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First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber)


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) >> Chow v Information Commissioner [2025] UKFTT 490 (GRC) (07 May 2025)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKFTT/GRC/2025/490.html
Cite as: [2025] UKFTT 490 (GRC)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] UKFTT 490 (GRC)
Case Reference: FT/EA/2024/0273

First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Information Rights

Decided without a hearing
Decision Given On: 7 May 2025

B e f o r e :

JUDGE MATON
MEMBER DAN PALMER-DUNK
MEMBER DAVE SIVERS

____________________

Between:
DAVID CHOW
Appellant
- and -

THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent

____________________


____________________

HTML VERSION OF DECISION
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    Decision: The appeal is Dismissed.

    REASONS
  1. In this Decision the following terms have the following meanings:
  2. Article the article in relation to which the Request was made;
    Academic the academic in whose name the Article was published;
    Closed Material the information contained within the closed bundle dated 10 February 2025 to the extent that this was not disclosed to the Appellant;
    Commissioner the Information Commissioner;
    Decision Notice the notice dated 20 June 2024, number IC-280194-X5S6, setting out the decision of the Commissioner in this matter;
    DPA the Data Protection Act 2018;
    FOIA the Freedom of Information Act 2000;
    Panel the panel of the University Tribunal referred to in the Request;
    Request the request by the Appellant dated 30 September 2023;
    Requested Information the information which was within the scope of the Request;
    UK GDPR the United Kingdom Data Protection Regulation;
    University the University of Cambridge;
    University Tribunal the tribunal of the University referred to in the Request.

  3. This is an Appeal against the decision of the Commissioner as set out in the Decision Notice. The University did not participate in the Appeal.
  4. The parties consented to the Appeal being decided without a hearing. The Tribunal is satisfied that it was fair and just to do so. The Tribunal received and considered a bundle of documents, including the Appellant's notice of appeal, the Commissioner's Response, and correspondence between the parties relating to the Request and to the Appellant's complaint to the Commissioner.
  5. Pursuant to successive case management directions by Judge Worth dated 13 November 2024, by Tribunal Registrar Bamawo dated 13 February 2025, and by Judge Heald dated 14 February 2025, the Tribunal considered the Closed Material, which had not been disclosed to the Appellant. This included material considered by the University to be within scope of the Request, but exempt from disclosure.
  6. Pursuant to the directions dated 13 November 2024 a gist of the closed material was prepared by the Commissioner, and was circulated to the Tribunal and to the Appellant on 4 March 2025. I made directions dated 10 March 2025 giving the Appellant the opportunity to make any further submissions based on this gist by 17 March 2025. The Appellant confirmed by email on 17 March 2025 that he had no further submissions to make based on the gist.
  7. The Tribunal notes the requirement, as expressed in Barrett v Information Commissioner and Financial Ombudsman Service [2024] UKUT 107 (AAC), to minimise to the fullest extent possible the disadvantages in the Appellant's position as not being party to the Closed Material, and in the Tribunal's view has done so in this case.
  8. Background

  9. The Appeal arises in relation to the Article, which was published in an academic journal in the name of the Academic, who was an academic working at the University. Allegations had been made that the Academic had plagiarised material which was used in the Article, and this matter was reported in the national press.
  10. By email dated 30 September 2023 the Appellant made the Request, which was in the following terms:
  11. 1(a) the published version of the work (it is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution CC-BY-NC-ND, but now difficult to obtain).

    (b) All versions of the work submitted for potential publication to any publisher. If available, I would prefer these in formats that can show how the document has been edited, such as using Microsoft Word's "track changes" function

    2. The full text of all known uncredited sources for the work. I believe that this consists of two student essays. Please also describe the nature of such sources, e.g. work submitted for university examination or for a supervision.

    3. All results from plagiarism detection services, e.g. iThenticate or Turnitin, applied to (any version of) the work.

    (b) Manual identification of which parts of the work originated from uncredited sources.

