United Kingdom House of Lords Decisions

Lord Chancellor—This is an appeal brought by Mrs Agnes Millicent Anderson or Campbell as executrix of her husband the deceased William Frederick Mostyn Campbell, acting under his will, dated the 27th of October 1895, as sole and residuary legatee under that will, against a judgment of the Second Division of the Court of Session in Scotland, pronounced upon a Special Case presented for the opinion and judgment of that Court, in which the appellant was the second party and the respondents were the first and third parties. I find myself in complete agreement with the opinion of Lord Dundas and therefore do not examine the matter at undue length.

The appeal is against the decision of the Second Division upon a direction to trustees, contained in the will which requires construction, to apply the residue “for behoof of such charitable or other deserving institutions in connection with the city of Glasgow as my trustees shall think fit.” The case that is made for the appellant is that the direction to which I have just directed your Lordships' attention is void by reason of uncertainty.

There can, I think, be no question that the word “or” in the sentence under consideration is used disjunctively, and that the word “other” distinguishes that word so used very markedly from the language which has been the subject of discussion and decision in other cases. It is extremely difficult to think of a charitable institution which in the opinion of the users of the language contained in testaments would not also be deserving, and having regard to the use of the disjunctive “or” and the use of the word “other” it is inconceivable that the testator in adopting this language did not intend to add to his purely charitable disposition a power to his trustees to make benefactions to institutions other than charitable institutions which resembled charitable institutions in this respect, and in this respect only, that they were “deserving.”

I do not propose to follow the learned counsel through the cases, because in my judgment the effect of the cases may now be regarded as clear. We have to assume—indeed I must assume—that we have here a distinct alternative between charitable institutions and deserving institutions. There being, as I have said, two distinct sets of objects here, the conclusion follows, when the House has read not only decisions in the Scotch Courts but also decisions in this House, that a bequest in favour of the one set is valid, and that a bequest in favour of the other set is so vague and indefinite that it cannot be treated as valid. I am unable to distinguish this case from the decision of the Scottish Court in Symmers' Trustees, 1918, S.C. 337, where the language used is not “charitable institutions” but “charitable agencies.” In my opinion the variation of the phrase between “institutions” and “agencies” is unimportant, and I concur in the decision which was given by the Scotch Court in that case.

It is only necessary that I should point out in conclusion how extremely vague in fact is the phrase “deserving institutions.” If such a disposition were tolerated it would enable a testator to appoint another, not indeed in a broad sense, to make his will for him, but according to his individual vagary and idiosyncrasy to make pecuniary benefactions to such an infinite variety of institutions that it would be impossible to conceive a greater breach of the doctrine, which has been laid down in so many familiar cases, that the objects of testamentary bounty must be indicated with a reasonable degree of certainty and precision.

For these reasons I move your Lordships that the interlocutor of the Court below be reversed.

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