Antoniades & Anor v Barnet London Borough Council [2025] UKFTT 389 (GRC) (02 April 2025)

Neutral citation number: [2025] UKFTT 389 (GRC)

Case No. FT/WA/2024/0015

Decision given on: 2 April 2025

In the First-tier Tribunal

(General Regulatory Chamber)

Welfare of Animals

Before: Tribunal Judge Heald

Appellants: (1) Praxitelis Antoniades

(2) Ruth Antoniades

Respondent: The Barnet London Borough Council

Upon Hearing: Counsel (Mr Paul Tapsell) for the Appellants and Counsel (Mr Asitha Ranatunga) for the Respondent by Cloud Video Platform on 27 March 2025

And Upon: the Respondent by Counsel confirming unequivocally that they accepted that the giving away of the dogs (referred to in the Reasons) by the Appellants does not require a licence.

It is Ordered that:-

1. the name of the Respondent is amended to "The Barnet London Borough Council."

2. the Appeal is struck out by rule 8(3)(c) The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009.

3. if the Respondent wishes to pursue its application for costs:-

(a) the Respondent shall, by 4pm on 14 April 2025, provide to the Appellants and the Tribunal its written submission as to entitlement and quantum (rule 10(3)).

(b) the Appellants shall, by 4pm on 28 April 2025, provide any submissions in Reply including as regards affordability (rule 10(5)) to the Tribunal and Respondent.

(c) the application shall be referred to the Judge and shall be determined on the papers and if allowed shall be ascertained by summary assessment.

4. the Appellants' application to suspend the Respondent's decision to revoke their licence is refused.

REASONS

1. The Appellants have for some considerable time been in the business of the breeding and sale of dogs from their premises in Muswell Hill. This activity is regulated by the Animal Welfare Act 2006 ("the Act") and The Animal Welfare (Licensing of Activities Involving Animals) (England) Regulations 2018 ("the 2018 Regulations"). The Respondent ("the Council") is a licensing authority for the purposes of the Act and the 2018 Regulations.

2. What follows is a summary of the submissions, evidence and the law. It does not seek to provide every step of my reasoning. The absence of a reference by me to any specific submission or evidence does not mean it has not been considered.

3. In this Decision page numbers indicated by their inclusion in brackets refer to pages of the Bundle. If any matter is underlined that has been added for emphasis.

Evidence and matters considered

4. The parties were represented by Counsel who are thanked for their attendance and assistance. A bundle was provided together with a bundle of 3 legal authorities and a skeleton provided by Counsel for the Appellants dated 26 March 2025. The relevant body camera video recording was provided separately.

Background

5. On 1 January 2024 the Council granted a licence ref AWBREE/23/70149 ("the Licence") for 12 months to the Appellants (B20). It said:-

"The Barnet London Borough Council hereby licences Mr Praxitelis Antoniades & Mrs Ruth Antoniades of [redacted] being the occupier of premises within the area of the authority to carry out the breeding of dogs at Family Pets UK LTD...."

6. A litter was born on 11 August 2024 of which 2 puppies now aged over 7 months old remain with the Appellants.

7. On 11 September 2024 two officers for the Council attended the Appellants' premises to undertake an inspection as provided for by the Act. They left because, on the Council's case, the officers were intentionally obstructed.

8. On 3 October 2024 (A3) the Council gave Notice to the Appellants of its Decision ("the Decision") to revoke the Licence as a result of a breach (in its view) of reg 15(b) of the 2018 Regulations. The Council said (2):-

"Obstruction here refers to the actions of the licence holder Mr Praxitelis Antoniades at the time of the inspection. The Licencing Authority has reviewed the footage of the scheduled inspection that took place on 11 September 2024 in conjunction with and the witness statements provided by the inspectors who attended your premises. The Licencing Authority has observed that, by means of verbal abuse, physical intimidation verbal threats and threatening gestures Mr Antionides made the premises unsafe for the Inspectors attending and obstructed them from exercising their duty to carry out the inspection of the premiss. As per the Regulations this is an offence and a breach of the Regulations and a sufficient reason for the Licencing Authority to revoke the licence."

9. On 20 November 2024 a litter of 8 puppies was born (conceived prior to the revocation of the Licence and now just over 4 months old) and these remain with the Appellants.