    4. (a) The scope of the University's subsequent investigation by a disciplinary panel.

    (b) Explanation by [the Academic] to the panel explaining the presence of material from student essays within the published work.

    (c) The panel's final conclusions.

    (d) The panel's final reasoning behind such conclusions.

    (e) The membership of the panel.

  12. By an emailed letter dated 27 October 2023, the University responded, confirming that it held the Requested Information but refusing to release it citing s40(3A) FOIA, and saying that releasing it would breach the first data protection principle.
  13. By email dated 30 October 2023 the Appellant requested that the University review its decision.
  14. By emailed letter dated 24 November 2023 the University set out the results of its internal review, stating that the initial response had been in error in refusing to disclose the Requested Information by reference to s40 FOIA, and that it should have neither confirmed nor denied whether it held the Requested Information.
  15. On 5 January 2024 the Appellant complained to the Commissioner.
  16. The Commissioner carried out an investigation and issued the Decision Notice on 20 June 2024. The Commissioner:
  17. a. noted that the University had stated that it did not hold any information within Part 3(a) of the Request;
    b. decided that information within Parts 1(a), 1(b), 2 and 3(b) of the Request should be disclosed, on the basis that, contrary to the view taken by the University, this information was not personal data, and so the exemption in s40 FOIA could not apply;
    c. decided that the University should disclose a limited amount of information in relation to Part 4(a) of the Request, excluding personal data; and
    d. otherwise upheld the University's refusal to release information within Part 4 of the Request, relying on s40(2) FOIA.
  18. The Appellant appealed to the Tribunal.
  19. The Appeal

  20. The Appellant appealed the Commissioner's decision insofar as it relates to Part 4 of the Request. The Appellant raised three grounds of appeal, applying these to Part 4 generally:
  21. a. that the Commissioner did not fully separate the work of the University Tribunal between those parts that are personal data and those that are not;
    b. that the Commissioner did not give adequate weight to the transparency of the University's governance in the public interest test; and
    c. that the Commissioner did not give adequate weight to the reasonable expectation of disclosure on the part of the data subjects based on previous decisions in other cases.
  22. The Commissioner resists the Appeal, and relies on the reasoning set out in the Decision Notice. The Commissioner also makes some observations in relation to the Appellant's grounds of appeal.
  23. Relevant law

  24. The Appellant made the Request pursuant to FOIA. The relevant provisions of FOIA for the purposes of this Appeal are as follows:
  25. 1 General right of access to information held by public authorities.

    (1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled—

    (a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and

    (b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.

    [...]

    2 Effect of the exemptions in Part II.

    [...]

    (2) In respect of any information which is exempt information by virtue of any provision of Part II, section 1(1)(b) does not apply if or to the extent that—

    (a) the information is exempt information by virtue of a provision conferring absolute exemption,

    [...]

    (3) For the purposes of this section, the following provisions of Part II (and no others) are to be regarded as conferring absolute exemption—[…]

    (f) section 40(1)

    (fa) section 40(2) so far as relating to cases where the first condition referred to in that subsection is satisfied

    [...]

    40 Personal information

    (1) Any information to which a request for information relates is exempt information if it constitutes personal data of which the applicant is the data subject.

    (2) Any information to which a request for information relates is also exempt information if—

    (a) it constitutes personal data which does not fall within subsection (1), and
    (b) the first, second or third condition below is satisfied.

    (3A) The first condition is that the disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise than under this Act—

    (a) would contravene any of the data protection principles, or
    (b) would do so if the exemptions in section 24(1) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (manual unstructured data held by public authorities) were disregarded.

