DECISION
Introduction
1.
This is an appeal against discovery assessments for income tax, class 4
National Insurance contributions and associated penalties in respect of alleged
under-declarations of profits from the Appellant’s self-employment in the
property construction and maintenance industry.
The assessments under appeal
2.
The assessments under appeal are for additional income tax and class 4
NICs as follows:
|
Tax year
|
Date of
original assessment
|
Amount of
assessment under appeal
|
Associated
penalty under appeal
|
|
1999-2000
|
9 Dec 2008
|
£13,781.60
|
£6,890
|
|
2000-2001
|
9 Dec 2008
|
£14,296.05
|
£7,148
|
|
2001-2002
|
11 Dec 2009
|
£14,443.95
|
£7,222
|
|
2002-2003
|
21 Oct 2009
|
£16,852.35
|
£8,426
|
|
2003-2004
|
7 Feb 2008
|
£18,769.93
|
£9,385
|
|
2004-2005
|
7 Feb 2008
|
£25,880.80
|
£12,940
|
The facts
3.
The Appellant started in self-employment on 13 September 1999 in the
property construction/maintenance sector. He reported the cessation of that
business on 30 June 2000 in his self-assessment tax return for the year ended 5
April 2001.
4.
The Appellant had a son, James, who left school in the summer of 2001
after reaching the age of 16 in September 2000. The Appellant’s evidence was
that he handed the business over to his son, who had shown a great aptitude and
interest for it. He remained in control of the business, however, and only
paid his son from the business what he thought was appropriate.
5.
The son had delivered tax returns, starting with a return for the year
ended 5 April 2003, in which he reported that he had commenced self-employment
on 7 April 2001. No explanation was given as to the apparent nine month gap
between the Appellant ceasing the business and his son commencing it. On 11
January 2005, HMRC sent a letter to James Trodden informing him that they
intended to enquire into the whole of his return for the 2002-03 tax year.
They requested certain information, including the business records. After the
bulk of the material was delivered by accountants on behalf of James Trodden,
there followed a meeting at HMRC on 24 October 2005, at which various questions
were put by HMRC arising out of their examination of the records and
information supplied. At that meeting, the Appellant took the lead in replying
to questions, saying that he controlled the business. It is clear from the
level of detail which he provided in response to questions that it was he
rather than his son who was in control of the business. In addition, the only
customer of the business from whom we heard evidence considered she was dealing
with the Appellant.
6.
We find as a fact that the business was being carried on by the
Appellant rather than his son at all material times. To the extent his son was
involved in the business, we find it was as nominee for the Appellant.
7.
At the meeting on 24 October 2005, HMRC asked a number of detailed
questions that had arisen from an examination of the business records and
information supplied to them. They followed this up with a letter dated 4
November 2005 and the enquiry process continued from there. At that stage,
HMRC gave no indication that they considered the Appellant’s son was not in
fact running the business in his own right.
8.
On 23 January 2006, HMRC issued a protective notice of enquiry to the
Appellant’s son in respect of his 2003-04 tax return, but they did not seek any
information or records to continue with that enquiry.
9.
As the enquiries into the 2002-03 return continued, HMRC focused on a
number of addresses to which the business had had materials or equipment
delivered (according to its purchase invoices) but for which there did not
appear to be any sales invoices. Three such addresses in particular were
followed up.
10.
At the first address, Memsahib Restaurant, the Appellant’s explanation
was that the restaurant was owned by a good friend of his, who permitted the
business to use its car park for storage while the yard of the business was
being resurfaced and the restaurant was closed for conversion into a
residential property. It was denied that the business had carried out the
conversion work at the restaurant, and the site meetings between the Appellant
and the local authority building inspector at the restaurant were explained as
a favour for a friend. No corroborating evidence in support of this
explanation was put before the Tribunal, in particular the Appellant’s friend
did not attend to give evidence.
11.
At the second address, Stoatley Rise, the explanation was that the
business had originally been instructed to carry out some major groundworks,
including levelling and building a large retaining wall. After the work had
been substantially completed, the customer raised a spurious complaint but they
decided to cut their losses and resign from the job without payment.
12.
