Care Standards

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008

Heard at the Royal Courts of Justice on 5th, 6th and 7th March 2018

[2017] 3182.EY

Before:

Mr John Reddish (Tribunal Judge)
Ms Pat McLoughlin (Specialist Member)
Ms Wendy Stafford (Specialist Member)

B E T W E E N:

MAUREEN FERGUSON

and

OFSTED

DECISION AND REASONS

Appeal

On 9 November 2017 Ms Maureen Ferguson ("the appellant") appealed under section 74(1) of the Child Care Act 2006 against the decision of the respondent to cancel her registration as a childminder.

Representation

The appellant attended the hearing and represented herself.
The respondent was represented by Miss Juliette Smith, a solicitor with Ofsted Legal Services.

Restricted reporting

The Tribunal made an order pursuant to rule 14(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008 prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any document or information likely to lead to members of the public to identify the children in this case.

Evidence

The Tribunal considered the documents contained in the appeal bundle which consisted of 7 sections lettered A to G – a total of 764 pages.

The bundle included written materials and exhibits prepared by the appellant for this appeal; for her two previous appeals against the suspension of her registration (including a witness statement by her son dated 5 February 2018). and for her formal complaints against two police officers (made on 28 November 2017) and against Ms Catherine Greene, the Early Years Regulatory Inspector who conducted the investigations which led to the decision under appeal (made on 10 December 2017).

The bundle also contained the written response to the appeal prepared by Miss Smith on behalf of the respondent with:
3 witness statements by Ms Greene dated 15 June 2017, 29 October 2017 and 19 January 2018 and the exhibits thereto;
a witness statement by Ms Jennifer Gee, an Ofsted Early Years Senior Officer and the exhibits thereto (including the witness statements made by Police Constable Faz Khan and Police Constable Adelaide Halliday) dated 14 June 2017;
2 witness statements by Ms Pauline Nagarzadeh, an Ofsted Early Years Senior Officer, dated 29 November 2017 and 19 January 2018;
a witness statement by Mr James Norman, an Ofsted Senior Officer, dated 17 January 2018;
a witness statement by Ms A, a former employee of the appellant, dated 19 December 2017;
a witness statement by Ms D, the mother of a child (AD) cared for by the appellant, dated 19 December 2017:
a witness statement by Ms F, a former employee of the appellant, dated 17 January 2018;
a witness statement by Ms O, the mother of the children (HK and AK) cared for by the appellant, dated 17 January 2018; and
a witness statement by Ms K, an Early Education Practitioner, dated 19 January 2018.

The bundle also contained:
the written decisions of the Tribunal dated 22 June 2017 and 6 December 2017;
a “Scott schedule”, to which both parties contributed, setting out the breaches of the regulations alleged by the respondent and the appellant’s answers to each of those allegations;
the Childcare Investigation Toolkit evidence reports prepared by Ms Greene on 13 June 2017 (Ms D); 7 July 2017 (the appellant); 10 July 2017 (Ms O); 11 August 2017 (Ms B -mother of RP) and 11 August 2017 (Ms A); and
copies of the formal correspondence that passed between the respondent and the appellant from 24 May 2017 to 25 October 2017.

The Tribunal received and considered further documents during the hearing. These consisted of:
a print-out of the file maintained electronically by the respondent containing all of the entries made between 24 May 2017 and 1 March 2018 (38 pages);
the Childcare Investigation Toolkit evidence report prepared by Ms Greene on 6 December 2017 relating to her telephone conversation with the unnamed complainant who spoke to the police officers on 23 May 2017;

a transcript of the interview of the appellant by Mr Richard Newman, a police officer from the Child Abuse Investigation Team on 23 May 2017 between 8.09 p.m. and 8.35 p.m.;
copies of the relevant entries from the notebook maintained by PC Kahn in May 2017; and
screen prints of several electronic communications between Ms F and the appellant in August 2017.

The Tribunal heard oral evidence on oath or affirmation from:
Ms A;
PC Kahn;
PC Halliday;
Ms O;
Ms F;
Ms D;
Ms Greene and
Ms Nazarkardeh.

The appellant chose not to give oral evidence on oath but confined herself to oral submissions to supplement the written submissions contained in the bundle.

The facts

The material facts as found by the Tribunal are as follows:

1. The appellant was registered as childminder in December 2010, having been found to be suitable by the respondent's officers.

2. In 2012 the appellant became embroiled in proceedings with the father of her child. She alleged that he had assaulted their son. The responsible local authority instigated a statutory investigation. The appellant should have reported this to the respondent but she did not. She received a warning but no further action was taken.

3. On 25 January 2013 the appellant was inspected and found to be satisfactory. The respondent's officers issued her with a notice setting out the areas in which she was required to improve.

4. On 28 June 2016 the appellant was again inspected and her service was found to be good. Thereafter she received more enquiries from potential clients than she had before.

5. In or about September 2016 Ms D approached the appellant and asked her to consider providing childminding services for her son AD. He was then 13 years old. He is severely disabled by cerebral palsy. He is unable to stand or sit upright without support. He uses a wheelchair which was specially designed for him. He is incontinent of both urine and faeces. He wears nappies which may have to be changed at any

time. He attends a special school. Ms D is a single parent. She works full time for a local authority and has 3 other children.

6. During discussions between Ms D and the appellant it emerged that the appellant would have difficulties in receiving AD when he was delivered to her premises by bus from his school, because she would probably not be there. At the relevant time, she would be absent collecting other children from their schools or nurseries. However, this problem was not then further confronted because the appellant did not have a vacancy.

7. Shortly thereafter, the appellant contacted Ms D and informed her that she now had a vacancy and would provide childminding services for AD. Ms D was reluctant to take up this offer because of the difficulty previously discussed but the appellant persisted and assured Ms D that it could be overcome. She would, she said, obtain help from her aunt (who lived nearby) or her son (who was 15 and would be home from his school) to receive AD and to supervise him until she returned.

8. Ms D agreed to these arrangements. The appellant began caring for AD from 3 p.m. (or such later time as he was delivered to her premises by his school bus) until 6 p.m. each day, in November 2016.

9. The appellant agreed to change AD's nappy when necessary. She demonstrated to Ms D how she would do this and reassured her that there would be no problem because AD was quite light and manageable.