  26. "Personal data" in FOIA has the same meaning as in Parts 5 to 7 DPA. Section 3(2) DPA provides that "personal data" means "any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual" to which Part 2, Part 3 or Part 4 DPA applies. 
  27. 19. Information can be personal data without the individual to whom it relates being identifiable from the information itself. In Farrand v Information Commissioner and London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority [2014] UKUT 0310 (AAC) ("Farrand"), HHJ Jacobs said that "[t]he important issue is whether the data can be related to a living individual, not whether that person can be identified from any particular part of the data […] suppose the request related to my medical records. Each individual entry would probably contain nothing that would identify me as an individual, but every entry could be related to me if it were set in the context of my records as a whole".

  28. "The data protection principles" in FOIA means (so far as relevant to this Appeal) the principles set out in Article 5 UK GDPR.  The principle directly relevant in this Appeal is the first data protection principle, the requirement that the processing of personal data be lawful, fair and transparent.
  29. The processing of personal data is lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the conditions in Article 6(1) UK GDPR is met. The only such condition potentially relevant for the purposes of this Appeal is that in Article 6(1)(f) , that the processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by a third party or parties to whom the data is disclosed. 
  30. In South Lanarkshire Council v Scottish Information Commissioner [2013] UKSC 55 ("South Lanarkshire"), the UK Supreme Court stated at [18] in the context of the predecessor provision, condition 6 in Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 1998, that this test involved three steps:
  31. a. Is the data controller or the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed pursuing a legitimate interest or interests?
    b. Is the processing involved necessary for the purposes of those interests?
    c. Is the processing unwarranted in this case by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of the data subject?
  32. The Commissioner notes, and the Appellant accepts, that references in the Appellant's grounds of appeal to a "public interest test" should have been references to the balancing of "legitimate interests" required when considering the first data protection principle and the application of the s40 FOIA exemption. The Tribunal has considered the arguments on this basis.
  33. Evidence and discussion

  34. Before considering the individual elements of the Request, it is helpful to set out some aspects of the evidence submitted in this Appeal, and the factual context in which these issues are to be decided, as found by the Tribunal based on the evidence.
  35. It should be noted in relation to these matters that the University was not a party to this Appeal, and the Tribunal did not have the benefit of evidence or submissions on its behalf regarding its structures and procedures, or their significance or otherwise for this Appeal. The Tribunal has made its decision based on its assessment of the evidence provided.
  36. The University is one of the most prominent and well-renowned academic institutions in the world.
  37. The Appellant gave evidence regarding what he said was the Academic's role with the University and in particular in relation to its governance, and made submissions based on this evidence. He submitted that the Academic was a senior academic, and a member of the Regent House, the University's governing body; that membership of the Regent House was "largely restricted to academic staff on long-term contracts", numbering around 7,000 members; and that "most or all" members of the University Tribunal were also members of the Regent House.
  38. The Tribunal has been provided with documents setting out aspects of the University's internal disciplinary processes, in particular in relation to research misconduct. Pursuant to the Commissioner's decision, the University has disclosed to the Appellant an overview of the process which it followed in the relevant case, and provided details of its policies and procedures which apply to cases of this type. The University operates different procedures for different categories of persons who are subject to its disciplinary arrangements. In the case of the Academic, this was the process applicable to academic staff, set out in the Schedule to Statute C of the University's Statutes and Ordinances.
  39. The Appellant also notes that the University's current procedures for investigating alleged research misconduct, which he says were approved by the Regent House, state that "if the Complaint or the substance of the Complaint is published, the University will make public the outcome of the procedure". He acknowledges that the current procedure took effect after the conclusion of the case relating to the Academic, and submits that this was a "formal codifying of what were, at the time of [the Academic's] University Tribunal, reasonable expectations of disclosure".
  40. The Appellant notes that previous decisions regarding plagiarism and other incidents of research misconduct have been publicised by the University, in its official newspaper, and has provided a number of extracts from that newspaper in evidence. Most of these extracts relate to either the Court of Discipline or (in relation to examples after 2015) the Discipline Committee of the University. The two extracts relating to cases in the University Tribunal refer to graduates of the University, rather than to members of staff. The Appellant submits that, when compared with other categories of people, the expectation of transparency regarding senior academic staff ought to be greater.
  41. The Commissioner submits that any reference to past decisions is irrelevant, as each decision notice is unique and considered on its own facts. As the Appellant notes in his Reply, this misses the point. The Appellant's submission is that, given the publicity given to previous, arguably similar cases, those involved in the present case ought to have expected a similar degree of publicity. The Commissioner has not addressed this argument.
  42. The Appellant also states that the names of panel members are "routinely disclosed in academia". He supports this by reference to the journal in which the Article was published having publicly stated that the publisher and editor wished to retract the Article.
  43. The Appellant makes reference to the timing of the alleged plagiarism and claims that some of the evidence shows that the Academic had "falsified dates".
  44. Discussion