10. The Licence would have expired in any event on 31 December 2024.

Relevant Law

11. Section 26 of the Act provides that:-

"an inspector may carry out an inspection in order to check compliance with:

(a)the conditions subject to which a licence is granted;

(b)provision made by or under this Act which is relevant to the carrying on of an activity to which a licence relates.

(2)An inspector may, for the purpose of carrying out an inspection under subsection (1), enter—

(a)premises specified in a licence as premises on which the carrying on of an activity is authorised;

(b)premises on which he reasonably believes an activity to which a licence relates is being carried on."

12. Reg 19 of the 2018 Regulations says:-

"A person must not intentionally obstruct an inspector appointed for the purposes of the enforcement of these Regulations in the exercise of any powers conferred by or under the Act."

13. Reg 15 of the 2018 Regulations provides that:-

"15. A local authority may, without any requirement for the licence holder’s consent, decide to suspend, vary or revoke a licence at any time on being satisfied that—

(b)there has been a breach of these Regulations,

14. By reg 11 and schedule 8(1) of the 2018 Regulations an application may not be be made for a licence by:-

"A person who has at any time held a licence which was revoked under regulation 15 of these Regulations"

Name of the Respondent

15. The name of the Respondent was slightly incorrect. It is amended to "The Barnet London Borough Council".

Family Pets UK Limited ("the Company")

16. There has been discussion in correspondence and at CMD about the legal status and the role of the Company in this Appeal. It was not clear to Counsel for either party why in the Licence the words "at Family Pets UK LTD...." had been included. However all did agree that the Company was not the holder of the Licence nor an Appellant and its name should not be added as a party to the Appeal.

The Appeal

17. On 29 October 2024 the Appellants issued this Appeal (B6-B40). The Council has submitted a form of Response (B113) and there have been a number of case management decisions (C122-C137).

18. The Role of the Tribunal at any Appeal is set out by reg 24 of the 2018 Regulations which says:-

(1) Any operator who is aggrieved by a decision by a local authority—

(b) to revoke or vary a licence,

may appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

(4) On appeal, the First-tier Tribunal may overturn or confirm the local authority’s decision, with or without modification.

19. By a form GRC5 dated 16 December 2024 (B51-67) the Council asks that the Appeal be struck out pursuant to rule 8(3)(c) 2009 Rules and if it is for an order to be made that the Appellants pay the Council's costs of defending the Appeal.

20. By a form GRC5 dated 17 December 2024 (B68-112) the Appellants seek the suspension of the revocation of the Licence pending the outcome of the Appeal to enable the remaining 2 puppies born on 30 August 2024 and the 8 puppies born on 20 November 2024 to be sold.

21. In dealing with these applications regard has been had to the overriding objective in rule 2 2009 Rules to deal with cases fairly and justly including for example by:-

"(a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties;"

(c) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;

Strike out application

(3) The Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if—

(c) the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant's case, or part of it, succeeding.

23. I was referred to two cases in the authorities bundle namely Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs v Fairford Group [2014]UKUT 329 (TCC) and Kaur v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 978.

24. In Fairford the Upper Tribunal summarised the task to be carried out by a Tribunal in these circumstances: -

41. In our judgment an application to strike out in the FTT under Rule 8(3)(c) should be considered in a similar way to an application under CPR 3.4 in civil proceedings (whilst recognising that there is no equivalent jurisdiction in the First-tier Tribunal Rules to summary judgment under Part 24). The Tribunal must consider whether there is a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful (in the sense of it being entirely without substance) prospect of succeeding on the issue at a full hearing, see Swain v Hillman [2001] 2 All ER 91 and Three Rivers (see above) Lord Hope at [95]. A ‘realistic’ prospect of success is one that carries some degree of conviction and not one that is merely arguable, see ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472. The tribunal must avoid conducting a ‘mini-trial’. As Lord Hope observed in Three Rivers, the strike out procedure is to deal with cases that are not fit for a full hearing at all

25. In Kaur from para 64 the Court of Appeal considered the question of whether the Judge had been entitled to:-

"...find that there was no reasonable prospect of the Appellant proving at a full hearing that there was anything about the post-termination handling that contributed to a cumulative repudiatory breach of her contract."