10. In December 2016 the appellant found that changing AD's nappy was challenging and difficult. On one occasion she thought that she might have strained her back when lifting him. She started wearing a supportive belt and, later, informed Ms D that she had been advised by her doctor not to lift AD. Thereafter, she did not attempt to change AD's nappy. On several occasions he soiled himself during the time that he was with the appellant. The appellant took no steps to deal with this and decided that AD should be left until collected by his mother.

11. On two occasions in or about December 2016, when the driver of the school bus arrived at the appellant's premises with AD, he found that she had left "post it" notes on her door indicating the time when she would be back and implying that the driver should wait until then. He found this to be unacceptable. Ms D raised the matter with the appellant and she agreed that she would employ an assistant to care for AD during the period when she might be elsewhere collecting other children.

12. On 23 December 2016 the appellant made a call to the respondent and asked for details of how to register an assistant. She was given appropriate advice.

13. On 9 January 2017 the appellant employed Ms A as a child minding assistant, principally to take care of AD when the appellant was collecting the other children in her care from the local Nursery School

and Children's Centre but also to undertake other duties. Ms A was an experienced nursery assistant and had qualifications in Childcare and Health and Social Care. She explained to the appellant that her DBS certificate had expired and that she, as her new employer, would have to complete the application. Thereafter, the appellant took no steps to obtain a certificate for Ms A. When she left the appellant's employment in mid-March 2017 she still did not have one.

14. In February 2017 Ms O made contact with the appellant and it was agreed that the appellant would provide childminding services for her twin sons, HK and AK. Ms O explained that HK had a diagnosis of an autistic spectrum disorder. The appellant said that this would not be a problem because she had experience of children with special needs and she was already caring for a child who was in a wheelchair.

15. Ms A found caring for AD difficult. She felt that she had had no preparation for the challenges that he presented. She formed the view that the appellant also experienced difficulties with AD and that she was "out of her depth". At first AD was placed, in his wheelchair, in the living room but that proved, on occasions, to be unsafe because the younger children would make contact with AD's arms when he thrust them out when experiencing a muscle spasm. The appellant then habitually placed AD at the edge of the room facing towards the corridor.

16. On 1 March 2017 AD spat food that was in his mouth in the direction of Ms A. This action was involuntary and occurred because of his disability. The appellant (as she subsequently informed Ms D) insisted that AD should be punished. She did so by placing his remaining food in a waste bin. Ms D protested about this to the appellant. The appellant seemed unwilling to listen to this protest and told Ms D that she should be "ashamed" that her son had behaved in the way that he had. Ms D was very upset by this. She felt that the appellant was discriminating against AD because of his condition and doubted whether she had the experience of dealing with children with disabilities that she claimed.

17. On many occasions while Ms A was working for her, the appellant disciplined HK and AK by giving them a "time out". This involved standing one or other of them in the nearby bathroom, with the door open, for varying periods of time. Ms A felt that the appellant's use of "time out" was excessive and inappropriate for very young children but she felt unable to challenge her.

18. On 22 March 2017 the appellant attended a play session at her local Nursery School and Children's Centre with HK and AK. She introduced the children to Ms K as her "naughty boys" and recounted examples of their bad behaviour whilst with her. Ms K suggested that the behaviour she had described was typical of a child with a disorder on the autistic spectrum and advised the appellant to seek advice from a Special Educational Needs Co-ordinator.

19. On 23 March 2017 the appellant attended a “twilight course”, run by a Special Education Needs Co-ordinator in her local authority area, to enable her to adopt strategies to develop language and communication in her setting and to discover what to do if a child were having difficulty with communication. Other than that, the appellant undertook no training to improve her skills in relation to children with special needs, notwithstanding that she had two in her care.

20. On 11 April 2017 the appellant wrote to Ms D. She said that, from the end of the school year, it was most unlikely that she would be able to accommodate AD. This was because her assistant had “resigned at short notice” and no longer worked for her. She was not making plans to replace her and she would have school pick-ups in September 2017 which would clash with AD’s time of arrival. The appellant gave notice that the child minding arrangement with Ms D would end in July 2017, on the last day of AD’s school term, or earlier if she preferred.,

21. On 8 May 2017 the appellant employed Ms F as a child minding assistant to take care of AD when she was collecting the other children and to undertake other duties for a total of 16 hours per week. Ms F had some experience of working as a volunteer with young children but had no childcare qualifications and no first aid qualification. The appellant explained to her that she would be caring for one child who was in a wheelchair and who might be difficult to handle; twin boys aged 3, one of whom had a disorder on the autistic spectrum who could be “a bit of a handful” and a 4-year old boy who was “as good as gold”. Other than that, the appellant offered Ms F no induction training.

22. Ms F explained to the appellant that she had a DBS certificate but she was unsure as to its validity in respect of her employment. The appellant made some enquiries and reported to Ms F that she would not need to have a certificate if she were working under supervision. That advice was subsequently contradicted but the appellant took no further steps to obtain a certificate for Ms F during the next 2 weeks.

23. Soon after she started work for the appellant, Ms F began to feel very uneasy about the instructions she was being given and about the methods adopted by the appellant, particularly in relation to AD. She heard the appellant making derogatory and negative remarks about AD. He told Ms F that he could hear and understand what the appellant was saying and that he did not like it. She placed AD in his wheelchair facing the corridor on the instructions of the appellant on several occasions.

24. While Ms F was working for the appellant and when the group was sitting at the table, the appellant usually placed AD facing into the corner of the room and away from the others. She told Ms F that she did so because AD was inclined to dribble and she and her son found this disgusting and it put them off their food. Ms F subsequently asked AD whether he liked it when the appellant faced him into the corner. He replied: “No, I hate it”.

25. The appellant told Ms F that AD's cup should be washed up separately from the cups used by the other children because it was "disgusting".

26. On several occasions when AD became distressed, Ms F tried to discover what was wrong and to comfort him. The appellant took her aside and told her not to ask AD why he was distressed because he would "start wailing" and frighten the other children.

27. On one occasion, Ms F suspected that AD had soiled himself because she could smell him. She told the appellant and the appellant said that she could not change him because of her back and she would leave him until his mother arrived.

28. Ms F was also unhappy about the appellant's treatment of the twins, HK and AK. On one occasion AK pushed his brother over and he hit his head. The appellant laughed and said that the fall served him right because he was "too excitable". In the presence of HK, the appellant told Ms F that he had autism and that he could be really annoying at times. She added that he was difficult and that he got "on her nerves".