    Issues

  45. In order to decide the Appeal, it is necessary for the Tribunal to consider the following issues, in relation to each element of Part 4 of the Request:
  46. a. Does the Requested Information constitute personal data, and if so, who are the relevant data subjects?
    b. If it is personal data, would the disclosure of the Requested Information contravene any of the data protection principles (applying the test as set out in South Lanarkshire).
  47. In relation to his first ground of appeal, the Appellant submits that:
  48. a. the Commissioner's arguments at paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Decision Notice (which set out the Commissioner's conclusions that the relevant parts of the Requested Information did not constitute personal data) should be applied to Part 4 of the Request;
    b. the determination of plagiarism can be done anonymously;
    c. analysis of the content of the Article is not personal data due to the Article's publication;
    d. the Academic's explanation of the circumstances leading up to the alleged plagiarism may be personal data;
    e. regarding Part 4(e) of the Request, the work of the University Tribunal involved both "personal and non-personal aspects" and the University has chosen not to separate these.
  49. In relation to his second ground of appeal, the Appellant submits that:
  50. a. members of the Regent House should expect a degree of scrutiny, and their decisions in that capacity should be subject to appropriate accountability, in order to maintain confidence in the University's decisions;
    b. there was no right of appeal for the "victim" of the alleged plagiarism from the decision of the University Tribunal;
    c. the sanction imposed by the University Tribunal, as reported in the press, did not match the sanction which would "ordinarily" apply in similar cases, raising questions of probity;
    d. regarding Part 4(e) of the Request, disclosure of the names of members of the University Tribunal would demonstrate whether or not there were conflicts of interest involved in its decision;
    e. there should be transparency regarding decisions affecting publicly funded research.
  51. In relation to his third ground of appeal, the Appellant submits that:
  52. a. the various examples of publicity relating to previous cases which he has provided support his arguments that details regarding the present case should be disclosed;
    b. the University's personal data policy indicates that some information regarding officers and staff of the University may be published in the University's official newspaper;
    c. although the Decision Notice indicates that the confidentiality of the University's process in the relevant case was stressed to all parties, the Appellant has seen no evidence of this.
  53. In final submissions dated 9 January 2025, the Appellant made further submissions regarding the Academic's senior role at the University and details in relation to the submission of the Article for publication.
  54. The Tribunal considered how the relevant law, in light of the evidence provided, applied to each of the elements of Part 4 of the Request, in light of the Appellant's grounds of appeal and submissions.
  55. Before turning to the elements of Part 4 of the Request in detail, we set out here how the Tribunal considers that the tests in South Lanarkshire apply to the information in Part 4 of the Request more generally, as this is applicable to several parts of the Request.
  56. Is the Requested Information personal data?

