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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Salinger v Heidelberg Graphic Equipment Ltd [1998] UKEAT 779_98_0110 (1 October 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1998/779_98_0110.html Cite as: [1998] UKEAT 779_98_110, [1998] UKEAT 779_98_0110 |
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At the Tribunal | |
Before
THE HONOURABLE LORD JOHNSTON
MR P R A JACQUES CBE
MR J C SHRIGLEY
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE
For the Appellant | THE APPELLANT IN PERSON |
LORD JOHNSTON: This is a preliminary hearing in the appeal at the instance of Miss Salinger who has brought before the Employment Tribunal a complaint of unfair dismissal against her former employers, Heidelberg Graphic Equipment Ltd. There was a preliminary hearing before the Employment Tribunal against the background that the application was presented wholly out of time in respect of three month time limit running from the date of dismissal. The Employment Tribunal having heard evidence, so ruled that it could not invoke the proviso to the general requirement that three months' time limit has to apply on the basis that it was not reasonably practicable for the appellant to have complied within that time limit. The appellant immediately asked for a review of that decision on 24th November 1997, which request appears to have been turned down by the Chairman on a letter dated 8th April 1998. In the meantime, however, the appellant appealed to this tribunal against the substance of the decision. At a hearing on 18th May 1998 this tribunal held that upon the basis of the evidence presented to the Employment Tribunal, it could not interfere with the finding that the proviso of reasonable practicability had not been met. Faced with that situation, the appellant then appealed again to this tribunal against the refusal on the part of the Chairman to grant a review which she had separately applied for.
It is very important to bear in mind that the two tracks whereby a dissatisfied applicant or indeed respondent at an Employment Tribunal may proceed by way of appeal is entirely separate. The main ground of appeal to this tribunal is concerned with alleged errors of law with regard to the procedures and findings of the Employment Tribunal. On the other hand, an application for a review of the tribunal's decision is made to the Chairman under specific headings of Regulation 11 of the Industrial Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1993. Not surprisingly, before us Miss Salinger concentrated upon sub-clause (e) which refers to the interests of justice, which she said required us to review the whole position and remit back to the Chairman. It has to be borne in mind that properly understood, that phrase does not embrace all aspects of the justice of the case, but merely essentially whether there had been procedural errors or procedural problems which require rectification. However before us, the appellant presented further evidence by way of doctor's material which was to the effect that her state of mind was such that she could not reasonably have been expected to present the application to the tribunal earlier than she did. This material was not before the Chairman at the time of hearing nor at the time of the application for review.
In these circumstances, it seems to us appropriate that at least an opportunity should be given for the Chairman to review his decision to refuse a review against the background of this new evidence, albeit that he may still conclude, and it is entirely a matter for him, that it does not affect the overall position given in his original decision. That we leave up to him, but we are at least prepared to allow the matter to be reviewed by him against the background of the new material.
In these circumstances, it is the order of this tribunal that the matter will be remitted back to the Chairman under in terms of Regulation 11(1)(d) for him to reconsider the question of whether or not the original decision should be reviewed, and that is the limit of our ruling.