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Treaty

on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

London, Moscow and Washington, 1 July 1968

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by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
by Command of Her Majesty
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TREATY SERIES No. 88 (1970)

**TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

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CORRECTION No. 2

Cover and Title Page.

For "27 November 1969" read "27 November 1968".

For "29 November 1969" read "29 November 1968".

Page 79.

Under "Date of Ratification or Accession (A)" in the right-hand column under "Washington" the date "31.8.70" against San Marino remains correct.

November 1970

LONDON: Her Majesty's Stationery Office

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TREATY

ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water⁽¹⁾ in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing

(1) Treaty Series No. 3 (1964), Cmnd. 2245.

stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter for the United Nations,⁽²⁾ States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency⁽³⁾ and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

⁽²⁾ Treaty Series No. 67 (1946), Cmd. 7015.

⁽³⁾ Treaty Series No. 19 (1958), Cmnd. 450.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

ARTICLE V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement

or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositories of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

ДОГОВОР О НЕРАСПРОСТРАНЕНИИ ЯДЕРНОГО ОРУЖИЯ

Государства, заключающие настоящий Договор, ниже именуемые "Участниками Договора",

Учитывая опустошительные последствия, которые имела бы для всего человечества ядерная война, и вытекающую из этого необходимость приложить все усилия для предотвращения опасности возникновения такой войны и принять меры для обеспечения безопасности народов,

Считая, что распространение ядерного оружия серьезно увеличило бы опасность ядерной войны,

В соответствии с резолюциями Генеральной Ассамблеи Организации Объединенных Наций, призывающими к заключению соглашения о предотвращении более широкого распространения ядерного оружия,

Обязуясь сотрудничать в целях содействия применению гарантий Международного агентства по атомной энергии в отношении мирной ядерной деятельности,

Выражая свою поддержку усилиям по исследованию, усовершенствованию и другим усилиям, направленным на содействие применению в рамках системы гарантий Международного агентства по атомной энергии принципа эффективных гарантий в отношении движения исходных и специальных расщепляющихся материалов посредством использования приборов и других технических способов в определенных ключевых местах,

Подтверждая тот принцип, что блага мирного применения ядерной технологии, включая любые технологические побочные продукты, которые могут быть получены государствами, обладающими ядерным оружием, от развития ядерных взрывных устройств, должны быть доступны для мирных целей всем государствам-участникам Договора, как обладающим, так и не обладающим ядерным оружием,

Будучи убежденными, что в осуществление этого принципа все Участники настоящего Договора имеют право участвовать в возможно самом полном обмене научной информацией для дальнейшего развития применения атомной энергии в мирных целях и вносить в это развитие свой вклад по отдельности или в сотрудничестве с другими государствами,

Заявляя о своем намерении по возможности скорее достигнуть прекращения гонки ядерных вооружений и принять эффективные меры в направлении ядерного разоружения,

Настоятельно призывая к сотрудничеству всех государств в достижении этой цели,

Напоминая о решимости, выраженной участниками Договора о запрещении испытаний ядерного оружия в атмосфере, в космическом пространстве и под водой 1963 г. в его преамбуле, стремиться достичь навсегда прекращения всех испытательных взрывов ядерного оружия и продолжать переговоры с этой целью,

Стремясь содействовать смягчению международной напряженности и укреплению доверия между государствами, с тем чтобы способствовать достижению прекращения производства ядерного оружия, уничтожению всех существующих его запасов и исключению ядерного оружия и средств его доставки из национальных арсеналов в соответствии с договором о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем,

Напоминая, что в соответствии с Уставом Организации Объединенных Наций государства должны воздерживаться в их международных отношениях от угрозы силой или ее применения как против территориальной неприкосновенности или политической независимости любого государства, так и каким-либо другим образом, несовместимым с Целями Объединенных Наций, и что следует содействовать установлению и поддержанию международного мира и безопасности с наименьшим отвлечением мировых людских сил и экономических ресурсов для дела вооружения,

Согласились о нижеследующем:

Статья I

Каждое из государств-участников настоящего Договора, обладающих ядерным оружием, обязуется не передавать кому бы то ни было ядерное оружие или другие ядерные взрывные устройства, а также контроль над таким оружием или взрывными устройствами ни прямо, ни косвенно; равно как и никоим образом не помогать, не поощрять и не побуждать какое-либо государство, не обладающее ядерным оружием, к производству или к приобретению каким-либо иным способом ядерного оружия или других ядерных взрывных устройств, а также контроля над таким оружием или взрывными устройствами.

Статья II

Каждое из государств-участников настоящего Договора, не обладающих ядерным оружием, обязуется не принимать передачи от кого бы то ни было ядерного оружия или других ядерных взрывных устройств, а также контроля над таким оружием или взрывными устройствами ни прямо, ни косвенно; не производить и не приобретать каким-либо иным способом ядерное оружие или другие ядерные взрывные устройства, равно как и не добиваться и не принимать какой-либо помощи в производстве ядерного оружия или других ядерных взрывных устройств.

Статья III

I. Каждое из государств-участников Договора, не обладающих ядерным оружием, обязуется принять гарантии, как они изложены в соглашении, о котором будут вестись переговоры и которое будет заключено с Международным агентством по атомной энергии в соответствии с Уставом Международного агентства по атомной энергии и системой гарантий Агентства, исключительно с целью проверки выполнения его обязательств, принятых в соответствии с настоящим Договором, с тем чтобы не допустить переключения ядерной энергии с мирного применения на ядерное оружие или другие ядерные взрывные устройства. Процедуры гарантий, требуемых настоящей статьей, осуществляются в отношении исходного или специального расщепляющегося материала, независимо от того, производится ли он, обрабатывается или используется в любой основной ядерной установке или находится за пределами любой такой установки. Гарантии, требуемые настоящей статьей, применяются ко всему исходному или специальному расщепляющемуся материалу во всей мирной ядерной деятельности в пределах территории такого государства, под его юрисдикцией или осуществляемой под его контролем где бы то ни было.

2. Каждое из государств-участников Договора обязуется не предоставлять: а) исходного или специального расщепляющегося материала или б) оборудования или материала, специально предназначенного или подготовленного для обработки, использования или производства специального расщепляющегося материала, любому государству, не обладающему ядерным оружием, для мирных целей, если на этот исходный или специальный расщепляющийся материал не распространяются гарантии, требуемые настоящей статьей.

3. Гарантии, требуемые настоящей статьей, осуществляются таким образом, чтобы соответствовать статье IУ настоящего Договора и избегать создания препятствий для экономического или технологического развития Участников Договора или международного сотрудничества в области мирной ядерной деятельности, включая международный обмен ядерным материалом и оборудованием для обработки, использования или производства ядерного материала в мирных целях в соответствии с положениями настоящей статьи и принципом применения гарантий, изложенным в преамбуле Договора.

4. Государства-участники Договора, не обладающие ядерным оружием, заключают соглашения с Международным агентством по атомной энергии с целью выполнения требований настоящей статьи либо в индивидуальном порядке, либо совместно с другими государствами в соответствии с Уставом Международного агентства по атомной энергии. Переговоры о таких соглашениях начинаются в течение 180 дней со времени первоначального вступления в силу настоящего Договора. Для государств, сдающих на хранение свои ратификационные грамоты или документы о присоединении по истечении периода в 180 дней, переговоры о таких соглашениях начинаются не позднее даты такой сдачи. Такие соглашения вступают в силу не позднее восемнадцати месяцев со дня начала переговоров.

Статья IУ

1. Никакое положение настоящего Договора не следует толковать как затрагивающее неотъемлемое право всех Участников Договора развивать исследования, производство и использование ядерной энергии в мирных целях без дискриминации и в соответствии со статьями I и II настоящего Договора.

2. Все Участники Договора обязуются способствовать возможно самому полному обмену оборудованием, материалами, научной и технической информацией об использовании ядерной энергии в мирных целях и имеют право участвовать в таком обмене. Участники Договора, которые в состоянии делать это, также сотрудничают в деле содействия, по отдельности или совместно с другими государствами или международными организациями, дальнейшему развитию применения ядерной энергии в мирных целях, особенно на территориях государств-участников Договора, не обладающих ядерным оружием, с должным учетом нужд развивающихся районов мира.

Статья V

Каждый из Участников настоящего Договора обязуется принять соответствующие меры с целью обеспечения того, чтобы в соответствии с настоящим Договором, под соответствующим международным наблюдением и посредством соответствующих международных процедур потенциальные блага от любого мирного применения ядерных взрывов были доступны государствам-участникам настоящего Договора, не обладающим ядерным оружием, на недискриминационной основе, и чтобы стоимость используемых взрывных устройств для таких Участников Договора была такой низкой, как только это возможно, и не включала расходы по их исследованию и усовершенствованию. Государства-участники настоящего Договора, не обладающие ядерным оружием, будут в состоянии получать такие блага в соответствии со специальным международным соглашением или соглашениями через соответствующий международный орган, в котором должным образом представлены государства, не обладающие ядерным оружием. Переговоры по этому вопросу начнутся так скоро, как это возможно, после вступления в силу настоящего Договора. Государства-участники настоящего Договора, не обладающие ядерным оружием, которые пожелают этого, могут также получать такие блага в соответствии с двусторонними соглашениями.

Статья VI

Каждый Участник настоящего Договора обязуется в духе доброй воли вести переговоры об эффективных мерах по прекращению гонки ядерных вооружений в ближайшем будущем и ядерному разоружению, а также о договоре о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем.

Статья VII

Никакое положение настоящего Договора не затрагивает право какой-либо группы государств заключать региональные договоры с целью обеспечения полного отсутствия ядерного оружия на их соответствующих территориях.

Статья VIII

I. Любой Участник настоящего Договора может предложить поправки к этому Договору. Текст любой предложенной поправки

представляется правительствам-депозитариям, которые рассылают его всем Участникам Договора. Затем, если этого потребует одна треть или более Участников Договора, правительства-депозитарии созывают конференцию, на которую они приглашают всех Участников Договора для рассмотрения такой поправки.

2. Любая поправка к настоящему Договору должна быть утверждена большинством голосов всех Участников Договора, включая голоса всех государств-участников настоящего Договора, обладающих ядерным оружием, и всех других Участников Договора, являющихся членами Совета управляющих Международного агентства по атомной энергии на дату рассылки такой поправки. Поправка вступает в силу для каждого Участника Договора, сдающего свою грамоту о ратификации поправки, после сдачи на хранение таких ратификационных грамот большинством всех Участников Договора, включая ратификационные грамоты всех государств-участников настоящего Договора, обладающих ядерным оружием, и всех других Участников Договора, являющихся членами Совета управляющих Международного агентства по атомной энергии на дату рассылки этой поправки. Впоследствии она вступает в силу для любого другого Участника Договора после сдачи им на хранение своей грамоты о ратификации поправки.

3. Через пять лет после вступления в силу настоящего Договора в Женеве (Швейцария) созывается конференция Участников Договора, для рассмотрения того, как действует настоящий Договор, чтобы иметь уверенность в том, что цели, изложенные в преамбуле, и положения Договора осуществляются. Через каждые последующие пять лет большинство Участников Договора может, путем представления предложения с этой целью правительствам-депозитариям, добиться созыва дальнейших конференций с той же целью рассмотрения того, как действует Договор.

