. That being so, the tribunal were entitled to dispose of the case in the way in which they did.

That seems to us to be a decision on the facts which the Industrial Tribunal were manifestly entitled to arrive at. They are the fact-finding tribunal and we cannot interfere with any decision of theirs unless there is some error law.

The Notice of Appeal in this case, dated 11th December 1996, records that the grounds on which this appeal is brought:

"6. ... that the Industrial Tribunal erred in law in that no reasonable Industrial Tribunal properly directed could be satisfied that the notice of the hearing on 1st and 2nd April 1996 sent to the Appellant on 3rd November 1995 had been received by the Appellant. The Appellant therefore appeals against the refusal of the Industrial Tribunal sitting on 30th October 1996 to review the decision of the Tribunal on 1st April 1996."

It will be apparent from the terms of the Notice of Appeal itself, that this simply is an attempt to seek to re-open the facts in this case. Documents were sent out by the tribunal and were received, and the Industrial Tribunal having seen and heard the father and the applicant give evidence, were perfectly entitled on the facts to conclude, despite their evidence, that in fact the Notice of Hearing had been sent to them. It may be that the father was expecting a letter of reminder and forgot. But however that may be, this was a decision of an Industrial Tribunal which was open to them to arrive at, and with which we cannot interfere: our jurisdiction being limited to dealing with points of law only. The appeal will be dismissed.

I should add that the appellant has indicated that he would not be attending today, but we have been happy to deal with this in his absence.