26. Reference was made specifically to para 77 in which it was held as follows:-

"[77] However there is no absolute rule against striking out a claim where there are factual issues—see, eg, Ahir v British Airways plc [2017] EWCA Civ 1392. Whether it is appropriate in a particular case involves a consideration of the nature of the issues and the facts that can realistically be disputed. There were in this case no relevant issues of primary fact. Had the matter proceeded to a full hearing the job of the tribunal would not have been to decide the rights and wrongs of the incident of 22 April, and it would not have heard evidence directly about that question. The issue would have been whether the disciplinary processes were conducted seriously unfairly so as to constitute, or contribute to, a repudiatory breach of the Appellant’s contract of employment. The evidence relevant to that question in substance consisted only of the documentary record. It is true that if there were any real grounds for asserting actual bad faith on the part of the decision-makers that could not have been resolved without oral evidence; but that was not the pleaded case, and the Employment Judge was entitled to conclude that there was no arguable basis for it. Judge Hand recognised that strike-outs of this kind might not be something to be done ‘on a daily basis’, but he said that each case must depend on its own facts and that in the present case the Judge’s decision was justified."

27. Turning first to the video evidence there was no suggestion made that its content was anything other than an accurate and fair factual record of what had occurred during the inspection on that day both as regards what could be heard and seen.

28. In the Appellants' Grounds (B13) they refer to the inspection and to what they call "a heated discussion...". If that is a suggestion that there was fault on both sides I do not accept it nor was it at times a discussion.

29. The video shows clearly that the Inspectors (carrying out a statutory duty) spent time trying to calm the situation, that they asked the 1st Appellant to stop his behaviour, that they gave a warning that the inspection might have to be halted and then ended the inspection giving an explanation as to why and left. It also clearly shows the 1st Appellant after a relatively uneventful start at times being angry, rude, aggressive and threatening. For example (the time refers to the recording):-

(a) the 1st Appellant is recorded as saying that one of the officers is a liar and she "distorts everything" and at 16.59 that "This is my f... house, everywhere is my house "

(b) at about 17.03 he made a throat slitting gesture directed at one of the officers, by drawing his finger across his throat as if it were a knife and making a noise with his voice. This was repeated at 17.07.

(d) at 17.30 he said "you are a horrible woman" to one of the officers.

(e) from 17.32 while walking out of the meeting he shouted "go to hell" about four times.

(f) when the officers said they had decided to leave he came back into the room and said (at 17.50) "you are not going to go anywhere"

(g) when the officers were explaining why they were leaving the 1st Appellant can be heard saying (at about 18:47) "I will harm those who harm us" and this was followed immediately by "you harm me I will harm you" while looking at one of the officers.

(h) the throat slitting gesture was repeated at 20.06.

30. As the meeting draws to an end and people are moving about due to background noise I could not clearly make out some words and was not completely certain what the 1st Appellant said at 20.19. As a result I looked at the witness statements in the Bundle and saw that at page D157 an officer says:-

"As we stood up to leave Mr Antoniades stood up and stepped towards me shouting again that he ‘hoped I die with no money and get eaten by my own flesh"

and I noted that this was signed on 26 September 2024 about 2 weeks after the attempted inspection and was consistent with those parts I could hear clearly.

31. Thereafter on the video the 1st Appellant can be heard saying "she is a very nasty woman" (20.38) about one of the officers and "you are not welcome here" at 20.40.

32. In its application (B60ff) the Council says for example:-

"7. The video footage is evidence that Mr Antoniades repeatedly shouted and swore at one of the inspectors and said that she was not “welcome” at the premises on more than one occasion. Mr Antoniades was repeatedly asked to stop but he ignored it. The video also evidences that even after the Appellants were informed that the inspectors B:61 were going to leave because of Mr Antoniades’ behaviour, he offered no apology and continued to be abusive towards the inspector"

"10.As a result of the aforesaid, the Respondent submits that the 1st Appellant’s behaviour was intentional and deliberate to:

(a) intimidate the inspectors;

(b) make the inspectors feel uncomfortable;

(b) cause interference during the inspection; and

(c) cause obstruction during the inspection.

11.As a result of the 1st Appellant’s behaviour the inspection could not be completed, and the inspectors had to leave the premises without compromising their safety."

33. At the hearing the Council's case was that the content of this video even without the statements is compelling enough on its own for it to be established to satisfy a strike out application:-

(a) that the inspection was being intentionally obstructed

(b) that the Council were entitled to revoke the Licence, acted properly in doing so and had little other option, in light of what had occurred, but to revoke it.

34. In answer to this Counsel for the Appellants focused on two main elements namely that in his submission:-

(a) evidence would be needed to be heard to properly decide on the question of whether there was an "intentional obstruction" and if so then

(b) there would need to be evidence as to the basis upon which the Council used its discretion to revoke when other options could have been deployed such as to vary or suspend the Licence in particular by the sole involvement of the 2nd Appellant.