  57. Much of the Requested Information within Part 4 is personal data relating to the Academic, consisting of matters relating to an investigation into their conduct under the University's disciplinary process.
  58. The Appellant argues that much of the Requested Information can be disclosed without personally identifiable information.
  59. Applying the approach of the Upper Tribunal in Farrand, the Requested Information is personal data of the Academic if it is data which relates to the Academic, whether or not the Academic is identifiable from the data itself.
  60. The Appellant cites the Commissioner's reasoning at paragraphs 25 and 26 of the Decision Notice.
  61. Having considered the relevant information, the Tribunal is not at all convinced that Commissioner's decision was correct, to the extent that he concluded, without specification, that the information to which those paragraphs refer is not personal data.
  62. The relevant information includes, among other things, the published version of the Article and other, unpublished work, potentially including work by others. The conclusion that this work is not information which relates to individuals is remarkable, in particular in relation to Part 2 of the Request, "the full text of all known uncredited sources for the [Article]". These materials are not published, but the Commissioner's conclusion is that the University must disclose them and cannot withhold them as personal data. If correct, the same reasoning could in theory be applied to a wide range of other material held by the University, or other universities.
  63. It may be that the relevant information should still be disclosed, with or without redactions, but the Tribunal doubts the Commissioner's conclusion that the relevant information not being personal data was the correct basis. The Tribunal has not had the benefit of submissions from the parties or the University on this point, and has not found it necessary to make a finding on it.
  64. In relation to the Appellant's arguments that publication of the Article means that it is no longer the Academic's personal data, this argument fails. Publication does not change the answer to the question whether the Article is information which relates to a living individual.
  65. Is the Appellant, pursuing one or more legitimate interests?

  66. The Appellant says that he is pursuing transparency and accountability in relation to executive decision-making within the University.
  67. As noted above, he says that he is concerned to ensure that there is proper accountability for decisions made regarding publicly funded research. There is particular force in this argument given the world-leading status of the University as an academic institution.
  68. The Tribunal considers that these are legitimate interests.
  69. Is disclosure necessary for the purposes of those interests?

  70. In South Lanarkshire the Supreme Court held at [5] that "'necessary' means 'reasonably' rather than absolutely or strictly necessary", and said that "in ordinary language we would understand that a measure would not be necessary if the legitimate aim could be achieved by something less".
  71. The Tribunal considers that disclosure of the circumstances and details of the investigation carried out by the University (not specifically by the University Tribunal, as set out in the wording of the Request) would further the relevant legitimate interests.
  72. It is difficult to see a way in which "something less" in terms of disclosure could further these interests. Given that the investigation related to the Academic, and that the Appellant has obtained some information relating to the case already, even the disclosure of partial or redacted information in response to the Request is likely to be as intrusive in terms of the Academic's rights.
  73. The Tribunal considers that, in relation to each element of Part 4 of the Request, disclosure would be necessary to further the relevant legitimate interests.
  74. Is the disclosure unwarranted, by reference the balance of interests?

