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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Bisp v. Presswatch Ltd & Anor [1999] UKEAT 870_99_1811 (18 November 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1999/870_99_1811.html Cite as: [1999] UKEAT 870_99_1811

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR JOHN CROSFILL (of Counsel)


 


JUDGE WILKIE QC: The Employment Tribunal at Reading heard the Appellant's claims on Monday and Tuesday 24^th & 25^th May of this year. The claims at that stage were for wrongful dismissal, unfair dismissal and sex discrimination. The wrongful dismissal claim was withdrawn at the hearing and was dismissed on that basis. The claim for sex discrimination was dismissed. Neither of those decisions are the subject of this appeal. As far as the unfair dismissal claim is concerned, the conclusion of the tribunal was that she resigned in circumstances whereby section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 does not apply and accordingly the complaint of unfair dismissal fails.

1. The notice of appeal takes two points and Mr Crosfil in his extremely able submissions to us this morning and in his skeleton argument has fleshed out those two points. The first point he accepts is one of perversity, in other words it is taking issue with the conclusions of fact come to by this tribunal on the basis that no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could have come to those conclusions and that its conclusions where plainly wrong.
2. The findings of fact and the conclusions are summarised in paragraphs 20 and 21 of their decision. In paragraph 20 the tribunal indicate that they preferred the Respondent's version of events to that of the Applicant where they were in dispute. They make the finding that the reality of the situation that was prior to the 30^th June, when there was a particular incident, the Applicant was encountering considerable stress and was considering her position.
3. It is said that the conclusion that the verbal comment which, on one view, triggered her resignation was said in jest demonstrates the wrong the approach because it should be the impact on the listener, alternatively the impact on the reasonable listener that is important not the intent with which the comment was made.
4. As far as that is concerned, in paragraph 10 of the decision, evidence was recorded which the tribunal accepted as to what the applicant's view was about the comment that was allegedly made namely that she was going to resign that day anyway but the comment had given her the excuse that she was looking for.
5. In paragraph 21, and consistent with that piece of evidence which the tribunal had accepted, the tribunal make the following finding; "we do not consider the applicant resigned because of the second Respondent's remark but principally because of the stress on which she was operating. We also do not consider the remark made, either in isolation or in conjunction with other remarks, to breach the implied term of trust and confidence so that the applicant's resignation would amount to constructive dismissal.
6. In our judgement having read the decision carefully and having considered Mr Crosfil's submissions, we are unpersuaded that there is any reasonably arguable case that the Tribunal's conclusions were plainly wrong or such that no reasonable Tribunal could have come to on the evidence that was before it and on the evidence which they accepted.
7. The second ground for appeal, in essence, criticises the decision of the tribunal for failing to give any or any sufficient reasons for rejecting this part of the case. Whilst the tribunal decision does not list, point by point, each and every point that was made and the reasons for rejection or accepting them, reading the decision as a whole it is plain that they have addressed all the main points, have articulated where they accept evidence, where they do not accept evidence and have articulated their conclusions such that Mr Crosfil was able both in the notice of appeal and in his skeleton argument to focus of the particular points which he says were worthy of criticism.
8. On this ground too we find that there is no reasonably arguable case that this decision is flawed accordingly, we dismiss this appeal on that basis and at this stage.