

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

**IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION No 2106088 BY
JACKSON INTERNATIONAL TRADING COMPANY
KURT D BRUHL GESELLSCHAFT MbH & Co KG
TO REGISTER THE TRADE MARK
ROYAL SHAKESPEARE
IN CLASS 32**

AND

**IN THE MATTER OF OPPOSITION THERETO UNDER
No 47239 BY MR J D POPE
ROYAL SHAKESPEARE COMPANY**

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5 **Jackson International Trading Company**
Kurt D Bruhl Gesellschaft mbH & Co KG
to register the trade mark
Royal Shakespeare
In Class 32

10
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IN THE MATTER OF Opposition thereto under

15 **No 47239 by Mr J D Pope**
Royal Shakespeare Company

DECISION

20 On 24 July 1996 Jackson International Trading Company Kurt D Bruhl Gessellschaft mbH & Co. KG applied to register the mark ROYAL SHAKESPEARE in Class 32 for a specification of goods which reads 'beers including low-alcohol and non-alcoholic beers; fruit drinks, fruit juices and Isotonic drinks'.

25 The application is numbered 2106088.

On 24 July 1997 Mr J D Pope, Royal Shakespeare Company filed notice of opposition to the application.

30 The grounds are in summary:

(i) under Section 5(1) and 5(2)(b) having regard to what is now a registration standing in their name (No. 2055924). Details of this registration are given in the Annex to this decision.

35 (ii) under Section 5(3) in that use of the mark applied for would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to the distinctive character and the repute of the opponents' mark .

40 (iii) under Section 99 of the Trade Marks Act 1994 having regard to the fact that the opponent company is incorporated under Royal Charter.

The opponents also ask for registration to be refused in the exercise of the Registrar's discretion. It has been said many times now in opposition proceedings that the Registrar has
45 no discretion to refuse registration where the requirements of the Act are otherwise met.

The applicants filed a counterstatement denying the above grounds and seeking an award of costs in their favour. The matter came to be heard on 1 December 1999 when the applicants were represented by Mr A J A Bubb of Gee & Co, Trade Mark Attorneys and the opponents by Mr M Vanhegan of Counsel instructed by Allied Domecq plc.

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Opponents' evidence

The opponents filed a statutory declaration by Jonathan D Pope, the Senior Director of the Royal Shakespeare Company (the RSC). His evidence is as follows:

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“The RSC is a company set up in trust to administer the affairs of The Royal Shakespeare Theatre. The Royal Shakespeare Theatre was originally incorporated by Royal Charter in 1925, as the Shakespeare Memorial Theatre, Stratford-upon-Avon. On 27 February 1961 the name was changed, by Royal Order in Council, to The Royal Shakespeare Theatre, Stratford-upon-Avon.

15

The purposes of The Royal Shakespeare Theatre are set out in paragraphs 1-9 of The Charter. There is now produced and shown to me, marked Exhibit JDP/1, a copy of the current Charter of Incorporation.

20

Continuously since 1925, the RSC has produced and presented the works of Shakespeare to audiences throughout the world, as well as organising exhibitions, distributing advertising literature and organising other promotional activity. There is now produced and shown to me, marked Exhibit JDP/2, programmes of various dates and other promotional literature all illustrating the RSC's use of the Trade Mark RSC Royal Shakespeare Company.

25

Advertising expenditure behind the trade mark is considerable and incorporates all forms of media, including TV, Radio and Press. This is reflected in the figures for the past 5 years which are as follows:-

30

<u>Year</u>	<u>Expenditure (£s)</u>
1992/93	1,331,751
1993/94	1,334,345
1994/95	1,534,419
1995/96	1,605,045
1996/97	<u>1,594,477</u>
	<u>7,400,037</u>

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The figures for theatre goers, who enjoy performances given by The Royal Shakespeare Company, are in the thousands every year. As an example, over the past five years, ticket sales worldwide are as follows:-

45

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Tickets Sold</u>
1992/93	1,077,586

	1993/94	1,221,444
	1994/95	1,179,974
	1995/96	1,199,621
	1996/97	<u>1,155,699</u>
5		<u>5,834,324</u>

10 The mark ROYAL SHAKESPEARE COMPANY is therefore extremely well known to the public to the extent that if the mark ROYAL SHAKESPEARE was applied to a beer product, the consumer would infer that the product was in some way associated with the Opponents' activities."

