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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Bassey v Southend On Sea Borough Council [1999] UKEAT 1462_98_2304 (23 April 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/1462_98_2304.html Cite as: [1999] UKEAT 1462_98_2304

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS


 


THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether there is an arguable point of law in an Appeal which Mr Bassey wishes to make against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at Stratford which unanimously dismissed his complaint of unlawful race discrimination which he had brought against his former Employers, the Southend on Sea Borough Council.

The brief facts can be taken from the Tribunal decision. On 14th October 1997, Mr Bassey of Afro-Caribbean origin, submitted an application form to the Respondents, Southend Borough Council, for registration as a Door Supervisor under the relevant scheme. It was drawn to his attention that it was a condition of the scheme that door supervisors must have undertaken training provided by currently approved organisations. The scheme contemplated that some door supervisors might have undertaken training provided by organisations not currently approved and it was the normal practice that in such a case, an individual would be required to undertake further training by an approved organisation. Mr Bassey was at that time registered under a similar scheme operated by the Westminster Council and he had undertaken a form of training with an organisation known as "Critical Training Limited". It was pointed out to him by the Council that his certificate from this organisation was not from an approved trainer and that therefore, he would have to have further training. He accepted that he found that an unreasonable demand and the exchange between the parties became heated.

The form of application for registration requires an Applicant to state his previous names, if any. Mr Bassey had changed his name by Deed Poll and he had informed the Council's Electoral Officer of that fact, but on his application form he did not include his previous name. He was also asked to declare details of any unspent convictions and his attention was drawn to the provisions of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. Mr Bassey signed a declaration to the effect that the information that he had given on his application form was true and complete in every respect and that he recognised and acknowledged that the grant for registration would be subject to a police record check but that spent convictions were not taken into account by the Licensing Authority. He had 7 spent convictions, the last occurring in April 1993, but he did not disclose that he had been convicted at Chelmsford Crown Court on 5th February 1992 and sentenced to 9 months imprisonment for an offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, nor did he disclose that on 12th April 1996 he had formally been cautioned by the Metropolitan Police for carrying an offensive weapon in a public place.

He chose not to disclose these matters, according to the Employment Tribunal "because he considered the Council had no business to enquire". Having made customary enquiries of the Police and having discovered the facts to which we have referred, there was an application by the Police opposing the grant of registration to Mr Bassey and his application was refused by the Council. He exercised his Right of Appeal and set out the grounds of that Appeal by letter dated 3rd February 1998. Put shortly, it was his case that the conviction at Chelmsford Crown Court had been unlawfully obtained, that the caution was for a relatively trivial matter and he protested the decision of the Council to require prospective employees to disclose details of their criminal record.

Mr Bassey presented his Appeal in person to a Committee of the Council but he was unsuccessful. Mr Bassey has acknowledged to us that he did appeal against his conviction but that the Appeal was unsuccessful.

The Tribunal note that Mr Bassey's complaint to them was lacking in particularity but they went on to conclude that it was clear from the facts that the complaint fails, not only as there is no evidence whatsoever upon which it can be concluded that others of a different racial group had been treated more favourably, but no arguable basis had been shown to support the suggestion that the decision was unreasonable, still less, manifestly unreasonable. On his own account, Mr Bassey has a poor record and he had not assisted his cause by omitting two material facts from his application form. There is no room for the possibility that any inference could be drawn that the refusal of which the complaint is made was on racial grounds. Accordingly, they rejected his complaint.

It is not immediately apparent to us why this Appeal has been made to the Employment Appeal Tribunal because it is unclear that this is a complaint which falls within our jurisdiction, but we prefer to consider this case on the assumption that we do have jurisdiction on this Appeal. The Appellant has supported his Appeal with a PHD form and a skeleton argument of sorts. We have to say with great respect to him that it seems to us that there is no point of law raised in the appeal to which we should have regard. This was a factual exercise for the Employment Tribunal. It seems to us manifestly clear from the facts as found by them that the complaint made by Mr Bassey was frankly, if we might respectfully say so, hopeless from the start. Having lost the case before the Employment Tribunal we have to say that we regard his Appeal as hopeless, in the same way. This was a bad case, it seems to us, of him misleading a relevant authorising body, which disentitled Mr Bassey to have his application for registration granted. Accordingly, the Appeal will be dismissed.