Статья IX

1. Настоящий Договор открыт для подписания его всеми государствами. Любое государство, которое не подпишет Договор до вступления его в силу в соответствии с пунктом 3 данной статьи, может присоединиться к нему в любое время.

2. Настоящий Договор подлежит ратификации государствами, подписавшими его. Ратификационные грамоты и документы о присоединении сдаются на хранение правительствам Соединенного Королевства Великобритании и Северной Ирландии, Соединенных Штатов

Америки и Союза Советских Социалистических Республик, которые настоящим назначаются в качестве правительств-депозитариев.

3. Настоящий Договор вступает в силу после его ратификации государствами, правительства которых назначены в качестве депозитариев Договора, и 40 другими подписавшими настоящий Договор государствами и сдачи ими на хранение ратификационных грамот. Для целей настоящего Договора государством, обладающим ядерным оружием, является государство, которое произвело и взорвало ядерное оружие или другое ядерное взрывное устройство до 1 января 1967 года.

4. Для государств, ратификационные грамоты или документы о присоединении которых будут сданы на хранение после вступления в силу настоящего Договора, он вступает в силу в день сдачи на хранение их ратификационных грамот или документов о присоединении

5. Правительства-депозитарии незамедлительно уведомляют все подписавшие и присоединившиеся к настоящему Договору государства о дате каждого подписания, дате сдачи на хранение каждой ратификационной грамоты или документа о присоединении, дате вступления в силу настоящего Договора, дате получения любых требований о созыве конференции, а также о других уведомлениях.

6. Настоящий Договор должен быть зарегистрирован правительствами-депозитариями в соответствии со статьей 102 Устава Организации Объединенных Наций.

Статья X

1. Каждый Участник настоящего Договора в порядке осуществления своего государственного суверенитета имеет право выйти из Договора, если он решит, что связанные с содержанием настоящего Договора исключительные обстоятельства поставили под угрозу высшие интересы его страны. О таком выходе он уведомляет за три месяца всех Участников Договора и Совет Безопасности Организации Объединенных Наций. В таком уведомлении должно содержаться заявление об исключительных обстоятельствах, которые он рассматривает как поставившие под угрозу его высшие интересы.

2. Через двадцать пять лет после вступления Договора в силу созывается конференция для того, чтобы решить, должен ли Договор продолжать оставаться в силе бессрочно или действие Договора должно быть продлено на дополнительный определенный период или периоды времени. Это решение принимается большинством Участников Договора.

Статья XI

Настоящий Договор, английский, русский, испанский, французский и китайский тексты которого являются равно аутентичными, сдается на хранение в архивы правительств-депозитариев. Должным образом заверенные копии настоящего Договора препровождаются правительствами-депозитариями правительствам государств, подписавших Договор и присоединившихся к нему.

TRAITE

SUR LA NON-PROLIFERATION DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES

Les Etats qui concluent le présent Traité, ci-après dénommés les "Parties au Traité",

Considérant les dévastations qu'une guerre nucléaire ferait subir à l'humanité entière et la nécessité qui en résulte de ne ménager aucun effort pour écarter le risque d'une telle guerre et de prendre des mesures en vue de sauvegarder la sécurité des peuples,

Persuadés que la prolifération des armes nucléaires augmenterait considérablement le risque de guerre nucléaire,

En conformité avec les résolutions de l'Assemblée générale de l'Organisation des Nations Unies demandant la conclusion d'un accord sur la prévention d'une plus grande dissémination des armes nucléaires,

S'engageant à coopérer en vue de faciliter l'application des garanties de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique aux activités nucléaires pacifiques,

Exprimant leur appui aux efforts de recherche, de mise au point et autres visant à favoriser l'application, dans le cadre du système de garanties de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique, du principe d'une garantie efficace du flux de matières brutes et de produits fissiles spéciaux grâce à l'emploi d'instruments et autres moyens techniques en certains points stratégiques,

Affirmant le principe selon lequel les avantages des applications pacifiques de la technologie nucléaire, y compris tous sous-produits technologiques que les Etats dotés d'armes nucléaires pourraient obtenir par la mise au point de dispositifs nucléaires explosifs, devraient être accessibles, à des fins pacifiques, à toutes les Parties au Traité, qu'il s'agisse d'Etats dotés ou non dotés d'armes nucléaires,

Convaincus qu'en application de ce principe, toutes les Parties au Traité ont le droit de participer à un échange aussi large que possible de renseignements scientifiques en vue du développement plus poussé des utilisations de l'énergie atomique à des fins pacifiques, et de contribuer à ce développement à titre individuel ou en coopération avec d'autres Etats,

Déclarant leur intention de parvenir au plus tôt à la cessation de la course aux armements nucléaires et de prendre des mesures efficaces dans la voie du désarmement nucléaire,

Demandant instamment la coopération de tous les Etats en vue d'atteindre cet objectif,

Rappelant que les Parties au Traité de 1963 interdisant les essais d'armes nucléaires dans l'atmosphère, dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique et sous l'eau ont, dans le Préambule dudit Traité, exprimé leur détermination de chercher à assurer l'arrêt de toutes les explosions expérimentales d'armes nucléaires à tout jamais et de poursuivre les négociations à cette fin,

Désireux de promouvoir la détente internationale et le renforcement de la confiance entre Etats afin de faciliter la cessation de la fabrication d'armes nucléaires, la liquidation de tous les stocks existants desdites armes, et l'élimination des armes nucléaires et de leurs vecteurs des arsenaux nationaux en vertu d'un traité sur le désarmement général et complet sous un contrôle international strict et efficace,

Rappelant que, conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies, les Etats doivent s'abstenir, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force, soit contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout Etat, soit de toute autre manière incompatible avec les Buts des Nations Unies, et qu'il faut favoriser l'établissement et le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales en ne détournant vers les armements que le minimum des ressources humaines et économiques du monde,

Sont convenus de ce qui suit :

ARTICLE PREMIER

Tout Etat doté d'armes nucléaires qui est Partie au Traité s'engage à ne transférer à qui que ce soit, ni directement ni indirectement, des armes nucléaires ou autres dispositifs nucléaires explosifs, ou le contrôle de telles armes ou de tels dispositifs explosifs; et à n'aider, n'encourager ni inciter d'aucune façon un Etat non doté d'armes nucléaires, quel qu'il soit, à fabriquer ou acquérir de quelque autre manière des armes nucléaires ou autres dispositifs nucléaires explosifs, ou le contrôle de telles armes ou de tels dispositifs explosifs.

ARTICLE II

Tout Etat non doté d'armes nucléaires qui est Partie au Traité s'engage à n'accepter de qui que ce soit, ni directement ni indirectement, le transfert d'armes nucléaires ou autres dispositifs nucléaires ou du contrôle de telles armes ou de tels dispositifs explosifs; à ne fabriquer ni acquérir de quelque autre manière des armes nucléaires ou autres dispositifs nucléaires explosifs; et à ne rechercher ni recevoir une aide quelconque pour la fabrication d'armes nucléaires ou d'autres dispositifs nucléaires explosifs.

ARTICLE III

1. Tout Etat non doté d'armes nucléaires qui est Partie au Traité s'engage à accepter les garanties stipulées dans un accord qui sera négocié et conclu avec l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique, conformément au Statut de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique et au système

de garanties de ladite Agence, à seule fin de vérifier l'exécution des obligations assumées par ledit Etat aux termes du présent Traité en vue d'empêcher que l'énergie nucléaire ne soit détournée de ses utilisations pacifiques vers des armes nucléaires ou d'autres dispositifs explosifs nucléaires. Les modalités d'application des garanties requises par le présent article porteront sur les matières brutes et les produits fissiles spéciaux, que ces matières ou produits soient produits, traités ou utilisés dans une installation nucléaire principale ou se trouvent en dehors d'une telle installation. Les garanties requises par le présent article s'appliqueront à toutes matières brutes ou tous produits fissiles spéciaux dans toutes les activités nucléaires pacifiques exercées sur le territoire d'un tel Etat, sous sa juridiction, ou entreprises sous son contrôle en quelque lieu que ce soit.

2. Tout Etat Partie au Traité s'engage à ne pas fournir: a) de matières brutes ou de produits fissiles spéciaux, ou b) d'équipements ou de matières spécialement conçus ou préparés pour le traitement, l'utilisation ou la production de produits fissiles spéciaux, à un Etat non doté d'armes nucléaires, quel qu'il soit, à des fins pacifiques, à moins que lesdites matières brutes ou lesdits produits fissiles spéciaux ne soient soumis aux garanties requises par le présent article.

3. Les garanties requises par le présent article seront mises en oeuvre de manière à satisfaire aux dispositions de l'article IV du présent Traité et à éviter d'entraver le développement économique ou technologique des Parties au Traité, ou la coopération internationale dans le domaine des activités nucléaires pacifiques, notamment les échanges internationaux de matières et d'équipements nucléaires pour le traitement, l'utilisation ou la production de matières nucléaires à des fins pacifiques, conformément aux dispositions du présent article et au principe de garantie énoncé au Préambule du présent Traité.

4. Les Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires qui sont Parties au Traité concluront des accords avec l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique pour satisfaire aux exigences du présent article, soit à titre individuel, soit conjointement avec d'autres Etats conformément au Statut de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique. La négociation de ces accords commencera dans les 180 jours qui suivront l'entrée en vigueur initiale du présent Traité. Pour les Etats qui déposeront leur instrument de ratification ou d'adhésion après ladite période de 180 jours, la négociation de ces accords commencera au plus tard à la date de dépôt dudit instrument de ratification ou d'adhésion. Lesdits accords devront entrer en vigueur au plus tard 18 mois après la date du commencement des négociations.

ARTICLE IV

1. Aucune disposition du présent Traité ne sera interprétée comme portant atteinte au droit inaliénable de toutes les Parties au Traité de développer la recherche, la production et l'utilisation de l'énergie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques, sans discrimination et conformément aux dispositions des articles premier et II du présent Traité.

2. Toutes les Parties au Traité s'engagent à faciliter un échange aussi large que possible d'équipement, de matières et de renseignements scientifiques et technologiques en vue des utilisations de l'énergie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques, et ont le droit d'y participer. Les Parties au Traité en mesure de le faire devront aussi coopérer en contribuant, à titre individuel ou conjointement avec d'autres Etats ou des organisation internationales, au développement plus poussé des applications de l'énergie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques, en particulier sur les territoires des Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires qui sont Parties au Traité, compte dûment tenu des besoins des régions du monde qui sont en voie de développement.

ARTICLE V

Chaque Partie au Traité s'engage à prendre des mesures appropriées pour assurer que, conformément au présent Traité, sous une surveillance internationale appropriée et par la voie de procédures internationales appropriées, les avantages pouvant découler des applications pacifiques, quelles qu'elles soient, des explosions nucléaires soient accessibles sur une base non discriminatoire aux Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires qui sont Parties au Traité, et que le coût pour lesdites Parties des dispositifs explosifs utilisés soit aussi réduit que possible et ne comporte pas de frais pour la recherche et la mise au point. Les Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires qui sont Parties au Traité seront en mesure d'obtenir des avantages de cette nature, conformément à un accord international spécial ou à des accords internationaux spéciaux, par l'entremise d'un organisme international approprié où les Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires seront représentés de manière adéquate. Des négociations à ce sujet commenceront le plus tôt possible après l'entrée en vigueur du Traité. Les Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires qui sont Parties au Traité pourront aussi, s'ils le souhaitent, obtenir ces avantages en vertu d'accords bilatéraux.

