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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Ritchie & Ors v. Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration [2004] UKEAT 0043_03_2303 (23 March 2004) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2004/S0043_03_2303.html Cite as: [2004] UKEAT 43_3_2303, [2004] UKEAT 0043_03_2303

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APPEARANCES

 

 

For the Appellants	Mr P Grant-Hutchison, Advocate Instructed by- Messrs Brodies Solicitors 15 Atholl Crescent EDINBURGH EH3 8HA
For the Respondent	Mr P Brown, Solicitor Of- Messrs Biggart Baillie Solicitors Dalmore House 310 St Vincent Street GLASGOW G2 5QR


 


LORD JOHNSTON:

1. This appeal arises in a rather unusual way.
2. The applicants, who are solicitors, employed by the respondents, brought an application to the Employment Tribunal alleging unlawful deduction of wages in respect of failure on the part of the respondents to pay their annual dues in respect of a practising certificate to entitle them to be a solicitor, the dues being payable to the Law Society.
3. It appears that for some time the employer did make such payments then declined to do so. We have to say at once that there is clearly a contractual issue in this respect, but, as the Tribunal points out, this is not the matter before us. The only question to be determined by the Tribunal was whether or not the dues should be treated as wages or expenses. The Tribunal determined the matter on the basis that they were expenses.
4. Despite the grounds of appeal, Mr Grant-Hutchison, appearing for the appellants, restricted his submissions to two very limited points, suggesting procedural irregularities on the part of the Tribunal and an error of law which would warrant the matter being sent for a rehearing. His principal complaint appeared to be that the Tribunal had proceeded upon the evidence that was given by one of the applicants as to how he regarded the status of the dues and failed to take into account an admitted fact determined at a preliminary hearing that "the respondents were keen to employ solicitors". This latter fact, Mr Grant-Hutchison submitted, was very important yet the Tribunal had left out of account and in so doing had misdirected themselves on the basis that they should have used that as a pointer to the fact that the so-called "keenness" of the local authority, rendered the payment of dues an enticement to employment and therefore salary rather than expenses.
5. Mr Grant-Hutchison had a subsidiary point that in an extempore judgment given at the end of the hearing, in the last paragraph, the Tribunal rehearsed a matter external to this particular issue but did not thereafter refer to it in the extended reasons.
6. We take that point no further upon the basis that any extempore judgment which should be regarded as summary reasons, is overtaken by the extended reasons which stand on their own feet and must be looked at intrinsically.
7. This we do in this case and have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Tribunal reached a decision, upon any view of the material before it, it was entitled to reach. We would, however, go further than do the Tribunal and express the view, that, even if the payment of dues could be regarded as an enticement to employment, it certainly does not translate into wages, being the equivalent of a subscription, or in this case, a professional requirement incumbent upon a person who wishes to practice as a solicitor. The fact that for the purposes of work involving the Children's Panel or Reporters, a solicitor did not have to have a practising certificate, does not to our mind, add anything to the point. The fact that such are paid by the employer cannot translate it into part of a salary or wages. It is perhaps significant that a self-employed solicitor would be entitled to deduct from his earnings the cost of such a certificate, and, indeed, looking at the matter conversely, the Inland Revenue do not regard it as a benefit of kind in the context of employment.
8. In these circumstances we consider that the Tribunal reached a correct decision and this appeal will be refused.