Commissioner's File: CIS 8475/95 
Mr Commissioner Howell QC
21 May 1996 

SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS ACT 1992 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION ACT 1992
APPEAL FROM DECISION OF APPEAL TRIBUNAL ON A QUESTION OF LAW 

DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER

Claim for: Income Support 
Appeal Tribunal: Plymouth SSAT 

[ORAL HEARING] 

1. The decision of the social security appeal tribunal given on 3 July 1995 on 
this claim for income support was in my judgment erroneous in point of law, 
because the tribunal omitted to deal with one material issue of fact which 
emerged in the course of the hearing before them. I set their decision aside and 
give the decision I consider appropriate in the light of the facts they found, 
supplemented by my own findings. 
2. The appeal was brought by the adjudication officer against the tribunal 
decision awarding the claimant income support from 6 January 1995 on the ground 
that his capital resources were below the prescribed limit. The main issue is 
whether they were right in holding that a sum of £35,000 attributable to the 
proceeds of sale of his former home and held in a bank deposit at the date of 
his claim, fell to be disregarded under para 3 of schedule 10, Income Support 
(General) Regulations 1987 SI 1967. 
3. I held an oral hearing of the appeal at which Miss Juliet Hartridge of the 
DSS Solicitor's Department appeared for the adjudication officer. The claimant 
appeared and was represented by Mr Vincent Wiltson of Devon Welfare Rights Unit. 
I am grateful to all three of them for their help on the points of law and fact 
discussed at the hearing. 
4. The claimant is now aged 36 and is married with three young children. Until 
June 1994 he and his wife owned their own house, but then sold it as they 
planned to move to Torquay where he was working. Unhappily, in the autumn of 
1994 they were told (after selling the house) that his job in Torquay would not 
be lasting beyond the end of the year. Without employment he could not get a 
mortgage and it quickly became obvious that they could not afford to move there 
at all. He was unable to find other work, and claimed income support in early 
January 1995. He and his family were then living in rented accommodation in the 
same neighbourhood as their old house. As he made clear in the claim form, they 
still had the £35,000 sale money from it on deposit; and planned to use this to 
acquire another home as soon as they could. 
5. It being out of the question to buy a suitable house in Torquay for £35,000, 
the claimant and his wife decided to buy a small plot of land in their old 
neighbourhood and put a bungalow on it. Prices were cheaper there and this 
provided an affordable way of getting a new home without a mortgage. By the date 
of his income support claim, they had found a suitable plot with an old building 
on it and obtained planning permission to take it down and replace it with a 
bungalow. The claimant had also arranged with a local builder to do those parts 
of the work he was unable to manage himself (he is a qualified plumber). In 
response to a supplementary list of questions from the department the claimant 
explained on 5 February 1995 (T32) that he was by then in course of purchasing 
the land, the documents were in the hands of his solicitor and the purchase was 
going through. He had also accepted a quote from the builder for the 
construction of the new property in accordance with detailed estimates which he 
enclosed. 
6. By para 3 of sch 10 to the income support regulations cited above, there is 
to be excluded from the reckoning of a claimant's capital assets under reg. 
46(2): 
    "3. Any sum directly attributable to the proceeds of sale of any premises 
    formerly occupied by the claimant as his home which is to be used for the 
    purchase of other premises intended for such occupation within 26 weeks of 
    the date of sale or such longer period as is reasonable in the circumstances 
    to enable the claimant to complete the purchase." 
7. The claimant sought to have the £35,000 sale money from his previous house 
disregarded in calculating his capital for income support, on the ground that it 
would all be needed to pay for the new home and he had it earmarked for that 
purpose, so that it fell within the exclusion. The adjudication officer however 
rejected the claim on the ground that the claimant had more than £8,000 of 
capital which could not be disregarded under para 3. His reason was that the 
claimant was not purchasing his new home. In his words (page 41): 
    "The crucial word is "purchase". Your circumstances are rather different. 
    Instead of purchasing a home (buying a house/bungalow/flat) you are building 
    a home. Building a home is not mentioned in our Regulations and therefore 
    the monies being used for that purpose cannot be disregarded." 
8. The claimant appealed, on the ground succinctly set on his behalf by his 
Citizens Advice Bureau in their letter at page T43, that if indeed the matter of 
"building" a house was not mentioned in the regulations he was still purchasing 
both the materials and the labour to construct his house, so that what he was 
doing did amount to a "purchase". This approach to the meaning of the regulation 
was accepted and adopted by the tribunal, which on 3 July 1995 allowed the 
claimant's appeal and held that income support was payable to him from 6 January 
1995.