ARTICLE VI

Chacune des Parties au Traité s'engage à poursuivre de bonne foi des négociations sur des mesures efficaces relatives à la cessation de la course aux armements nucléaires à une date rapprochée et au désarmement nucléaire, et sur un traité de désarmement général et complet sous un contrôle international strict et efficace.

ARTICLE VII

Aucune clause du présent Traité ne porte atteinte au droit d'un groupe quelconque d'Etats de conclure des traités régionaux de façon à assurer l'absence totale d'armes nucléaires sur leurs territoires respectifs.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Toute Partie au Traité peut proposer des amendements au présent Traité. Le texte de tout amendement proposé sera soumis aux gouvernements dépositaires qui le communiqueront à toutes les Parties au

Traité. Si un tiers des Parties au Traité ou davantage en font alors la demande, les gouvernements dépositaires convoqueront une conférence à laquelle ils inviteront toutes les Parties au Traité pour étudier cet amendement.

2. Tout amendement au présent Traité devra être approuvé à la majorité des voix de toutes les Parties au Traité, y compris les voix de tous les Etats dotés d'armes nucléaires qui sont Parties au Traité et de toutes les autres Parties qui, à la date de la communication de l'amendement, sont membres du Conseil des Gouverneurs de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique. L'amendement entrera en vigueur à l'égard de toute Partie qui déposera son instrument de ratification dudit amendement, dès le dépôt de tels instruments de ratification par la majorité des Parties, y compris les instruments de ratification de tous les Etats dotés d'armes nucléaires qui sont Parties au Traité et de toutes les autres Parties qui, à la date de la communication de l'amendement, sont membres du Conseil des Gouverneurs de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique. Par la suite, l'amendement entrera en vigueur à l'égard de toute autre Partie dès le dépôt de son instrument de ratification de l'amendement.

3. Cinq ans après l'entrée en vigueur du présent Traité, une conférence des Parties au Traité aura lieu à Genève (Suisse), afin d'examiner le fonctionnement du présent Traité en vue de s'assurer que les objectifs du Préambule et les dispositions du Traité sont en voie de réalisation. Par la suite, à des intervalles de cinq ans, une majorité des Parties au Traité pourra obtenir, en soumettant une proposition à cet effet aux gouvernements dépositaires, la convocation d'autres conférences ayant le même objet, à savoir examiner le fonctionnement du Traité.

ARTICLE IX

1. Le présent Traité est ouvert à la signature de tous les Etats. Tout Etat qui n'aura pas signé le présent Traité avant son entrée en vigueur conformément au paragraphe 3 du présent article pourra y adhérer à tout moment.

2. Le présent Traité sera soumis à la ratification des Etats signataires. Les instruments de ratification et les instruments d'adhésion seront déposés auprès des Gouvernements du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, des Etats-Unis d'Amérique et de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, qui sont par les présentes désignés comme gouvernements dépositaires.

3. Le présent Traité entrera en vigueur après qu'il aura été ratifié par les Etats dont les gouvernements sont désignés comme dépositaires du Traité, et par quarante autres Etats signataires du présent Traité, et après le dépôt de leurs instruments de ratification. Aux fins du présent Traité, un Etat doté d'armes nucléaires est un Etat qui a fabriqué et a fait exploser une arme nucléaire ou un autre dispositif nucléaire explosif avant le 1er janvier 1967.

4. Pour les Etats dont les instruments de ratification ou d'adhésion seront déposés après l'entrée en vigueur du présent Traité, celui-ci entrera en vigueur à la date du dépôt de leurs instruments de ratification ou d'adhésion.

5. Les gouvernements dépositaires informeront sans délai tous les Etats qui auront signé le présent Traité ou y auront adhéré de la date de chaque signature, de la date de dépôt de chaque instrument de ratification ou d'adhésion, de la date d'entrée en vigueur du présent Traité et de la date de réception de toute demande de convocation d'une conférence ainsi que de toute autre communication.

6. Le présent Traité sera enregistré par les gouvernements dépositaires conformément à l'article 102 de la Charte des Nations Unies.

ARTICLE X

1. Chaque Partie, dans l'exercice de sa souveraineté nationale, aura le droit de se retirer du Traité si elle décide que des événements extraordinaires, en rapport avec l'objet du présent Traité, ont compromis les intérêts suprêmes de son pays. Elle devra notifier ce retrait à toutes les autres Parties au Traité ainsi qu'au Conseil de sécurité de l'Organisation des Nations Unies avec un préavis de trois mois. Ladite notification devra contenir un exposé des événements extraordinaires que l'Etat en question considère comme ayant compromis ses intérêts suprêmes.

2. Vingt-cinq ans après l'entrée en vigueur du Traité, une conférence sera convoquée en vue de décider si le Traité demeurera en vigueur pour une durée indéfinie, ou sera prorogé pour une ou plusieurs périodes supplémentaires d'une durée déterminée. Cette décision sera prise à la majorité des Parties au Traité.

ARTICLE XI

Le présent Traité, dont les textes anglais, russe, espagnol, français et chinois font également foi, sera déposé dans les archives des gouvernements dépositaires. Des copies dûment certifiées conformes du présent Traité seront adressées par les gouvernements dépositaires aux gouvernements des Etats qui auront signé le Traité, ou qui y auront adhéré.

TRATADO

SOBRE LA NO PROLIFERACION DE LAS ARMAS NUCLEARES

Los Estados que conciertan este Tratado, denominados en adelante las "Partes en el Tratado",

Considerando las devastaciones que una guerra nuclear infligiría a la humanidad entera y la consiguiente necesidad de hacer todo lo posible por evitar el peligro de semejante guerra y de adoptar medidas para salvaguardar la seguridad de los pueblos,

Estimando que la proliferación de las armas nucleares agravaría considerablemente el peligro de guerra nuclear,

De conformidad con las resoluciones de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas que piden que se concierte un acuerdo sobre la prevención de una mayor diseminación de las armas nucleares,

Comprometiéndose a cooperar para facilitar la aplicación de las salvaguardias del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica a las actividades nucleares de carácter pacífico,

Expresando su apoyo a los esfuerzos de investigación y desarrollo y demás esfuerzos por promover la aplicación, dentro del marco del sistema de salvaguardias del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, del principio de la salvaguardia eficaz de la corriente de materiales básicos y de materiales fisionables especiales mediante el empleo de instrumentos y otros medios técnicos en ciertos puntos estratégicos,

Afirmando el principio de que los beneficios de las aplicaciones pacíficas de la tecnología nuclear, incluidos cualesquiera subproductos tecnológicos que los Estados poseedores de armas nucleares puedan obtener del desarrollo de dispositivos nucleares explosivos, deberán ser asequibles para fines pacíficos a todas las Partes en el Tratado, sean estas Partes Estados poseedores o no poseedores de armas nucleares.

Convencidos de que, en aplicación de este principio, todas las Partes en el Tratado tienen derecho a participar en el más amplio intercambio posible de información científica para el mayor desarrollo de las aplicaciones de la energía atómica con fines pacíficos y a contribuir a dicho desarrollo por sí solas o en colaboración con otros Estados,

Declarando su intención de lograr lo antes posible la cesación de la carrera de armamentos nucleares y de emprender medidas eficaces encaminadas al desarme nuclear,

Pidiendo encarecidamente la cooperación de todos los Estados para el logro de este objetivo,

Recordando que las Partes en el Tratado por el que se prohíben los ensayos con armas nucleares en la atmósfera, el espacio ultraterrestre y debajo del agua, de 1963, expresaron en el Preámbulo de ese Tratado su

determinación de procurar alcanzar la suspensión permanente de todas las explosiones de ensayo de armas nucleares y de proseguir negociaciones con ese fin,

Deseando promover la disminución de la tirantez internacional y el robustecimiento de la confianza entre los Estados con objeto de facilitar la cesación de la fabricación de armas nucleares, la liquidación de todas las reservas existentes de tales armas y la eliminación de las armas nucleares y de sus vectores en los arsenales nacionales en virtud de un tratado de desarme general y completo bajo estricto y eficaz control internacional,

Recordando que, de conformidad con la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, los Estados deben abstenerse en sus relaciones internacionales de recurrir a la amenaza o al uso de la fuerza contra la integridad territorial o la independencia política de cualquier Estado, o en cualquier otra forma incompatible con los Propósitos de las Naciones Unidas, y que han de promoverse el establecimiento y mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad internacionales con la menor desviación posible de los recursos humanos y económicos del mundo hacia los armamentos,

Han convenido en lo siguiente :

ARTÍCULO I

Cada Estado poseedor de armas nucleares que sea Parte en el Tratado se compromete a no traspasar a nadie armas nucleares u otros dispositivos nucleares explosivos ni el control sobre tales armas o dispositivos explosivos, sea directa o indirectamente; y a no ayudar, alentar o inducir en forma alguna a ningún Estado no poseedor de armas nucleares a fabricar o adquirir de otra manera armas nucleares u otros dispositivos nucleares explosivos, ni el control sobre tales armas o dispositivos explosivos.

ARTÍCULO II

Cada Estado no poseedor de armas nucleares que sea Parte en el Tratado se compromete a no recibir de nadie ningún traspaso de armas nucleares u otros dispositivos nucleares explosivos ni el control sobre tales armas o dispositivos explosivos, sea directa o indirectamente; a no fabricar ni adquirir de otra manera armas nucleares u otros dispositivos nucleares explosivos; y a no recabar no recibir ayuda alguna para la fabricación de armas nucleares u otros dispositivos nucleares explosivos.

ARTÍCULO III

1. Cada Estado no poseedor de armas nucleares que sea Parte en el Tratado se compromete a aceptar las salvaguardias estipuladas en un acuerdo que ha de negociarse y concertarse con el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, de conformidad con el Estatuto del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica y el sistema de salvaguardias del Organismo, a efectos únicamente de verificar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones asumidas por ese Estado en virtud de este Tratado con miras a

impedir que la energía nuclear se desvíe de usos pacíficos hacia armas nucleares u otros dispositivos nucleares explosivos. Los procedimientos de salvaguardia exigidos por el presente artículo se aplicarán a los materiales básicos y a los materiales fisionables especiales, tanto si se producen, tratan o utilizan en cualquier planta nuclear principal como si se encuentran fuera de cualquier instalación de ese tipo. Las salvaguardias exigidas por el presente artículo se aplicarán a todos los materiales básicos o materiales fisionables especiales en todas las actividades nucleares con fines pacíficos realizadas en el territorio de dicho Estado, bajo su jurisdicción, o efectuadas bajo su control en cualquier lugar.

2. Cada Estado Parte en el Tratado se compromete a no proporcionar: a) materiales básicos o materiales fisionables especiales, ni b) equipo o materiales especialmente concebidos o preparados para el tratamiento, utilización o producción de materiales fisionables especiales, a ningún Estado no poseedor de armas nucleares, para fines pacíficos, a menos que esos materiales básicos o materiales fisionables especiales sean sometidos a las salvaguardias exigidas por el presente artículo.

3. Las salvaguardias exigidas por el presente artículo se aplicarán de modo que se cumplan las disposiciones del artículo IV de este Tratado y que no obstaculicen el desarrollo económico o tecnológico de las Partes o la cooperación internacional en la esfera de las actividades nucleares con fines pacíficos, incluido el intercambio internacional de materiales y equipo nucleares para el tratamiento, utilización o producción de materiales nucleares con fines pacíficos de conformidad con las disposiciones del presente artículo y con el principio de la salvaguardia enunciado en el Preámbulo de Tratado.