Applicants' evidence

15 The applicants filed a declaration by Kurt D Bruhl, the Director of Jackson International Trading Company Kurt D Bruhl Gesellschaft mbH and Co KG.

20 Mr Bruhl says that his company has built up a long standing reputation in the drinks industry and for many years has been active in the sale and distribution of coffee, tea, whisky and sparkling wine. He exhibits (KDB1) samples of packaging for existing product lines.

25 A substantial part of Mr Bruhl's declaration is devoted to an explanation of the adoption of the mark applied for by way of a development from an existing trade mark ROYAL SHAKES BEER. I do not think I need record details of the use and promotion of the latter mark as it is of tangential relevance only to the present proceedings and the opponents have not challenged the basis for adopting the mark under attack.

30 In relation to the opponents' position Mr Bruhl acknowledges that the RSC is well known as a theatre group. However, he suggests that the RSC is unknown as a producer in the food and drinks market, a fact which, he says, is reflected in the classes covered by their registration no. 2055924. He denies therefore that the mark applied for would lead consumers to believe that the goods originated from the RSC.

That concludes my review of the evidence.

35 In his opening remarks Mr Vanhegan indicated that, arising from the evidence, the opponents' objections embraced issues that were not expressly covered by the pleadings. It seemed to me that even if the evidence could be said to support other grounds the applicants should not be asked to address these issues without a formal amendment of the pleadings. I, therefore, heard submissions from both sides on possible amendments. Mr Vanhegan said he wished to
40 introduce grounds based on Section 3(4) (to cover the Trade Descriptions Act), Section 4(1)(d) (linked to the objection under Section 99) and Section 5(4) (based on the opponents' common law rights).

45 In the event I decided not to allow any amendment of the opponents' grounds. Briefly my reasons were as follows:-

- the request was made unreasonably late in the day and without adequate warning

- the new grounds arose out of issues that should have been apparent to the opponents at the outset

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- the need for parties to properly define the issues at an early stage has been the subject of recent comment in the High Court (see CLUB EUROPE, CH 1998 C5007; NASA HC 1999 710) and before the Appointed Person WILD CHILD Trade Mark 1998 RPC 455 and DEMON ALE, decision dated 28 September 1999.

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- two of the proposed grounds (Section 3(4) and 5(4)) would bring in issues that the applicants could not have anticipated. In particular the opponents' evidence goes to substantiating their reputation in their core activity of theatrical productions and does not clearly lay claim to common law rights beyond this area though I accept that Mr Vanhegan sought to make such a case by reference to information contained in the exhibits

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- further specific concerns arise in relation to the proposed Section 4(1)(d) ground. I will comment further on this below in the context of Section 99

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As a result I will deal below with the grounds as originally pleaded.

It was conceded at the hearing that there is no basis for objection under Section 5(1) so that ground can be dismissed. Section 5(2)(b) reads:

25

“(2) A trade mark shall not be registered if because -

(a)

30

(b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected,

There exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.”

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The proper approach to the matter has been set out by the European Court of Justice in a number of recent cases, including Canon v MGM (1999 ETMR1). The following passage from that case is relevant:

40

“17. A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the relevant factors, and in particular a similarity between the trade marks and between the goods or services. Accordingly, a lesser degree of similarity between these goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa. The interdependence of these factors is expressly mentioned in the tenth recital of the preamble to the Directive, which states that it is indispensable to give an interpretation of the concept of the likelihood of confusion, the appreciation of

45

which depends, in particular, on the recognition of the trade mark on the market and the degree of similarity between the mark and the sign and between the goods or services identified.

5 18. Furthermore, according to the case law of the Court, the more distinctive the
earlier mark, the greater will be the risk of confusion, (SABEL. paragraph 24). Since
protection of a trade mark depends, in accordance with Article 4(1)(b) of the
Directive, on there being a likelihood of confusion, marks with a highly distinctive
10 character, either per se or because of the reputation they possess on the market, enjoy
broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character.”

Plainly the respective marks are not identical and Mr Bubb quite properly pointed out that the
letters RSC are a dominant feature of the opponents’ earlier trade mark. The words ROYAL
SHAKESPEARE COMPANY are arguably a subsidiary element in the mark. However, if the
15 matter rested purely on the marks themselves the applicants could not escape the fact that the
mark applied for is wholly contained within one of the significant components of the
opponents’ earlier trade mark and may be a source of confusion between the respective marks.