29. On another occasion in the week which commenced on 15 May 2017, Ms F was in the living room and thought she heard the appellant swearing at one of the twins in the nearby bathroom. She could not be sure what she had heard but feared that the appellant had used some vividly coarse language to convey to the child that she was unhappy with his behaviour. After Ms F had finished work and was travelling home with her partner, who had been working in the appellant's garden on that day, Mr W remarked that he had heard, through the open bathroom window, the appellant swearing at a child. She had, he recalled, said: "You are fucking pissing me off". Ms F was dismayed to have confirmation of the bad language that she had also imperfectly heard.

30. During the time that the children were seated at the table in the living room, eating with the appellant and her son, the appellant habitually placed HK in a high chair to prevent him interfering with others or otherwise behaving in a challenging manner. Ms O saw HK confined to a high chair when she arrived early on one occasion to collect her sons. She was very upset about this. She protested to the appellant that she should not prevent HK from sitting with the other children and asked her not to do it again. The appellant agreed to desist from this practice but did not do so. Ms O found HK in a high chair on another occasion. Ms F saw that he was habitually placed in a high chair at meal times.

31. Throughout the time that she worked for the appellant, Ms F felt that she was not supported by her or given any instructions about the regulatory requirements. The appellant did not show her any written materials or talk to her about the statutory requirements.

32. In early May 2017 the appellant persistently asked AD about his mother's intentions with regard to alternative childminding arrangements. On one occasion he responded by saying that he was "not going anywhere".

33. On 16 May 2017 the appellant sent text messages to Ms O in which she said that the twins had been "doing their usual play fighting" and that HK had had "an outburst", possibly because AK had done something to him. She added that they seemed to do something (i.e. to start fighting) as soon as she went to do something in the kitchen.

34. At this time, Ms O had already started a search for another childminder because she did not like the way that the appellant treated her sons. She was not happy about the food they were given. She felt that, even though they liked sausage rolls, it was inappropriate for them to have them every day. The appellant also appeared to her to be tired of the twins. She had said to Ms O that they were difficult for her and Ms O had also overheard her describing them to her assistant as "impossible to manage".

35. Ms O was troubled by the appellant's responses when she asked her to identify other adults who were on her premises from time to time. When she asked the appellant to identify the man sitting on her couch, she told her it was "none of her business". The appellant also told Ms O that her choice of assistants was not her concern and she was not entitled to ask about the man who was working in her garden. Ms O disagreed; felt that she had a legitimate interest in these matters and took offence.

36. Ms F shared her concerns about the appellant with a member of her family and sought advice as to whether she should immediately report her to the authorities or whether she should first challenge her personally and consider her response. Ms F was advised to adopt the latter course.

37. On 22 May 2017 Ms F resolved to speak to the appellant about her concerns before she left work on that day. However, circumstances did not then permit her to confront the appellant at any length. She told the appellant that she would like to talk to her on the following day about her unhappiness. The appellant said "Oh, you are not resigning are you?" Ms F replied: "Not yet".

38. At lunchtime on 23 May 2017 the appellant took HK, AK and RP to a nearby supermarket to collect provisions. Upon her return to her car in the supermarket car park she stowed away her shopping and the twins' double buggy; placed the children in the car in their car seats and then started the engine. The car was in gear and lurched forward dangerously. The appellant assumed that AK had caused this by "touching the gearstick". She sought and received confirmation from RP that he had done so. The appellant was angry and accused AK of doing something that she had previously forbidden. The appellant shouted

loudly at AK and, when rearranging his car seat, she did so in a manner which further drew her to the attention of a woman who was nearby and who had already heard the commotion. Both of the twins cried loudly. They were subsequently described as “sobbing” and “sobbing uncontrollably”.

39. The woman who had heard and observed the incident approached PC Kahn and PC Halliday at about 1.15 pm. They were in uniform and happened to be in the supermarket car park, having attended to another matter. The woman told them that the woman in the car behind hers had hit her child and had been “too rough” with him. She had “forcefully pushed him into his car seat”. She thought that she had “slapped him round the face”, though she did not actually see the slap. She had only heard it. She had been about 12 feet away. She had, she said, been “extremely upset by what she had witnessed”.

40. Mr Kahn and Ms Halliday then approached the appellant and spoke to her. She gave them her name and address and said that she was very busy. Mr Kahn explained to her that “a member of the public” had informed them that she had been ”too rough with the children” and had “forcefully placed one of the babies into his car seat after shouting at him and slapping him around the face”. The appellant aggressively denied this allegation. She accepted that there had been “some shouting”. She specifically denied being too forceful and slapping the child, whom she identified as her own son. She insisted that she was entitled to discipline her own children as she saw fit; vigorously challenged the officers’ right to question her conduct and complained that they were wasting her time. Ms Halliday was surprised and shocked by the appellant’s reaction to their intervention. She noted that the appellant was “very irate”. She said: “Who are you to tell me how to discipline my children?” and: “They are my children, so people should keep their nose out.” or words to a like effect.

41. When Ms Halliday opened the door of the appellant’s car she saw that the two children in the rear of the vehicle (AK and HK) were “visibly shaken up” and were crying. AK was “shaking and holding his right cheek”. The child in the front seat (RP) was “okay”.

42. When the appellant told the police officers that she was the mother of all three of the children, Mr Kahn recorded the surnames of the twins in his notebook as “Ferguson”. Meanwhile, Ms Halliday spoke to the children and endeavoured to calm them. She asked RP what had happened and he said “She [the appellant] slapped him [AK] and pushed him there [indicating the foot well in the rear of the car]”. RP also asserted, in response to a question from Ms Halliday, that the twins were “not his brothers”.

43. Mr Kahn than challenged the appellant’s assertion that the three children were hers. She then said that only RP was hers and that the twins were not hers. She was their childminder. When asked by Mr Kahn, RP said

that the appellant was “not his mummy”. The appellant then conceded that she was a childminder to all three of the children and explained that she had claimed to be their mother because she did not want to be delayed.

44. The police officers decided that they had reasonable grounds to arrest the appellant and they also took the view that if they did not take steps to remove the children to a place of safety they might suffer further harm at the hands of the appellant. The appellant eventually calmed down. Mr Kahn did not feel that he needed to apply any restraint to complete the arrest at 2.15 p.m.

