Appeal No.	 PA/275/98

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On  1 July 1998

Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (P)
(IN CHAMBERS)

MR J M ARMSTRONG	APPELLANT

MRS V E RIGBY	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	IN PERSON	
For the Respondent	MS LUCY WILLIAMS
(Representative)
Southampton & District
Unemployed Centre
11 Porchester Road
Woolston
Southampton SO19 2JB 	

	MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT):     This is an appeal against the Registrar’s decision refusing to extend time for the lodging of a Notice of Appeal.  I apply the principles set out in United Arab Emirates v Abdelghafar [1995] ICR 65 as the guidelines, pursuant to which I shall exercise my discretion on this appeal.

	The Notice of Appeal in this case was 105 days out of time.  Mr Armstrong, the Appellant, was judged by an Industrial Tribunal, held at Southampton, to have unfairly dismissed a former employee of his, a Mrs Rigby, the Respondent to this appeal.  The hearing took place on 9 September 1997.  The decision was sent to the parties on 13 October 1997.  There is no need to recite the terms of that decision.

	When an Industrial Tribunal gives a decision in this way, accompanying it is a leaflet which explains in very clear terms, precisely what the time limits are for making an appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and what the rights are of a dissatisfied party to apply for a review or an appeal.  The time limit is 42 days.  It is a time limit and not a target to be aimed at.  It is a generous period of time which is provided and the experience of the Employment Appeal Tribunal is that, bar a relatively small number of cases, almost all persons who wish to appeal an Industrial Tribunal decision are well able to do so, within the time provided.

	I turn to the first question which is, what is the explanation for the delay in lodging the Notice of Appeal in this case?  The explanation which was initially put forward by Mr Armstrong was that soul-searching had led him to enquire as to the channels for an appeal because he never had the intention to cause Mrs Rigby to leave.  This, unfortunately, has caused time to lapse.

	It would appear that the Appellant was quite well able to run his Post Office business during this period and indeed, to take legal advice.  There is a letter in the file of 17 November 1997 sent to Mr Armstrong by his Solicitors, indicating that there was no reasonable prospect of success in any appeal.  I have sympathy with people who find the legal system expensive and somewhat confusing, but I am quite satisfied that Mr Armstrong is a capable person who must be taken to have understood the time limits in this case, not only as a result of himself receiving the leaflet from the Industrial Tribunal, but because of the fact that he was in a position to, and did take, professional legal advice.

	Before me he relied on an additional reason, namely that he sustained a car accident on 2 October 1996 which required him to be hospitalised for a period of two days.  He says that, as a result of that car accident he suffered from post traumatic stress disorder, but that he was really effectively unaware that he was so suffering, either at the time of the events giving rise to the dismissal or when he went to the Industrial Tribunal or when he lodged his Notice of Appeal.

	He says that, therefore, he was in a confused state, but he also told me that during the whole of this period he has had nothing but support from Post Office Counters Ltd and that he has been congratulated on the way that he has been running his business.  I was not satisfied that he was able to provide me with any reasonable explanation as to how he was able to manage his own affairs and run a business on the one hand, but was somehow disabled from putting in a Notice of Appeal, especially where he has legal advisers acting for him, on the other.

	In any event, it would appear that he had Solicitors retained for him during negotiations which took place between the parties as to the payment of compensation, and I have been provided with a form representing a settlement agreement, to which it is alleged he was a party, albeit that he has not signed the document.  That is on a form which ACAS use for settlement of disputes, called a COT 3 form.

	Taking all these factors into consideration, it does seem to me that this is a case where Mr Armstrong has not persuaded me that there is any good or sensible reason why the appeal was lodged well out of time.

	Furthermore, on the facts of this case I am satisfied, having looked both at the Industrial Tribunal decision itself, and the letter from the lawyers to which I have referred, and the COT 3 form, that any appeal in this case would effectively be hopeless.

	Accordingly, in the exercise of my discretion, although I regard the prospects of success on the appeal as being a matter which only has a slight weight, I refuse the appeal which will therefore be dismissed.