The more difficult task facing the opponents is establishing similarity between the applicants’
20 goods in class 32 and their own goods and services as set out in the Annex. Although the
opponents’ earlier trade mark (no. 2055924) covers some ten classes it is certainly not
immediately apparent that there is any similarity with the applicants’ goods. Mr Vanhegan put
his case at the hearing on the basis of his clients’ Class 21 specification which covers beverage
containers (and broader terms that would cover the same).

25 Guidance on the issue of similarity of goods and services (accepting that it needs to be taken
within the context of the composite nature of the test) was given in *British Sugar Plc v James
Robertson & Sons Ltd* 1996 RPC 281 at pages 296/7.

30 The factors to be considered are:

- “
- (a) The respective uses of the respective goods or services;
 - (b) The respective users of the respective goods or services;
 - 35 (c) The physical nature of the goods or acts of service;
 - (d) The respective trade channels through which the goods or services
40 reach the market;
 - (e) In the case of self-serve consumer items, where in practice they are
respectively found or likely to be found in supermarkets and in
particular whether they are, or are likely to be, found on the same or
45 different shelves;
 - (f) The extent to which the respective goods or services are competitive.
This inquiry may take into account how those in trade classify goods,

for instance whether market research companies, who of course act for industry, put the goods or services in the same or different sectors.”

5 It is, I think, hardly necessary to go through the above criteria in detail to establish that there are considerable differences between beverage containers and the beverages of the applicants’ specification in Class 32. The only common ground is that the users could be the same but, self evidently, the uses and physical nature of the goods are quite different as are the trade channels. They are not competitive goods in the sense that they would represent alternative choices for a purchaser. Taking account of these points and bearing in mind the composite
10 nature of the test I have no hesitation in concluding that the opposition fails under Section 5(2)(b).

Section 5(3) reads

15 “(3) A trade mark which -

(a) is identical with or similar to an earlier trade mark, and

(b) is to be registered for goods or services which are not similar to those
20 for which the earlier trade mark is protected,

shall not be registered if, or to the extent that, the earlier trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom (or, in the case of a Community trade mark in the European Community) and the use of the later mark without due cause would take unfair
25 advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.”

Mr Vanhegan’s submissions sought to establish a broad reputation for the opponents encompassing not just their core theatre productions but also entertainment services in the
30 round including for instance the provision of bar and restaurant services (and hence alcohol and other beverages). His objective in doing so was to establish a link between the applicants’ goods and the opponents’ goods and services. By reference to the exhibits he was able to identify the following:

35 - the RSC’s sponsorship deal with Allied Domecq, the international drinks firm

- references to drinks in a number of the brochures promoting forthcoming activities. These in effect acknowledge Allied Domecq’s role as sponsor and refer to and list the latter’s family of brands.
40

- a ‘bars and catering’ entry in the income and expenditure account (page 30) of the 1995/6 Report and Accounts showing receipts of £128,734.

45 - provision of food and drink referred to for example on page 37 of the Autumn 96/Spring 97 brochure and pages 13 and 28 of the RSC’s ‘facilities and services for people with disabilities’ brochure

- hotel reservation and booking services (the RSC StopOver Stratford brochure).

I note too that the 1995/6 Report and Accounts refers (Note 2) to two wholly owned trading subsidiaries the principal activities of which are said to be the merchandising of goods relating
5 to the Royal Shakespeare Theatre and the development and marketing of computer software for theatre administrations. However, the opponents have provided no more specific information and have not suggested that the activities of these subsidiaries are relevant.

The opponents face a fundamental problem in my view in relying on the above evidence.
10 Persuasively though Mr Vanhegan put the opponents' case he faced the difficulty that an objection under Section 5(3) has to be based on an earlier trade mark; that earlier trade mark must be shown to have a reputation; and the goods and/or services must be dissimilar to those of the applied for mark.