9. The basis of the tribunal's decision was that "the purchase of other premises 
intended for such occupation" included as a matter of common sense "not only 
premises in all its widest possible meaning, but also land and the property to 
be built on that land. Thus, for example, if the claimant had purchased a 
property which was in the course of erection, or indeed was intended to be 
erected, and had to use the proceeds of sale in that way, plainly this would be 
covered by [paragraph] 3 and that would have been the intention of Parliament. 
It was only by chance that in fact the claimant chose to buy the land separately 
from the premises......the ordinary sense [of the words used] included a 
property or premises, either in existence or in the course of construction, or 
indeed intended to be constructed, as a result of the transaction referred to." 
10. Although not recorded in the tribunal's findings it is common ground, and I 
so find, that the claimant had completed the purchase of the plot of land some 
two months before the tribunal hearing. At that time it had on it an old wooden 
bungalow which had been used for holiday lets but was not suitable for permanent 
occupation, although some drainage and other services existed which could be 
reused. By the date of the tribunal hearing, the claimant had used £23,000 from 
his deposit in purchasing the land with planning permission. He had also bought 
some materials and paid for a digger to clear the site, and had about £10,000 of 
the original sale proceeds still in hand for further materials and labour. Thus 
at the date of the tribunal hearing, over two thirds of the original sale 
proceeds were no longer represented by a "sum" which might qualify under para 3 
but by the site itself or the work in progress on it. However the tribunal based 
their decision solely on the "purchase" issue and did not deal with any 
differences the use of the money might make under sch. 10; partly no doubt 
because these were not drawn to their attention in the adjudication officer's 
written or oral submissions. 
11. In this appeal brought with the leave of the tribunal chairman granted on 22 
August 1995, the adjudication officer says that the tribunal's decision must on 
any footing be wrong. As regards the period from May 1995 when the claimant 
completed the purchase of the land, the value of the land itself could not be 
disregarded under para 3 because it no longer constituted a sum of money. In 
addition the land by itself was not capable of being occupied as the claimant's 
home. Nor could para 3 apply at all to the cash held on deposit either before or 
after the land purchase in May 1995. The various elements of the project could 
not be lumped together and described as a "purchase", and the land by itself was 
not "premises" which means here a dwelling for occupation and not a building 
site. Neither the money nor the assets into which the claimant was converting it 
could therefore qualify for exclusion under sch 10: only when the project was 
completed and the claimant had moved in would he finally have an asset which 
would fall to be disregarded, as a "dwelling occupied as the home" under para 1. 

12. In the course of oral argument Miss Hartridge added a further point which 
had not been taken in front of the tribunal, that the words in para 3 "which is 
to be used" require something more than a mere subjective intention to use the 
sale proceeds of a previous house towards buying another. She suggested that 
para 3 could apply to money held against a new purchase only when this was 
already the subject of a legal obligation or something very close to it, such as 
a firm commitment subject to contract, and drew attention to the difference in 
wording from para 2 where "which he intends to occupy" showed that if the 
draftsman meant a mere intention he said so. 
13. In response the claimant says that the meaning of "purchase" was the only 
point raised by the adjudication officer before the tribunal so that they should 
not be faulted for concentrating on this issue alone. Even had the other issues 
been raised, they should, he says, have made no difference. Not only were the 
tribunal right in giving a broad meaning to the word "purchase", but if a 
distinction had to be made between the sale proceeds when represented by cash 
and when reinvested in the new project, the land or other property so acquired 
could easily qualify as "premises acquired for occupation" under para 2 of 
sch.10, consistently with the decision in case CIS/687/92. In that case the 
Commissioner was concerned with para 7(3) of sch. 3 and mortgage interest for 
housing costs. He held that although a piece of land without any building on it 
could never itself constitute a home, it was quite possible for a person to 
acquire a home in two stages instead of one by first acquiring the land and then 
arranging for a home to be built on it: see para 7 of the decision. In such a 
case all the costs connected with the acquisition of the site and the subsequent 
building work thus counted as money applied for the purpose of acquiring an 
interest in the dwelling occupied as the home. As for the meaning of "is to be 
used", the claimant says whatever these words are to be construed to mean they 
must include a case such as his, where there was not only (1) an intention on 
his part as firm as there could be, but also (2) a specific project already 
under way or all set to begin, and (3) one sole purpose, to provide him with a 
home for occupation by himself and his family as quickly as it could be done. 
