



**First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Information Rights
Decision Notices
FS50804157 - EA/2019/0389
FS50868003 - EA/2019/0447**

EA/2019/0389 & EA/2019/0447

**Heard remotely
On 29 September 2020**

Alex Kuznetsov

Appellant

Information Commissioner

First Respondent

London Borough of Camden

Second Respondent

Representation

The Appellant: in person
First Respondent: did not appear
Second Respondent: Mr C Knight (Counsel)

Cases

**Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759, DC
Dransfield v Information Commissioner & Devon County Council [2012] UKUT 440
Dransfield v Information Commissioner and another [2015] EWCA Civ 454
Magyar Helsinki Bizottsag v Hungary [2016] ECHR 975
Moss v the Information Commissioner and the Cabinet Office [2020] UKUT 0242 (AAC)**

Some proceedings relating to Mr Kuznetsov
CPO Report to the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government
NPCU/CPO/X5210/76259
Kuznetsov v London Borough of Camden [2017] EWHC 3740
CO/2373/2017
Kuznetsov v Manulife Asset Management 2200417/2017

DECISION AND REASONS

1. At the start of this hearing the Appellant (“Mr Kuznetsov”) sought to repeat an unsuccessful application made at the start of the hearing on 9th September. He refused to co-operate with the tribunal, would not make an opening statement and chose not to participate further in the hearing. The tribunal considered that his failure to engage properly with the hearing was his choice and the interests of justice required the tribunal to proceed with the hearing. The tribunal’s attention was drawn

to the behaviour of Mr Kuznetsov with respect to the CPO Inquiry (Inquiry held on 2 and 8 September 2016– bundle pages 380 - 411 at paragraphs 4-21, 133); this behaviour has been largely replicated in the period leading to 29 September.

2. Mr Kuznetsov was formerly a leaseholder on a housing estate which has subsequently been redeveloped by the Second Respondent (“Camden”). On 25 April 2013 Camden was granted planning permission to redevelop the estate and other land and build 290 homes and 3 business units. In April 2015 Camden offered £654,000 for his flat (based on an independent valuation it had received of £620,000). Mr Kuznetsov refused and on 26 October 2015 Camden made a compulsory purchase order authorising the acquisition of the estate. By August 2016 Mr Kuznetsov’s flat was the sole occupied residence of an estate of 99 residential units and preparatory works began. Mr Kuznetsov made simultaneous applications in two separate courts to prevent these works. No steps in these proceedings have been taken since February 2017.
3. The CPO enquiry originally scheduled for 10 May 2016 was finally held four months later. The only objectors were Mr Kuznetsov and two occupiers of his flat. On 4 January 2017 the Inspector recommended confirmation of the CPO. The Secretary of State confirmed the CPO in March 2017 and with effect from 20 July 2017 the property was vested in Camden. On 20 October 2017 he was evicted. On 24 October 2017 he obtained an ex parte injunction from the High Court which the Judge two days later discharged stating: - *“It now appears that I was seriously misled on Tuesday by Mr Kuznetsov, or at least he failed to disclose some highly material background to this case”*. He unsuccessfully applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against this, and also unsuccessfully applied to suspend the CPO. The property was demolished in January 2018.
4. Mr Kuznetsov sought entry to Camden’s housing register on 24 November 2017. He claimed to be homeless and gave his contact address as his former property. During the course of this application on 25 May 2018 Mr Kuznetsov made a request for information from Camden’s Housing Needs Team:

“I followed up on our discussion yesterday and asked whether you can send me the policy on the procedure used (e.g. dataflow). You confirmed that you have a document establishing the sequence of processing information and will send it to me, unless your manager [name redacted] would object”

5. Camden declined to provide the information relying on s14(1) FOIA: -

“section 1(1) does not oblige a public authority to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious”

6. Mr Kuznetsov complained to the First Respondent (“the IC”) who following an investigation issued her decision notice FS50868003 on 6 November 2019 which upheld Camden’s position. The decision notice contained an annex setting out a detailed history of the conflict between Mr Kuznetsov and Camden which she had attached to a previous determination upholding the application of s14(1) to a request for information from Mr Kuznetsov. She considered that Mr Kuznetsov had caused Camden a disproportionate level of disruption, irritation and distress and that the effort dealing with his series of requests, SARs and internal complaints was disproportionate and there was not a wider public interest in the information; complying with the request would only lead to further requests.