45. Mr Kahn asked the appellant to provide contact details for the twins' mother. She declined to provide these but immediately telephoned Ms O and told her that the police were accusing her of hitting her son. Mr Kahn took over the call and explained the position to Ms O. He said that he did not want to leave her children with her childminder. Ms O said that she would leave work immediately and come to the police station to collect her sons.

46. On 23 May 2017 the appellant telephoned Ms F and told her to go to her house and to be there to receive AD. Ms F reminded her that she did not have a key to the house. Ms F travelled towards the appellant's home but, while she was doing so, she received another call. The appellant told her not to bother; that there was “a situation” and that she need not come in to work for the rest of the week. Ms F discovered what had happened to the appellant when she later spoke to her partner's father. He told her that there had been “an incident” and that the appellant had been detained at the police station.

47. At 3.10 p.m. on 23 May 2017 the appellant telephoned Ms D from the police station. She said that there had been an incident at the end of her road and that she was unable to get to her premises. She quickly ended the call. Ms D tried to call her back but to no avail. Since it was too late to call AD's school, because he had already left, Ms D arranged for her sister to intercept the school bus and to collect AD. Ms D regarded this as “the last straw” and sent a text message to the appellant to inform her that she was dissatisfied with her services and was terminating their agreement forthwith. She was not, at this time, aware that the appellant had been arrested on suspicion of having assaulted a child. She also said in her text that she would call upon the appellant on the following day to collect her receipts for money paid and a refund of her pre-payment.

48. At 8.07 p.m. on 23 May 2017 Mr Richard Newman of the Child Abuse Investigation team interviewed the appellant in the presence of her solicitor. Mr Newman informed the appellant that she had been arrested because a member of the public had seen her slap, or believed that she had slapped, a child who was in the rear seat of her vehicle. The appellant denied that there was a slap and gave her account of the

incident. She accepted that someone might have heard her tone to have been “a bit strong” and so had “added something extra”. She had been “firm” with AK but the allegation that she slapped him made no sense because she was right handed and his face was alleged to have been red on his right side. The witness had “made up some sort of story”. She had told AK off but she did not know where the “additional stuff” had come from. In answer to further questions, the appellant said that she had lifted AK and put him into the car seat but not “forcefully”, as had been alleged. The suggestion that the witness “heard a slap” was “absolute nonsense”. She did not slap AK. All that the witness could have heard was her “telling him off”. She might have been “a bit agitated” and she did raise her voice because he (AK) had been told many times not to touch the gear stick but he didn’t listen. She had, she conceded, felt it necessary to enable AK to see that she was annoyed. The appellant went on to say that AK and HK were so badly behaved that her assistant had “never seen two children in [such] action” and that a sales assistant in Argos had told her that she deserved a medal for putting up with the sort of behaviour she had witnessed. When AK started “his wailing” she just switched off and did not let it bother her. In response to a question from Mr Newman about her claim that the children were hers, the appellant said that she had done that because she feared that they would ask “ten thousand questions” and she needed to get home quickly. She agreed with Mr Newman that she should not have said that she was the children’s mother.

49. The appellant did not report the fact of her arrest and interview to the respondent. On 24 May 2017 the deputy head teacher of the local Nursery School and Children’s Centre telephoned Ofsted and informed them that Ms O had reported to her that the appellant had been arrested and that she had had to collect her children from the police station. The deputy head confirmed that she had also notified the Local Authority Designated Officer of what she had been told about the events of the previous day.

50. On 24 May 2017 the respondent’s Early Years Senior Officer, Mr Martin Jeffs exercised the respondent’s statutory power to suspend the appellant’s registration and notified her accordingly.

51. On the evening of 24 May 2017 Ms D went to the appellant’s home. She could tell that the appellant was there and knocked on her door several times. The appellant did not answer. The appellant had been told by the police that she must not have contact with any of the parents or witnesses and she felt that she should therefore not speak to Ms D on this occasion.

52. At a strategy meeting held at the offices of the local authority on 31 May 2017, the police announced that they would be taking no further action against the appellant because the potential witness was unwilling to make a statement or to attend court. It was therefore agreed that Ofsted

were free to conduct an investigation and that Ms Greene would arrange to visit the appellant.

53. On 4 June 2017 Ms D made a detailed, written complaint to Ofsted, using the respondent's on-line facility, when she was still unaware that the appellant had been arrested on 23 May 2017. She described the incidents that had occurred on 1 March 2017 and 23 and 24 May 2017 and indicated that she hoped that Ofsted would investigate the extent of the appellant's experience with disabled children; remove her as "an adequate childminder for disabled children" and obtain from her a written apology to her son for the way in which she had treated him.

54. On 5 June 2017 the complaint made by Ms D was drawn to the attention of Ms Greene. She made contact with Ms D on the following day and assured her that she would be in touch with again as soon as she had any further information to share.

55. On 6 June 2017 the appellant telephone Ms Greene to inform her that she had submitted an appeal against her suspension. She said that she had been informed by the police that they would be taking no further action and referred to the incident as a "mountain out of a mole hill".

56. On 7 June 2017 Detective Sergeant Anderson of the Child Abuse Investigation Team informed Ms Greene that the witness from the car park did not want to get drawn into the court procedure but that she might be willing to make a statement to Ofsted.

57. On 9 June 2017 Ms Greene spoke to the witness. She said that she was happy to give an account of what happened over the telephone but did not want to go to court. She said that she had been shocked by what she had seen. The person she saw was "so focussed on hitting the child and shouting at the child" that she did not appear to care who could see her in a very busy car park. It was fortunate that there was a police car in the car park. She had told the officers that they needed to go and see what was happening.

58. Later on 9 June 2017 Ms Greene spoke to the appellant. She wished to arrange an interview with her. The appellant said that she was busy. She eventually made herself available on 7 July 2017.

59. On 12 June 2017 Ms Greene spoke again to the witness from the car park at the telephone. She said that she was not prepared to talk about the incident any further and invited Ms Greene to ask the police what she had told them.

60. In early June 2017 the appellant telephoned Ms F on several occasions. She asked her not to contact Ofsted and then to answer them without disclosing how or why she was recruited. The appellant told her what to say if she were asked by Ofsted about a variety of matters. Ms F told

the appellant that she did not like the way in which she treated the children and that she would not lie for her.