At the third, Neadfield Hanger, the explanation was that the address was
a car park that was simply used as a delivery address for the hire of equipment
in order to avoid excessive delivery charges that would be incurred if the
equipment were delivered by the hire company to the works address. The
business supposedly used its own vehicles to transport the equipment to the
works site from this delivery address. At the hearing the Appellant produced
some photographs showing a small digger, a four wheel drive vehicle and a
trailer parked just inside the entrance to what appeared to be a large private
drive with name plates on the gate pillars apparently identifying a number of
properties to which the drive gave access, including Neadfield Hanger.
13.
HMRC followed up the explanation given in relation to the Stoatley Rise
work and were able to speak to Mrs Knapp, the customer, who confirmed that the
job had been completed to her satisfaction and she had paid the Appellant cash
for it, as he had specified. By reference to bank statements, she was able to
establish that she had withdrawn cash from her bank account totalling £17,900
in March and April 2002 to make these payments. HMRC explained their findings
in a letter to the Appellant’s son dated 26 March 2007, in response to which
the Appellant telephoned to agree to the meeting which had been proposed by
HMRC in that letter.
14.
At the meeting, which took place on 17 April 2007, HMRC explained they
considered that there was undeclared business income for the Stoatley Rise job
and the other work which they believed had been paid for but not declared in
relation to the sites reflected in the other purchase invoices. They said they
were contemplating adding £37,218 to the taxable profits for the enquiry year
2002-03 for this. When the calculations were performed, this would result in
an increased tax liability over the three tax years 2001-02 to 2003-04 of some
£45,000, to include interest and penalties. They offered to settle the enquiry
on this basis.
15.
Mrs Knapp (the customer on the Stoatley Rise job) gave evidence before
us as to the cash payments referred to. The Appellant sought to persuade us
that she was not giving a true picture of events. We found her to be an
entirely credible witness and accept her version of events. She confirmed that
she had withdrawn the money from her account in order to pay the Appellant in
cash, as he had requested. He had said that cash was needed so he could pay
his workers in cash. Of the £17,900 she had withdrawn, she was confident that
all except for perhaps £250 was paid over to the Appellant.
16.
Following the April 2007 meeting, the Appellant and his son appointed
new advisers to help in the enquiry. HMRC’s attempt to obtain agreement to the
proposed increases was rejected and a further meeting took place on 15 August
2007 between HMRC and the new advisers.
17.
At that meeting, HMRC explained their concerns to the advisers in more
detail, confirmed that their previous informal offer of settlement was
withdrawn and explained that unless it was accepted that the accounts of the
business were wrong, they would press ahead and raise assessments. They also
said they had grave doubts as to whether it really was the Appellant’s son who
was carrying on the business, rather than the Appellant himself.
18.
There followed further inconclusive correspondence (including a very
detailed letter dated 20 September 2007 from the Appellant’s advisers, which
repeated the assertion that no cash had been received, as alleged, from Mrs
Knapp in respect of the Stoatley Rise job).
19.
HMRC were not satisfied with the explanations offered and on 7 February
2008 they issued assessments to the Appellant as follows:
(1)
For the year 2003-04 for £24,310.38 income tax and class 4 NICs in
respect of undeclared profits of £73,378 from self-employment;
(2)
For the year 2004-05 for £28,276.32 income tax and class 4 NICs in
respect of undeclared profits of £75,709 from self-employment, £9,516 of
employment income and £1,060 of interest received;
(3)
For the year 2005-06 for £33,874.47 income tax and class 4 NICs in
respect of undeclared profits of £77,645 from self-employment, £22,198 of
employment income, £24,000 of profit from UK land and property, £1,692 of
interest received and £5,360 of UK dividend income.
20.
It is worth mentioning at this stage that the 2005-06 assessment was
later withdrawn by HMRC and the other two were substantially reduced. It is
fair to say that, on the basis of the evidence before the Tribunal, the three
assessments as originally issued would appear to have been excessive (though
not on the basis of the information available to HMRC at the time).
21.
These three assessments were appealed, but the Appellant’s advisers also
made a formal complaint about their issue. This process took up more time, but
in June 2008 the Appellant appointed new specialist investigation advisers, who
met with HMRC in August 2008. HMRC drew various outstanding issues to the
attention of the new advisers, including the outcome of their preliminary
review of the Appellant’s known assets and a comparison of those assets with his
declared income. It was ultimately agreed that the new advisers would prepare
a disclosure report to HMRC on the Appellant’s instructions. A timetable for
delivery of this report of six months was agreed, running to late March 2009.