14. I accept Miss Hartridge's submission on behalf of the adjudication officer 
that the tribunal erred in law in pronouncing the claimant entitled to income 
support continuously from the date of his claim down to the date of their own 
decision, without making any findings of fact about his having reinvested part 
of the cash in buying the land and starting the work. This emerged in the course 
of the evidence and made it necessary for the tribunal, whether or not given the 
assistance they were entitled to expect from the adjudication officer's 
representative, to consider whether it made any difference to the issues they 
had to decide. For the reasons given by the adjudication officer, it raised 
further material issues. The tribunal therefore erred in law by failing to 
address all relevant questions, make and record adequate findings of fact and 
give adequate reasons for their decision as required by reg 25 Social Security 
(Adjudication) Regulations 1986 SI 2218. For those reasons I set their decision. 

15. I consider it expedient to make the necessary additional findings of fact 
based on the documents before me and what I was told at the appeal hearing. They 
are not in dispute. In addition to the findings recorded in para 10 above, I 
find that the purchase of the land had been under way since the start of 1995 
when planning permission had been obtained and was completed in May 1995 for the 
sum of £23,000. The land itself already had a building on it which had been used 
for occupation, but the claimant's project for which he had full planning 
permission was to demolish and rebuild so as to provide himself with a new 
bungalow for permanent occupation. In May 1995 he had already paid for some 
materials and digging work but still had £10,000 of the original sale proceeds 
in hand for materials and labour which was used as the project went on. No doubt 
more had been used by the date of the tribunal hearing and it has I think all 
been used up as work has proceeded. The claimant told me at the appeal hearing 
that the major part of the work is now complete. He intends to move in as soon 
as his new house is ready for occupation, he estimates in a couple of months. 
16. In calculating his capital for income support, the claimant can only have 
the cash sale proceeds of his previous house, the land he bought in May 1995, or 
anything built or being built on it disregarded if they fit into one or other of 
the express exclusions in schedule 10 to the income support regulations. I bear 
in mind the observations of the Court of Appeal on this schedule in Chief 
Adjudication Officer and Another v. Palfrey and Ors (unrep. CA 8 February 1995) 
where two of their Lordships confessed themselves unable to discern any rational 
purpose in the bits of the schedule they had to construe, so that a purely 
literal construction had to be adopted. For my part however I think that it is 
possible to see a basic intention behind paras 1-4 and 25-28. They are all 
concerned with cases where claimants have or have had, or are in the process of 
acquiring, valuable assets, but these consist of or represent their own homes; 
and for various reasons it is unfair or unrealistic to expect the value to be 
treated in the same way as disposable cash to use for day to day living. 
17. Hence such value is excluded from what is reckonable as capital for income 
support, in various ways depending on the facts. The primary exclusion is the 
"dwelling occupied as the home" (no more than one for each claimant) under para 
1. Paras 2, 27 and 28 deal with situations where a claimant has acquired or is 
acquiring "premises", not yet occupied as the claimant's home but intended to 
be. The value of such "premises" is left out of account in calculating capital 
assets, for six months or longer if reasonable in the circumstances. Paras 3, 25 
and 26 deal with converse situations where a claimant is in the throes of the 
property market or the conveyancing system: disposing or trying to dispose of 
property but not yet having managed to do so, or with cash in hand between 
disposing of one home and acquiring another. In such cases too, six months or 
longer is allowed without the value of the property having to be brought into 
account as capital for income support. 
18. These provisions in my judgment imply recognition of the transitional 
difficulties people experience in changing homes and the often slow processes of 
the property market. They also embody a principle that capital money tied up in 
providing a home or needed for the purpose is different from the ordinary 
savings a person should expect to have to realise and turn into cash before 
being given public assistance. The value of the home needs to be treated 
differently, since there is no advantage to claimants or anyone else in forcing 
them to become homeless or treating as cash an asset they cannot be expected to 
sell. Para 4 extends the same principle to property owned by a claimant but 
occupied in whole or part by an elderly or incapacitated relative, or a former 
partner from whom the claimant is neither estranged nor divorced. 