4. Los Estados no poseedores de armas nucleares que sean Partes en el Tratado, individualmente o junto con otros Estados, de conformidad con el Estatuto del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, concertarán acuerdos con el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica a fin de satisfacer las exigencias del presente artículo. La negociación de esos acuerdos comenzará dentro de los ciento ochenta días siguientes a la entrada en vigor inicial de este Tratado. Para los Estados que depositen sus instrumentos de ratificación o de adhesión después de ese plazo de ciento ochenta días, la negociación de esos acuerdos comenzará a más tardar en la fecha de dicho depósito. Tales acuerdos deberán entrar en vigor, a más tardar, en el término de dieciocho meses a contar de la fecha de iniciación de las negociaciones.

ARTÍCULO IV

1. Nada de lo dispuesto en este Tratado se interpretará en el sentido de afectar el derecho inalienable de todas las Partes en el Tratado de desarrollar la investigación, la producción y la utilización de la energía nuclear con fines pacíficos sin discriminación y de conformidad con los artículos I y II de este Tratado.

2. Todas las Partes en el Tratado se comprometen a facilitar el más amplio intercambio posible de equipo, materiales e información científica y tecnológica para los usos pacíficos de la energía nuclear y tienen el derecho de participar en ese intercambio. Las Partes en el Tratado que estén en

situación de hacerlo deberán asimismo cooperar para contribuir, por sí solas o junto con otros Estados u organizaciones internacionales, al mayor desarrollo de las aplicaciones de la energía nuclear con fines pacíficos, especialmente en los territorios de los Estados no poseedores de armas nucleares Partes en el Tratado, teniendo debidamente en cuenta las necesidades de las regiones en desarrollo del mundo.

ARTÍCULO V

Cada Parte en el Tratado se compromete a adoptar las medidas apropiadas para asegurar que, de conformidad con este Tratado, bajo observación internacional apropiada y por los procedimientos internacionales apropiados, los beneficios potenciales de toda aplicación pacífica de las explosiones nucleares sean asequibles sobre bases no discriminatorias a los Estados no poseedores de armas nucleares Partes en el Tratado y que el costo para dichas Partes de los dispositivos explosivos que se empleen sea lo más bajo posible y excluya todo gasto por concepto de investigación y desarrollo. Los Estados no poseedores de armas nucleares Partes en el Tratado deberán estar en posición de obtener tales beneficios, en virtud de uno o más acuerdos internacionales especiales, por conducto de un organismo internacional apropiado en el que estén adecuadamente representados los Estados no poseedores de armas nucleares. Las negociaciones sobre esta cuestión deberán comenzar lo antes posible, una vez que el Tratado haya entrado en vigor. Los Estados no poseedores de armas nucleares Partes en el Tratado que así lo deseen podrán asimismo obtener tales beneficios en virtud de acuerdos bilaterales.

ARTÍCULO VI

Cada Parte en el Tratado se compromete a celebrar negociaciones de buena fe sobre medidas eficaces relativas a la cesación de la carrera de armamentos nucleares en fecha cercana y al desarme nuclear, y sobre un tratado de desarme general y completo bajo estricto y eficaz control internacional.

ARTÍCULO VII

Ninguna disposición de este Tratado menoscabará el derecho de cualquier grupo de Estados a concertar tratados regionales a fin de asegurar la ausencia total de armas nucleares en sus respectivos territorios.

ARTÍCULO VIII

1. Cualquiera de las Partes en el Tratado podrá proponer enmiendas al mismo. El texto de cualquier enmienda propuesta será comunicado a los Gobiernos depositarios que lo transmitirán a todas las Partes en el Tratado. Seguidamente, si así lo solicitan un tercio o más de las Partes en el Tratado, los Gobiernos depositarios convocarán a una conferencia, a la que invitarán a todas las Partes en el Tratado, para considerar tal enmienda.

2. Toda enmienda a este Tratado deberá ser aprobada por una mayoría de los votos de todas las Partes en el Tratado, incluidos los votos de todos los Estados poseedores de armas nucleares Partes en el Tratado y de las demás Partes que, en la fecha en que se comuniquen la enmienda, sean miembros de la Junta de Gobernadores del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica. La enmienda entrará en vigor para cada Parte que deposite su instrumento de ratificación de la enmienda al quedar depositados tales instrumentos de ratificación de una mayoría de las Partes, incluidos los instrumentos de ratificación de todos los Estados poseedores de armas nucleares Partes en el Tratado y de las demás Partes que, en la fecha en que se comuniquen la enmienda, sean miembros de la Junta de Gobernadores del Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica. Ulteriormente entrará en vigor para cualquier otra Parte al quedar depositado su instrumento de ratificación de la enmienda.

3. Cinco años después de la entrada en vigor del presente Tratado se celebrará en Ginebra, Suiza, una conferencia de las Partes en el Tratado, a fin de examinar el funcionamiento de este Tratado para asegurarse que se están cumpliendo los fines del Preámbulo y las disposiciones del Tratado. En lo sucesivo, a intervalos de cinco años, una mayoría de las Partes en el Tratado podrá, mediante la presentación de una propuesta al respecto a los Gobiernos depositarios, conseguir que se convoquen otras conferencias con el mismo objeto de examinar el funcionamiento del Tratado.

ARTÍCULO IX

1. Este Tratado estará abierto a la firma de todos los Estados. El Estado que no firmare este Tratado antes de su entrada en vigor, de conformidad con el párrafo 3 de este artículo, podrá adherirse a él en cualquier momento.

2. Este Tratado estará sujeto a ratificación por los Estados signatarios. Los instrumentos de ratificación y los instrumentos de adhesión serán entregados para su depósito a los Gobiernos del Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, de los Estados Unidos de América y de la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas, que por el presente se designan como Gobiernos depositarios.

3. Este Tratado entrará en vigor después de su ratificación por los Estados cuyos Gobiernos se designan como depositarios del Tratado y por otros cuarenta Estados signatarios del Tratado, y después del depósito de sus instrumentos de ratificación. A los efectos del presente Tratado, un Estado poseedor de armas nucleares es un Estado que ha fabricado y hecho explotar un arma nuclear u otro dispositivo nuclear explosivo antes del 1º de enero de 1967.

4. Para los Estados cuyos instrumentos de ratificación o de adhesión se depositaren después de la entrada en vigor de este Tratado, el Tratado entrará en vigor en la fecha del depósito de sus instrumentos de ratificación o adhesión.

5. Los Gobiernos depositarios informarán sin tardanza a todos los Estados signatarios y a todos los Estados que se hayan adherido a este Tratado, de la fecha de cada firma, de la fecha de depósito de cada instrumento de ratificación o de adhesión a este Tratado, de la fecha de su entrada en vigor y la fecha de recibo de toda solicitud de convocación a una conferencia o de cualquier otra notificación.

6. Este Tratado será registrado por los Gobiernos depositarios, de conformidad con el artículo 102 de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.

ARTÍCULO X

1. Cada Parte tendrá derecho, en ejercicio de su soberanía nacional, a retirarse del Tratado si decide que acontecimientos extraordinarios, relacionados con la materia que es objeto de este Tratado, han comprometido los intereses supremos de su país. De esa retirada deberá notificar a todas las demás Partes en el Tratado y al Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas con una antelación de tres meses. Tal notificación deberá incluir una exposición de los acontecimientos extraordinarios que esa Parte considere que han comprometido sus intereses supremos.

2. Veinticinco años después de la entrada en vigor del Tratado se convocará a una Conferencia para decidir si el Tratado permanecerá en vigor indefinidamente o si se prorrogará por uno o más períodos suplementarios de duración determinada. Esta decisión será adoptada por la mayoría de las Partes en el Tratado.

ARTÍCULO XI

Este Tratado, cuyos textos en inglés, ruso, español, francés y chino son igualmente auténticos, se depositará en los archivos de los Gobiernos depositarios. Los Gobiernos depositarios remitirán copias debidamente certificadas de este Tratado a los Gobiernos de los Estados signatarios y de los Estados que se adhieran al Tratado.

防止核武器蕃衍條約

締結本條約之國家，以下簡稱“締約國”，

鑒於核戰爭足使全體人類淪於浩劫，是以務須竭力防避此種戰爭之危機，採取措施，以保障各國人民安全，

認為核武器之蕃衍，足使核戰爭爆發危險大增，

為符合聯合國大會歷次要求締結防止核武器擴大散布協定之各項決議案，

擔允通力合作，以利國際原子能總署和平核工作各項保防之適用，

表示關於在若干衝要地點，以儀器及其他技術，有效保防原料及特種對裂質料之流通之原則，凡為促進在國際原子能總署保防制度範圍內實行此項原則而作之研究、發展及其他努力，概予支持，

確認一項原則，即核技術和平應用之惠益，包括核武器國家發展核爆炸器械而可能獲得之任何技術上副產品在內，應供全體締約國和平使用，不問其為核武器國家抑係非核武器國家，

深信為推進此項原則，本條約全體締約國有權參加盡量充分交換科學情報，俾進一步擴展原子能之和平使用，並獨自或會同其他國家促成此種使用之進一步擴展，

聲明欲儘早達成停止核武器競賽並擔允採取趨向於核裁軍之有效措施，

促請所有國家通力合作，達到此項目標，

查一九六三年禁止在大氣層、外空及水中試驗核武器條約締約國在該條約前文表示決心謀求永遠停止一切核武器爆炸試驗，

並為達到此目的繼續談判，

亟欲進一步緩和國際緊張局勢，鞏固國與國間之互信，以利依據一項在嚴格有效國際管制下普遍徹底裁軍之條約，停止製造核武器，清除一切現有囤積，並廢除內國兵工廠之核武器及其投送工具，

復查依照聯合國憲章，各國在其國際關係上不得作武力之威脅或使用武力侵害任何國家之領土完整或政治獨立，亦不得以任何其他與聯合國宗旨相悖之方式作武力之威脅或使用武力，且須儘量減少世界人力與經濟資源之消耗於軍備，以促進國際和平及安全之建立及維持，

爰議定條款如下：

第一條

本條約各核武器締約國擔允不將核武器或其他核爆炸器械或此種武器或爆炸器械之控制，直接或間接讓與任何領受者，亦絕不協助、鼓勵或誘導任何非核武器國家製造或以其他方法取得核武器或其他核爆炸器械，或此種武器或爆炸器械之控制。

第二條

本條約各非核武器締約國擔允不自任何讓與者，直接或間接受核武器或其他核爆炸器械或此種武器或爆炸器械之控制之讓與，不製造或以其他方法取得核武器或其他核爆炸器械，亦不索

取或接受製造核武器或其他核爆炸器械之任何協助。

第三條

一. 各非核武器締約國擔允接受依國際原子能總署規約及該總署保防制度,而與該總署將來商訂之協定所列保防事項,專為查核本國已否履行依本條約所負義務,以期防止核能自和平用途移作核武器或其他核爆炸器械之用。凡源料或特種對裂質料,不論正在任何主要核設施內生產、處理或使用,抑在任何此種設施之外,概應遵循本條所定必需之保防程序。本條所定必需之保防,對於在此種國家領域內或在其管轄範圍內或在其控制下任何地方實行之一切和平核工作所用一切源料或特種對裂質料,一律適用。

