United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

The Judge overruled the objection.

It was objected to parole evidence proposed, that it was incompetent, in respect of being an attempt to set up a right of copyright by parole. The evidence was allowed in the mean time.

The charge of the presiding Judge was excepted to, “in so far as it was laid down, that in the event of primâ facie evidence being rebutted, the pursuer might still support his title without production of a formal instrument of assignation, attested by two witnesses.”

The jury gave a verdict in favour of the suspenders.

The Court of Session afterwards disallowed the exceptions, discharged the rule for a new trial, and gave judgment for the suspenders.

The respondents (in the suspension) appealed, maintaining, in their printed case, that the judgment of the Court was erroneous,—1. Because it disallowed the exception to that part of the charge of the presiding Judge, wherein he told the jury, that, in event of the primâ facie evidence of title afforded by a copy certificate of registration in Stationers' Hall being rebutted, the respondent might still support his title without a formal deed of assignment attested by two witnesses. 2. Because it admitted, in proof of the respondents' title, as evidence of assignment, a receipt in writing, without any stamp impressed thereon;—and also a certificate of registration wanting in an essential statutory requirement, and inapplicable to the nature of the right on which the respondents' case was actually founded. Power v. Walker, 3 M. & S. 7; Clementi v. Walker, 2 B. & C. 861; Davidson v. Bohn, 6 C.B. 456; Power v. Walker, 4 Camp. 9; Latour v. Bland, 2 Stark, 382; Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 994. The respondents (suspenders in the Court of Session) in their printed case supported the interlocutors complained of, on the following grounds:—1. Because, whatever may have been the state of the law in reference to property in copyright held by derivative title before the passing of the Act 54 Geo. III. c. 156, it is not necessary under the provisions of that act, that such title, in the case of compositions printed and published after its date, should be attested by two witnesses; much less does that act exclude all evidence whatever in support of such title, unless an instrument so attested—8 Anne, c. 19. 2. Because by the Act 5 and 6 Vict. c. 45, under which the respondent, Mr. Jeffreys, sought his remedy, it is competent to support a derivative title to copyright to the effect of obtaining the remedy given by the act otherwise than by an assignment attested by two witnesses. 3. Because none of the statutes creating copyright require a formal deed of assignment to vest copyright in a party not the author: much less do they absolutely exclude all other evidence in support of the title of such a party. 4. Because it is competent to refer to any other evidence, in support of a derivative title to copyright, than a formal deed of assignment attested by two witnesses, and there is no statute, decision, or legal principle which could justify a Judge in ruling that actual production of such assignment is absolutely indispensable. 5. Because there is nothing in any statute, decision, or legal principle, sanctioning the law laid down in the exception. 6. Because, so far as it seeks review of the judgment refusing a new trial, the appeal is incompetent on any grounds other than misdirection of the Judge at the trial in matter of law, or the undue admission or rejection of evidence; has not been properly taken in reference to those grounds on which alone it would have been competent; and, even if properly taken, must be disposed of in the same way and on the same grounds with the exception itself. 7. Because, even assuming the competency, it appears from the Judge's notes of the evidence, that the verdict was conform to the evidence, as well as in accordance with the justice of the case.

Knowles Q.C., and Quain Q.C., for the appellants, contended that the exception to the admissibility of other evidence than a formal assignment attested by witnesses was a good exception, and ought to have been sustained. The state of the law in 1841, previous to the Statute 5 and 6 Vict. c. 45, must regulate the question. By the previous Statutes 8 Anne, c. 19, and 41 Geo. III. c. 107, an assignment attested by two witnesses was necessary to pass the copyright— Davidson v. Bohn, 6 C.B. 456. It was not sufficient to evade that rule by producing an unstamped receipt for copyright money, coupled with an admission of the authoress, for the admission was confined to the receipt as its sole foundation, and the receipt was valueless. The Statute 54 Geo. III. c. 156, did not alter the rule as to witnesses being required to an assignment — Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 994, per Lord St. Leonards. It is true, the exception does not very clearly bring out the exact ground of objection; but to construe these exceptions strictly would discourage Scotch appeals.

Forsyth Q.C., and Webster, for the respondents, were not called upon.