22.
Having considered the up to date position in their researches and the
preliminary discussions they had had with the new advisers, HMRC became
concerned about what they perceived to be the unpaid tax at risk for 1999-2000
and 2000-2001 and therefore on 9 December 2008 they issued the following
further assessments to the Appellant:
(1)
for 1999-2000 for £34,419.20 unpaid income tax and class 4 NICs in
respect of undeclared profits of £100,000 from self-employment;
(2)
for 2000- 2001 for £34,592.05 unpaid income tax and class 4 NICs, also
in respect of undeclared profits of £100,000 from self-employment.
23.
A small payment on account was received from the Appellant and work
apparently continued on the disclosure report. Things do not appear to have
gone smoothly and it was delayed beyond the agreed deadline. In October 2009
HMRC lost patience and asked the Appellant to supply them with copies of all
bank account and credit card statements in which he had an interest for the
period from 7 April 2001 to 30 April 2005. They also raised, on 21 October
2009, a further assessment in respect of the tax year 2002-03 for £34,347.95 in
respect of unpaid income tax and class 4 NICs on undeclared profits of £100,000
from self-employment.
24.
The issue of this latest assessment did not go down well with the
Appellant. He telephoned HMRC and told them he was not prepared to provide the
bank statements etc that they had requested. However, he did then agree to
attend a meeting at HMRC in mid-November 2009, at which he did in fact supply
various documents, including bank and credit card statements. He also appears
to have dismissed his specialist investigation advisers at about the same time.
25.
Following the meeting, HMRC reviewed the documents provided, in
particular the bank statements. They considered in particular the 2001-02 tax
year and noted that there appeared to be substantial deposits into the
Appellant’s bank account despite him having no declared source of income for
that year. They therefore decided to complete the picture by raising an
assessment for that year (which was done on 11 December 2009) for £14,443.95 in
respect of unpaid income tax and class 4 NICs on undeclared profits of £50,000.
26.
The Appellant had originally maintained (and he continued to do so
before the Tribunal) that £17,000 of the deposits to his personal bank account
in 2001-02 were contributions to the capital of the business made by his
partner (whom he subsequently married). Copies of her bank statements were
produced which included payments made out of it (to an unnamed payee) as
follows:
|
Date of
statement entry
|
Amount paid
out
|
|
9 April 2001
|
£8,000
|
|
20 April 2001
|
£5,000
|
|
3 May 2001
|
£2,000
|
|
15 May 2001
|
£1,000
|
|
15 May 2001
|
£1,000
|
27.
No evidence from the Appellant’s wife was forthcoming before or at the
hearing to corroborate the Appellant’s explanation. There are a number of
obvious inconsistencies in the explanation, not least the fact that the
Appellant’s bank account shows credit amounts of £8,000 and £5,000 being
received shortly before those amounts are shown as debited to his partner’s
account, and there are no corresponding entries in his personal bank account
for the other three alleged payments. In addition, the account of his partner
from which the payments are supposed to have been made appears to have been a
specially opened account, described as “Clockhouse Account” (for no identified
reason) and on the two statement sheets before us (numbered 2 and 3), there were
totals of £110,000 paid out and £17,000 received for which no explanation was
given. We are therefore sceptical about the Appellant’s allegations in
relation to these supposed payments and in the absence of any corroboration we do
not accept this explanation given by the Appellant.
28.
Following a formal appeal against the December 2009 assessment, HMRC
issued a detailed letter dated 17 March 2010 setting out their view of the
matter. In that letter, they indicated that they proposed to reduce the
2005-06 assessment to nil (on the basis that the business was taken over by a
limited company for nearly all of that period and there were very few
unexplained personal bankings during the period from 6 April 2005 to the time
the company took over the business, so any undeclared personal income was
likely to be minimal). They confirmed the most recent (2001-02) assessment and
reduced most of the other assessments after recalculating them based on
undeclared profits of £50,000 per year (adjusted for inflation from 2001-02).
In view of the large unidentified deposits totalling £62,318.80 in 2004-05,
however, they only reduced their view of the undeclared profits for that year
from £100,000 to £70,000.
