Appeal No.	EAT/0439/97

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 26 February 2001

Before
MISS RECORDER SLADE QC
MISS C HOLROYD
MR G H WRIGHT MBE

MISS D WILLIS	APPELLANT

MARS CONFECTIONARY	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	APPELLANT IN PERSON

RECORDER SLADE QC:

1.	This is the preliminary hearing of an appeal by Miss Willis from the decision of an Employment Tribunal on 30 January 1997.  The purpose of this preliminary hearing is to determine whether the grounds of appeal disclose an arguable point of law.  The grounds of appeal are those which were sent under cover of a letter dated 7 July 1997, therefore lodged well over 3 years ago.  In those grounds of appeal the point is made that the Respondent had knowingly and deliberately failed to comply with an earlier Tribunal order for full disclosure of relevant documents and that, 3 or 4 bundles of documents were made available to Miss Willis only after she had completed her evidence and was half way through cross-examination of the Respondent’s second witness.  In  her notice of appeal, Miss Willis stated “I am unable to detail  various other points of law which arose out of this procedural defect” as her advisers were on annual leave.  It is her submission that the first point that we mentioned is sufficient to satisfy the Tribunal that her case should be allowed to proceed to a full hearing.  

2.	We now have had placed before us skeleton arguments from Miss Willis which raised innumerable other points, mainly factual.  We are here to determine whether the point which is raised in the ground of appeal which I have just referred to, discloses an arguable point of law.  It appears that the Tribunal sat hearing evidence and arguments over 5 days.  There was a break of some considerable time between the first 3 days of hearing and the resumed hearing thereafter.  It also appears that towards the end of the first 3 days, it became apparent that incomplete disclosure had been made.  How it came about is not entirely clear but what is clear was that the Respondents, at some point during the adjournment before the resumed hearing, did make disclosure to Miss Willis and it is in respect of that disclosure that she makes complaint.

3.	Pausing there, it appears that the Tribunal must have indicated at the end of the first 3 day hearing, that further disclosure was required, and that the indication was complied with.  The hearing resumed after a considerable gap.  What also appears to be the case is that Miss Willis at the resumed hearing did not apply to adjourn the case and did not apply for the Tribunal to make any other order consequent upon the further discovery and so the Tribunal, quite naturally, proceeded to hear the case.  We are told by Miss Willis that during the course of her cross-examination of the Respondent’s witnesses, she made comment about her being prejudiced by the late disclosure and further, that she made comment in her closing submissions about that fact.  As to how she was prejudiced, she tells us that had she had had disclosure of the documentation at the outset before hearing of the case started, she might have contacted additional witnesses and might have taken steps to have some representation.  

4.	We have considered very carefully whether the argument advanced to us by Miss Willis and the facts outlined to us disclose any error on the part of the Tribunal or any denial of natural justice.  Having regard to the fact that the initial defect in the Respondent’s disclosure was remedied, whether at the insistence of the Tribunal or otherwise we do not know but in any event was remedied by the date of the resumed hearing, and having regard to the fact that no application was made to adjourn the hearing when it did resume, we cannot find that there is an arguable point of law in this appeal.  Tribunals are used to having un-represented parties appear before them and those un-represented parties must make any points that they wish to make clear to the Tribunal.  We consider that this Tribunal cannot be criticised for failing to do something that it was not asked to do.  

5.	In those circumstances, we dismiss the appeal