19. Against this background, I have to consider first whether the tribunal were 
right to read "the purchase of other premises" so as to include acquiring land 
and having a house built on it; second whether "premises" in paras 2-3 can 
include land which at the time of its acquisition does not have on it the 
completed dwelling the claimant intends to occupy as his home; third whether the 
words "which is to be used" in para 3 make it necessary to show more than that 
the claimant intends to use the money in question to provide himself with 
another home; and fourth, if any of this claimant's assets are to be disregarded 
under sch 10, what counts as a "reasonable" period in his circumstances. 
20. I can no reason to restrict the expression "the purchase of other premises" 
in para 3 to cases where the purchase is achieved by a single transaction of 
buying land with a completed house ready for immediate occupation already 
sitting on it. For my part I agree with the view of the tribunal that this 
expression should be construed as a whole and given a reasonably wide meaning, 
to include the outlay of money to acquire a home for occupation by the claimant 
and his family as part of a single plan whether this takes place all at once, or 
separately in two or more stages. Thus land may be acquired with a house already 
built on it; or acquired and a ready made portable home delivered and put up on 
it; or acquired with a house still being put up or about to be put up on it by 
the seller; or acquired and a builder separately engaged by the purchaser to put 
up a house on it for him; or acquired and a house put up on it by the purchaser 
himself, using his own labour and buying in materials or subcontracting separate 
parts of the project. 
21. All of these ways of laying out money to acquire a home are in my judgment 
within the scope of "the purchase of other premises" under para 3. All seem to 
be equally within the basic aim of disregarding the value of capital from one 
home which is temporarily in transit and waiting to be used to provide another. 
Parliament cannot have intended that a person such as the claimant engaged on 
the admirable project of building his own home at modest cost should not qualify 
to have his "house capital" disregarded, while an unemployed futures trader with 
all his money in a lavish home can sell and have the whole sum disregarded while 
he reinvests it in another mansion, just because the mansion is already built 
and the claimant's bungalow is not. Miss Hartridge did not suggest that there 
was any legislative purpose that might be served by such a distinction. 
22. In my judgment therefore, the claimant's project of buying land and putting 
up a house on it with the proceeds of sale of his previous home counts as using 
those proceeds for "the purchase of other premises intended for occupation by 
the claimant as his home" under para 3 of schedule 10. I am happy to find that 
this is consistent with the approach adopted by the Commissioner in case 
CIS/687/92 at para 7. I confirm the decision of the tribunal that the 
adjudication officer was wrong to reject the claim on the ground that claimant's 
project did not amount to a "purchase" within para 3. 
23. However para 3 only applies to sums of money, as the present adjudication 
officer and Miss Hartridge are right in my view to point out. So although the 
money the claimant applied in purchasing the land in May 1995 was and remained 
"directly attributable" to the proceeds of sale of his previous home, it was no 
longer a "sum" within para 3 after the land had been bought. I therefore have to 
go on to consider whether the plot of land itself can qualify for separate 
exclusion after May 1995 under para 2 of sch 10. This provides that the 
calculation of capital is to disregard:
    "2. Any premises acquired for occupation by the claimant which he intends to 
    occupy as his home within 26 weeks of the date of acquisition or such longer 
    period as is reasonable in the circumstances to enable the claimant to 
    obtain possession and commence occupation of the premises."
The argument here is whether the land can count as "premises" before the house 
on it is built, or finished ready for occupation.
24. Again in my judgment it would be too narrow a construction to say that where 
a claimant is providing himself with a home by acquiring land and building or 
having a house built on it, the land itself cannot count as "premises acquired 
for occupation" because what the claimant intends to live in is the house, not 
just the land underneath it. As noted by Lord Wilberforce in Maunsell v. Olins 
[1975] AC 373 at 386, the word "premises" is a very general word which has a 
wide range of possible meanings and it has to be looked at in its particular 
context to see what types of property are intended to be included. Unusually, as 
observed by Cross J as he then was in Bracey v. Read [1963] 1 Ch 88, it is a 
word whose strict legal meaning is much wider than its popular one. Legally it 
can (but does not have to) include everything capable of being the subject 
matter of a demise or grant in a lease or conveyance, including not only 
buildings but also all kinds of real property and even incorporeal rights such 
as easements. 
25. I was referred to the Commissioner's decision in case CIS/767/93 where the 
meaning of the word in para 4 of this schedule was considered. I respectfully 
agree with him that in each of the first four paragraphs the word "premises" 
must bear a similar meaning and be restricted to the kind of property which 
someone has occupied or could occupy as their home. As he held in that case, 
this includes by implication not only the habitable rooms in a building but also 
property within the same curtilage such as a garden, garage or outbuildings: cf. 
reg 2 of the income support regulations. It necessarily also includes the land 
on which this all stands. It does not include other property such as farm land 
which is not part of the home or its immediate surroundings and can quite well 
be disposed of separately without affecting the occupation of the home (ibid); 
nor separate unbuilt on land that cannot be used for residential purposes: 
CIS/673/93 para 3. 
