Special Case - Sharpe's Trustees v. Kirkpatrick and Others [1879] UKHL 315 (16 November 1879)

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URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1879/16SLR0315.html
Cite as: 16 ScotLR 315, [1879] UKHL 315

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SCOTTISH_SLR_House_of_Lords

Page: 315

House of Lords.

Saturday, November 16, 1879.

16 SLR 315

Special Case — Sharpe's Trustees

v.

Kirkpatrick and Others.

(Ante Dec. 20, 1877, vol. xv. 252; 5 Rettie 380.)


(Before the Lord Chancellor (Cairns), Lord O'Hagan, and Lord Selborne.)

Subject_Succession — Legacy — Residue — Cumulative Bequest.

Interest — Payable from Death of Testator.

Succession — Legacy — Legacy — Duty.
Facts:

Terms of a deed held ( rev. judgment of Court of Session) insufficient to take a case out of the general rule that a legacy and bequest of residue are cumulative.

Terms of a deed held ( rev. judgment of Court of Session) not to imply any postponement of payment so as to defeat the right of legatees to claim interest from the date of the testator's death.

A testator having written on the margin of a holograph letter of instructions the words “all free of legacy-duty,” held ( rev. judgment of Court of Session) that the application of these words could not be limited to the legacies opposite to which they were written, but must extend to all the legacies.

Headnote:

This was an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Session pronounced on December 20, 1877, and reported ante, vol. xv. 252, and

Page: 316

5 R. 380, where the facts of the case are fully narrated.

The second party, Sir Thomas Kirkpatrick, appealed against the judgment of the Court of Session in so far as it negatived his right to a legacy of £1000 in addition to half the residue; and the fourth parties, the legatees, appealed against the judgment in so far as it negatived their right to interest from the date of the testator's death, and limited the application of the marginal note “all free of legacy-duty” to the servants' legacies, opposite to which it occurred.

The third party, Mr Bedford, who was one of the two residuary legatees, was respondent in the first appeal, and, with Sir Thomas Kirkpatrick, in the second also.

In moving the judgment of the House—

Judgment:

Lord Chancellor—These appeals raise three separate questions, the first raising one question only. Sir Thomas Kirkpatrick claims a legacy of £1000 as having been given to him by the will. The words of the will are “to Roger Kirkpatrick …. the sum of £2000, and to each of his brothers the sum of £1000.” If one stopped at those words, the matter would not admit of argument, for Sir Thomas was one of seven brothers of Roger. There is nothing ambiguous or equivocal in the words. Unless, therefore, some other part of the will takes away this legacy, it must stand good as a legacy to Sir Thomas. The only reason given for taking it away is that the appellant has also a gift of half of the residue, and it was argued at the bar that this was a case of double gifts, and that one only could be allowed. In my opinion it is not at all a case of double gifts, nor anything like it. Why should they not both stand? The case of double gifts has not the remotest bearing on the matter. To construe this will as has been done in the Court below is nothing less than to make a new will for the testator, which no Court has any right to do. A Court has no business to interpolate and introduce words in order to alter what is clear and precise. The conclusion of the Court below could not be sustained without doing violence to the will, and the decision must be reversed, and the respondent must pay the costs of the first appeal.

As to the second point, namely, whether the legacies bear interest from the date of death—it is admitted that that is the general rule in Scotland. But it was argued that the legacies were payable only out of the heritable estate, and when that estate was sold. This is an entire mistake. The legacies are payable out of the saleable estate, which includes both heritable and moveable. There is nothing to restrict the legacy to the proceeds of the real estate. The general rule therefore applies, that interest is due on the legacies from the testator's death at five per cent., and the decision of the Court below must be reversed.

As to the third point, namely, whether the words on the margin, “All free of legacy-duty,” apply to all the legacies, it might have been doubted whether those words were altogether free from uncertainty, and whether they ought not to be disregarded. But certainly if they are to have effect, then there is no reason for confining them to the servants' legacies. The construction that the words apply only to servants' legacies adopted by the Court below is a most arbitrary construction. It is impossible so to limit the words.

And in this third point also the Court below has come to a wrong conclusion. The second appeal must therefore be sustained, and the interlocutor reversed, but in the second appeal the costs will come out of the estate.

Lord O'Hagan and Lord Selborne concurred.

Appeals sustained.

Counsel:

Counsel for Second Party— Hastings, Q.C.— Dauney— Low. Agent— J. C. Stogdon.

Counsel for Third Party—Kay, Q.C.— G. R— Gillespie. Agents— Grahames & Wardlaw.

Counsel for Fourth Parties— Southgate, Q.C.— Headman. Agents— J. & J. Graham.

1879


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