35. In the Grounds of Appeal (B13) the Appellants say as regards the day of the inspection:-

"On 11th September 2024, lnspectors on behalf of the Regulator attended at the Appellants' home by prior arrangement to carry out an inspection. The Regulator claims that during the course of the inspection that Mr Antoniades 'by means of verbal abuse, physical intimidation, verbal threats and threatening gestures...made the premises unsafe... and obstructed them from exercising their duty' and so decided to revoke the licence by a Notice of Licence Revocation dated 3rd October 2024 (copy attached).

Whilst it is accepted that there was a heated discussion between Mr Antoniades and one of the lnspectors: -

(a) it is denied that this heated discussion was (i) intentional, nor (ii) an obstruction

(b) during that heated discussion it is not suggested by the Regulator that Mrs Antoniades' conduct was inappropriate.

36. In their response to the strike out application of 24 December 2024 the Appellants said (B114):-

" 2. lt will be a question of fact for the Tribunal to determine whether there was an intentional obstruction of an inspector. This will require the Tribunal to consider evidence regarding the actions and the intentions of each of the two Appellants.

3. (a) lf, which is denied, the Tribunal finds that one of the Appellants intentionally obstructed an inspector, the Tribunal will then need to consider whether the licence could and/or should continue in the name of the other Appellant

(b) lf, which is denied, the Tribunal finds that both Appellants intentionally obstructed an lnspector, the Tribunal will then need to consider whether it was a reasonable exercise of discretion by the Respondent to then revoke the licence."

37. In a submission provided for the Appellants dated 30 January 2025 (B119) they say that:-

(a) to decide if the Council was entitled to revoke the Licence will involve a consideration of the 1st Appellant's behaviour and whether that was an intentional obstruction of the inspection.

(b) to be able to make this determination (including of "intentionality") the Tribunal will need to review the video evidence and hear from the Appellants, the officers who attended and potentially others.

(c) if the Tribunal found there was an intentional obstruction it would then need to decide if revocation was justified or if some other remedy would have been appropriate especially bearing in mind the absence of any concern raised about the 2nd Appellant's conduct at the inspection.

38. At B120 they say that:-

"11. The matters set out in the “continuation sheet” attached to the Respondent’s GRC5 Application are not evidence upon which the Tribunal can make factual determinations; the document amounts, at best, to pleadings and, given the dispute regarding the factual matters alleged in the document, the Tribunal will have to weigh the parties’ evidence and witnesses to make any such determinations."

39. The Appellants say in summary as regards strike out:-

"10...the assessment of the factual matters and...the determination of what, if any, the appropriate, reasonable and proportionate response would be, cannot be done on the papers or as a preliminary issue and require a substantive hearing which would, in any event, cover all the evidence to be called at the substantive hearing of the appeal."

40. In his skeleton and at the hearing Counsel for the Appellants adopted the 30 January 2025 representations and emphasised that there were factual issues in this case to resolve. He referred to Fairford and Kaur. Other points raised were these:-

(a) the presence of significant factual disputes.

(b) the need to view the events in the context of previous dealings.

(d) the existence of 5 witness statements with exhibits in the bundle.

(e) that the Appellants both intend to give evidence together with others including someone who was assisting them.

41. Counsel also said:-

"iv. Having determined what happened and why at the inspection the Tribunal would then need to go on to assess whether there was an obstruction (arguably to the criminal standard as that appears to be the basis of the Respondent’s case) and then go on to consider whether revocation of the licence of both individuals was appropriate in all the circumstances (e.g. even if the Tribunal were to accept, after hearing all the evidence) that Mr Antoniades had obstructed the officers."

42. In his submission:-

(a) the strike out hearing should not be a mini trial

(b) there are significant factual areas of dispute

(d) "there is a realistic prospect of the Appellants succeeding (whether individually or together and fully or at least to some extent)"

43. At the hearing Counsel for the Appellants also spent some time setting out their case on the range of options available to the Council and how and why for example a variation of the Licence to involve the 2nd Appellant only would have been a more appropriate response even if there had been an intentional obstruction.

44. Counsel for the Council made submissions that:-

(a) in this case and in the absence of an explanation from the Appellants it was in effect obviously an intentional obstruction from the video itself.