29.
This resulted in the figures set out at [2] above.
The basis of HMRC’s estimated assessments
30.
Miss Waterhouse, in her witness statement, gave evidence as to her
thinking behind the initial raising of the assessments and her subsequent
proposal to reduce them.
31.
As to the 2002-03 assessment, she said this was originally calculated on
the basis of the undeclared cash receipts for the Stoatley Rise job. She took
the entire £17,900 as profit (as the Appellant had not made any allegation of
costs to be set against that income which had not already been claimed in the
accounts put forward by his son); on the basis that the job lasted
approximately two months, she considered it reasonable to expect four times
this profit to be earned in the course of a whole year. This gave a figure of
£71,600, which she rounded down to £70,000 for the purposes of the assessment
issued in February 2008.
32.
She simply applied an inflation increase to this figure for the purposes
of calculating the 2003-04 and 2004-05 assessments also issued in February 2008.
33.
Before issuing the other assessments, she obtained further information.
As a result of property searches she discovered that the Appellant had
purchased some £615,000 of property in his own name in 2006 as well as further
property jointly with others. She was also concerned, as a result of comments
made to her by the specialist investigation advisers appointed by the
Appellant, that the earlier assessments may have been underestimated. She
therefore incorporated an estimated figure of £100,000 per year in the
assessments for 1999-2000 and 2000-01 issued in December 2008.
34.
Similar thinking was behind her estimate of £100,000 of undeclared
profits incorporated in the 2002-03 assessment issued in October 2009.
35.
By December 2009, further information had been provided which led Miss
Waterhouse to believe that an under-declaration figure for the final
outstanding year (2001-02) of only £50,000 was appropriate. Some confirmation
had been received to the effect that the property purchases were largely funded
by mortgage borrowing rather than undeclared business profits, though there
were still significant cash deposits in the Appellant’s personal bank account
for that year for which she did not consider a reasonable explanation had been
provided.
36.
In March 2010, when she was preparing her “View of the matter” letter,
she re-considered the assessments for all the years. The most recent (2001-02)
assessment remained appropriate in her view after her review of the information
supplied. She considered however that the other assessments all required to be
reduced, so as to be more in line with the 2001-02 figures. As a result, she made
the reductions mentioned at [28].
37.
The resulting adjusted figures were all confirmed by HMRC on their
statutory review of the matter in August 2010.
Penalties
38.
In addition, HMRC considered the question of penalties. They imposed
penalties at a rate of 50% of what they considered to be the unpaid tax in
respect of each of the relevant years. For 2001-02 and 2002-03 (the years for
which the Appellant had made no return of his income) they imposed the
penalties under section 7 Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA”) and for the other
years they imposed them under section 95 TMA. They gave abatements of 10% (out
of a possible 20%) for disclosure, on the basis that the Appellant had initially
provided some records, 20% (out of a possible 40%) for cooperation (on the
basis that the Appellant had attended meetings as well as providing further
records, albeit at a late stage) and 20% (out of a possible 40%) for size and
gravity (on the basis that the under-declaration did appear to be deliberate
and over a number of years, though not very large).
The law
39.
We consider first the main provision under which the assessments have
been issued. Section 29 TMA, at all material times, provided so far as
relevant as follows:
“29 Assessment where loss of tax discovered
(1) If an officer of the Board or the Board discover,
as regards any person (the taxpayer) and a year of assessment –
(a) that any income which
ought to have been assessed to income tax, or chargeable gains which ought to
have been assessed to capital gains tax, have not been assessed,
.....
the officer or, as the case may
be, the Board may, subject to subsections (2) and (3) below, make an assessment
in the amount, or the further amount, which ought in his or their opinion to be
charged in order to make good to the Crown the loss of tax.
....
(3) Where the taxpayer has
made and delivered a return under section 8 or 8A of this Act in respect of the
relevant year of assessment, he shall not be assessed under subsection (1)
above –
(a) in respect of the year
of assessment mentioned in that subsection; and
(b) in the same capacity
as that in which he made and delivered the return,
unless one of the two conditions
mentioned below is fulfilled.
(4) The first condition is
that the situation mentioned in subsection (1) was brought about carelessly or
deliberately by the taxpayer or a person acting on his behalf.”