15 The opponents' earlier trade mark (no. 2055924) does not cover the sort of services (bar and catering services, hotel booking and reservation services etc) for which a reputation is being claimed. Moreover, I cannot see that the opponents have substantiated a reputation in any of the goods or services (save for theatre productions) that are contained in the specification of
20 earlier trade mark no. 2055924 such as might provide a basis for a Section 5(3) action. Thus even to consider the material relied on by Mr Vanhegan would have involved an elision of any common law rights that exist into an action which must have as its foundation an earlier trade mark. I cannot, of course, consider the matter on that basis. I, therefore, take the view that the only service for which earlier trade mark rights and a reputation exists is 'theatre
25 productions'. Before going on to consider the Section 5(3) position on this basis I should just add that the opponents would have faced further difficulties given the lack of substantiating detail to support their claim to a wider reputation. It is by no means clear what marks are used. I note, for instance, that the restaurants appear to have their own names (The Box Tree, The River Terrace as well as referring to the RST). An issue, might also arise as to whether bar services are in fact dissimilar to the applicants' goods.

30 The applicants do not dispute the opponents' reputation in theatre productions. Mr Vanhegan suggested that the consequences of registration of the applicants' mark would be both to take unfair advantage of and cause detriment to the character and repute of the earlier trade mark. Reaching a decision on this point also requires me to take a view on what ROYAL
35 SHAKESPEARE would signify and in particular whether the words would be likely to suggest some form of association with the Royal Shakespeare Company. There is no independent evidence on the point.

In terms of the first of the adverse consequences identified in the Section it was suggested that
40 use would be parasitic in the sense that the applicants were hoping to ride on the back of the opponents' reputation. In support of this my attention was drawn to what was described as an 'advertorial' in the applicants' Exhibit KDB2 - this being a promotional article from the magazine "European Retail, Wholesale and International Trades Update 1997/8." It relates to promotion of the Royal Shakes Beer brand and not the mark applied for but the opponents
45 would say it indicates the applicants' intentions. In fact the applicants freely admit that the mark is a play on Shakespeare and named after the playwright. The article is by way of an advertising puff for the products and contains what I consider to be a light hearted ten point

comparison between the beer and the playwright, for instance “Shakespeare’s writings embody the essential characteristics of English refinement and quality. ‘Royal Shakes Beer’ is a premium beer produced to the highest English standards”. Mr Vanhegan pointed to a particular passage which reads:

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“Any form of entertainment is an indulgence we all deserve to enjoy, whether this be an evening at the theatre or the supping of a traditional English beer of the finest quality

10 I do not accept the interpretation the opponents seek to place on this material. There is nothing to suggest any form of association with the Royal Shakespeare Company and no evidence that it would be construed in this way. I note that the applicants have launched the products on the European market as well as selling in this country through Duty Free outlets. It seems to me that the mark was chosen to suggest a quintessentially English character rather than in an attempt to trade on the Royal Shakespeare Company’s reputation.

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In Oasis Stores Ltd’s Trade Mark Application, 1998 RPC 631 (the EVEREADY case) the Hearing Officer accepted that the applicants’ mark may have reminded some people of the opponents’ mark but went on to say:

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“I do not consider that simply being reminded of a similar trade mark with a reputation for dissimilar goods necessarily amounts to taking unfair advantage of the repute of that mark. The opponents chances of success may have been better if they were able to point to some specific aspect of their reputation for batteries etc sold under their mark which was likely, through (non-origin) association, to benefit the applicants’ mark to some significant extent. However, in my judgement, the opponents have not established any such conceptual connection between their reputation for batteries etc, and the goods in respect of which the applicants’ mark is to be used.”

25

30 I would not even go so far as to say that the mark applied for here would remind people of the Royal Shakespeare Company mark. In the latter the words reflect the theatre’s Royal Charter and the fact that it has as its objective the promotion of Shakespeare’s work. The word ‘Company’ reflects the fact that it is an institution charged with that role. In the mark applied for any connection with Shakespeare is fanciful at best and no obvious association comes to mind with theatrical productions.

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The opponents also allege detriment to the distinctive character or repute of their mark. The EVEREADY case referred to above and AUDI-MED Trade Mark 1998 RPC 863 suggest a number of headings against which such a proposition can be tested. The following is from page 649 of the former:

40

1. The inherent distinctiveness of the earlier trade mark;
2. The extent of the reputation that the earlier mark enjoys;
3. The range of goods or services for which the earlier mark enjoys a reputation;

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4. The uniqueness or otherwise of the mark in the market place;
5. Whether the respective goods/services, although dissimilar, are in some way related or likely to be sold through the same outlets;
6. Whether the earlier trade mark will be any less distinctive for the goods/services for which it has a reputation than it was before.”

