Appeal No.	 EAT/803/98

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On  1 April 1999

Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE PETER CLARK
MISS C HOLROYD
MRS T A MARSLAND

MR F A HARAKIS	APPELLANT

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH	RESPONDENTS

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON	
For the Respondents	JANE MULCAHY
(of Counsel)
Instructed by:
The Office of the Solicitor
Department of Health
New Court
48 Carey Street
London
WC2A 2LS	

	JUDGE PETER CLARK:	This is an appeal by Mr Harakis against a decision of a Chairman, Mr G W Davis, sitting alone at the London (South) Employment Tribunal on 14th April 1998, striking out his complaint of racial discrimination under Rule 13(2)(d) of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure. That decision with written reasons was promulgated on 1st May 1998.

	The appeal came on for a preliminary hearing before a division of this tribunal, presided over by Judge Byrt QC, on 28th October 1998. On that occasion, the appellant was represented by Ms Monaghan of Counsel under the Employment Law Advice Appeal Scheme. The appeal was allowed to proceed to a full appeal hearing on the basis of an amended Notice of Appeal drafted by Ms Monaghan. Following that hearing the appellant instructed solicitors, Messrs Edwin Coe who applied on his behalf for Legal Aid on 28th November 1998. That application, we are told, was refused on a date sometime in the third week in March 1999. Against that refusal the appellant has appealed. However, no decision on his appeal has yet been made. On 15th April 1999 those solicitors apprised this tribunal of the Legal Aid position and applied for an adjournment of today’s full appeal hearing. That application was refused by the Registrar by letter of 19th April 1999. 

	Today Mr Harakis renews his application for an adjournment. He submits that as a layman he is not equipped to deal with the procedural points which arise in this appeal.

	Ms Mulcahy, on behalf of the respondent, adopts a neutral stance, she does not actively resist the application.

	We consider that this appeal raises important points of law and if the appellant is to succeed in his appeal and receive Legal Aid, then it will be of benefit for him to be represented at the full hearing of this appeal. We are conscious of the expense and inconvenience that an adjournment will cause, but we have to weight that against the interests of justice and in our judgment those interests require that the application is granted.

	We shall therefore adjourn this appeal, in the first instance for 28 days from today. If the Legal Aid application is resolved within that time, then the matter can be promptly restored to the list. If no decision is received within the 28 days period, then it is open to the appellant’s solicitors to apply for a further postponement of the hearing. That application should be put before me.

	On this basis, we adjourn the appeal.