61. On 13 June 2017 Ms Greene spoke at the telephone with Ms D. Ms Greene asked about the agreement made with the appellant. Ms D said that the appellant was going to mind, change and feed her son after school until 6 p.m. Ms D mentioned a number of matters of complaint. She felt that the appellant could not be bothered to take AD's coat off; that she failed to change his nappy and that she kept claiming that AD had declined his food. That, she felt, was unlikely. The appellant had thrown his food in the bin on one occasion when he spat at her involuntarily and she never fed him again but just gave a ham sandwich, Vimto and a packet of crisps.

62. On 20 June 2017 the Tribunal dismissed the appellant's appeal against her suspension.

63. In June 2017 Ms O arranged for her children to be cared for by another childminder. HK settled well with her and there were "no issues with his behaviour". The contrast between the twins' behaviour when they were with the appellant and when they were with their new childminder was marked.

64. Later on 7 July 2017 Ms Greene visited the appellant at her home. The appellant explained that she had admonished AK instantly in the car park to "help him learn". She pointed at him and told him off, using "a different tone". This had caused "a little tearful crying". When RP had told the police that she had hit AK, he was merely adopting what the police had put to her. The appellant accepted that she had let PC Kahn think that the children were hers but later told him that she was not their biological mother. She felt that PC Kahn was "covering his own back" by making exaggerated allegations because he had been "a bit drastic" and there might be "a lawsuit afterwards". The children were not crying. At the police station, slapping was not mentioned.

65. When dealing with the allegations made by Ms D in relation to AD, the appellant said that she had had issues lifting him; that his previous childminder had been "fed up with his behaviour" and that she had tried placing him in the hallway for time out but this did not work. He had spat at her assistant but she did not throw his food into a bin nor did she feed him inappropriately. He would sit in the space by the door, sometimes facing out into the hallway, because he preferred that position.

66. In July 2017 the appellant contacted Ms O on several occasions by telephone and by email. She claimed that Ms O owed her money for the rest of the week beginning 22 May 2017. Ms O made it clear to the appellant that, having regard to what had happened on 23 May 2017, she was not prepared to make any further payment. The appellant then left an angry voicemail message in which she swore at Ms O. On 19

July 2017 the appellant threatened to report her to HMRC for wrongly claiming tax credits. She later threatened her with court proceedings.

67. On 4 August 2017 Ms O telephoned Ofsted. She expressed her concern about the tone of the calls and emails than she had received from the appellant. On the following day she sent Ofsted a photograph of one of the twins showing bruising to his neck. She later explained to Ms Greene that her son had returned from the care of the appellant with a bruise to his neck. No accident report had been completed.

68. Ms A was reluctant to speak to Ofsted about her time working as the appellant's assistant because she was "anxious about possible repercussions" but Ms Greene managed to contact her by telephone on 11 August 2017. Ms A explained that the appellant had found the acquisition of a DBS certificate for her "all too complicated".

69. On 11 August 2017 Ms Greene spoke to the appellant at the telephone. The appellant admitted that she had used "unchecked assistants" who had, on at least one occasion, looked after children on their own. The appellant denied the allegation by Ms O that she had used the high chair to restrain HK and said that she had never done that.

70. On 12 August 2017 Ms Greene spoke to Ms B (mother of RP) at the telephone. She recalled that she had seen one of the twins sitting in a high chair. She said that every time she went into the appellant's house (which was not often) the twin was in the high chair. She thought that he should be playing with the other boys and suggested to the appellant that she should not simply give him "the Gameboy" to keep him quiet. The appellant agreed that "she needed to do something else with him". Ms B also told Ms Greene that when she collected RP from the police station on 23 May 2017, he was "really upset" by the appellant's claim that she was his mother and the twins were his brothers. He wanted to make sure that everyone knew that the appellant was not his mother.

71. On 17 August 2017 Ms F sent a text message to the appellant in which she said that she would not be bullied and would not be "extorted" and would be giving the appellant nothing by way of reimbursement for a missing pushchair.

72. On 18 August 2017 Ms F sent another text message to the appellant in which she said: "don't expect me to lie for you to Ofsted".

73. On 4 September 2017 the respondent gave the appellant notice of their intention to cancel her registration because she was no longer suitable to be a childminder and could not demonstrate that she could comply with the statutory requirements. In her letter, Ms Gee set out the matters relied upon, including the incident on 23 May 2017; the failure to care properly for vulnerable children with special educational needs and the failure to follow safeguarding procedures in relation to her assistants. Ms Gee concluded that the appellant's behaviour had caused emotional

distress to the children and that she had “acted in a way which was not conducive to that of a registered childminder”.

74. On 12 September 2017 the appellant responded by letter. She said that a large percentage of the report’s contents distorted, misinterpreted and contradicted the facts. She said that she intended to “elaborate” her objections through further correspondence in due course.

75. On 2 October 2017 the appellant sent a response to the respondent. She suggested, amongst other things, that the police reports contained “more elaborate, over dramatised and over sensationalised additional allegations” than the false allegations initially made; that Ms D had “poor behaviour management” (because otherwise her son would not have behaved in the way that he did) and that her assistants had been called in as emergency cover because Ms D had failed to make appropriate arrangements with the bus company. Dealing in greater detail with the incident on 23 May 2017, she said that it had never been alleged that a witness had seen or heard her slap a child; that the police had fabricated a story and had made an unlawful arrest; that they had falsely alleged that she had acted aggressively and angrily towards them; that they saw her as “an easy target” to maintain their quota of arrests and that any distress caused to Ms D was either “her own fault” or the fault of the police for making an illegal arrest.

76. On 25 October 2017 the respondent informed the appellant that they had rejected her objections and had confirmed the cancellation of her registration. Ms Nazarkardeh set out the reasons for the decision and the conclusion that the appellant was unable to sustain a good standard of care and had failed to demonstrate that she was able to maintain the requirements of registration.

77. On 9 November 2017 the respondent continued the suspension of the appellant’s registration for a further six weeks and the appellant immediately appealed. Her appeal was dismissed by the Tribunal on 4 December 2017. The Tribunal noted that the appellant put her case in a manner which was “strongly defensive rather than reflective”.

78. On 28 November 2017 the appellant made a formal complaint against the police officers which she supported with a written statement.

79. On 10 December 2017 the appellant made a formal complaint to Ofsted about the conduct of Ms Greene. She accused her of “making statements recklessly” with little regard to whether they were true or false.