7. On 30 September 2018 Mr Kuznetsov asked Camden: -

“Could you provide information on the costs paid in the legal proceedings in the claim Alexander Kuznetsov v London Borough of Camden (claim No HC- 2017.002796) amounts paid and the dates on which the payments had been made, payment confirmations and invoices, please?

Please also include copies of the contracts setting a legal basis for the payments.”

8. Camden again relied on s14(1) and the IC upheld this position in decision notice FS50804157 issued on 17 September 2019. In an annex to the decision notice the IC repeated the detailed chronology (drawn from the previous decision notice setting out many court proceedings, FOIA/EIR and subject access requests which he had pursued against Camden. She found that Camden had for three years devoted considerable effort to dealing with Mr Kuznetsov, placing a strain on its ability to deal with other matters, there was little evidence to show the information was of public interest, while the request was not itself onerous complying with this request would only lead to more requests and the continued willingness to deal with non- Bacton requests contradicted any claim of harassment.

Mr Kuznetsov’s case

9. Mr Kuznetsov appealed to this tribunal against both decisions.
10. In his appeal with respects to the costs information he advanced 18 grounds of appeal including that the information was personal data, that the decision of the IC was in breach of ECHR, was a perverse and unsubstantiated decision which had not applied the proper test for s14(1), by a person who should have declared a bias on the basis that (he claimed) the decision-maker was a member of a Parish Council and would therefore be biased in favour of Camden’s arguments, and the information concerned a risk of breaches of the Bribery Act , the Solicitors Act and of malfeasance in public office. Mr Kuznetsov made similar arguments in the appeal against the November decision notice.
11. During the course of these two appeals Mr Kuznetsov has submitted a number of documents which combine applications, allegations against individuals, claims of law and other arguments. he has submitted witness statements in respect of each appeal. In an 87-paragraph witness statement in respect of the appeal arising out of correspondence with the Housing Needs Team he argued a right to the information under 10 separate information regimes including the Housing Act 1996. In paragraph 9 he stated: -

“Other examples of the applicant being treated differently [and contrary to law and policies] include failure to take reasonable steps to secure that accommodation does not cease to be available for the applicant’s property s.195(2) HA 1996,”

It would appear that he is here claiming that the lawful demolition of the estate is being claimed to be a breach of his rights under the Housing Act.

12. The witness statement went on to argue that he had been denied his rights under the Housing Act and dealt extensively with his criticisms of the redevelopment, of Camden’s management of the estate, allegations of breach of Article 3 ECHR (inhumane and degrading treatment), claims of failure to comply with requirements

of the service of notices in connection with the planning application and redevelopment of the estate.

13. Paradoxically he argued that the information request was nothing to do with the Bacton estate litigation and that in addition to the strong public interest in the disclosure he had a personal interest (paragraph 36) as a *“party who was directly affected by the public authority’s acts and omissions and was subject to extreme prejudice, including substantial costs and damages. This is over and above the interference with statutory and convention rights and rights under international treaties.”* He argued bias on the part of the IC’s officer on the basis that he had made the decision in the other case and that the decision was perverse, ignored the statutory provisions and caselaw and was unsustainable on the IC’s own findings.
14. In the witness statement with respect to costs information (again dated 4 August 2020) he referred to the witness statement of Mr Smith for Camden (dated 22/7/2020 and wrongly identified in Mr Kuznetsov’s statement as being of 20/09/2020) alleging deliberate misstatement: *“To arrive at this figure Mr. Smith alleged that Camden LBC paid him and another employee...£317 per hour. This was inconsistent with the information from other sources”*. He submitted that as a result of this he had been deprived of money due to misrepresentation, breach of duty to the Court and/or breach of the Solicitors Act. Later in the statement (paragraph 27 he claimed that this *“show, or in any event tended to show a risk of ...[b] corruption, contrary to The Bribery Act 2010.”* The statement concluded with a signed and dated statement *“I believe that the facts stated in this Statement are true”*

The IC’s position

15. In resisting the appeals the IC relied on her decision notices and the decision of the Upper tribunal in Dransfield and the four broad themes which assist in considering whether a request is vexatious
 - The burden on the public authority
 - the motive of the requestor
 - The value or serious purpose
 - Any harassment of, or distress caused to, the public authority’s staff
16. She endorsed Camden’s view that the context and history showed the substantial burden imposed on Camden, issues relating to the estate had been fully canvassed in various proceedings and acceding to the requests would not bring an end to the matter, she could see little evidence of a wider public interest, Mr Kuznetsov’s accusatory language and unfounded allegations about Camden staff. She considered the numerous grounds of appeal and allegations against her investigation and noted that the only matter within scope was whether she had correctly applied s14(1) and maintained her position that she had correctly applied the binding authority on this provision *Dransfield*.

