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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Abbots v. HM Customs & Excise [1999] UKEAT 405_99_2107 (21 July 1999) URL: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/405_99_2107.html Cite as: [1999] UKEAT 405_99_2107

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR UNDERWOOD (of Counsel) APPEARING UNDER EMPLOYMENT LAW APPEAL ADVICE SCHEME (ELAAS)


 


JUDGE CLARK: The Appellant, Mr Abbots, is a self-confessed alcoholic. He was employed by the Respondent as Principal Legal Officer from 1989 until his dismissal, effective on 2 March 1998. On 5 October 1998 he presented a complaint of unfair dismissal to the London South Employment Tribunal. The claim was resisted, among other grounds, on the basis that it was time-barred.

1. The limitation point was taken as a preliminary issue before a full Employment Tribunal chaired by Ms Christiana Hyde sitting on 13 January 1999. The Tribunal dismissed the complaint on the time point by a decision promulgated with Extended Reasons on 1 February 1999. It is against that decision that Mr Abbots now appeals.
2. Section 111(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides:

"an industrial tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented to the Tribunal -

(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or

(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months."

It was common ground that the complaint was presented outside the primary limitation period of three months. That period expired on 1 June 1998. The complaint was presented four months later.

3. Was it not reasonably practicable for the Appellant to present the compliant within time? The Tribunal found that it was. They took into account his problems with alcohol. They found that in late March 1998 he was arrested and remanded in custody for three weeks in respect of a domestic dispute. On 24 April 1998, at Oxford Magistrates Court, he was given a sentence which resulted in his immediate release. He remained at liberty until the expiry of the primary limitation period. Shortly thereafter he conducted his own defence in High Court contempt proceedings.
4. The Tribunal took into account that during the primary limitation period the Appellant was taking advice from his trade union that did not consider that he had a claim. He was at liberty for all but three weeks of that three-month period. They were not satisfied on the evidence that the effects of his alcoholism were such as to prevent him, a qualified barrister, from submitting his complaint in time. Accordingly they dismissed the complaint. The subsequent application for review was summarily dismissed by the Chairman under rule 11(5) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 1993.
5. In his Notice of Appeal, the Appellant contends that the Tribunal did not properly regard alcohol as a serious illness and had not appreciated the significance of its effect on his ability to commence these proceedings. They were wrong to conclude that he was physically capable of doing so. Mr Underwood appears on his behalf under the ELAAS pro bono scheme today, and has focused his argument on the proposition that the Tribunal failed to make adequate findings of fact so that the Appellant knows why he lost on the limitation point. In particular, they did not make sufficient findings as to the potential impairment of mental capacity caused by alcohol abuse. We cannot accept that submission.
6. The question posed to the Tribunal was pre-eminently an issue of fact for them. It will be rare that this Appeal Tribunal will interfere with the Employment Tribunal's judgment on that matter, Palmer v Southend Council [1984] ICR 372, 385. The Tribunal, in our judgment took into account the Appellant's illness and whether for that reason it was not feasible for him to lodge his application in time. They found that he was not prevented from doing so. That was essentially a matter for them.
7. In all the circumstances we have concluded that there are no grounds in law for interfering with the Tribunal's decision. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.