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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Murray v. HM Land Registry [2001] UKEAT 1440_00_2506 (25 June 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2001/1440_00_2506.html Cite as: [2001] UKEAT 1440_00_2506, [2001] UKEAT 1440__2506

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT


 
JUDGE PETER CLARK
1. The Appellant, Mr Murray was employed by the Land Registry, first in Croydon and later in Cardiff, as a Registration Officer from 20 June 1988 until his resignation effective on 10 September 1999.
2. Following that resignation he presented an originating application to the Cardiff Employment Tribunal, dated 5 December 1999, complaining of constructive unfair dismissal. The trigger for his resignation appears to have been his failure to secure promotion. It was the Respondent's handling of his application for promotion, particularly by his line manager, Mr Heatley, which he contended destroyed the necessary mutual trust and confidence vital in this and every contract of employment.
3. The substantive hearing of the complaint took place in Cardiff before a Tribunal chaired by Mr G H Prichard on 2 August 2000. By a decision with extended reasons promulgated on 23 August 2000 (the original decision), the complaint was dismissed. The Tribunal concluded, having heard the evidence and argument over a very full day, that the Respondent was not in breach of contract, let alone in fundamental breach, consequently there was no constructive dismissal and, it follows, no unfair dismissal.
4. By letter dated 1 September 2000 the Appellant made an application for review of the original decision, on the footing that the interests of justice required a review (Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure Rule 11(1)(e)). He listed 6 separate grounds of application.
5. That application and those grounds were considered by the Chairman Mr Prichard, and summarily dismissed under Rule 11(5) in a review decision with extended reasons promulgated on 16 October 2000 (the review decision). He considered that the review application had no reasonable prospect of success.
6. Against that decision the Appellant now appeals. This is not his first appeal in this case; it is in fact the fifth.
7. On 27 July 2000 a division on which I sat heard 2 Interlocutory appeals (EAT 880/00; EAT 881/00), concerning discovery and the Tribunal's refusal to order a postponement of the hearing fixed for 2 August. We dismissed both appeals for the reasons given in the judgement which I delivered on that day.
8. On 2 November 2000, at a Preliminary Hearing, a division presided over by Mr Recorder Burke QC heard 2 further appeals, EAT 813/00 and EAT 1268/00. The first concerned a refusal to review an opinion expressed by a Chairman, Dr Rachel Davies, at a pre-hearing review held on 7 April 2000, that the claim had no reasonable prospect of success. The second was an appeal against the original decision dated 23 August 2000.
9. Both appeals were dismissed. Of particular significance to the appeal before us is the Employment Appeal Tribunal's careful analysis of the original decision in appeal No 1268/00. The Appeal Tribunal found that there was no error of law in the original decision; the Employment Tribunal had reached a permissible conclusion, on the facts as found, that the Appellant was not constructively dismissed by the Respondent.
10. Against that background, we turn to the present appeal. Mr Murray has not attended to prosecute his appeal (for understandable economic reasons) but he has submitted a skeleton argument running to 8 page, which we have considered in conjunction with his review application and Mr Prichard's review decision.
11. The review procedure under Rule 11(1) is not designed to allow a litigant, unhappy with the result in his case, to reargue the matter afresh. Although Rule 11(1)(e), the interests of justice ground, may appear to be a broad provision, it is a discretion which must be exercised judicially, having regard not only to the interests of the Applicant for review, but also those of the Respondent and the public interest requirement for finality of litigation where possible – Flint v Eastern Electricity Board [1975] ICR 395.
12. Having considered Mr Murray's detailed submissions here and below, we are quite unable to detect any error of law in the Chairman's review decision. There has been no procedural mishap or miscarriage of justice, which would warrant a review under Rule 11(1)(e). None of the specified grounds for review, set out at Rule 11(1)(a)-(d) arise.
13. In these circumstances, we shall dismiss this appeal.