Appeal No.	 EAT/34/99

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 14.04.1999

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MISS A MACKIE OBE
MS B SWITZER

Mr M Bulindi	APPELLANT

1) Mrs Ann Osler  2) Richmond upon Thames College	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	Mr Bulindi
(In Person)

	JUDGE PETER CLARK:	By an Originating Application presented to the London (South) Employment Tribunal on 2nd July 1998 the Appellant, Mr Bulindi brought a complaint of victimisation against the Respondents, Ann Osler and Richmond Upon Thames College (“the College”).  The nature of his case is not clear from that pleading.  By their Notice of Appearance the College contended that the Appellant had never been employed - he was a student at the College.  The case was listed for hearing on 22nd October 1998 before a Tribunal chaired by Mr D Booth.  The Respondents appeared through Ms Leigh, the Personnel Director of the College.  The Appellant did not attend.  The Application was dismissed by a decision with extended reasons dated 28th October 1998.  The Tribunal held that as the Appellant was a student of the College and not an employee the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain his complaint.  

	It seems that the Appellant had contacted ACAS to say that he was unwell and would not be attending the hearing.  That message eventually got through to the Tribunal at 3.25 pm.  The Chairman then considered whether to reinstate the case but decided that since the Appellant’s attendance could not alter the fact that he was a student and not an employee, he would not do so.  An application for a review of that decision was summarily dismissed by the Chairman by a decision dated 18th November 1998.  The basis for that decision was that the Appellant was not an employee and therefore the Tribunal had no jurisdiction.  Against both the substantive decision and the review decision, the Appellant now appeals.

	Mr Bulindi has appeared before us in person today and therefore, we have been able to draw from him some more details as to what precisely his case is.  He accepted an offer of a place on a training course at the College which began on 12th January 1998.  The purpose of that course, he tells us, was to acquire expert skills, particularly in computer operations and to improve his chances for employment, either with the College or outside or indeed, on a self-employed basis.  It does not appear that this was a course which brought the College within the definition of a qualifying body under Section 12 of the Race Relations Act 1976.

	He tells us that he complained about interference with a programme which he was running by a technician and that in due course he was accused by Mrs Osler, who was head of the department to which he was attached, of bringing the College into disrepute and ejected from the programme on 8th April 1998 without explanation.  Hence, he brought his complaint which he tells us, is brought under Section 1 and/or 2 of the 1976 Act.  The question for us, in this appeal, is whether there are any grounds for interfering with either of the Tribunal’s decisions on the basis that an error of law is made out.  His case, on appeal, can be summarised in one sentence:  

“I did not get justice”.  

	We think that the real question is whether the Tribunal was entitled to conclude, and the Chairman entitled to conclude on the Review Application, that it had no jurisdiction to entertain this complaint, even had the Appellant attended when the case was first called on.  

	Mr Bulindi tells us that although he received no payment by way of wages, he was allowed free access to the College’s website.  We cannot see that that could conceivably create the relationship of employer and employee as defined in Section 78 of the 1976 Act.  It follows that the short answer to this Appeal is that the Tribunal was, in our judgment, entitled to take the view that it had no jurisdiction.  It took that view without having heard Mr Bulindi.  We have now heard him and in our judgment, that decision is vindicated.

	Accordingly, there being no grounds in law for interfering with either of these decisions, we must dismiss this Appeal.