Appeal No EAT/16/01

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

	At the Tribunal
	On 5 June 2001

Before
SIR CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY QC
MR P R A JACQUES CBE
MRS J M MATTHIAS

MR P COPLAND	APPELLANT

TECHNICAL DEMOLITION SERVICES	RESPONDENT

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING EX-PARTE

Revised

	APPEARANCES

For the Appellant	APPELLANT NEITHER PRESENT NOR REPRESENTED	

SIR CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY

1.	This is an Appeal by Mr P Copland against the decision of the Employment Tribunal sitting at Liverpool, the Extended Reasons for which were sent to the parties on 30 October 2000.  In that decision the Tribunal found that Mr Copland had not been employed for a continuous period of 1 year and thus did not have any right to claim unfair dismissal or to complain that he had not been provided with written reasons for his dismissal.

2.	In his Notice of Appeal that is dated 8 December 2000 Mr Copland or those representing him argue essentially that the Tribunal’s decision was based on a misinterpretation of the facts and misinterpretation of the concept of a temporary cessation of work within the meaning of section 212(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

3.	The essential facts are that Mr Copland worked for the Respondent’s Technical Demolition Services as a worker on various sites carrying out demolition work.  On a particular site at Brighton Street, Wallasey the work came to an end on a date in August 1999.  Mr Copland was according to the Tribunal’s findings given verbal notice of termination of his contract to take effect on 20 August 1999 and the Tribunal finds at paragraph 6(v) that they were satisfied that his contract of employment with the Respondent, which was a purely oral contract which began on 13 January 1999, was terminated by the Respondents on 20 August 1999.

4.	It further appears that the Respondents issued the Applicant with a P45 form on 27 August 1999.  What happened then was that although the Applicant had kept in touch with the Respondents hoping to find other demolition work he by chance met a representative of the Respondents, a Mr O’Dowd, in Birkenhead on 23 October 1999 and Mr O’Dowd told him that the Respondents might have work in the Asbestos Division which was different from the Demolition Division.  He therefore contacted the Asbestos Division and commenced employment with them on 24 October 1999.  The issue before the Tribunal therefore was whether the gap in the Applicant’s employment between 20 August 1999 and 24 October 1999 was a merely a “temporary cessation of work” within the meaning of section 212(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 or whether the Applicant’s contract of employment had been definitively terminated on 27 August with the effect that despite his re employment on 24 October he did not have the necessary qualifying period of continuous employment for 1 year - the gap between August and October not counting for that purpose.

5.	That being the issue what has happened today is that the Applicant has not appeared to prosecute his appeal and no one has appeared on his behalf.  This Employment Appeal Tribunal received a letter from the Birkenhead Citizens Advice Bureau of 9 May 2001 notifying the Registry that although they were helping this Appellant they would not be representing him at the hearing and that he was unable to instruct a Solicitor or Counsel due to limited resources.  They, the Citizens Advice Bureau, asked the Registry if particulars of the Appeal could be forwarded to the Free Representation Unit for possible help.

6.	The Registry replied on 14 May to the effect that the Employment Appeal Tribunal could not itself approach the Free representation unit on behalf of Mr Copland but would be happy to send a copy of the court bundle to them if an address and reference to which it could be sent could be provided.  The Employment Law Appeal Advice Scheme does provide representation for unrepresented parties at the Employment Appeal Tribunal Preliminary Hearings, but as the Citizen Advice Bureau was acting for Mr Copland he was not eligible for that particular scheme.

7.	Nothing further has been heard from the Appellant since that date.  Despite the Appellant’s absence today we have given careful consideration to the matters raised in the Notice of Appeal.  We have come to the conclusion that the issue in this case is essentially a question of fact for the Employment Tribunal to determine and in particular whether the Applicant was “continuously employed” for the necessary period or not.

8.	Having examined the Tribunal’s reasoning and factual findings on that point we have been unable to detect any error of law in the Tribunal’s decision.  The consequence of that is that this Appeal must be dismissed.