二. 各締約國擔允不將(甲)源料或特種對裂質料,或(乙)特別為特種對裂質料之處理、使用或生產而設計或預備之設備或材料,供給任何非核武器國家作和平用途,但該源料或特種對裂質料受本條所定必需之保防支配者不在此限。

三. 本條所定必需之保防,其實施應遵依本條約第四條,且不妨害締約國經濟或技術發展或和平核工作方面之國際合作,包括依照本條規定及本條約前文所載保防原則在國際上交換核質料及和平用途核質料之處理、使用或生產之設備在內。

四. 本條約非核武器締約國應單獨或會同其他國家依照國際原子能總署規約與該總署締結協定,以應本條所定之需求。商訂此項協定應於本條約最初生效之日起一百八十日內開始。於一百八十日後交存批准書或加入書之國家,至遲應於交存時開始

商訂此項協定。此項協定至遲應於開始商訂之日後十八個月生效。

第四條

一. 本條約不得解釋為影響本條約全體締約國無分軒輊，並遵照本條約第一條及第二條之規定，為和平用途而推進核能之研究、生產與使用之不可割讓之權利。

二. 本條約全體締約國擔允利便並有權參加盡量充分交換有關核能和平使用之設備、材料及科學與技術情報。凡能參加此項交換之締約國亦應合作無間，獨自或會同其他國家或國際組織促成核能和平使用之進一步發展，尤應在非核武器締約國領域內促成此項發展，並適當顧及世界各發展中區域之需要。

第五條

本條約各締約國擔允採取適當措施保證核爆炸任何和平使用之潛在惠益將依據本條約，在適當國際觀察之下及經由適當國際程序提供本條約非核武器締約國一體享用，無分軒輊，對此等締約國收取所用爆炸器械之費用，將盡量低廉，且不收研究及發展之任何費用。本條約非核武器締約國依據一項或多項特種國際協定，經由非核武器國家有充足代表參加之適當國際機關，應能獲得此種惠益。關於此項問題之談判，一俟本條約發生效力即應儘早開始。本條約非核武器締約國倘願意時亦得依據雙邊協定獲得

此種惠益。

第六條

本條約各締約國擔允誠意談判訂定關於早日停止核武器競賽與關於核裁軍之有效措施，以及在嚴格有效國際管制下普遍徹底裁軍之條約。

第七條

本條約並不影響任何國家集團為確保各該集團領域內根絕核武器而締結區域條約之權利。

第八條

一. 本條約任何締約國得對本條約提出修正案。任何修正案全文應送由保管國政府分發全體締約國。嗣後保管國政府經三分之一以上締約國之請求應召開會議，邀請全體締約國審議此項修正案。

二. 通過本條約任何修正案必須有全體締約國過半數之可決票，包括本條約所有核武器締約國及於分發修正案時為國際原子能總署理事會理事國之所有其他締約國之可決票在內。修正案應於過半數締約國之修正案批准書，包括本條約所有核武器締約國及於分發修正案時為國際原子能總署理事會理事國之所有

其他締約國之批准書在內，交存之時起，對已交存此項批准書之每一締約國發生效力。嗣後，對其餘每一締約國於其交存修正案批准書之時起發生效力。

三、本條約生效後五年，應於瑞士日內瓦召開締約國會議，檢討本條約之運用施行，以確保前文宗旨及條約規定均在實現中。嗣後每隔五年，經過半數締約國向保管國政府提出請求，得再召開會議，其目標同前，仍為檢討本條約之運用施行。

第九條

一、本條約聽由各國簽署。凡在本條約依本條第三項發生效力前尚未簽署本條約之國家，得隨時加入本條約。

二、本條約應由簽署國批准。批准書與加入書應交存茲經指定為保管國政府之大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國、蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯盟及美利堅合眾國政府。

三、本條約應於經指定為保管國政府之國家及本條約其他簽署國四十國批准並交存批准書後發生效力。本條約稱核武器國，謂於一九六七年一月一日屆至前製造並爆炸核武器或其他核爆炸器械之國家。

四、對於在本條約生效後交存批准書或加入書之國家，本條約應於其交存批准書或加入書之日發生效力。

五、保管國政府應將每一簽署之日期，每一批准書或加入書交存之日期，本條約發生效力日期及收到召開會議之任何請求或其他通知之日期，迅速通知所有簽署及加入國家。

六、本條約應由保管國政府依聯合國憲章第一百零二條登記。

第十條

一、每一締約國倘斷定與本條約事項有關之非常事件危害其本國最高權益，為行使國家主權起見，有權退出本條約。該國應於退約三個月前，將此事通知本條約所有其他締約國及聯合國安全理事會。此項通知應敘明該國認為危害其最高權益之非常事件。

二、本條約發生效力二十五年後應召開會議，決定本條約應否無限期繼續有效，抑應延長一個或多個一定時期。此項決定應以締約國過半數之可決票為之。

第十一條

本條約之英文、俄文、法文、西班牙文及中文各本同一作準，一併留存保管國政府檔庫。保管國政府應將本條約正式副本分送各簽署國及加入國政府。

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorised, have signed this Treaty.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

В УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ ЧЕГО нижеподписавшиеся, должным образом на то уполномоченные, подписали настоящий Договор.

СОВЕРШЕНО в трех экземплярах, в городах Лондоне, Вашингтоне и Москве, июля месяца, первого дня, тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят восьмого года.

EN FOI DE QUOI les soussignés, dûment habilités à cet effet, ont signé le présent Traité.

FAIT en trois exemplaires à Londres, Moscou et Washington, le premier juillet mil neuf cent soixante-huit.

EN TESTIMONIO DE LO CUAL, los infrascritos, debidamente autorizados, firman este Tratado.

HECHO en tres ejemplares, en las ciudades de Londres, Moscú y Wáshington, el día primero de julio de mil novecientos sesenta y ocho.

為此,下列代表各秉正式授予之權,謹簽字於本條約,以昭信守。
本條約共繕三份,於公曆一千九百六十八年七月一日
訂於倫敦、莫斯科及華盛頓。

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:

За Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии:

POUR LE ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D'IRLANDE DU NORD:

POR EL REINO UNIDO DE GRAN BRETAÑA E IRLANDA DEL NORTE:

大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國:

MICHAEL STEWART

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

За Союз Советских Социалистических Республик:

POUR L'UNION DES RÉPUBLIQUES SOCIALISTES SOVIÉTIQUES:

POR LA UNIÓN DE REPÚBLICAS SOCIALISTAS SOVIÉTICAS:

蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦:

M. СМІРНОВСКИЙ

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

За Соединенные Штаты Америки:

POUR LES ETATS-UNIS D'AMÉRIQUE:

POR LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA:

美利堅合衆國:

DAVID BRUCE

FOR AFGHANISTAN:
За Афганистан:
POUR L'AFGHANISTAN:
POR EL AFGANISTÁN:
阿富汗:

DR. A. MAJID

FOR AUSTRALIA:
За Австралию:
POUR L'AUSTRALIE:
POR AUSTRALIA:
澳大利亞:

ALEXANDER DOWNER
27th February 1970

FOR AUSTRIA:
За Австрию:
POUR L'AUTRICHE:
POR AUSTRIA:
奧地利:

JOSEF A. SCHÖNER

FOR BELGIUM:
За Бельгию:
POUR LA BELGIQUE:
POR BÉLGICA:
比利時:

J. VAN DEN BOSCH
Aug. 20, 1968

FOR BULGARIA:
За България:
POUR LA BULGARIE:
FOR BULGARIA:
保加利亞:

д-р П. ВУТОВ

FOR CANADA:
За Канаду:
POUR LE CANADA:
FOR EL CANADÁ:
加拿大:

C. S. A. RITCHIE
July 23, 1968

FOR CEYLON:
За Цейлон:
POUR CEYLAN:
FOR CEILÁN:
錫蘭:

LALITA RAJAPAKSE

FOR THE CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF):
За Демократическую Республику Конго:
POUR LE CONGO (RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU):
FOR EL CONGO (REPÚBLICA DEMOCRÁTICA DE):
剛果 (民主共和國):

P. M'BALA
Sept. 17th, 1968

FOR CYPRUS:
За Кипр:
POUR CHYPRE:
POR CHIPRE:
賽普勒斯:

C. A. ASHIOTIS

FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA:
За Чехословакию:
POUR LA TCHÉCOSLOVAQUIE:
POR CHECOSLOVAQUIA:
捷克斯拉夫:

DR. MILOSLAV RUŽEK

FOR DENMARK:
За Данию:
POUR LE DANEMARK:
POR DINAMARCA:
丹麥:

ERLING KRISTIANSEN

FOR ETHIOPIA:
За Эфиопию:
POUR L'ETHIOPIE:
POR ETIOPÍA:
衣索比亞:

GABRE-MASCAL
5th September 1968

FOR FINLAND:
За Финляндию:
POUR LA FINLANDE:
POR FINLANDIA:
芬蘭:

ERIK HEINRICHS

FOR GAMBIA:
За Гамбию:
POUR LA GAMBIE:
POR GAMBIA:
岡比亞:

L. F. VALANTINE
4th September, 1968

FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY:
За Федеративную Республику Германии:
POUR LA RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE D'ALLEMAGNE:
POR LA REPÚBLICA FEDERAL DE ALEMANIA:
德意志聯邦共和國:

With reference to the note handed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in its capacity as depositary Government.*

HERBERT BLANKENHORN
28 November 1969

FOR GHANA:
За Гану:
POUR LE GHANA:
POR GHANA:
迦納:

S. K. ANTHONY
24th July, 1968

* See page 53.

FOR HUNGARY:
За Венгрию:
POUR LA HONGRIE:
POR HUNGRÍA:
匈牙利:

VARSÁNYI GYÖRGY

FOR ICELAND:
За Исландию:
POUR L'ISLANDE:
POR ISLANDIA:
冰島:

GUDM. I. GUDMUNDSSON

FOR INDONESIA:
За Индонезию:
POUR L'INDONÉSIE:
POR INDONESIA:
印度尼西亞:

ADJIE
2^d March 1970

FOR IRAN:
За Иран:
POUR L'IRAN:
POR EL IRÁN:
伊朗:

A. ARAM

FOR IRELAND:
За Ирландию:
POUR L'IRLANDE:
POR IRLANDA:
愛爾蘭:

PROINSIAS MAC AOGAIN
4th July, 1968

FOR ITALY:
За Италию:
POUR L'ITALIE:
POR ITALIA:
義大利:

R. MANZINI
28th January, 1969


FOR JAMAICA:
За Ямайку:
POUR LA JAMAÏQUE:
POR JAMAICA:
牙買加:

H. LINDO
14th April, 1969

FOR JAPAN:
За Японию:
POUR LE JAPON:
POR EL JAPÓN:
日本:

M. YUKAWA
3rd February, 1970

FOR KUWAIT:
За Кувейт:
POUR LE KOWEÏT:
FOR KUWAIT:
科威特:



22/8/68

FOR LAOS:
За Лаос:
POUR LE LAOS:
FOR LAOS:
寮國:

PRINCE KHAMMAO

FOR LEBANON:
За Ливан:
POUR LE LIBAN:
FOR EL LÍBANO:
黎巴嫩:

N. DIMECHKIÉ

FOR LIBYA:
За Ливию:
POUR LA LIBYE:
FOR LIBIA:
利比亞:

