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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Jackson v. East Sussex County Council [1999] UKEAT 270_99_2306 (23 June 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/270_99_2306.html Cite as: [1999] UKEAT 270_99_2306

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	IN PERSON


 


MR JUSTICE CHARLES: This is an appeal which comes before us by way of a preliminary hearing at which the issue for us is whether or not the appeal raises points that are reasonably arguable.

1. The parties are Mr Jackson, who is the Appellant, and East Sussex County Council, who are the Respondent. Mr Jackson appeals against a decision of the Employment Tribunal, the Extended Reasons for which were sent to the parties on 6 January 1999. The decision of the Employment Tribunal was that the Appellant's, that is Mr Jackson's complaints under section 1(1)(a) and 1(1)(b) of the Race Relations Act 1976 fail and are dismissed.
2. Mr Jackson was, as we understand it, represented before the Employment Tribunal but today he has chosen to represent himself. I should say at this stage that, although as he pointed out he did not have experience of representing himself in this Tribunal, he has in our view made his points succinctly and clearly to us and we are grateful to him. As he pointed out and therefore understands the issue before us is whether or not his appeal raises reasonably arguable points of law. We have concluded that it does not. In brief our reasons for that conclusions are as follows:
3. In paragraph 5 of the Extended Reasons the Employment Tribunal, in our judgment correctly, set out the approach in law to allegations of direct discrimination under section 1(1)(a) and in paragraph 5 adopt a correct legal approach to the allegations of indirect discrimination. In our judgment the reasoning on both aspects of their decision appears clearly from the Extended Reasons which further show, in our judgment, that on both issues the Employment Tribunal have adopted the correct approach in law that they have set out. In particular, in our judgment, the Employment Tribunal have adopted the correct approach to the question whether or not direct discrimination should be inferred, in that they have found the primary facts, and then gone on to explain, in our view clearly, why in the circumstances of this case they did not infer discrimination.
4. The points raised by Mr Jackson in a helpful skeleton argument and in his oral submissions were firstly, that the Tribunal did not take sufficient account of his managerial ability to undertake the job and therefore, to sufficiently seek an explanation from the Respondents as to why they did not take that experience into account or give it additional importance and weight. As to that he referred us specifically to paragraph 6(d) to his IT1 and in the course of submission we also referred to paragraph 7(d) of the Extended Reasons. In this context Mr Jackson told us that the earlier judgment of this Tribunal, which confirms his management experience, was not before the interviewing panel but we accept and understand that in the information he provided to the interviewing panel his management experience was referred to.
5. The second point is that one of the matters that Mr Jackson complained of concerning one of the members of the interview panel, a Mrs Cialfi, was not dealt with by the Tribunal. That was a complaint that in the material provided relating to the interviews carried out the answers he gave to certain questions were summarised and then his marks were included, whereas in respect of one of the successful candidates the answers were not summarised in the relevant papers and simply marks were given. He says that that showed a disparity in treatment as to which again the Tribunal should have sought further explanation from the Respondents, and in the light of that explanation it would have been open to them to infer discrimination.
6. We have taken those two points together because they both lead to the point made by Mr Jackson in this part of the appeal that the Tribunal erred in their approach to the issue as to whether or not direct discrimination should be inferred. As we have said at the beginning of this judgment we do not agree.
7. Turning particularly to the allegation as to Mr Jackson's management experience and skills, it seems to us that when the Extended Reasons are read as a whole, that is one of the factors taken into account, both by the interviewing panel and by the Tribunal, in testing the process they went into. In this context we refer back to paragraph 7(d) which looks at the overall qualifications of Mr Jackson, although we accept and emphasise that no one sub-paragraph should be read in isolation.
8. As to the second point, we accept that so far as our reading goes that point was not dealt with specifically by the Tribunal in their Extended Reasons. It is not necessary for Tribunals to deal with each and every point raised. They have dealt with what appear to us to be the more major criticisms of that member of the interview panel, and make findings contrary to Mr Jackson's contentions. Further, in respect of this allegation it does not seem to us that it would lead to an inference being drawn that there was discrimination in this case when it is looked at in isolation, and that view is confirmed when one has regard to the overall reasoning of the Tribunal in their Extended Reasons, when they deal with the issue as to what inferences should be made in the light of their primary findings of fact and the case advanced by Mr Jackson.
9. Another point made by Mr Jackson to the same effect was the failure of the Tribunal to have regard to the fact that the interview panel did not apply the Equal Opportunities Policy of the East Sussex County Council. In our judgment precisely the same points apply to this assertion. In our judgment, it is not reasonably arguable that it demonstrates that the Tribunal in any way erred in law or in any way left out an important fact in their considerations.
10. A further point made by Mr Jackson is that no fact should be treated as being predominant in the decision-making process as to choosing between various applicants for a post. Equally, he says that in reaching its findings, the Tribunal should not have treated any fact as being predominant. We agree with that as a general position. In our judgment, it is quite clear from the Extended Reasons that neither the interviewing panel and thus the employers or the Tribunal made this error.
11. Finally, we should mention that in his skeleton argument Mr Jackson identified two further points which, as we understood them, were to the effect that a condition had been applied that candidates should have experience in rural areas and, if that had been the case, that would found a claim under section 1(1)(b). In making his oral submissions to us Mr Jackson, in our judgment correctly, said that the interviewing panel and thus the employers, had not imposed or applied any such requirement or condition. In our judgment, it is clear that they did not do so and the parts of the Extended Reasons relating to Mr Jackson's experience in urban as opposed to rural areas is part of the general consideration of his overall experience, skills and expertise.
12. In summary therefore, although we are aware that Mr Jackson feels aggrieved by this decision of the Employment Tribunal, he is aware that the jurisdiction of this Tribunal is confined to errors of law and for the reasons we have given there is no reasonably arguable point that such an error has been made by the Employment Tribunal. Again, we express our thanks to him for putting his case clearly and politely to us.