Camden’s evidence

17. Mr Smith a lawyer with Camden gave written (bundle pages 268-284, exhibits 285-326) and oral evidence. The written evidence explained the background to the costs issue arose as a result of Chancery proceedings commenced by Mr Kuznetsov claiming £938,000 for the property, the grounds upon which Mr Kuznetsov has based his claim have shifted and during the course of the proceedings the Deputy Master ordered payment on account of costs on 21 September 2018 of £12,000 by 12 October

2018 (pages 295-306). Mr Kuznetsov has taken no steps with Camden's legal department to explore the basis of the cost's calculation. At the date he made the information request he was liable to pay £12,000 to Camden; however on 30 November 2018 the order was stayed and the litigation remains unresolved, however since the original claim was struck out Mr Smith's evidence was that Camden remains entitled to its costs for that part of the litigation irrespective of the final outcome of the case. He set out how costs are calculated in accordance with the Court's rules and confirmed that the disclosure sought went beyond what would usually be considered in the normal course of the resolution of a costs dispute by the court, furthermore such disclosure would be subject to rules protecting their confidentiality and would not be disclosed to the whole world as they would be under FOIA.

18. Mr Smith confirmed that Mr Kuznetsov had brought a considerable number of separate court cases against Camden, five related to the CPO or the preparatory work on the estate, three related claims were by Mr Kuznetsov against Camden's contractor, sub-contractor of by a company associated with Mr Kuznetsov against the CPO. There were four claims related to his applications to be on Camden's housing waiting list. Many of his actions are overlapping or repetitive and contain many unarguable claims. Two Judges of the High Court have warned him that he is at risk of having a Civil restraint order imposed on him (such an order would prevent him from bringing certain cases before the courts). He has continued to refuse to give an address for service or has insisted that he lives in the accommodation at 150 Bacton long after he was evicted and it was demolished. He has made successive DPA and FOIA requests, often for information which he already has. These requests and the litigation interrupts more useful work and cause stress and distress to Camden's legal staff.
19. He repeatedly makes allegations against the Planning Inspector, the author of the IC's decision notices and Camden staff with whom he has dealt and has been warned by the High Court not to do so Sir Ros Cranston and (CO/2373/2017 -order in bundle page 568):- *"The claimant should be warned that unsupported allegations of conflicts of interest, dishonesty, corruption and the like may lead to adverse consequences for him"*. Since then he has reported Camden lawyers to their professional bodies, both the Solicitors Regulatory Authority and the Bar Standards Board declined to act against the lawyers, however this conduct has continued and causes distress to those who are the subjects of such complaints.
20. Mr Smith demonstrated the lack of substantive results for Mr Kuznetsov of this litigation and the considerable cost and disruption to Camden caused by it, as well as the harm to Camden staff his approach causes.
21. Ms Laws, is Team Leader in Information Rights and has led a team of four officers who handle FOIA/EIR and another four who deal with data protection including SAR; she has been in post for three years. Mr Kuznetsov has made 12 SARs to Camden since June 2016 as well as three SARs to the IC which required meetings between Camden and the IC to discuss redaction of third-party personal data. He has made 20 FOIA/EIR requests in just over three years. Camden did not rely on numerous requests made by Mr Kuznetsov before then. Of the 20 recent requests some which related to the Bacton Estate were considered manifestly unreasonable or vexatious, although have been responded to; although Camden did not rely on these provisions with respect to two Bacton related requests in 2017 or two relating to housing applications in 2018, one relating to pension arrangements for senior staff in 2018 and one related to the staffing and budget of the legal department in 2019.