80. On 6 February 2018 the appellant presented her written statement in support of her appeal in the form of 27 exhibits. She asked rhetorically why Ms Greene was permitted to introduce new allegations “six or seven months down the line”. She described the situation with regard to “the boy with cerebral palsy” (AD) and said that his mother had brought him

to her setting "under deceitful circumstances" and had placed her in a predicament that she did not wish to be in. She alleged that Ms Greene had "contaminated the case"; had groomed the witnesses to make false allegations and to "bear false witness"; had pretended to have had "conversations that clearly did not take place". She had, she said, plotted "to put negativity in the situation". The appellant submitted that the two police officers were guilty of making a false arrest and were being investigated for that. Ms O was, she said, overly anxious; had neglected her own son; had forgotten all the favours that the appellant had done for her and had stolen from her by failing to pay for services received. Ms D was, she said, irresponsible. Ms F was "the disgruntled second assistant" who lacked integrity. They were all trying to condemn her but had not "come to court with clean hands".

The law

Section 68 of the Childcare Act 2006 Act provides that the respondent may cancel the registration of a person registered if it appears that the prescribed requirements for registration which apply to that person have ceased to be satisfied or that she has failed to comply with a requirement imposed upon her by the regulations.

The detailed requirements imposed upon providers are set out in the schedules to the Childcare (Early Years Register) Regulations 2008 and the Childcare (General Childcare Register) Regulations 2008.

Providers must be suitable to provide childminding.

Providers are responsible for managing children's behaviour and must not use or threaten any punishment which could adversely affect a child's well-being and must manage the behaviour of children in a suitable manner.

Any care that childminders provide for older children must not adversely affect the care of children receiving early years provision.

Providers must ensure that their premises, including the overall floor space, are fit for purpose and that the premises and equipment are organised in a way that meets the needs of children.

Providers must ensure that there are suitable hygienic changing facilities for changing any children who are in nappies.

Providers must have arrangements in place to support children with special educational needs or disabilities and must not treat any child less favourably by reason of any disability or learning difficulty that he or she may have.
Where children are provided with meals, they must be healthy, balanced and nutritious.

Registered providers must ensure that all childminding assistants employed by them are suitable. Their names, addresses and dates of birth must be supplied

to Ofsted and they must have Disclosure and Barring Service certificates. They must also receive induction training.

The burden of proving the facts upon which Ofsted relies in support of a cancellation lies upon them. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.

Any cancellation of a registration must be a proportionate and necessary step in all the circumstances.

The Tribunal's conclusions with reasons

Having considered all of the evidence given and the arguments presented at the hearing and the witness statements and other papers submitted in advance, the Tribunal came to the conclusions set out below.

81. The evidence of Ms F was of great assistance. The Tribunal found her to be thoughtful, reflective, assertive and credible. She gave careful consideration to everything that she encountered during the short time that she worked for the appellant and provided a good account of her observations, feelings and conclusions. Her oral evidence was compelling and convincing. The suggestion that she had been groomed or instructed to give false accounts to the Tribunal was unsupported and unsupportable. She was planning to confront the appellant on 23 May 2017 and was surprised and relieved when it appeared that others had relieved her of that task.

82. The Tribunal also accepted the evidence of Ms D. She had come to know the appellant quite well and had also become resigned to acceptance of some of her inadequacies. The "last straw", which provoked her to terminate her contract for services with the appellant, was the belated notification by the appellant of her inability to receive AD on 23 May 2017. Because the appellant had failed and neglected to give her a true explanation, Ms D was unaware of, and unaffected by, the serious difficulties which had arisen on that date when she made that decision. She relied upon other matters which gave rise to justified concern. Her detailed, written report to Ofsted was made before any approach from their officers. Ms D later discovered that the appellant had humiliated her son and she also came to believe that she might even have abused him physically but that did not provoke her to accuse the appellant, falsely or otherwise. She had made her position clear long before she heard about these matters. The Tribunal were satisfied that her evidence was truthful and they found it to be was very persuasive. Her witheringly forthright rejection of the suggestions made to her by the appellant in cross-examination were revealing and compelling. The anger and distress that she experienced, and continues to experience, were controlled and did not, in the Tribunal's judgment, invalidate or undermine the veracity of her account.

83. The Tribunal also regarded the evidence of Ms O as truthful and helpful. She is intelligent and has insight and sound judgment. English is not her first language but she has an excellent command of it and was well able to convey her recollections accurately and convincingly. She was balanced and restrained in her criticism of the appellant and did not overstate her contentions in relation to the mistreatment of her children. She was shocked and horrified when she was informed by Mr Kahn that the appellant had been convincingly accused of slapping and otherwise physically mistreating her son but she did not allow that to colour her account of earlier problems. The suggestion by the appellant that she too had been groomed or coached into giving false accounts to the Tribunal by Ms Greene was baseless.

84. Ms A was a timid witness who was easily persuaded by the appellant to accept the truth of the matters that she put to her. Nevertheless, she made it clear that she was sometimes rendered uncomfortable by the behaviour of the appellant and she did not retract her reasoned criticism of several of the practices that she had observed in early 2017.

85. The Tribunal accepted the evidence of the arresting police officers, Mr Kahn and Ms Halliday. They were not, as the appellant suggested, exaggerating in an attempt to justify unlawful and unwarranted actions. They were faced with an intemperate and untruthful person who had caused significant alarm and distress to an impartial, concerned observer. They reacted with restraint and justification and subsequently gave a true account of their involvement, both in writing and orally to the Tribunal. The inconsistencies in their respective accounts were not significant and did not invalidate them. Had they given exactly the same account in exactly the same words, the Tribunal would have found them less persuasive. The allegation that Mr Kahn put to the appellant was edited and incomplete but reasonably so. The suggestion that nobody suggested to the appellant that she had slapped the child when she was interviewed at the police station was directly contradicted by the transcript. It followed that the appellant’s suggestion that the allegation was a subsequent invention by Mr Kahn and Ms Halliday was ill founded. The hearsay evidence of the complainant (which the Tribunal could and did admit) was entirely corroborative of the police officers evidence.

86. Wherever and whenever the accounts given by Ms F, Ms A, Ms O, Ms D, Mr Kahn and Ms Halliday differed from those set out by the appellant, the Tribunal preferred those given by the witnesses. The Tribunal formed the view that the appellant’s detailed assertions were not credible. The appellant chose not to give evidence on oath and did not submit herself to cross-examination. Having regard to her declared and emphasised religious beliefs, this served to confirm the Tribunal’s view that her written assertions (which she frequently repeated orally during her attempts to challenge the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent) could not sensibly be relied upon.