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10 I have commented above on the content of the respective marks and the fact that although they have points of similarity the intent behind the marks is quite different. The inherent distinctiveness of the earlier trade mark (point 1) relies on a combination of the letters and words. The Royal Shakespeare Company is widely known and referred to as the RSC. Taken together with the derivation of the title this suggests that the words will be seen mainly as supporting and explaining the letters.

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20 The reputation (points 2 and 3) of the earlier mark is well established for theatre productions but on the evidence before me it is either not widely known for other goods and services or any such wider reputation (in relation to goods and services of no. 2055924) is not substantiated in the evidence. In terms of uniqueness in the market place (point 4) the opponents have no rival claimants to the name Royal Shakespeare Company; it is not shown that others are using the words ROYAL SHAKESPEARE but I note from the applicants' evidence that they have a co-existence agreement with Forte companies who apparently use the mark SHAKESPEARE and representations of the bard. So far as outlets are concerned (point 5) it is perfectly true that beer and other drinks are likely to be sold in theatre bars and restaurants so a tenuous link can be said to exist. However, I have no doubt that the RSC would closely control the sale of beverages (and brands) offered in their own establishments. From the point of view of the generality of retail outlets there seems little likelihood of the opponents' services meeting the applicants' goods. The reputation enjoyed by the RSC (point 6) for theatre productions would not in my view be damaged in any tangible way by registration and use of the mark applied for.

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35 In AUDI-MED (page 873 lines 33-36) the Hearing Office concluded in relation to Section 5(3) that “this provision can only apply where use of the later mark will have more than a de minimis effect on the distinctiveness of the earlier trade mark in the market-place”. That test has not been met here. The opposition fails under Section 5(3).

40

Finally, there is the ground based on Section 99. Section 99(1) deals with unauthorised use of the Royal arms and is not relevant for present purposes. Section 99(2) is relied on by the opponents and reads:

“(2) A person shall not without the authority of Her Majesty or of a member of the Royal family use in connection with any business any device, emblem or title in such a manner as to be calculated to lead to the belief that he is employed by, or supplies goods or services to, Her Majesty or that member of the Royal family.”

45

Section 99(3) deals with the consequences of unauthorised use. Section 99(4) specifies who may bring proceedings for contravention of subsection (1) or (2) as follows:

“(4) Contravention of subsection (1) or (2) may be restrained by injunction in proceedings brought by -

- 5 (a) any person who is authorised to use the arms, device, emblem or title in question, or
- (b) any person authorised by the Lord Chamberlain to take such proceedings.”

10 The opponents do not say how they would bring themselves within the sub-section unless it is taken to be by virtue of the Theatre’s Royal Charter. Finally Section 99(5) reads:

“(5) Nothing in this section affects any right of the proprietor of a trade mark containing any such arms, device, emblem or title to use that trade mark.”

15 Before considering the submissions in relation to these provisions I must return to the request to amend the opponents’ statement of grounds by introducing an objection under Section 4(1)(d). The latter reads:

20 “4.- (1) A trade mark which consists of or contains-

- (a)
- (b)
- 25 (c)
- (d) words, letters or devices likely to lead persons to think that the applicant either has or recently has had Royal patronage or authorisation,

30 shall not be registered unless it appears to the registrar that consent has been given by or on behalf of Her Majesty or, as the case may be, the relevant member of the Royal family.”

35 A mark that consists of or contains matter that falls within the prohibition and does not have the benefit of the consent referred to falls to be refused under Section 3(5) which itself reads:

“(5) A trade mark shall not be registered in the cases specified, or referred to, in section 4 (specially protected emblems).”

40 I decided not to allow the requested amendment partly for the reasons given earlier but also because it seemed to me that Section 4(1)(d) and Section 99 are dealing with different issues and do not ‘read across’ from one to the other (the position may be contrasted for instance with Section 5(1) - (3) and Section 10(1) - (3) where near identical wording is used reflecting the fact that the circumstances in which a mark is to be refused registration mirror those where infringement would occur if it was used). Section 4(1)(d) contains a prohibition on registration of “words, letters or devices” which suggest Royal patronage or authorisation in

the widest sense whereas Section 99(2) deals with the prohibited use of “any device, emblem or title” where it might suggest employment with or the supply of goods or services to Her Majesty or a member of the Royal family. These are material differences.