22. Some subject access requests have been particularly time consuming, one in 2017 took approximately 100 hours of staff time. Even to consider a SAR and conclude that it is unreasonable takes about three hours of staff time. She gave evidence of a significant number of repeated and unreasonable requests. Among more recent requests her teams have responded to are: -

- 21 /4/2020 a rectification request by Mr Kuznetsov about data concerning his residency within the Borough of Camden. He was asked to clarify the request, failed to do so, the request was refused as manifestly unfounded and excessive, Mr Kuznetsov then threatened legal action.
- 22/4/2020 a rectification request relating to data Camden holds about his financial assets. Camden did not agree the request on the basis that it considers the data held to be correct.
- 22/4/2020 a SAR for information about Mr Kuznetsov and his former leasehold property, this had already been repeatedly requested and the IC had already rule against him, it also requested housing data which to Mr Kuznetsov's knowledge was being provided following a pre-action protocol concerning a housing application. He immediately submitted a pre-action protocol letter challenging the SAR refusal.
- One request on 23/6/2020 and two requests on 1/7/2020 for his personal data made under Russian law which he asserted applied made to the Information Rights Officer, the Borough Solicitor and the leader of the council.
- 8/7/2020 a request to the lawyer conducting these appeals, made under Russian law.

23. On 21 May 2020 Mr Kuznetsov concluded an email to Ms Laws with a strange threat:
-

"As a goodwill, Sarah Laws is advised to avoid visiting the US for 5 years commencing from 2 July 2020 unless the requested information is provided by 22.02.2020"

24. Mr Kuznetsov has also made repeated unsuccessful complaints to the Local Government Ombudsman.

25. Ms Laws in oral evidence confirmed that the stress caused by Mr Kuznetsov's conduct had caused two members of her staff to request that they did not deal with him. In her written evidence she stated: -

"I have rarely dealt with a requestor who has corresponded with a Council on such a large scale about, mainly, one issue. Not only is the Appellant's use of litigation, complaints, correspondence and information rights apparently endless, but it is also invariably framed in aggressive, accusatory and wholly unfounded terms which are a considerable source of stress and concern to those of my colleagues who have to deal with it. I am aware that dealing with [Mr Kuznetsov] has taken up a large amount of officer time to try and assist the appellant."

26. He has been criticised by the court for material non-disclosure in ex parte proceedings against Camden which, for two days, resulted in an order against Camden. His application, supported by his signed statement of truth dated 20 October 2017, appears at page 687 of the bundle:

1. *I confirm that I have been forced out of my home on 20/10/2017 by three persons who all edged to be acting on behalf of the defendant but neither explained the ground for their actions nor provided any documents or identified themselves despite my request.*

2. *I have not been served with any notices of possession proceedings, court orders authorising repossession or was provided any documents supporting such proceedings.*
27. In discharging the order in *Alexander Kuznetsov v London Borough of Camden* [2017] EWHC 3740 (transcript of proceedings bundle pages 690 -) Mr Justice Haddon-Cave summarised the evidence Mr Kuznetsov had given in order to obtain the order and continued: -

"6. It now appears that I was seriously misled on Tuesday by Mr Kuznetsov, or at very least he failed to disclose some of the highly material background to this case. In particular, he failed to inform me of the following material facts. Firstly, that he has been involved in long running proceedings seeking to challenge the compulsory purchase of the block of flats where he lives. Secondly, that he had previously been served with all the requisite legal documents and warrants by the council and the Sherriff's Office entitling the London Borough of Camden to take possession of 150 Bacton, Haverstock Road NW5 and evict him.

7. I specifically asked Mr Kuznetsov yesterday whether he had received any warrants or any documents entitling these three persons that he alleged had summarily evicted him from his flat and he said, "No, no documents"

The learned judge then listed the relevant orders with which Mr Kuznetsov had been served, details of other proceedings by Mr Kuznetsov and an associated company which had been dismissed and other recent developments, before continuing: -

"15. That brings the matter up to date. What I am now going to do is to make a number of orders in the light of these facts and matters. The striking feature of this case has been the non-disclosure by Mr Kuznetsov and the misleading account which he has given to this Court, as I've described above. It also transpires as Mr Hutchings QC has informed me this afternoon, that Camden council have been in close contact – were in close contact – with Mr Kuznetsov throughout Monday of this week. It is, therefore, surprising that Mr Kuznetsov gave Camden council no notice of his intention to apply on Tuesday to this emergency court, or to disclose the fact that he applied already on the 20th of October. No application was made or passed to Mr Justice Dove. No doubt, this was all deliberate in order to keep this court in the dark." Mr Kuznetsov unsuccessfully applied to the Court of Appeal to overturn this decision.