(b) the word "intentional" is included in the 2018 Regulations to cover a situation where for example a person was unable to come to the door and so in such a situations the inspectors would have been been obstructed but not intentionally.

(c) the Council did have a discretion as to how to respond but in reality in this case they had little option and acted properly.

(d) while there was some "history" it was not relevant for this application being more a matter of mitigation or to give context.

Decision on strike out

45. There is no dispute that:-

(a) the Inspectors were at the premises lawfully to carry out a statutory inspection of the Appellants' regulated activity.

(b) the Council may revoke a licence if satisfied that there has been an intentional obstruction of an inspection.

46. When considering a strike out by rule 8(3)(c) 2009 Rules the Tribunal must avoid conducting a mini trial. There has not been one. Apart from the few occasions indicated in these Reasons in reaching this Decision I have not reviewed the content of the statements but remained focused principally on the video noting that its content was not challenged.

47. While there had apparently been some previous issues between the parties I have not enquired into the detail of that because in my view even if there was some difficult history the Council were at the premises lawfully to carry out a statutory inspection on that day and such information would only be of value as context.

48. As regards the burden of proof to establish intentional obstruction in my view at any reg 24 appeal the issues to be decided would not be on the criminal standard of proof despite a breach of reg 19 without lawful excuse also being an offence.

Obstruction

49. I was not referred to any legal authority on the meaning of "obstruction" in reg 19. In ordinary language it means a "hindrance" or something "in the way" that might "block" or make something "harder to achieve". In an example of a legal context the CPS Guidance says that a person obstructs a constable for the purposes of section 89(2) Police Act 1996 where "they prevent them from carrying out their duties or make it more difficult for them to do so."

50. From the video alone there is, in my view, no realistic prospect of the Appellants succeeding at an Appeal on the question of whether what occurred amounted to an obstruction.

Intentional Obstruction

51. Some time was spent with Counsel for both parties considering the question of the meaning of "intentional" and how that question could be determined at a strike out stage. Even though the Appellants were faced with the hurdle of the seriousness of the video evidence the requirement that an obstruction must be intentional could have been a reason an application to strike out would fail even where there was obstruction.

52. From what can be heard and the content of the video there is nothing to suggest that the obstruction was unintentional. The inspection was pre-arranged. Its nature, purpose and timing was not a surprise. There was no suggestion on the video that the 1st Appellant did not, for some reason, know what he was doing and/or saying. It is also clear from the video that he was told that the inspection would be halted if his behaviour continued but he carried on despite that warning.

53. The video evidence is very strongly suggestive of there being intentional obstruction. Therefore for it to be shown there was a need for a trial on this point it was, in my view, incumbent on the Appellants to put forward some positive case in the Grounds of Appeal or a suggestion at least in a submission as to what they say the intention was. However in the Grounds (B13) they simply deny that "this heated discussion was (i) intentional" and their response to the strike out (B114) broadly repeated in their representation (B119) says only that this question is something to be determined after hearing the evidence.

54. In my view therefore there is no realistic prospect of the Appellants succeeding at an Appeal on the question of whether what occurred amounted to an intentional obstruction.

Revocation

55. The Council decided to revoke the Licence. It is common ground that if it was satisfied that there had been a breach of reg 19 it had the power, if it wished, to revoke the Licence but that this was discretionary and other discretionary options existed such as to vary or suspend the Licence.

56. Here the Appellants did suggest, for example, that the Council should have varied the Licence so as to exclude the 1st Appellant but retain the 2nd Appellant as the holder of the Licence. They say that the Council's decision to revoke and not to vary is a matter for review by a Tribunal on hearing the evidence and not one for a strike out.

57. Reg 24(4) of the 2018 Regulations gives to the Tribunal the power to "overturn or confirm the local authority's decision, with or without modification" however in considering an Appeal the Tribunal must also give appropriate weight to the view of the Licencing Authority to whom the Act and the 2018 Regulations give certain responsibilities for the welfare of animals.

58. The Court of Appeal in Hope and Glory Public House Ltd, R (on the application of) v City of Westminster Magistrates Court & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 31 (26 January 2011) held that the answer to "How much weight was the district judge entitled to give to the decision of the licensing authority?" was:-

"45...the proper conclusion....can only be stated in very general terms. It is right in all cases that the magistrates' court should pay careful attention to the reasons given by the licensing authority for arriving at the decision under appeal, bearing in mind that Parliament has chosen to place responsibility for making such decisions on local authorities. The weight which the magistrates should ultimately attach to those reasons must be a matter for their judgment in all the circumstances, taking into account the fullness and clarity of the reasons, the nature of the issues and the evidence given on the appeal."