  75. The University's investigation, and the University Tribunal process, are internal matters of the University. They are disciplinary proceedings regarding an academic member of staff. At a general level, the Tribunal considers that this type of proceeding is likely to include sensitive information about relevant individuals, the disclosure of which may well be likely to compromise their privacy. The Decision Notice at paragraphs 42 to 46 sets out a number of ways in which such prejudice might arise in this case. Having considered the Closed Material itself in the context of the Appeal, the Tribunal concludes that this applies in this case.
  76. The Appellant says that the Commissioner did not give adequate weight to the need for transparency around the University's decision-making in his decision. He also makes other arguments, referred to above, in support of the importance of transparency in relation to the Requested Information in this specific case.
  77. In relation to the Appellant's arguments that the sanction imposed by the University Tribunal, as reported in the press, did not match the sanction which would "ordinarily" apply, the evidence does not demonstrate that there is any "ordinary" sanction in similar cases.
  78. The Appellant cites paragraph 4, Chapter I, of Schedule to Statute C of the University's Statutes and Ordinances, which defines "good cause" for dismissal of a member of academic staff as any of four categories of actions, the potentially relevant of which can be summarised as follows:
  79. a. conviction for an offence deemed by the University Tribunal to render the person unfit for office; or
    b. conduct of an immoral, scandalous or disgraceful nature incompatible with their office; or
    c. failure or persistent refusal or neglect or inability to perform duties or comply with the conditions of office.
  80. The Appellant does not make reference to paragraph 12, Chapter III of the same document, which provides that, if charges against an individual are upheld, the University Tribunal may remove the person from office if it finds that good cause is established, or apply such lesser penalty as appears to the University Tribunal to be fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case.
  81. This does not demonstrate that any particular sanction would "ordinarily" apply in a case with similar facts, and the Appellant has submitted no further evidence in support of this argument.
  82. The Appellant raises a number of arguments in support of there being a reasonable expectation that some or all of the personal data included within Part 4 of the Request would be made public.
  83. The Appellant says that he has not seen evidence that those involved in the disciplinary case would have expected the matter to remain confidential. The Tribunal has concluded, on the basis of a review of the Closed Material, that such an expectation would have applied in this case.
  84. In relation to the Appellant's argument that there was no right of appeal for the "victim" of the alleged plagiarism from the decision of the University Tribunal, this does not in the view of the Tribunal assist the Appellant, as it does not provide any further reason that the balance of interests is more in favour of disclosure than it would be otherwise.
  85. The Tribunal notes all of the Appellant's arguments. The Tribunal also notes that the underlying matter is not one of public administrative decision-making, which has a direct impact on the rights and obligations of members of the public, but a decision of a university regarding disciplinary matters relating to a member of its staff. The Appellant is right to note that these matters may have a bearing on the reputation of the University, and potentially by extension the wider academic community. But the context for these decisions is not the same as it might be for other public authorities.
  86. This Decision now proceeds to set out how the Tribunal has applied this element of the test to each element of Part 4 of the Request.
  87. Part 4(a): Scope of the investigation

  88. Paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Decision Notice required the University to disclose material in relation to part 4(a) of the Request as follows:
  89. The disclosure of parts of the scope of the University's subsequent investigation by a disciplinary panel […] The [U]niversity must disclose the methodology and definitions (for example plagiarism, research misconduct etc.) only, subject to the redaction of personal data.

  90. The Appellant appeals against the Commissioner's decision in relation to this element of the Request, but does not particularise any grounds which relate to it, and it is unclear in what way he objects to it.
  91. Applying the relevant tests to this Part: to the extent that this Part of the Request related to steps taken by the University in the specific case of the Academic, the relevant information is personal data relating to the Academic, being the scope of an investigation about the Academic's conduct.
  92. However, the relevant policies and procedures are not personal data. It is these policies and procedures which are the focus of the Decision Notice on this point.
  93. The information disclosed by the University in response to the Decision Notice on this point goes further than describing its policies and procedures, and includes confirmation of specific steps taken by the University in relation to the Academic. This is not a matter for the Tribunal in this Appeal.
  94. The relevant paragraph of the Annex to the Decision Notice is not clearly worded, and could have more clearly described the specific information which was ordered to be disclosed. This does not mean that the Decision Notice was incorrect on this point.
  95. To the extent that information within the scope of Part 4(a) is personal data of the Academic, was the Commissioner's decision, that this should not be disclosed, correct?
  96. Having concluded above that disclosure would be necessary to further a legitimate interest of the Appellant, the Tribunal notes also that disclosing details of an investigation into alleged misconduct by an individual, including in the specific circumstances of this case, is likely to cause prejudice to that person by giving additional details which are, or could be taken by third parties to be, prejudicial to that person and their reputation. Furthermore, the details of the scope of the investigation, taken in isolation, are likely to be of limited value in furthering the Appellant's interests – the details of the scope of the investigation will say little about the substance of the underlying matters.
  97. The Tribunal does not consider that the Commissioner's decision was wrong in relation to this element of the Request.
  98. Part 4(b): Explanation by the Academic to the Panel