28. In one of his unsuccessful actions against Camden (CO/3329/2018 at bundle page 725) Mr Kuznetsov sought to challenge a costs order made against him. Judge Markus QC rejected his arguments: *"The Claimant also submits that the Defendant inflated the statements of costs. I reject this. It relies substantially on the misconception that the solicitor's salary determines the hourly rate. The costs schedule was supported by a statement of truth and the Claimant has not advanced any proper basis for impugning the statement."* On 11 December 2019 Mr Justice Mostyn dismissed the appeal from Judge Markus addressing Mr Kuznetsov's arguments in detail, setting out the basis upon which costs are calculated in accordance with the Supreme Court Practice, and the Court of Appeal authority for the approach to costs which Camden has adopted and concluded *"I therefore reject the challenge to the bill of costs, specifically to the hourly rate component of the statement of costs."*

Consideration

29. Mr Kuznetsov in his wide-ranging arguments seeks to move beyond the caselaw on s14(1) by reference to *Barker and Magyar*. *Barker* is a case under s42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and the power of the court to make a civil proceedings order against a person who habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious civil proceedings. This is a separate statutory regime with no

application to FOIA, although it may be noted that in *Barker* the court was satisfied that the vexatious litigation had come to an end and would not be repeated. He argues that the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in *Magyar* gives him a right of access to the information under Article 10 (which protects freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Upper Tribunal decision in *Moss* is clear that this tribunal is bound to follow *Kennedy* a decision of the Court of Appeal (upheld by the Supreme Court) that Article 10 does not give such a right to access information.

30. The Court of Appeal endorsed the wholistic approach of the Upper Tribunal in *Dransfield*, endorsing the Upper Tribunal's view that the purpose of s14 was "*to protect the resources (in the broadest sense of the word) of the public authority from being squandered on disproportionate use of FOIA*" emphasising that the hurdle of establishing this was a high one (paragraph 72).

31. Lady Arden (paragraph 68) also confirmed that vexatiousness was to be viewed as setting an objective standard as "*no reasonable foundation for thinking that the information sought would be of value to the requester or the public or any section of the public*" and that:-

"The decision-maker should consider all the relevant circumstances in order to reach a balanced conclusion as to whether a request is vexatious. If it happens that a relevant motive can be discerned with a sufficient degree of assurance, it may be evidence from which vexatiousness can be inferred. If a requester pursues his rights against an authority out of vengeance for some other decision of its, it may be said that his request was without any reasonable foundation. But this could not be said, however vengeful the requester, if the request was aimed at the disclosure of important information which ought to be made public"

32. In considering the information requests in their context it is therefore appropriate to look first at the value or serious purpose of the requests. Although Mr Kuznetsov has argued that he was entitled to the information in the witness statement for the housing appeal (paragraph 3) under the Housing Act 1996 he has not specified how the information requested falls within that Act. S168 provides a duty on a housing authority to publish its allocation scheme, which he already possessed, there is also a right under s106(5) to the personal details which he has supplied, which is not within the scope of the request. This witness statement discusses Mr Kuznetsov's grievances against Camden and criticises named officers as well as making allegations of various forms of misconduct. It is difficult to discern any value to the requester or any section of the public of the disclosure of this information.

33. A similar point may be made with respect to the cost's information. There is a well-established process through the courts of challenging aspects of a bill of costs a litigant has been ordered to pay, however Mr Kuznetsov has chosen not to do that, rather through use of FOIA to request a level of detail including "*dates on which the payments had been made, payment confirmations and invoices*" such information is of no use in determining the correct amount of the bill which he would be required to pay and of no conceivable public interest.

34. In neither case was there any value in the information requested. It is clear however from the notices of appeal and the various witness statements which Mr Kuznetsov has lodged in these proceedings that he is using the two requests and the appeals which have flowed from them as an opportunity to make extremely serious and unfounded allegations against individuals and the two respondents. On 5 April 2018 (bundle page 263) he accused an officer in the Information and Records Management

team of committing a criminal offence suggesting he would be personally liable for a £500,000 fine and, in the email copied to the ICO and the HSE criticised him stating:-
“the very wording of the response shows the true motivation for the vigorous resistance against compliance with the applicant’s lawful request. This demonstrates the very reason why almost 70 residents of the Grenfell tower have been burnt alive last year...”