59. The letter giving notice of revocation (A3) says that the video had been reviewed and the Council was satisfied it had grounds to revoke the Licence due to a breach of reg 19 of the 2018 Regulations. The description of "obstruction " in the letter is in my view a fair one.

60. I accept that it is arguable that the Council should have responded differently. However because:-

(a) of the content of the Video

(b) of the approach in Hope and Glory

(d) the Appellants live together at these premises.

(e) of the involvement of the Company of which the 1st Appellant is the director

I conclude that there is no realistic prospect of the Appellants succeeding at an Appeal on the question of whether the discretion exercised by the Council should be overturned by the Tribunal.

Conclusion

61. For these reason and having considered rule 2 2009 Rules the Appeal is struck out.

Costs

62. The Council has also made an application for costs pursuant to rule 10(1)(b) 2009 Rules. It was agreed at the hearing that if an order was made to strike out the Appeal and the Council wished to purse a claim for costs rather than have a further hearing. The process to be adopted would be that the parties would make written submissions with a decision made on the papers.

Suspension of the revocation of the Licence

63. In the Grounds of Appeal the Appellants said:-

"The Appellants apply to the Tribunal on an interim basis to allow the licensable activity to continue while the appeal is proceeding"

64. The default position is that a revocation decision takes effect and will continue to apply unless the Tribunal orders otherwise. Reg 24(3) of the 2018 Regulations says:-

(3) The First-tier Tribunal may on application and until the appeal is determined or withdrawn—

(b) suspend a revocation or variation under regulation 15.

65. The Appellants' application to suspend the revocation of the Licence to enable them to deal with the remaining 10 dogs and see them re homed was submitted on 16 December 2024 sometime after the Decision and about 2 weeks prior to the expiry of the Licence. It was not considered until after the expiry of the License and this timing was unfortunate.

66. I indicated at the hearing that in order to protect the welfare of the dogs it was likely that I would have suspended the revocation to allow for their sale. However as the Licence period had ended prior to the hearing of the application such an Order, if granted, would not have the desired effect as the underlying licence had expired. Additionally, having since the hearing now struck out the Appeal, it has been determined and so the power to suspend from reg 24(3)(b) is no longer in existence.

67. A question also arose as to the ability of the 2nd Appellant to apply for a licence in her own name. I was referred to the witness statement of Ms Sallcombe dated 25 March 2025 made on behalf of the Council. She says (D333):-

"9. Suspending the revocation is not considered an appropriate course of action in this instance. The licence which was revoked was due to expire 31st December 2024. As such, if Mrs Antoniades were to start trading again, she would be doing so without a licence.

10. A new licence application would need to be submitted, and would be subject to the twelve week period between application and issue, for consideration, processing and review against the requirements as set out in the...".

68. Reg 11 and schedule 8(1) of the 2018 Regulations provides that an application may not be be made for a licence by:-

"A person who has at any time held a licence which was revoked under regulation 15 of these Regulations"

69. The Council's position seen cleanly in the evidence was that the 2nd Appellant was entitled to make an application and at the hearing this position was initially confirmed. However subsequently, on instructions, Counsel indicated that there was less certainty on the part of his client as to this point than set out in the statement. This was an unsatisfactory position for the 2nd Appellant and accordingly to provide the certainty that para 10 of the statement (D334) had previously appeared to give I indicated I intended to suspend the revocation to enable the 2nd Appellant (if she wished) to apply for a new licence.

70. However, since the hearing, the Appeal has been determined by being struck out and so the reg 24(3)(b) power to suspend is no longer available.

The dogs

71. Finally at the Appeal a question arose as to whether the dogs could be given away without a licence being in place. The Appellants had understood that this was not permitted. However, the Council (by its Counsel) said unequivocally, that it accepted that the giving away of the dogs by the Appellants, as opposed to the commercial sale of the dogs, did not require a licence.

Signed: Tribunal Judge Heald

Date: 31 March 2025.

	[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] [DONATE]
	First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) >> Antoniades & Anor v Barnet London Borough Council [2025] UKFTT 389 (GRC) (02 April 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/GRC/2025/389.html Cite as: [2025] UKFTT 389 (GRC)

First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)