40.
Thus HMRC are required to show that the Appellant has acted “carelessly
or deliberately” in under-declaring his taxable profits for any tax year in
respect of which he has made a return before they may raise an assessment for
tax on the difference. In contrast, where the Appellant has not actually made
a return, there is no such requirement.
41.
As to the amount of any assessment that HMRC may raise under section 29
TMA, it is clear that they are required to make an estimate based on reasonable
inferences. As was said by Walton J in Johnson v Scott (HM Inspector of
Taxes) [1978] 52 TC 383 at 393:
“Indeed, it is quite impossible to see how the Crown, in
cases of this kind, could do anything else but attempt to draw inferences. The
true facts are known, presumably, if known at all, to one person only – the
Appellant himself. If once it is clear that he has not put before the tax
authorities the full amount of his income, as on the quite clear inferences of
fact to be made in the present case he has not, what can then be done? Of
course all estimates are unsatisfactory; of course they will always be open to
challenge in points of detail; and of course they may well be under-estimates
rather than over-estimates as well. But what the Crown has to do in such a
situation is, on the known facts, to make reasonable inferences. When, in para
7(b) of the Case Stated, the Commissioners state that (with certain exceptions)
the Inspector’s figures were ‘fair’, that is, in my judgment, precisely and
exactly what they ought to be – fair. The fact that the onus is on the
taxpayer to displace the assessment is not intended to give the Crown carte
blanche to make wild or extravagant claims. Where an inference, of whatever
nature, falls to be made, one invariably speaks of a ‘fair’ inference, Where,
as is the case in this matter, figures have to be inferred, what has to be made
is a ‘fair’ inference as to what such figures may have been. The figures
themselves must be fair.”
42.
Once an assessment which complies with this requirement has been raised,
it is clear that the burden lies on the Appellant to show that it is wrong. Section
50(6) TMA provides as follows:
“(6) If, on an appeal notified to the tribunal, the
tribunal decides –
....
(c) that the appellant is
overcharged by an assessment other than a self-assessment,
the assessment .... shall be
reduced accordingly, but otherwise the assessment .... shall stand good.”
43.
We then consider the question of time limits within which any assessment
must be raised. Sections 34 and 36 TMA, as they applied at all material times,
provided as follows:
“34 Ordinary time limit of six years
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Act, and
to any other provisions of the Taxes Act allowing a longer period in any
particular class of case, an assessment to income tax or capital gains tax may
be made at any time not later than five years after the 31st January
next following the year of assessment to which it relates
36 Fraudulent or negligent conduct
(1) An assessment on any person
(in this section referred to as “the person in default”) for the purpose of
making good to the Crown a loss of income tax or capital gains tax attributable
to his fraudulent or negligent conduct or the fraudulent or negligent conduct
of a person acting on his behalf may be made at any time not later than 20
years after the 31st January next following the year of assessment to which it
relates”
44.
So far as penalties are concerned, sections 7 and 95 TMA provided, at
the material times and so far as relevant, as follows:
“7 Notice of liability to income tax and capital
gains tax
(1) Every person who –
(a) is chargeable to
income tax or capital gains tax for any year of assessment, and
(b) has not received a
notice under section 8 of this Act requiring a return for that year of his
total income and chargeable gains
shall, subject to subsection (3)
below, within six months from the end of that year, give notice to an officer
of the Board that he is so chargeable.
....
(8) If any person, for any
year of assessment, fails to comply with subsection (1) above, he shall be
liable to a penalty not exceeding the amount of the tax –
(a) in which he is
assessed under section 9 or 29 of this Act in respect of that year, and
(b) which is not paid on
or before the 31st January next following that year.
....
95 Incorrect return or
accounts for income tax or capital gains tax
(1) Where a person
fraudulently or negligently –
(a) delivers any incorrect
return of a kind mentioned in section 8... of this Act...
...
he shall be liable to a penalty
not exceeding the amount of the difference specified in subsection (2) below.
(2) The difference is that
between –
(a) the amount of income
tax and capital gains tax payable for the relevant years of assessment by the
said person (including any amount of income tax deducted at source and not
repayable); and
(b) the amount which would
have been the amount so payable if the return.... as made or submitted by him
had been correct.”
