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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) >> Amin v Information Commissioner [2025] UKFTT 325 (GRC) (14 March 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/GRC/2025/325.html Cite as: [2025] UKFTT 325 (GRC) |
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General Regulatory Chamber
Information Rights
Heard on: 11 March 2025 |
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B e f o r e :
TRIBUNAL MEMBER DR GASSTON
TRIBUNAL MEMBER DR MANN
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LUCAS AMIN |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER |
Respondent |
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For the Appellant: Peter Lockley of Counsel
For the Respondent: no attendance.
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Crown Copyright ©
Decision: The Appeal is Allowed.
Substituted Decision Notice: The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs shall, within 35 days of being sent this Decision, disclose a copy of the briefing paper at pages 3, 4 and 5 of the Closed Bundle save that the name of the policy advisor at page 4 under the heading "Attendees" shall be redacted pursuant to regulation 13 Environmental Information Regulations 2004.
Evidence and matters considered
Background in summary
"Drax is a "bioenergy" company that burns biomass – in this case wood pellets – to create energy for power and heat in the UK. It is by far the largest biomass power company in Britain and also the largest emitter of CO2. The firm has also, controversially, received £6.5 billion in public subsides reserved for generators of low carbon energy. This is because biomass feedstock – including wood pellets – are deemed to be low carbon by the government if they are sourced sustainably from pupose-grown forests. Despite concerns over the efficacy of Drax's low carbon power and the sustainability of the biomass it sources – which are spelled out below – the firm continues to receive public subsidies and is likely to see business grow as Britain develops its biomass sector"
"19...Biomass makes up roughly 4% of the UK's total electricity generation, most of which comes from Drax which is the largest biomass power company in Britain. In 2021 9.1 million tonnes of wood pellets were imported into the UK for biomass power"
"20. Bioenergy, produced from biomass, is currently considered by the UK government to be a renewable, low-carbon energy source, provided it is produced from sustainable sources. Drax insists that its biomass generation is "carbon neutral" because the emissions produced from its chimney stacks are offset by the emissions absorbed by the trees that are grown to produce the pellets. But this point is controversial and many think it would take decades for trees to absorb enough carbon dioxide to offset the emissions produced immediately as pellets are burned."
"In my role as an investigative journalist I have asked several sources what the phrase might refer to, and none could answer with any confidence. Biomass analysts at the climate and energy think tank Ember – which publishes regular reports on Drax – told me that the "agri-innovation policy" phrase "did not ring any bells"
Role of the Tribunal
(1)If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers—
(a)that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance with the law, or
(b)to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently,
the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.
(2)On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on which the notice in question was based.
The EIR
"5.—(1) Subject to paragraph (3) and in accordance with paragraphs (2), (4), (5) and (6) and the remaining provisions of this Part and Part 3 of these Regulations, a public authority that holds environmental information shall make it available on request"
12.(1) Subject to paragraphs (2), (3) and (9), a public authority may refuse to disclose environmental information requested if—
(a) an exception to disclosure applies under paragraphs (4) or (5); and
(b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.
Law
"The underlying rationale behind the exception is that public authorities should have the necessary space to think in private."
"...the exception is drafted to cover all internal communications, not just those actually reflecting internal thinking"
"102. Where the exception in reg. 12(4)(e) is relied upon, the public authority must identify the prejudice to the public interest which would occur if the information were to be disclosed. There is no presumption that there will be some such prejudice merely because the information falls within the definition of "internal communications". But nor is the prejudice to the public interest which can be relied upon limited to any particular kind of prejudice, or prejudice arising in any particular way. It is not limited to the need for 'safe space' for 'policy formulation and development'. It seems to me that it is sufficient that disclosure would in some way prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs (cf. the catch-all provision in s.36(2)(c) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000). The only limitation, it seems to me, is that the prejudice must be related to the fact that the communications are internal ones."
"Your public interest arguments should focus on the protection of internal deliberation and decision-making processes. This reflects the underlying rationale for the exception: to protect a public authority's need for a 'private thinking space"
"The relevant factors must be balanced against the public interest in disclosure. Regulation 12(2) provides that you should apply a presumption in favour of disclosure. This means that you are likely to have to disclose some internal communications, even if disclosure has a negative effect on your internal deliberation and decision-making processes."
