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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Pandya v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue [1999] UKEAT 696_99_0311 (3 November 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/696_99_0311.html Cite as: [1999] UKEAT 696_99_311, [1999] UKEAT 696_99_0311

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS


 


JUDGE WILSON:

1. In this preliminary hearing of a proposed appeal by the appellant, the Tribunal has received a notification from the appellant that he does not intend to be present at the hearing. In those circumstances we proceed with the hearing, on the basis of the written submission attached to the Notice of Appeal which was submitted on the 24 May 1999.
2. The Appellant's application to the Employment Tribunal was that he had been discriminated against by reason of race. The unanimous decision of the Tribunal, sitting in Birmingham on the 11 May 1999, was that the originating application had not been presented before the end of the period of 3 months beginning when the act complained of was done. The Tribunal did not in all the circumstances of the case consider it just and equitable to consider the complaint out of time. Accordingly they found that they were without jurisdiction.
3. The application had arisen out of an application by the Appellant to the Respondent for the post of a Revenue Assistant. He had received a letter telling him that he had been unsuccessful in his application. It was accepted that he had received that letter on the 7 May 1998. The Tribunal had referred itself to section 4 of the Race Relations Act 1976, and in particular to subsection 1(c), which provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against anybody by refusing or remitting to offer them employment. The Tribunal referred to Section 68 of the 1976 Act, which sets out the provisions about time limits, and also the saving clause about just and equitable circumstances.
4. The Appellant contended that the receipt of the letter of the 7 May was not the date from which time should count because, after receiving that letter he had been put in touch with an official of the Inspectorate of Taxes, from whom in due course he received a letter dealing with his complaint and stating that the examples given in the application form for the employment contained little acceptable evidence of the skills required for the post. Therefore the application had been rejected.
5. The Appellant was not satisfied with that explanation, and had taken the matter further. The Tribunal noted that the entirety of the complaint was reviewed by the Equal Opportunities Officer of the Inland Revenue, who had written to the Appellant again on the 30 June 1998, stating that he was satisfied that what had taken place, had been entirely in line with the Inland Revenue recruitment procedures, and that the score awarded to the Appellant's application form was correct. That score was not sufficient to qualify this Appellant for the next stage of the process, in so far as his application was concerned.
6. The Tribunal found that the act complained of was done on the 7 May 1998. The full inquiry by the complaints officer resulting in the letter of 30 June 1998, might possibly and feasibly, have been considered by the Tribunal, in the context of whether it was just and equitable for the claim to be heard, even outside the three month time limit from the date of that letter. If the Tribunal had taken that view which it did not do, in any event the originating application would still have been out of time as it should have been registered by the 29 September 1998. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded as already indicated.
7. The appellant's statement in support of his Notice of Appeal, repeats his assertion of a continuous communication with the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, and that was dealt with in paragraph 11 of the extended reasons.
8. Secondly he says that all the letters should have been taken into account to decide the last date of the last letter. That is another way of saying the same thing, and is dealt with by paragraph 11.
9. Next he says that information obtained might have sufficed to identify reasons as to why he was not offered employment, quoting Section 7(3) of the Industrial Tribunal Act 1996, and section 4 of the Race Relations Act 1976. It seems to us that those reasons and the information were provided as is shown in paragraph 12(b) of the decision.
10. The next point raised is that since he has not been able to receive other information, or has been prevented from obtaining it, the time limit in fact should be the time limit when he could have the information. We find no merit in that submission which appears to us to be repetitive as well, because he goes on to suggest that the time should start from the date of his application.
11. Points 6, 7 and 8 of the written notice suggest that there was a concerted sinister effort by the Civil Servants to keep him out of work, and we find that those suggestions really detract from the argument which is put forward before they are set out.
12. We can find no reason to suppose that on full argument these objections would have any prospect of success, and accordingly the appeal must be dismissed at this stage.