OMAR M. MUNTASSER
July 18th '68

FOR LUXEMBOURG:
За Люксембург:
POUR LE LUXEMBOURG:
POR LUXEMBURGO:
盧森堡:

A. J. CLASEN
14th August, 1968

FOR MALAYSIA:
За Малайскую Федерацию:
POUR LA MALAISIE:
POR MALASIA:
馬來西亞:

ABDUL JAMIL

FOR MEXICO:
За Мексику:
POUR LE MEXIQUE:
POR MÉXICO:
墨西哥:

EDUARDO SUÁREZ
July 26 1968

FOR MOROCCO:
За Марокко:
POUR LE MAROC:
POR MARRUECOS:
摩洛哥:

عائشة محمد بن يوسف

FOR NEPAL:
За Непал:
POUR LE NÉPAL:
POR NEPAL:
尼泊爾:

ISWARY RAJ MISRA

FOR THE NETHERLANDS:
За Нидерланды:
POUR LES PAYS-BAS:
POR LOS PAÍSES BAJOS:
荷蘭:

D. W. VAN LYNDEN
20th August, 1968

FOR NEW ZEALAND:
За Новую Зеландию:
POUR LA NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE:
POR NUEVA ZELANDIA:
紐西蘭:

DENIS BLUNDELL

FOR NICARAGUA:
За Никарагуа:
POUR LE NICARAGUA:
POR NICARAGUA:
尼加拉瓜:

MARCEL J. ULVERT

FOR NIGERIA:
За Нигерию:
POUR LA NIGÉRIA:
POR NIGERIA:
奈及利亞:

BABAFEMI OGUNDIPE

FOR NORWAY:
За Норвегию:
POUR LA NORVÈGE:
POR NORUEGA:
挪威:

ARNE SKAUG

FOR POLAND:
За Польшу:
POUR LA POLOGNE:
POR POLONIA:
波蘭:

TADEUSZ WIŚNIEWSKI

FOR RUMANIA:
За Румынию:
POUR LA ROUMANIE:
POR RUMANIA:
羅馬尼亞:

V. PUNGAN

FOR SAN MARINO:
За Сан-Марино:
POUR SAINT-MARIN:
POR SAN MARINO:
聖馬利諾:

CHARLES FORTE
29th July 1968

FOR SENEGAL:
За Сенегал:
POUR LE SÉNÉGAL:
POR EL SENEGAL:
塞內加爾:

S. LOUM
1e 26 Juillet 1968

FOR SINGAPORE:
За Сингапур:
POUR SINGAPOUR:
POR SINGAPUR:
新加坡:

A. P. RAJAH
5th Feb. 1970.

FOR SOMALIA:
За Сомали:
POUR LA SOMALIE:
POR SOMALIA:
索馬利亞:

A. ABDILLEH

FOR SWAZILAND:
За Свазиленд:
POUR SOUAZILAND:
FOR SWAZILANDIA:
史瓦濟蘭:

NKOMENI DOUGLAS NTIWANE
24th June, 1969.

FOR SWEDEN:
За Швецию:
POUR LA SUÈDE:
FOR SUECIA:
瑞典:

GUNNAR FAGRELL
19th August 1968

FOR SWITZERLAND:
За Швейцарию:
POUR LA SUISSE:
FOR SUIZA:
瑞士:

R. KELLER
27th November 1969

FOR TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO:
За Тринидад и Тобаго:
POUR LA TRINITÉ ET TOBAGO:
FOR TRINIDAD Y TABAGO:
千里達及托貝哥:

W. ANDREW ROSE
22nd August, 1968

FOR TUNISIA:
За Тунис:
POUR LA TUNISIE:
POR TÚNEZ:
突尼西亞:

M. ESSAAFI

FOR TURKEY:
За Турцию:
POUR LA TURQUIE:
POR TURQUÍA:
土耳其:

Ü HALÛK BAYÛLKEN
28th January, 1969

FOR THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC:
За Объединенную Арабскую Республику:
POUR LA RÉPUBLIQUE ARABE UNIE:
POR LA REPÚBLICA ARABE UNIDA:
阿拉伯聯合共和國:

A. HASSAN

FOR YUGOSLAVIA:
За Югославию:
POUR LA YUGOSLAVIE:
POR YUGOSLAVIA:
南斯拉夫:

VOJISLAV PEKIĆ
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
10th July 1968

STATEMENTS MADE ON SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY

AUSTRALIA

*The High Commissioner for Australia to the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*

*Australia House,
London.*

Sir,

27th February, 1970.

On the occasion of signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on behalf of the Government of Australia, I have the honour to communicate to you the following statement by the Government of Australia.

“ The Government of Australia :

Supports effective international measures to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In April 1968 when the Treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons was introduced in the United Nations General Assembly, Australia supported the resolution commending the Treaty for the consideration of Governments.

Is conscious of the fact that in the long run the security of the world as a whole will depend upon effective measures to control the nuclear arms race and to bring about general and complete disarmament. The Government therefore welcomes the call in Article VI of the Treaty for negotiations to achieve these ends.

Hopes that the Treaty will be effective in its operation and will lead to improved relationships and enhanced co-operation between the nations of the world, and in particular between the nations of the Asian and Pacific region.

Believes that a condition of an effective Treaty is that it should attract a necessary degree of support. Some progress in this direction has been made but the Government will nevertheless want to be assured that there is a sufficient degree of support for the Treaty.

Regards it as essential that the Treaty should not affect continuing security commitments under existing treaties of mutual security.

Attaches weight to the statements by the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union declaring their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide help to any non-nuclear weapons state party to the Treaty that is subject to aggression or the threat of aggression with nuclear weapons. At the same time the Government reaffirms its adherence to the principle, contained in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, of the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Notes that Article 10 of the Treaty provides that any party has the right to withdraw in circumstances that jeopardised its supreme interests.

Notes that the Treaty will in no way inhibit and is in fact designed to assist non-nuclear weapon states in their research, development and use of nuclear energy and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes either individually

or collectively; nor must it discriminate against any state or states in their peaceful pursuits in nuclear activities.

Considers that the safeguards agreement to be concluded by Australia with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Treaty Article III must in no way subject Australia to treatment less favourable than is accorded to other states which, individually or collectively, conclude safeguards agreements with that agency.

Considers it essential that the inspection and safeguards arrangements should not burden research, development, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; that they should not constitute an obstacle to a nation's economic development, commercial interests and trade; and that they should be effective in ensuring that any breaches of the Treaty would be detected.

Attaches importance to a review of the IAEA safeguards system and procedures to clarify those issues of importance to Australia.

Welcomes the fact that the Treaty in Articles 4 and 5 provides for international co-operation for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions; notes the assurances that under the Treaty the supply of knowledge, materials and equipment would not be denied to any party; and considers it important that no nuclear development should be prohibited except when such activities would have no other purpose than the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Will co-operate closely with other governments in seeking clarifications and understandings in relation to those matters which must be resolved before Australia could proceed to ratification, being convinced that a Treaty which was truly effective in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons would be a major contribution to the security of the world as a whole."

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

ALEXANDER DOWNER.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

*The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to
the Government of the United Kingdom*

*Botschaft der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland*

Die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland beehrt sich, aus Anlass und in förmlicher Verbindung mit ihrer heutigen Unterzeichnung des Vertrages über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen der Regierung des Vereinigten Königreichs von Grossbritannien und Nordirland die nachstehenden Voraussetzungen darzulegen, unter denen sie den Vertrag unterzeichnet.

I.

Die Bundesregierung geht davon aus,

dass der Vertrag der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gegenüber so ausgelegt und angewendet wird wie gegenüber den anderen Vertragsparteien;

dass die Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und ihrer Verbündeten weiterhin durch die NATO oder ein entsprechendes Sicherheitssystem gewährleistet bleibt;

dass die Resolution Nr. 255 des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen sowie die dieser zugrunde liegenden Absichtserklärungen der Vereinigten Staaten, der Sowjetunion und Grossbritanniens uneingeschränkt auch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland gelten;

dass der Vertrag den Zusammenschluss der europäischen Staaten nicht behindert;

dass die Vertragsparteien die im Vertrag vorgesehenen Abrüstungsverhandlungen, insbesondere auf dem Gebiet der nuklearen Waffen, alsbald aufnehmen werden.

II.

Die Bundesregierung erklärt, dass mit Unterzeichnung dieses Vertrages keine völkerrechtliche Anerkennung der DDR verbunden ist;

für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland daher auch im Rahmen dieses Vertrages keine völkerrechtlichen Beziehungen zur DDR entstehen.

III.

Soweit die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie und das mit der IAEO abzuschliessende Überprüfungsabkommen betroffen sind, geht die Bundesregierung von folgendem aus:

a) Beschränkung auf den Vertragszweck

Der Zweck des Vertrages ist, die gegenwärtigen Nichtkernwaffenstaaten daran zu hindern, Kernwaffen und sonstige Kernsprengkörper herzustellen oder sonstwie zu erwerben. Die Bestimmungen des Vertrages sind daher ausschliesslich auf die Verwirklichung dieses Zieles gerichtet. Keinesfalls führen diese Bestimmungen zu einer Beschränkung der Verwendung von Kernenergie für andere Zwecke durch die Nichtkernwaffenmächte.

b) Forschung und Entwicklung

Freiheit von Forschung und Entwicklung ist von wesentlicher Bedeutung für die Förderung der friedlichen Verwendung von Kernenergie, und es steht für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ausser Zweifel, dass der Vertrag niemals so ausgelegt oder angewandt werden kann, dass er Forschung und Entwicklung auf diesem Gebiet behindert oder unterbindet. Die Bundesregierung hat die Erklärung des amerikanischen Ständigen Vertreters bei den Vereinten Nationen vom 15. Mai 1968 und insbesondere folgende Feststellungen daraus zur Kenntnis genommen:

“... Jegliche Besorgnis ist unbegründet, dieser Vertrag würde Nichtkernwaffenstaaten Verbote oder Beschränkungen hinsichtlich der Möglichkeit zur Entwicklung ihrer Fähigkeiten auf dem Gebiete der Kernwissenschaft und -technik auferlegen.”