"25. There is a substantial body of case law which establishes that assertions of a "chilling effect" on provision of advice, exchange of views or effective conduct of public affairs are to be treated with some caution. In Department for Education and Skills v Information Commissioner and Evening Standard EA/2006/0006, the F-tT commented at [75(vii)] as follows: "In judging the likely consequences of disclosure on officials' future conduct, we are entitled to expect of them the courage and independence that has been the hallmark of our civil servants since the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms. These are highly educated and politically sophisticated public servants who well understand the importance of their impartial role as counsellors to ministers of conflicting convictions. The most senior officials are frequently identified before select committees, putting forward their department's position, whether or not it is their own."
26. Although not binding on us, this is an observation of obvious common sense with which we agree. A three-judge panel of the Upper Tribunal expressed a similar view in DEFRA v Information Commissioner and Badger Trust [2014] UKUT 526 (AAC) at [75], when concluding that it was not satisfied that disclosure would inhibit important discussions at a senior level:
"75. We are not persuaded that persons of the calibre required to add value to decision making of the type involved in this case by having robust discussions would be inhibited by the prospect of disclosure when the public interest balance came down in favour of it…
76. …They and other organisations engage with, or must be assumed to have engaged with, public authorities in the full knowledge that Parliament has passed the FOIA and the Secretary of State has made the EIR. Participants in such boards cannot expect to be able to bend the rules."
27. In Department of Health v Information Commissioner and Lewis [2015] UKUT 159 (AAC); [2017] AACR 30 (Lewis) Charles J discussed the correct approach where a government department asserts that disclosure of information would have a "chilling" effect or be detrimental to the "safe space" within which policy formulation takes place, as to which he said: "27. …The lack of a right guaranteeing non-disclosure of information...means that that information is at risk of disclosure in the overall public interest … As soon as this qualification is factored into the candour argument (or the relevant parts of the safe space or chilling effect arguments), it is immediately apparent that it highlights a weakness in it. This is because the argument cannot be founded on an expectation that the relevant communications will not be so disclosed. It follows that … a person taking part in the discussions will appreciate that the greater the public interest in the disclosure of confidential, candid and frank exchanges, the more likely it is that they will be disclosed… 28. …any properly informed person will know that information held by a public authority is at risk of disclosure in the public interest. 29. … In my view, evidence or reasoning in support of the safe space or chilling effect argument in respect of a FOIA request that does not address in a properly reasoned, balanced and objective way: i) this weakness, … is flawed."
28. Charles J discussed the correct approach to addressing the competing public interests in disclosure of information where section 35 of FOIA (information relating to formulation of government policy, etc) is engaged. Applying the decision in APPGER at [74] to [76] and [146] to [152], when assessing the competing public interests under FOIA the correct approach includes identifying the actual harm or prejudice which weighs against disclosure. This requires an appropriately detailed identification, proof, explanation and examination of the likely harm or prejudice.
"13 The EIRs (and the Scottish EIRs where Scottish public authorities are concerned) provide a legal basis for requesters to obtain environmental information from public authorities. The environment needs people to protect it and, if need be, challenge matters which may have an adverse impact on the environment. There has therefore been a move, internationally and nationally, to enable the public to participate in decisions about the environment in which they live. One aspect of public participation is that in environmental cases there are special provisions that proceedings should not be prohibitively expensive (Edwards and Another (Appellant) v Environment Agency and Others Case 260/11). Another aspect of public participation is that the public should have access to information, so they can be informed about matters relevant to the environment and be able to take decisions accordingly. These public participation obligations arise under the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental matters ("Aarhus"), which led to adoption of the Directive. The EIRs are part of the UK's implementation of its obligations under the Directive. The EIRs fall to be interpreted purposively in accordance with the Directive (Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA Case C-106/89 paragraph 8; The A-G for the Prince of Wales v Information Commissioner and Mr Michael Bruton [2016] UKUT 154 paragraph 15). In turn, although not material to this particular case, account is taken of Aarhus when interpreting the Directive (Fish Legal v Information Commissioner C-279/12, paragraphs 35-38)
"14. It is clear from the extracts from the Directive set out in the governing legislation section above that the purposes of the Directive include guaranteeing rights to access environmental information. Public authorities hold information on behalf of the public, and are to support and assist the public in seeking access to information. As the Court of Justice of the European Union ("CJEU") has said: "The right to information means that the disclosure of information should be the general rule and that public authorities should be permitted to refuse a request for environmental information only in a few specific and clearly defined cases. The grounds for refusal should therefore be interpreted restrictively, in such a way that the public interest served by disclosure is weighed against the interest served by the refusal". (Office for Communications v Information Commissioner Case C-71/10 at paragraph 22).