26. In my judgment it is entirely consistent with the decisions in those cases 
that "premises acquired for occupation" and "other premises intended for such 
occupation" in paras 2 and 3 include both the land itself and the buildings 
erected or intended to be erected on it, so long as together they add up to what 
the claimant intends to occupy as his home, with the inclusions permitted by reg 
2 or by implication. The plot bought by this claimant can perfectly well be 
described in the popular sense as "premises acquired for occupation" by him, 
given that this was the precise purpose for which he acquired it. His whole 
project consisted of acquiring the land and occupying it, by putting a bungalow 
on it and living in the bungalow as his home. This in my judgment is good enough 
to bring the land within the scope of para 2 from the moment he acquired it and 
for so long as it was still meaningful to regard the land as a separate asset as 
the building work progressed. To hold otherwise would involve the absurdity of 
people buying houses on a new housing development being treated differently 
according to whether their particular house was already finished, only partly 
built or not yet started when they acquired the beneficial ownership of the plot 
they had chosen. Again Miss Hartridge was unable to point to any likely purpose 
in making such irrational distinctions. 
27. I therefore hold that for the period after the claimant acquired the plot in 
May 1995 and while the project continued uncomplete, the land he bought, 
together with the various building materials becoming part of the realty on 
incorporation into his partly completed bungalow, were all "premises acquired 
for occupation by the claimant". 
28. In view of my conclusions on the first two questions, I now have to consider 
whether the £35,000 held on deposit at the date of claim, and the £10,000 (or 
the reducing balance) from May 1995 onwards, satisfied the condition in para 3 
that they were sums "to be used" for what I have held was the purchase of other 
premises intended for occupation by the claimant as his home. In my judgment 
Miss Hartridge was right in pointing to the difference between the wording "to 
be used" in para 3 and the tests of intended occupation in for example paras 2, 
27 and 28. It seems to me that the claimant has to demonstrate something more 
than just a genuine intention on his part to use the money from his old house to 
acquire a new one. Otherwise there would be the absurd result that the out of 
work millionaire could insist on the whole sale proceeds of his lavish home 
being disregarded for at least 6 months by saying that he planned to buy another 
equally lavish one as soon as he found one he liked: even though not in any way 
committed to do so, and easily able to buy a perfectly satisfactory home at once 
for less with the balance released for living expenses to take him off income 
support. 
29. I therefore accept Miss Hartridge's submission that the words "is to be 
used" in para 3 require an element of practical certainty as well as subjective 
intent. It would be unusual for any sum of money to be set aside or earmarked 
sufficiently to be impressed with a trust to use it only for the purchase of 
another home, and para 3 is not in my judgment restricted to cases where there 
is a binding legal obligation. Nevertheless the claimant must in my view be able 
to demonstrate at the time relevant for his claim a practical commitment to a 
purchase that is bound in the normal course of events to involve using the money 
he is keeping aside for the purpose. Such a commitment can be demonstrated for 
example by a binding contract for purchase which is not yet completed, or by a 
firm commitment (e.g. an agreement "subject to contract") in circumstances where 
the tribunal is satisfied the money could not reasonably be expected to be 
withdrawn from the project and used for other purposes such as living expenses 
instead. 
30. In the present case, the tribunal do appear to have been satisfied that the 
sum held on deposit by the claimant at the date of his claim was "to be used" by 
him for the purposes of acquiring his new home and for nothing else. Having 
regard to the fact that he had already obtained planning permission, placed the 
purchase in the hands of his solicitors and accepted a specific builders' quote, 
it seems to me that there was evidence on which they could properly have reached 
this conclusion. I do not therefore think it right to disturb it, especially as 
the adjudication officer at no stage thought it necessary to raise any question 
about it on the facts himself. I emphasise that this depends on the particular 
and somewhat exceptional circumstances of this case and is not to detract from a 
generally strict interpretation of "is to be used" as indicated in the last two 
paragraphs. On this basis, I hold that the original sale proceeds of £35,000 
between the date of claim and May 1995, and the reducing balance of £10,000 
after that date, were sums directly attributable to the proceeds of sale of the 
claimant's former home which were to be used for the purchase of other premises 
intended for occupation as his home. They therefore fell to be disregarded under 
para 3 along with the land itself under para 2, subject only to the final 
question which the tribunal did not consider at all, of how the time limits of 
26 weeks or longer under paras 2-3 should apply to the case.