87. The Tribunal were not satisfied that the meals provided by the appellant rendered her in breach of the requirements of the regulations. It was widely suggested that the food presented to the children by the appellant was not satisfactory and was therefore understandably rejected by them. The Tribunal was not persuaded that healthy, balanced and nutritious food was lacking. In the absence of scientific evidence about the content of the snacks or meals provided, the Tribunal declined to proceed to the conclusion that they were unbalanced, unhealthy or of insufficient nutritional value.

88. The Tribunal were not prepared to hold that the appellant breached her statutory obligation to ensure that any care she provided for an older child did not adversely affect the care of children receiving early years provision as alleged. There was some evidence that the younger children had, from time to time, collided with AD's arm but this was a relatively minor matter. The appellant's way of dealing with it was unsatisfactory from the point of view of AD because he was moved out of the way, whether he wanted to be elsewhere or not. However, for the most part he tolerated this removal, though not others, without protest or significant distress. At other times, the group got on well. AD would jokingly refer to the younger children as his subjects and they would go along with his pretence to be a king on his throne.

89. When considering whether or not the appellant had ensured that her premises, including the overall floor space, were fit for purpose the Tribunal were faced with some conflicting evidence. On the one hand it was suggested that there was insufficient space to accommodate AD's wheelchair but it was also suggested that he was kept apart from the other children unnecessarily when he could have been accommodated in the living area. The appellant's premises were small and rather cramped and probably only marginally fit for purpose. However, the Tribunal were satisfied that the appellant failed to organise the premises and equipment in a way that met the needs of children in her care. She promised Ms D that she would relocate the furniture to accommodate AD's wheelchair properly but she never did so. She placed AD in a position where his flailing arms would be less likely to hurt the younger children as they ran around but, in doing so, she failed him significantly. She singularly failed to realise or accept that he disliked being faced away from the other children.

90. When the appellant turned AD to face the wall to alleviate her own feelings of disgust and those of her teenage son, she failed to meet his needs and failed to make arrangements to support a child with a disability. She also acted in breach of her obligation not to treat a child less favourably by reason of his disability. When she instructed Ms F to wash up AD's cup separately she also discriminated against him unlawfully. It may have seemed like a small matter to the appellant but Ms F was troubled by this "differentiation" and AD could well have noted that he was being treated differently by the appellant because he

disgusted her. He lacked communication skills but he did not lack perception or understanding.

91. The appellant's treatment of AD in, on one occasion, throwing away his meal and, on many occasions, turning him to face the wall, amounted to the use of punishment which could have adversely affected, and did so affect, his well-being. Her use of a high chair to restrain or contain HK was unnecessary. It represented a failure to manage the behaviour of a child in a suitable manner and a failure to have arrangements in place to support a child with special educational needs. It also amounted to another treatment of a child less favourably by reason his disability and/or learning difficulty.

92. The appellant's failure to sustain her promise to change AD when necessary was not a breach of her obligation to have changing facilities but was a failure to put in place proper arrangements for a child with a disability.

93. The appellant's failure to provide reasonably close supervision of, and engaging activities for, the twins amounted to a failure to put in place proper arrangements for a child with a disability. The appellant herself said that the twins seemed to start fighting as soon as her back was turned. According to Ms A, they would pull the fireguard or fight over a toy or attack each other. Ms A took the view that "there was not enough to keep them occupied". She was probably right.

94. The appellant's use of "time out" was controversial. The Tribunal shared the doubts expressed by Ms A; Ms F and Ms Greene about the regular and frequent use of this method of dealing with challenging behaviour. The appellant revealed little understanding of this technique when she suggested that she might have taken AK back to her home and placed him in a "time out" instead of admonishing him instantly in the car park. Her insistence that there were suitable toys in the bathroom revealed a further lack of understanding. The presence or absence of toys was not to the point. Removing one of the children from the scene of a conflict or to impose a brief penalty for unacceptable behaviour could have been appropriate but the appellant used "time out" frequently and indiscriminately and without any apparent regard for the fact that HK had a social communication disorder and might not have any or any clear understanding of why he was being subjected to this treatment. It therefore constituted a failure on the part of the appellant properly to manage children's behaviour; the use of a punishment which could have adversely affected a child's well-being and a failure to manage the behaviour of children in a suitable manner.

95. The Tribunal noted that Ms K expressed the view that, although the appellant attended some of the training offered to her, she did not seem to understand or implement what she was taught. She displayed a lack of effective planning for the children, especially those with special needs. The Tribunal accepted the validity of these opinions which were given by

a person qualified to express them who knew the appellant. They confirmed the Tribunal's view that the appellant persistently failed to have arrangements in place to support the children with special educational needs whom she had in her care in 2017.

96. The appellant clearly and repeatedly breached the statutory requirements in relation to the employment of her assistants. Both of them told her that they did not have valid DBS certificates but the appellant failed to act, perhaps believing that this was unnecessary form-filling or "red tape". She should have made herself aware of the requirements and should, at the very least, have informed Ofsted on each occasion that she took on an assistant. They were not taken on in true emergencies and the proper procedure should plainly have been followed. The risks involved in failing to check their antecedents were obvious and should have been obvious to the appellant. Her attempt to blame Ofsted for a failure to give her appropriate advice was misconceived.

97. The appellant was also in breach of her statutory obligations when she used the services her aunt and her son (who was only 15) to receive AD and to supervise him until she returned. It was not clear exactly how many times these undisclosed assistants had cared for AD but the appellant did not deny that she had made and implemented that arrangement, with the consent of Ms D.

98. The appellant breached the requirement that she should give induction training to her assistants. The briefings that she gave to both Ms A and Ms F were inadequate and did not amount to "training" at all. Both of these young women had to find their own way with little or no guidance from the appellant.

99. The appellant demonstrated her lack of honesty and integrity on several occasions. Most obviously, on 23 May 2017 she lied repeatedly to Mr Kahn and Ms Halliday and, in doing so, caused confusion and distress to RP and probably also to HK and AK. She did not merely allow the officers to believe that she was the mother of the children in her care nor did she only once lie in answer to a closed question. She gave the names of the twins as "Ferguson" and, when she was shown to have lied, by the obviously valid denial by RP that the twins were his brothers, she repeated her offence by insisting that, though the twins were not hers, RP was her son.