35. This allegation against a junior member of staff, linking it to a tragedy in another part of London and copying in the HSE is a very clear instance of the harassment of a member of staff and is likely to cause distress to that member of staff. While this may seem particularly egregious there are numerous examples within the correspondence and both of Camden’s witnesses gave written and oral evidence of its effects on them or their colleagues.

36. The burden imposed on Camden by Mr Kuznetsov’s actions has been considerable. In describing the burden of FOIA requests Camden adopted a cut-of date which excluded requests prior to April 2017 -the adoption of a new case system and an adverse decision of the IC striking down Camden’s reliance on regulation 12(4)(b) (manifestly unreasonable) with respect to 6 information requests about the Bacton Estate. The estate itself was demolished in January 2018. The overarching context of the requests is the repeated litigation against Camden by Mr Kuznetsov arising out of the compulsory purchase and his housing position. These cases have been numerous, time consuming and unsuccessful. In addition to litigation and FOIA/EIR requests (there have been nine such since the first of the two requests under consideration) there have been SARs, complaints to the Local Government Ombudsman and to the professional regulators of Camden staff. They have been a fruitless expense of enormous quantities of staff time and resources which could have been much better spent. Not only has the litigation he has pursued produced no positive results for him, but he has attracted considerable judicial criticism for his attempts to mislead the court. It is clear that he places no weight on his obligations to the court – reliance may not be placed on his statements of truth. Even restricting consideration to the record of waste caused by Mr Kuznetsov since the demolition there could not be a more stark example of the need to protect a public authority’s resources.

37. Although Judges have warned Mr Kuznetsov of the possible personal consequences of his conduct of litigation, his actions have not been “consequence free” either for Camden, its residents and its staff or for himself. On 15 June 2016 he sent an e-mail from his work computer purporting to be on behalf of the financial institution for which he worked which led to his dismissal. An employment tribunal found in *Kuznetsov v Manulife Asset Management* 2200417/2017 (2 March 2018 at bundle page 351): -

“The Respondent genuinely and reasonably believed that [Mr Kuznetsov] was seeking to portray himself as acting on behalf of the Respondent] and deliberately sought to create the impression that Manulife might be interested in purchasing the Bacton Estate. He doctored his email signature block to make it look as though he was acting for the US entity and that he was a statutory director. His misconduct fully justified the decision to dismiss him”

38. In addition to losing his employment as a result of his pursuit of his dispute with Camden a costs award of £20,000 was made against him. It appears that the purpose of the email may have been, in the view of the Employment Tribunal, to increase the amount that Camden paid for his property; in the CPO proceedings he described it as four bedroomed (Camden stated that it had three), in his unsuccessful Chancery litigation he sought a purchase price for the property nearly £300,000 more than

Camden had offered. The initial purpose of Mr Kuznetsov in this dispute may have been to maximise the purchase price of the property, however his actions for some time have not contributed to that and (due to the real risk of further costs orders in his litigation) may have diminished the net capital sum due from Camden to him. Indeed, it may be noted that his arguments and evidence to the CPO Inquiry, which the Inspector found unsatisfactory made very serious allegations of harassment and misconduct against Camden and its contractors are similar to arguments he has put forward throughout his conflict. I am satisfied that any rational motivation for his actions (obtaining a good price for the property) has long since been overtaken by a profound sense that he has been wronged and he is endlessly and repeatedly seeking redress in a way which renders more and more distant any satisfactory conclusion. He sees conspiracy at every corner, he is unscrupulous and distorts and suppresses facts to fit his beliefs. While in his documents he seeks to give an impression of detailed mastery of the law, the reality is he produces enormous lists of provisions and extracts from cases without understanding the spirit and structure of the law. In the course of his dispute he may well have delayed the re-provision of an increased amount of housing on the Bacton Estate site, he has caused distress to many officials he has dealt with, a substantial expense to the Council, as well as loss and distress to himself.

39. I am satisfied that these requests are an egregious misuse of a statutory right, the decision notices in this appeal were correct in law, and these appeals are dismissed. The IC should consider, in any future complaints to her, whether any investigation is justified.

C. Hughes
9 October 2020