“Dieser Vertrag fordert von keinem Staat, einen Status technologischer Abhängigkeit hinzunehmen oder von Entwicklungen in der Kernforschung ausgeschlossen zu sein;”

“Das gesamte Gebiet der mit der Erzeugung elektrischer Energie verbundenen Kernwissenschaft . . . wird allen, die es nutzen wollen, nach diesem Vertrag zugänglicher werden. Hierzu gehört nicht nur die gegenwärtige Generation von Kernkraftreaktoren, sondern auch die fortgeschrittene, noch in der Entwicklung befindliche Technologie von Schnellen Brutreaktoren, die bei der Erzeugung von Energie gleichzeitig mehr spaltbares Material erzeugen als sie verbrauchen;”

und

“Viele Nationen betreiben gegenwärtig Forschung auf einem noch fortgeschritteneren Gebiet der Wissenschaft, nämlich dem der gesteuerten thermonuklearen Fusion. Die künftigen Entwicklungen dieser Wissenschaft und Technologie könnten durchaus vom Reaktor der Zukunft führen, in dem der Vorgang der Spaltung von Uran oder Plutonium durch Verschmelzungsreaktionen von Wasserstoffisotopen als Energiequelle ersetzt wird. Die Technologie der gesteuerten thermonuklearen Fusion ist vom Verträge nicht betroffen. . . .”

c) Beweislast

Im Zusammenhang mit Artikel III Absatz 3 und Artikel IV des Vertrages ist keine nukleare Tätigkeit auf dem Gebiet der Forschung, Entwicklung, Herstellung oder Verwendung zu friedlichen Zwecken untersagt, noch kann die Lieferung von Kenntnissen, Material und Ausrüstungen Nichtkernwaffenstaaten allein auf der Grundlage von Unterstellungen verweigert werden, dass eine derartige Tätigkeit oder eine derartige Lieferung zur Herstellung von Kernwaffen oder sonstigen Kernsprengkörpern verwendet werden kann.

d) Austausch von Informationen

Artikel IV begründet für Vertragsparteien, die hierzu in der Lage sind, die Verpflichtung zusammenzuarbeiten, um zur Weiterentwicklung der Anwendung der Kernenergie für friedliche Zwecke beizutragen. Daher erwartet die Bundesregierung, dass Massnahmen zur Beschränkung des unbehinderten Flusses wissenschaftlicher und technologischer Informationen überprüft werden, damit der weitest mögliche Austausch von wissenschaftlichen und technologischen Informationen für friedliche Zwecke gefördert wird.

e) Sonstige Kernsprengkörper

Beim gegenwärtigen Stand der Technik sind Kernsprengkörper Vorrichtungen, die in Bruchteilen von Sekunden in unkontrollierter Weise eine grosse Menge von Kernenergie unter Entwicklung von Stosswellen freisetzen, d.h. Vorrichtungen, die als Kernwaffen verwendet werden können.

Die Bundesregierung ist gleichzeitig der Auffassung, dass der Nichtverbreitungsvertrag Fortschritte auf dem Gebiet der Entwicklung und Anwendung der Technologie der friedlichen Verwendung von Kernsprengmitteln nicht behindern darf.

f) *Sicherungs- und Verifikationsabkommen*

Es besteht keine Unvereinbarkeit zwischen den Zielen des Nichtverbreitungsvertrages und des EURATOM-Vertrags. In Bezug auf die Sicherungsmassnahmen, die in seinem Artikel III vorgesehen sind, beschränkt sich der Nichtverbreitungsvertrag darauf, auf die Abkommen zu verweisen, die noch mit der IAEO zu schliessen sind und deren Inhalt daher noch nicht festliegt.

Die in Artikel III Absatz 1 und 4 beschriebenen Sicherungsabkommen mit der IAEO können von den Vertragsparteien nicht nur "einzeln", sondern auch "zusammen mit anderen Staaten" abgeschlossen werden. Die Staaten, die einer Organisation angehören, deren Tätigkeit mit der IAEO verwandt ist, genügen der Verpflichtung zum Abschluss dadurch, dass die betreffende Organisation das Abkommen mit der IAEO schliesst, wie es auch in Artikel XVI des IAEO-Statuts und im IAEO-Sicherungssystem vorgesehen ist.

Die Kontrollverpflichtung ausserhalb des eigenen Hoheitsgebietes gemäss Artikel III Absatz 1 besteht nur dann, wenn eine nichtnukleare Vertragspartei die beherrschende und wirksame Verfügungsgewalt über eine nukleare Anlage hat.

Um zu vermeiden, dass die Durchführung des NV-Vertrags mit der Einhaltung der Bestimmungen des EURATOM-Vertrags unvereinbar ist, müssen die Überprüfungsmassnahmen so definiert werden, dass die Rechte und Pflichten der Mitgliedstaaten und der Gemeinschaft unberührt bleiben, entsprechend der Stellungnahme, die die Kommission aufgrund des Artikel 103 des EURATOM-Vertrags abgegeben hat.

Zu diesem Zweck wird die Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften in Verhandlungen mit der IAEO eintreten müssen.

Die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland beabsichtigt, den NV-Vertrag so lange nicht zur Ratifizierung vorzulegen, bis die Verhandlungen zwischen der Kommission und der IAEO zu einer Einigung geführt haben.

IV.

Die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bekräftigt die anliegende Erklärung, die sie bei Unterzeichnung des NV-Vertrages abgegeben hat.

London, den 28. November 1969.

**Erklärung der Bundesregierung aus Anlass der Unterzeichnung
des NV-Vertrags**

Die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

(1) begrüsst es, dass das Prinzip der Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen nunmehr weltweit in einem Vertrag verfestigt worden ist, und weist darauf hin, dass die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bereits im Oktober 1954 im Brüsseler Vertrag auf die Herstellung nuklearer, biologischer und chemischer Waffen verzichtet hat und entsprechende Kontrollen angenommen hat;

(2) bekräftigt ihre Erwartung, dass der Vertrag ein Meilenstein auf dem Wege zur Abrüstung, zur internationalen Entspannung und zum Frieden sein wird und dass er einen gewichtigen Beitrag zur Schaffung einer auf die Sicherheit unabhängiger Völker und dem Fortschritt der Menschheit gründenden internationalen Gemeinschaft leistet;

(3) geht davon aus, dass der Vertrag der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gegenüber so ausgelegt und angewendet wird wie gegenüber den anderen Vertragsparteien;

(4) geht davon aus, dass die Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland durch die NATO gewährleistet bleibt; sie bleibt ihrerseits den kollektiven Sicherheitsregelungen der NATO uneingeschränkt verpflichtet;

(5) geht davon aus, dass die Resolution Nr. 255 des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen sowie die diesen zugrunde liegenden Absichtserklärungen der Vereinigten Staaten, Grossbritanniens und der Sowjetunion uneingeschränkt auch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland gelten;

(6) stellt fest, dass die in der Präambel des Vertrags enthaltenen Grundsätze und die in Artikel 2 der Charta der Vereinten Nationen niedergelegten völkerrechtlichen Prinzipien, die jede gegen die territoriale Unversehrtheit oder die politische Unabhängigkeit eines Staates gerichtete Androhung oder Anwendung von Gewalt ausschliessen, unabdingbare und auch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland uneingeschränkt geltende Voraussetzungen des Vertrags selbst sind;

(7) unterzeichnet den Vertrag in der Erwartung, dass er auch andere Abkommen über das Verbot der Anwendung und Androhung von Gewalt, die der Sicherung des Friedens in Europa dienen, fördert;

(8) stellt fest, dass die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in einer Lage, in der sie ihre höchsten Interessen gefährdet sieht, frei bleiben wird, unter Berufung auf den in Artikel 51 der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen niedergelegten völkerrechtlichen Grundsatz, die für die Wahrung dieser Interessen erforderlichen Massnahmen zu ergreifen;

(9) unterzeichnet den Vertrag in der Überzeugung, dass er den europäischen Zusammenschluss nicht behindert;

(10) betrachtet den Vertrag nicht als einen Endpunkt, sondern vielmehr als Ausgangspunkt für die im Vertrag selbst zu dessen natürlicher Ergänzung und wirksamer Durchführung vorgesehenen Verhandlungen über die Abrüstung, die friedliche Nutzung der Kernenergie und die sich für die friedliche Anwendung der Kernenergie ergebenden Vorteile;

(11) betont, dass die Forschung, Entwicklung und Nutzung der Kernenergie für friedliche Zwecke und die intersowie multinationale Zusammenarbeit auf diesem Gebiet durch den Vertrag nicht nur nicht beeinträchtigt werden darf, sondern sogar gefördert werden soll, besonders bei den Nichtkernwaffenstaaten;

(12) stellt fest, dass keine Unvereinbarkeit zwischen den Zielen des Nichtverbreitungsvertrags und des EURATOM-Vertrags besteht;

(13) geht davon aus, dass die in Artikel III des NV-Vertrags beschriebenen Übereinkünfte zwischen der IAEO und EURATOM auf der Grundlage des Prinzips der Verifikation geschlossen werden und dass die Verifikation in einer Weise erfolgt, welche die politischen, wissenschaftlichen,

wirtschaftlichen und technischen Aufgaben der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft nicht beeinträchtigt;

(14) besteht darauf, dass die Sicherungsmassnahmen entsprechend dem Wortlaut und Geist des Vertrags nur auf Ausgangs- und besonderes spaltbares Material und in Übereinstimmung mit dem Grundsatz einer wirksamen Sicherung des Spaltstoffflusses an bestimmten strategischen Punkten Anwendung finden. Sie geht davon aus, dass die im Vertrag verwendeten Worte "Ausgangsmaterial" und "besonderes spaltbares Material"—vorbehaltlich von der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ausdrücklich angenommener Änderungen—die im gegenwärtigen Wortlaut des Artikels XX der Satzung der IAEO festgelegte Bedeutung haben;

(15) geht davon aus, dass jede Vertragspartei bestimmt, welche "Ausrüstungen und Materialien" für sie unter die Exportauflage des Artikels III Absatz 2 fallen. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland wird dabei lediglich solche Auslegungen und Definitionen der Begriffe "Ausrüstungen und Materialien" akzeptieren, denen sie ausdrücklich zugestimmt hat;

(16) bekräftigt die Notwendigkeit einer Regelung der Frage der Kontrollkosten in einer Weise, die den Nichtkernwaffenstaaten keine unbilligen Lasten aufbürdet;

(17) erklärt, dass die Bundesrepublik Deutschland den NV-Vertrag erst dann zu ratifizieren beabsichtigt, wenn zwischen EURATOM und der IAEO ein dem Artikel III des NV-Vertrags entsprechendes Abkommen abgeschlossen ist, das nach Form und Inhalt die Voraussetzungen der Ziffern 13, 14, 15 und 16 dieser Erklärung erfüllt, und die Vereinbarkeit mit dem Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft festgestellt worden ist;

(18) betont die entscheidende Bedeutung, die sie im Interesse der wirtschaftlichen und wissenschaftlichen Chancengleichheit der Erfüllung der Zusage der Vereinigten Staaten und Grossbritanniens hinsichtlich der Kontrolle ihrer friedlichen nuklearen Anlagen beimisst und hofft, dass auch andere Kernwaffenstaaten entsprechende Zusagen abgeben werden;

(19) bekräftigt ihre Auffassung, dass bis zum Abschluss des Abkommens zwischen der IAEO und EURATOM die zwischen EURATOM und den Vertragsparteien des NV-Vertrags getroffenen Liefervereinbarungen in Kraft bleiben und nach Inkrafttreten des NV-Vertrags Lieferabkommen im Interesse eines ungehinderten Austausches von Kenntnissen, Ausrüstungen und Material zu friedlichen Zwecken von allen zusätzlichen politischen und administrativen Beschränkungen befreit werden sollten.

Die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland unterzeichnet heute in Washington, London und Moskau, den Hauptstädten der drei Verwahrregierungen, den Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen.

Am gleichen Tage übergibt die Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland den Verwahrregierungen—bei gleichzeitiger Unterrichtung der Regierungen aller Staaten, mit denen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland diplomatische Beziehungen unterhält—den Wortlaut einer Note, mit der sie diese Erklärung den genannten Regierungen zur Kenntnis bringt. Die Note enthält auch die bekannten deutschen Interpretationen des NV-Vertrags zur Sicherung des friedlichen Bereichs und des Verifikationsabkommens, das zwischen der IAEO und EURATOM gemäss Artikel III des NV-Vertrags zu schliessen ist.

[Translation]

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the occasion of and in formal conjunction with its signature to-day of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has the honour to expound to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the following understandings on which it signs the Treaty.