"19... It was "common ground" in the case of Export Credits Guarantee Department v Friends of the Earth [2008] Env LR 40 at paragraph 24 that the presumption serves two purposes: (1) to provide the default position in the event that the interests are equally balanced and (2) to inform any decision that may be taken under the regulations."
Request to Appeal (overview)
"This is an EIRs request about the following meetings.
ii. 10/1/23 – Mark Spencer met DRAX to discuss agri-innovation policy
1. I am writing to request documents related to each of these meetings, including but not limited to:
c. Briefing notes"
"The Commissioner's decision is that regulation 12(4)(d) is engaged, but that the public interest favours disclosure. Regulation 12(4)(e) is engaged in respect of all the information to which the public authority has applied it, but the public interest only favours maintaining the exception for some of the information. For the remaining information, the public interest favours disclosure."
Scope
The positions of the parties on the PIBT
(a) (B147) that disclosure of some information can aid "...accountability and transparency in government."
(b) (A7) "There is nothing improper about government ministers meeting with representatives of business nor in businesses seeking to influence policy. However, where this does happen there must be high standards of transparency to ensure that influence is not exercised in an improper manner."
(a) disclosure would not impact the candour of civil servants and in any event it will have diminished by the time of the refusal some 12 months after the meeting.
(b) the absence of other material such as a readout or correspondence and the:-
"...lack of accessible information about the meeting in both the public domain and within DEFRA – as no record of the meeting was created..."
(c) "Transparency around the meeting is particularly important because of specific concerns around i. the effectiveness of public subsidies given to Drax ii. the opportunity which Drax had to lobby the minister on biomass policy that was in development at the time of the meeting (but completed at the time of request)"
(d) "The Commissioner failed to apply the presumption toward disclosure at Regulation 12(2)"
(e) Drax was in receipt of government large subsides for biomass (A29)
(f) there was considerable public debate about the environmental impact of Drax
(g) because of the lack of clarity over the phrase "agri innovation policy"
(h) because of the concerns raised in October 2022 by the BBC panorama program in "a Green energy scandal exposed" in which allegations were made that Drax was sourcing its wood pellets by cutting down an "old-Growth" forest in Canada.
(i) Drax was subject to questions in Parliament and an investigation by Ofgem.
(j) the January 2023 meeting was part of policy formulation which led to the publication by the Government of its Biomass Strategy in August 2023.
" As set out in the grounds of appeal, I consider the Commissioner has failed to give appropriate weight to the public interest in favour of disclosure for the following reasons: (i) disclosure of the briefing would not, as the Commissioner claims, necessarily affect the candour of civil servants; (ii) there is a lack of accessible information about the meeting in both the public domain and within DEFRA – as a readout of the meeting was not created; (iii) transparency around the meeting is particularly important because of specific concerns around (a) the effectiveness of public subsidies given to Drax (b) the opportunity which Drax had to lobby the minister on biomass policy that was in development at the time of the meeting (but completed at the time of request); (iv) the Commissioner failed to apply the presumption toward disclosure at Regulation 12(2)"
(a) (A7) there is always some value in allowing a public authority to have some internal thinking space, so that it can debate sensitive matters candidly but privately. This is particularly important during the early stages of policy formulation
(b) "In respect of the briefing papers... This was prepared based on an assessment of what Drax...were likely to bring up at the meeting and the strategic priorities they wished to pursue. That necessarily involves some candid assessments..."