100. The appellant was probably dishonest when she told Ms D that she had been forbidden by her doctor from continuing to change AD. She adduced no evidence to that effect. Her use and display of a support belt was treated by Ms D as mere posturing. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant would have encountered real difficulties in changing AD, having regard to his age and disability. However, the appellant's decision to stop changing him; to pretend that she was under orders not

to do so; to make no other arrangements and to leave AD in a soiled state was unconscionable and a breach of her obligations.

101. The appellant was also dishonest when she wrote to Ms D on 11 April 2017. She said that her assistant had “resigned at short notice” and she was not making plans to replace her. Ms A had left in mid-March and Ms F replaced her in early May 2017.

102. When the appellant contacted Ms D on 23 May 2017 she was again dishonest. She was under some pressure and understandably stressed, having been arrested and detained but she chose to dissemble with Ms D rather than to reveal the true position.

103. When the respondent’s investigation began, the appellant endeavoured to persuade Ms F to be untruthful, if or when she was questioned by Ofsted’s officers. She asked her not to contact Ofsted and then to answer them without disclosing how or why she was recruited. She referred, perhaps indirectly, to the consequences which her partner would have to face if she caused difficulties for her or incriminated her. This prompted Ms F specifically to refuse to lie on her behalf, whatever the adverse effects of that upon her partner’s relationship with his father.

104. The Tribunal rejected the appellant’s intemperate criticisms of Ms Greene as entirely without foundation. In the Tribunal’s judgment Ms Greene conducted a proper enquiry in circumstances which were sometimes quite difficult because of the witnesses’ fear of “repercussions” and the belligerent stance taken by the appellant. She did not “groom” any of the witnesses. She translated their observations into witness statements and ensured, as far as possible, that the drafts properly reflected the evidence that they wished to give.

105. The appellant demonstrated her lack of empathy and understanding of the way in which her assertions and actions were perceived by others on several occasions. She spoke about AD and HK in their presence without any regard to their feelings. She twice told Mr Kahn that RP was her child, without regard to the alarm and distress that this might, and did, cause to him. In her conduct of the proceedings she seemed to be oblivious of the effect upon all of her readers of her exaggerations and illogical assertions. When Ms F indicated that she found her approach ludicrous she either failed to understand or effected not to do so. She showed a determination to defend her actions and a failure to appreciate how she appeared when doing so.

106. The appellant is not suitable to provide childminding. The evidence revealed consistent breaches of several of the statutory requirements for childminders, as follows. The appellant used punishment which could have adversely affected, and probably did adversely affect, a child’s well-being. She failed to manage the behaviour of children in a suitable manner. She failed to ensure that the premises and equipment were

organised in a way that met the needs of children. She did not have arrangements in place to support children with special educational needs or disabilities and treated AD less favourably by reason of his disability. She did not ensure that her assistants were suitable and did not supply their names, addresses and dates of birth to Ofsted. She did not ensure that they had had valid Disclosure and Barring Service certificates and she gave them no, or no sufficient, induction training.

107. The appellant lacks integrity and honesty. She also does not anticipate how her assertions and actions will be perceived by others. She often dealt with the challenging behaviour of children in an unsatisfactory manner. Her actions sometimes amounted to emotional abuse. The inquiries persistently addressed to AD about his mother's intentions with regard to alternative childminding arrangements were inappropriate. Her treatment of children in her care was, for several years, adequate but, when faced with the greater challenges presented by AD and HK, she faltered and found herself unable to cope. She did not have the skills, understanding or inclination to rise to those challenges.

108. The appellant's dealings with the parents of the children in her care were often offensive to them. She readily becomes vindictive and hostile. Her reactions to accusation, both in the car park of the supermarket and later, as matters progressed, were often misconceived. She readily and quickly made unsustainable and implausible counter allegations in response to criticism. Her written attacks upon Ms O and Ms D (accusing them of irresponsibility and mendacity) were as unwarranted as they were inappropriate.

109. The appellant's case was based upon comprehensive denial and numerous accusations of fabrication against all of the witnesses. She alleged that these were motivated by antipathy towards her personally. Her attitude was pugnacious. She frequently responded to witnesses who were giving oral evidence by saying: "that conversation didn't happen". The appellant made a complaint to the Independent Police Complaints Commission claiming that the police officers were motivated by a desire to bolster their arrest statistics. She said that they "knowingly and purposely made serious false allegations in their police reports" and that "an illegal unwarranted arrest was initiated by one of them (PC4745ES Faz Kahn)" and the other (PC1212EA Adelaide Halliday) assisted. She added that: "They have knowingly and purposely made false allegations about what a witness has said and also what a child has said". None of these accusations was true. The appellant believes that she was "an easy target". She has no justification for this belief. Her lack of judgment in relation to the allegations and accusations that she faced, from the outset and throughout the proceedings, confirmed the Tribunal's view that she was not a suitable person to provide childminding.

110. It is well established that any cancellation of a registration must be a proportionate and necessary step in all the circumstances. The Tribunal accepted and adopted the conclusions expressed by Ms Nazarkardeh in her oral evidence. The appellant's fundamental challenges to the integrity of her accusers; her failure to "take on board" any of the points made against her and her repeated insistence that "they made it up" made any other course than cancellation of registration inconceivable. Notices to improve and/or notices of "welfare requirements" with monitoring would have no effect upon a childminder who was convinced that nothing that she had done could properly be regarded as significant.

111. Those who encountered the appellant in 2016-17 were very critical of her. Ms A described the appellant as "a unique character" who meant well but "did things in her own way" and made her own rules. Ms F described her time with the appellant as "a horrible experience". Ms D said that the appellant had provided "a really awful experience" for her and her child. Ms O felt "let down and disappointed" by the appellant. All of these reactions were understandable and well founded. The respondent's conclusions were fully justified. The Tribunal agreed that Ofsted should not be confirming to parents that the appellant would (i) keep their children safe and (ii) would ensure their welfare, by continuing her registration. The Tribunal were satisfied that she could not and would not fulfil either of those duties.

Order

Appeal dismissed.

John Reddish
(Tribunal Judge)
First-tier Tribunal (Health Education and Social Care)
Date: 22 March 2018