45.
As to the process for imposing a penalty and appealing against the
amount of it, sections 100 and 100B TMA provided, so far as relevant, at the
relevant times as follows:
“100 Determination of penalties by officer of the
Board
(1) ....an officer of the Board authorised by the
Board for the purposes of this section may make a determination imposing a
penalty under any provision of the Taxes Acts and setting it at such amount as,
in his opinion, is correct or appropriate.
....
100B Appeals against penalty determinations
(1) An appeal may be brought against the determination
of a penalty under section 100 above and, subject to sections 93 and 93A of
this Act and the following provisions of this section, the provisions of this
Act relating to appeals shall have effect in relation to an appeal against such
a determination as they have effect in relation to an appeal against an
assessment to tax except that references to the tribunal shall be taken to be
references to the First-tier Tribunal.
(2) Subject to sections 93(8) and 93A(7) of this Act
on an appeal against the determination of a penalty under section 100 above
section 50(6) to (8) of this Act shall not apply but –
(a) in the case of a
penalty which is required to be of a particular amount......
....
(b) in the case of any
other penalty, the First-tier Tribunal may –
(i) if it appears that no
penalty has been incurred, set the determination aside,
(ii) if the amount
determined appears to be appropriate, confirm the determination,
(iii) if the amount
determined appears to be excessive, reduce it to such other amount (including
nil) as it considers appropriate, or
(iv) if the amount
determined appears to be insufficient, increase it to such amount not exceeding
the permitted maximum as it considers appropriate.”
Applying the law to the facts
46.
First, we address the question of whether HMRC were entitled to raise
assessments at all under section 29 TMA.
47.
The Appellant has made returns in respect of the years 1999-2000,
2000-01, 2003-04 and 2004-05. We have found (see above) that the Appellant
deliberately concealed his taxable receipts of not less than £17,650 from the
Stoatley Rise job in 2001-02 and 2002-03. We are satisfied on a balance of
probabilities that this deliberate concealment was not a one-off occurrence and
we infer that a similar pattern continued throughout all the years under
appeal.
48.
We find therefore that the Appellant did carelessly or deliberately
under-declare his taxable profits for each relevant year and therefore HMRC
were entitled to raise assessments in respect of the undeclared profits for
those years which they subsequently discovered, subject to the following
points.
49.
For the years up to 2002-03, the assessments were raised outside the
normal time limits prevailing at the time under section 34 TMA. We are
satisfied, however, on a balance of probabilities that there was a loss of tax
for each of the years 1999-2000 to 2002-03 and that loss of tax was
attributable to the Appellant’s fraudulent or negligent conduct. The extended
time limit in section 36 TMA is therefore engaged in relation to the
assessments for those years, which are therefore in time.
50.
We see no basis to strike down HMRC’s assessments as “wild” or
“extravagant”, either when they were originally made (in the light of the
information then available) or when HMRC indicated later their preparedness to
reduce them (in the light of more complete information). On the contrary, we
consider the assessments to have been fair.
51.
It follows that the burden lies on the Appellant to demonstrate that the
assessments, as proposed to be reduced by HMRC, are excessive.
52.
The Appellant has failed to discharge this burden. He has continued to
maintain, right up to the hearing, that he did not receive the cash payments
which Mrs Knapp says she paid him (and which we find to have been paid); he has
failed to produce full records for the business or a comprehensive explanation
for the unexplained amounts paid into his personal bank account.
53.
It follows that we must dismiss his appeal against the reduced
assessments as confirmed in HMRC’s formal review letter dated 18 August 2010
and as summarised at [2] above.
54.
So far as the penalties are concerned, we consider that penalties are
indeed properly due under sections 7 and 95 TMA and have been properly imposed
under section 100 TMA. We see no reason to interfere with the loadings applied
by HMRC. It follows that the penalties appear appropriate to us and should
therefore be confirmed.
Decision
55.
We find the assessments for all the years in question, as set out at [2]
above, to have been properly raised and within the appropriate time limits.
56.
We find the penalties also to have been properly imposed and we consider
the amounts to be appropriate.
57.
The appeal is therefore dismissed.
58.
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the
decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for
permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be
received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to
that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from
the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this
decision notice.
KEVIN POOLE
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 18 June 2012