(c) "...it is in the public interest that ministers receive candid briefings from civil servants and that that candour is likely to be affected by disclosure"
(d) "...the briefings don't necessarily reflect the actual discussions that took place or any lobbying that might have taken place"
(e) (B147) "...disclosing the information held by Defra could undermine effective government by discouraging frankness and candour in internal communications. It is important that government officials should have the necessary space to think in private and to formulate their decision-making"
(f) (B147) "Releasing information within the scope of your request at this moment in time would risk inhibiting officials from having full, frank and open discussions as part of the process of formulating policy, particularly if they felt that speculative information relating to live policy issues would be released before final decisions were made on those issues."
(g) (B155) "...disclosure would undermine effective government by discouraging frankness and candour in internal communications, damaging the quality of advice, and ultimately lead to poorer decision making... it is important that government officials should have the necessary space to think in private and to formulate their decision-making."
(h) (B155) "...releasing information within the scope of your request would risk inhibiting full, frank and open discussions as part of this process, particularly if those involved felt that speculative information relating to these discussions and decisions would be released as part of an information request"
(a) the evidence in the Bundle of the level of debate surrounding the effectiveness of the process used by Drax
(b) a National Audit Office report (A57) they had said that between 2002 and 2023 £22bn had been provided by government to support businesses using biomass to generate power and that £6.5bn was the:-
"...net amount in cash terms of government and consumer funding received by Drax, the largest recipient received by Drax, the of the Renewables largest recipient of the Renewables Obligation and Contracts for Difference Obligation and Contracts for Difference schemes, schemes, between 2002 and 2023"
(c) a report published in July 2023 by the global energy think tank Ember they said that Drax was the "power sector's single largest CO2 emitter despite generating only a small share of power."
(d) a report by EASAC (the European Academies Scientific Advisory Committee) that (A87):-
"The message emerging from our many publications and debates is that the urgency of the climate crisis requires that any renewable energy technology must succeed in reducing atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide soon enough to help meet the targets of the Paris Agreement. With average warming already over 1, it appears to EASAC's scientists that a 'renewable' energy that actually increases atmospheric CO2 for decades merely contributes to overshooting the 1.5 – 2 targets. Such technology is not effective in mitigating climate change and may even increase the risk of dangerous climate change"
(e) Ofgem's investigation into Drax which had later led to a large fine.
(f) concerns expressed on the use of land for the production of biomass fuel as opposed for example to food production.
(g) the apparent partnership between Drax and the National Farmers' Union (A132).
(i) the importance of there being scrutiny of corporate lobbying and that in this case this note is the only evidence of what the meeting was for (in the absence of a minute or read out).
(j) the absence of a proper consideration of the EIR presumption.
(a) that the note was not concerned with the internal formulation of policy but was to prepare the Minster for an external meeting
(b) the existence of the "in - built delay" to listing the meetings held (exceeded in this case)
(c) to the passage of time between the note and the time DEFRA had to deal with the request for information.
(d) the absence of evidence from DEFRA (other than in a "boilerplate explanation") on how the chilling effect was said to apply in this case.
Closed Hearing
Our review
(a) the presumption in the EIR as seen in Vesco.
(b) the fact that the safe space /chilling effect argument had not been put forward in a compelling way by DEFRA as required in Davies.
(c) that considerable (and in our view ample) time had gone by since the meeting with Drax.
(d) while policy will continue to develop, there was a policy announcement in August 2023 that related back to this earlier meeting.
(e) that disclosure might assist in an understanding of the phrase "agri-innovation policy"
(f) that it was the only documentary evidence of this meeting and without disclosure there would be no public information about it thus rendering the meeting devoid of any transparency other than the fact it was to happen.
(g) that Drax is an important provider of power generation and have been in receipt of a large amount of public funds.
(h) that, as said in Davies, all those involved will have been aware that the note was susceptible to disclosure.
Decision
Signed: Tribunal Judge Heald
Date: 13 March 2025