5 In their statement of grounds the opponents say that they are incorporated under Royal
Charter and that, accordingly, use of the mark applied for would be contrary to Section 99.
No further particularisation or substantiation of that objection has been provided in the
evidence save that the opponents refer to the RSC’s position as a company set up in trust to
administer the affairs of the Royal Shakespeare Theatre (it is the latter that is strictly, I think,
10 the Royal Charter holder). I will consider the Section 99 position below. Suffice to say at this
point in relation to the proposed amended ground that I do not think the applicants could have
been expected to assume that a Section 4(1)(d) objection was intended either additionally or
alternatively to the Section 99 objection. Nor in my view on the face of the matter is such an
objection so obviously sustainable that it should have been anticipated by the applicants.

15 In the light of my refusal to allow the amendment to the grounds it is only the Section 99
position that needs to be considered. The Section is contained within the “Miscellaneous and
General Provisions” part of the Act and has the side note “Unauthorised use of Royal arms
etc” (my emphasis). The wording of the Section too makes it clear that it is dealing with
20 certain prohibited uses. What the Section does not do is provide grounds for refusing
registration. This can only occur in the circumstances set out in Section 4 (read in conjunction
with Section 3(5)). In my view, therefore, the opponents cannot use Section 99 as a ground
of opposition and thus fail at the first hurdle.

25 Even if I am wrong in that initial finding the opponents face the added difficulty of making the
case that the applicants’ mark consists of a ‘device emblem or title’ and that use would be
calculated to lead to the belief indicated. The mark applied for is not a device or emblem but
it was suggested that the words constituted a title. I disagree. Section 99 in substance re-
enacts Section 61 of the 1938 Act. Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names deals with
30 Section 61 at Chapter 20-04 and indicates in a footnote that ‘title’ means a title of a member
of the Royal family. Royal Warrant Holders v Lipman (1934) 51 RPC 155 is cited in support
of this view. On that basis the mark applied for is certainly not a title. Nor does it suggest
employment by or the supply of goods to Her Majesty or a member of the Royal family.

35 It is strictly not necessary for me to go beyond this and consider the other submissions made
by Mr Vanhegan which strayed into considerations that in my view would only have come into
play if I had allowed the grounds to be amended by the inclusion of Section 4(1)(d) (where the
reference to ‘words’ might allow the opponents a toehold denied them by Section 99). I will
simply record that Mr Vanhegan sought to introduce Royal Worcester Corset Company’s
40 Application (1909) RPC 459 and Royal McBee Corporation’s Application, (1961) RPC 84
and an extract from the Registry Practice Manual (though not, I think, the latest practice).
Had I needed to take a view on the matter it is likely that I would have found myself in
disagreement with the opponents on the basis that the mark applied for is not in fact open to
objection on the basis of the guidance at page 92 line 33 *et seq* of the Royal McBee case and
45 current Registry practice. In other words the use seems to me to be laudatory in nature rather
than suggestive of Royal patronage. In the circumstances, however, it is neither necessary nor
open to me to make a formal finding on the point. The opposition fails under Section 99.

As the applicants have been successful they are entitled to a contribution towards their costs.
I order the opponents to pay the applicant the sum of £635.

5 **Dated this 7th day of January 2000**

10

M REYNOLDS
For the Registrar
for the Comptroller General

15

Details of opponents' registration

No.	Mark	Class	Journal	Specification
5	2055924			
				
		09	6179/06496	Records, compact discs, cassettes, videos, binoculars.
		14		Jewellery; cuff-links; tie-pins; key-rings; horological and chronometric instruments.
		16		Stationery; printed publications and material; paper articles; cardboard articles; labels; pens; pencils; files; rulers; calendars; instructional and teaching materials.
		18		Bags; trunks and travelling bags; wallets; purses; key cases; key holders; belts; umbrellas; parasols and walking sticks.
		21		Glassware, porcelain and earthenware; beverage containers.
10		25		Articles of clothing; headwear; footwear; articles of sports clothing.
		35		Advertising services; public relation services; publication of publicity texts; business management and business administration services; business promotion activities; organisation of exhibitions for commercial or advertising purposes.

No.	Mark	Class	Journal	Specification
		36		Financial sponsorship; fundraising services.
		41		Organising and promoting of cultural events; education and training services all relating to theatre; theatre productions; film shows; slide shows; television services; organisation of exhibitions for cultural purposes.
		42		Costume hire.