31. Because of the way the two paragraphs are worded, the time limits are 
different and may have to be applied separately. They need however to be viewed 
in the context of the general purpose of the first four paragraphs as I have 
sought to identify it, and the other similar time limits of 26 weeks or longer 
under paras 25 to 28. These appear to support the idea of a general intention 
that 26 weeks is a reasonable period to obtain possession of a new dwelling, 
make it fit for occupation and move in, or to take steps to dispose of real 
property or reorganise one's legal affairs following the break-up of a marriage 
or a joint home. Anything longer than 26 weeks has to be justified in the 
circumstances as reasonable for the particular purpose, but it is plainly 
contemplated that there will be circumstances in which a longer period is 
reasonably required; and the decision on what is reasonable in a particular case 
is left to the practical judgment and good sense of the tribunal. 
32. If it is right, as in my judgment it is, that a self-build operation is 
within the proper scope of the provisions of paras 2 and 3 for disregarding 
capital pending occupation of a new home, then it necessarily follows that a 
somewhat longer period may be accepted as reasonable to complete such a project 
than the few months or so it normally takes to arrange and complete the purchase 
of an existing house and move in. Accordingly, in my judgment, in such cases a 
period of something more like 12 months than six, from the purchase of the land 
and the breaking of the ground until occupation can commence at the completion 
of the project, may readily be accepted as reasonable. 
33. So far as the present claimant is concerned, I also take into account that 
some delay may have been imposed on his timetable by the initial rejection of 
his claim, the adjudication officer appealing against the tribunal decision in 
his favour, and the Secretary of State suspending payment of any benefit despite 
the tribunal's decision that he was entitled to it. All this must have added 
considerably to the uncertainties, and made progress with the project more 
difficult. 
34. In those circumstances, I hold that the claimant is entitled to have the 
land itself and the bungalow being built on it for his own occupation 
disregarded under para 2 of sch. 10 from the date of acquisition of the land 
until 6 July 1996. This is 18 months from the date of his original claim and 
something over 12 months from the date he actually bought the land and was ready 
to proceed with the building work. In my view on the basis of what I was told, 
he will then have been allowed a reasonable period in the circumstances to 
complete the project and commence occupation, even if some work such as 
decorations still remains to be finished off. 
35. As regards the cash sums on deposit, para 3 requires that they are to be 
used for the purchase within 26 weeks of the date of sale of his former house or 
such longer period as is reasonable in the circumstances to enable the claimant 
to complete the purchase. It is clear therefore that the period starts to run 
whether the claimant is receiving income support at the time or not, and the 
claimant here had sold his old house in mid-1994, 6 months before he lost his 
job and made his claim. Again I would regard the facts of this case as 
exceptional, but I consider it reasonable not to have committed himself to a new 
purchase before the end of 1994, when his employment came to an end as he had 
been warned in the autumn. By the start of January 1995 when he made his claim, 
he had already put together a feasible project for providing himself and his 
family with a new home in their altered circumstances, obtained planning 
permission, done detailed costings and accepted a quote from the builder. 
36. For similar reasons to those I have given above, it seems to me that a 
period ending 18 months from the date of his claim can in the circumstances be 
accepted as reasonable to complete his family's new home. I emphasise that such 
a long period after the sale of a former home requires quite exceptional 
circumstances to justify it. The sum of £35,000 held on deposit between the 
claim and May 1995, and the reducing sum of £10,000 held from that date onwards, 
are in the circumstances of this case to be disregarded under para 3 of sch. 10 
until the expiry of 18 months from the date of claim, that is until 6 July 1996. 

37. For the reasons I have tried to set out above, the appeal by the 
adjudication officer against the tribunal decision of 3 July 1995 is allowed. I 
exercise the power under s.23(7)(a) Social Security Administration Act 1992 to 
make the findings of fact recorded above and to substitute my own decision, 
which is that the proceeds of sale of the claimant's former home, and the land 
and property into which he has put those proceeds so as to provide himself with 
a new home, are to be disregarded under reg 46 in calculating his capital for 
income support purposes down to 6 July 1996. 

(Signed)
P L Howell
Commissioner 
21 May 1996