  99. The Appellant acknowledges that this element of the Requested Information is more likely to be personal data. It is not clear why these elements are more likely in the Appellant's view to relate to the Academic than other elements.
  100. The value of this element of the Requested Information in furthering the relevant legitimate interests is likely to be significant. The Tribunal, having considered the Closed Material, also takes the view that disclosure of this information would be more likely than that under Part 4(a) to be prejudicial to the Academic's interests.
  101. The Tribunal concludes that the balance of interests in relation to this element of the Requested Information is in favour of the information being withheld.
  102. Part 4(c): the Panel's conclusions

  103. The Tribunal's conclusion on this element is the same as that relating to Part 4(b), for the same reasons.
  104. Regarding the Appellant's arguments based on the University's policy that, if a complaint is published, then the University will make public the outcome of the complaint, as the Appellant acknowledges this policy was not in force at the time of the relevant case. The Appellant's assertion that this was a "formal codifying" of custom and practice is unevidenced and the Tribunal does not regard this as persuasive.
  105. Part 4(d): the Panel's reasons

  106. The Tribunal's conclusion on this element is the same as that relating to Part 4(b), for the same reasons.
  107. Panel 4(e): the membership of the Panel

  108. This element of the Request needs to be considered differently.
  109. The Tribunal has considered this principally in relation to this information being personal data of the members of the Panel, rather than of the Academic.
  110. The relevant information is clearly personal data of those individuals, and the legitimate interest in transparency regarding University decision-making would be furthered by its disclosure.
  111. In relation to the Appellant's argument that disclosure would help him to understand whether conflicts of interest were properly managed, disclosure of the membership of the University Tribunal panel would be "necessary", in the relevant sense, to further this interest.
  112. Would disclosure be unwarranted by reason of prejudice to the rights the University Tribunal members?
  113. Having considered the Closed Material, the confidential nature of the proceedings is clear from the documentation, although the Tribunal has seen no express confirmation that the names of members of the University Tribunal would not be disclosed. Equally we have seen no express confirmation that they would be disclosed.
  114. In relation to the Appellant's submissions regarding previous decisions, these indicate that in some cases the names of University Tribunal members have been published in relation to particular cases. However, there is no precedent in the evidence before the Tribunal for this happening in relation to cases involving University staff, and it is reasonable to consider that different principles might apply in relation to such cases, including the particular nature of the relationship between organisations and their employees or office-holders.
  115. In relation to the Appellant's submissions regarding the Academic and the University Tribunal members being members of the Regent House, this does indicate that there might be some reason for third parties to want to understand the nature of the relevant relationships in relation to transparency of decision-making.
  116. In relation to University's personal data policy indicating that some information regarding officers and staff of the University may be published in the University's official newspaper, this is in favour of there being a reasonable expectation of disclosure, to a limited extent – it does not apply this to the specific circumstances of the case, or to disciplinary proceedings more generally.
  117. In relation to the Appellant's submission that the names of panel members are "routinely disclosed in academia", this was not supported by the evidence provided.
  118. Having considered these matters, the Tribunal concludes that that balance of interests is in favour of the names being withheld rather than disclosed, due to the confidential nature of the University Tribunal proceedings and the absence of a clear basis for finding a reasonable expectation of disclosure in this specific case.
  119. To the extent that the names of the members of the Panel may constitute personal data of the Academic, on the basis that this information forms part of the investigation into the Academic's conduct, the Tribunal's conclusion is the same as that for Part 4(b).
  120. Further matter

  121. As a further matter, the Appellant submits in his reply to the Commissioner's Response that the University was in breach of s1(1)(a) FOIA, having said in its initial FOIA response that information within Part 3(a) of the Request was held, when it was not. He submits that the Decision Notice should have referenced this.
  122. In the Tribunal's view this was a matter of discretion for the Commissioner and the evidence does not lead the Tribunal to conclude that the Commissioner ought to have acted differently.
  123. Conclusion and decision

  124. For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal does not believe that the Commissioner's decision in relation to Part 4 of the Request was wrong in law, or that he ought to have exercised his discretion differently, and accordingly the Appeal is dismissed.
  125. Signed

    Tribunal Judge Maton

    Date: 30 April 2025


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