I.

The Federal Government understands that

the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted and applied in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany in the same way as in relation to the other Parties to the Treaty;

the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies shall continue to be ensured by NATO or an equivalent security system;

Resolution No. 255 adopted by the United Nations Security Council, as well as the Declaration of Intent of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain upon which that Resolution is based, shall also apply without any restriction to the Federal Republic of Germany;

the Treaty shall not hamper the unification of the European States;

the Parties to the Treaty will commence without delay the negotiations on disarmament envisaged under the Treaty, especially with regard to nuclear weapons.

II.

The Federal Government declares that

signature of this Treaty does not imply recognition of the German Democratic Republic under international law;

therefore, no relations under international law with the German Democratic Republic shall arise out of this Treaty for the Federal Republic of Germany.

III.

With respect to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to the verification agreement to be concluded with the IAEA, the Federal Government starts from the following assumptions:

a) Limitation to the purpose of the Treaty

It is the purpose of the Treaty to prevent the present non-nuclear-weapon States from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The provisions of the Treaty are therefore solely designed to attain this objective. In no case shall they lead to restricting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes by non-nuclear-weapon States.

b) Research and Development

Freedom of research and development is essential in the advancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to the Federal Republic of Germany it is beyond all doubt that the Treaty may never be interpreted or applied in such a way as to hamper or inhibit research and development in this sphere. The Federal Government has taken note of the statement

made by the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations on 15 May, 1968, and, in particular, of the following remarks:

“ . . . there is no basis for any concern that this Treaty would impose inhibitions or restrictions on the opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon States to develop their capabilities in nuclear science and technology;”

“ This Treaty does not ask any country to accept a status of technological dependency or to be deprived of developments in nuclear research;”

“ The whole field of nuclear science associated with electric power production . . . will become more accessible under the Treaty, to all who seek to exploit it. This includes not only the present generation of nuclear power reactors but also that advanced technology, which is still developing, of fast breeder power reactors which, in producing energy, also produce more fissionable material than they consume;”
and

“ Many nations are now engaged in research in an even more advanced field of science, that of controlled thermonuclear fusion. The future developments of this science and technology may well lead to the nuclear reactor of the future, in which the fission process of uranium or plutonium is replaced by the fusion reactions of hydrogen isotopes as the source of energy. Controlled thermonuclear fusion technology will not be affected by the Treaty. . . .”

c) Onus of proof

In connection with paragraph 3 of Article III and with Article IV of the Treaty no nuclear activities in the fields of research, development, manufacture or use for peaceful purposes are prohibited nor can the transfer of information, materials and equipment be denied to non-nuclear-weapon States merely on the basis of allegations that such activities or transfers could be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

d) Exchange of Information

Article IV requires those Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Federal Government therefore expects that any measures restricting the unhampered flow of scientific and technological information will be re-examined with a view to facilitating the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.

e) Other nuclear explosive devices

At the present stage of technology nuclear explosive devices are those designed to release in microseconds in an uncontrolled manner a large amount of nuclear energy accompanied by shock waves, *i.e.* devices that can be used as nuclear weapons.

At the same time the Federal Government holds the view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty must not hamper progress in the field of developing and applying the technology of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes.

f) Safeguards and Verification Agreements

There is no incompatibility between the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty establishing EURATOM. As to the safeguards provided for in its Article III, the Non-Proliferation Treaty limits itself to referring to agreements to be concluded with the IAEA, the contents of which have therefore not yet been laid down.

The safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as described in paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III, can be concluded by Parties to the Treaty not only "individually" but also "together with other States". States being members of an organization the work of which is related to that of the IAEA comply with their obligation to conclude the agreement by the organization concerned concluding it with the IAEA, as also provided in Article XVI of the Statute of the IAEA and in the Agency's safeguards system.

The obligation of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under paragraph 1 of Article III to accept safeguards outside its own territory prevails only if such Party has dominant and effective control over a nuclear facility.

In order to avoid incompatibility between the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and compliance with the provisions of the Treaty establishing EURATOM, the verification procedures must be so defined that the rights and obligations of member States and the Community remain unaffected, in accordance with the opinion rendered by the Commission under Article 103 of the Treaty establishing EURATOM.

To this end, the Commission of the European Communities will have to enter into negotiations with the IAEA.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany intends to postpone the ratification procedure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty until negotiations between the Commission and the IAEA have led to agreement.

IV.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany reaffirms the attached Statement made by it on signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

London, 28 November, 1969.

**Statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
on signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany :

- (1) welcomes the fact that the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has now been consolidated world-wide by treaty and points out that the Federal Republic of Germany has as early as October 1954, in the Brussels Treaty, renounced the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and accepted relevant controls;

- (2) reaffirms its expectation that the Treaty will be a milestone on the way towards disarmament, international détente, and peace, and that it will render an important contribution towards the creation of an international community based on the security of independent nations and on the progress of mankind;
- (3) understands that the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted and applied in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany in the same way as in relation to the other Parties to the Treaty;
- (4) understands that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany shall continue to be ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic of Germany for its part shall remain unrestrictedly committed to the collective security arrangements of NATO;
- (5) understands that Resolution No. 255 adopted by the United Nations Security Council, as well as the Declarations of Intent of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union upon which that Resolution is based, shall also apply without any restriction to the Federal Republic of Germany;
- (6) states that the principles contained in the Preamble to the Treaty, and the principles of international law laid down in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which preclude any threat or use of force directed against the territorial integrity or the political independence of a State, are the indispensable prerequisite to the Treaty itself and shall apply without any restriction also in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany;
- (7) signs the Treaty in the expectation that it will encourage further agreements on the prohibition of the use and threat of force, which will serve to stabilize peace in Europe;
- (8) states that the Federal Republic of Germany, in a situation in which it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy, will remain free by invoking the principle of international law laid down in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to take the measures required to safeguard these interests;
- (9) signs the Treaty convinced that it will not hamper European unification;
- (10) regards the Treaty not as an end but rather a starting point for the negotiations, provided for in the Treaty itself as its natural supplement and to ensure its effective implementation, concerning disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the benefits arising for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy;
- (11) stresses that the research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the international or multinational co-operation in this field must not only not be hampered but should even be furthered by the Treaty, especially as regards non-nuclear-weapon States;
- (12) notes that no incompatibility exists between the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty establishing EURATOM;

- (13) understands that the agreements between the IAEA and EURATOM, as described in Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, shall be concluded on the basis of the principle of verification, and that verification shall take place in a way that does not affect the tasks of the European Atomic Energy Community in the political, scientific, economic and technical fields;
- (14) insists that, in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Treaty, the safeguards shall only be applied to source and special fissionable material and in conformity with the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials at certain strategic points. It understands that the words "source material" and "special fissionable material" used in the Treaty shall have—subject to amendments expressly accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany—the meaning laid down in the present wording of Article XX of the Statute of the IAEA;
- (15) understands that each Party to the Treaty shall decide for itself which "equipment or material" shall fall under the export provision of paragraph 2 of Article III. In so doing the Federal Republic of Germany will accept only those interpretations and definitions of the terms "equipment or material" which it has expressly approved;
- (16) reaffirms the necessity of settling the question of the costs of safeguards in a way that does not place unfair burdens on non-nuclear-weapon States;
- (17) declares that the Federal Republic of Germany does not intend to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty before an agreement in accordance with Article III of that Treaty has been concluded between EURATOM and the IAEA which both in form and substance meets the requirements of paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of this Statement and compatibility with the Treaty instituting the European Atomic Energy Community has been established;
- (18) stresses the vital importance it attaches, with a view to ensuring equal opportunities in the economic and scientific fields, to the fulfilment of the assurance given by the United States and Great Britain concerning the application of safeguards to their peaceful nuclear facilities, and hopes that other nuclear-weapon States as well will give similar assurances;
- (19) reaffirms its view that, until the conclusion of the agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM, the supply contracts concluded between EURATOM and the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall remain in force, and that, after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supply contracts should, in the interest of an unhampered exchange of information, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes, be freed from any additional political or administrative restrictions.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany signs today in Washington, London and Moscow, the capitals of the three Depositary Governments, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

On this same day, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hands to the Depositary Governments—informing simultaneously the Governments of all States with which the Federal Republic of Germany maintains diplomatic relations—the text of a Note bringing the above Statement to the attention of these Governments. The Note also contains the known German interpretations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which are designed to preserve the sphere of peaceful activities and to ensure the conclusion of the verification agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM in accordance with Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

INDONESIA

Text of Statement communicated to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by the Ambassador of Indonesia

Statement of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

2nd March, 1970

The Government of Indonesia has decided to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the conviction that it will serve as an important step towards effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Together with the Non-Aligned Countries, it is the consistent policy of the Government of Indonesia to support all efforts to achieve a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to direct all endeavours towards the exclusive peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The Indonesian Government is already party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and it has always supported draft proposals designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

There is no doubt that the present Treaty could be effective only if all countries, nuclear-weapon as well as non-nuclear-weapon-States, could become party to this Treaty.

The Indonesian Government takes special note of Article III, paragraph 3, stating that the safeguards required by the Treaty shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties, or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. It is therefore the common task of all parties to this Treaty to make the relevant safeguards agreement acceptable to all.

The Government of Indonesia, further, attaches great importance to the declarations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, affirming their intention to seek Security Council action in order to provide or support immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon-State, party to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

Of utmost importance, however, is not the action *after* a nuclear attack has been committed but the guarantees to prevent such an attack. The Indonesian Government trusts that the nuclear-weapon-States will study further this question of effective measures to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon-States.

It is in this context that the Indonesian Government feels obliged to state, further, that its decision to sign the Treaty is not to be taken in any way as a decision to ratify the Treaty. Its ratification will be considered after matters of national security, which are of deep concern to the Government and people of Indonesia, have been clarified to their satisfaction.

ITALY

The Ambassador of Italy to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

L'Ambasciatore d'Italia presenta i suoi complimenti al Segretario di Stato Principale di Sua Maestà per gli Affari Esteri e del Commonwealth e ha l'onore di dichiarare quanto segue:

Il Governo italiano, nel procedere alla firma del Trattato contro la proliferazione delle armi nucleari, desidera rinnovare le dichiarazioni da esso fatte, in merito al Trattato, in varie sedi internazionali, e accolte dal Parlamento della Repubblica nel dibattito svoltosi nella seconda metà dello scorso mese di luglio e alla fine dello scorso mese di agosto.

Sulla base di tali dichiarazioni il Governo italiano:

1—riafferma la sua profonda convinzione che il Trattato—per il quale il Governo italiano ha da anni esercitato ogni possibile sforzo in vista di una sua sollecita conclusione—costituisce una pietra miliare sulla via del disarmo, della distensione internazionale e della pace e rappresenta un contributo fondamentale per l'instaurazione di una nuova società internazionale basata sulla sicurezza dei popoli e sul progresso dell'umanità;

2—sottolinea il proprio convincimento che i principi enunciati dalle clausole del preambolo del Trattato circa l'impegno dei firmatari, conformemente allo Statuto delle Nazioni Unite, ad astenersi nei loro rapporti internazionali dalla minaccia o dall'uso della forza contro l'integrità territoriale o l'indipendenza politica di ogni Stato, sono un presupposto inderogabile del Trattato stesso e che il loro scrupoloso e generale rispetto costituisce un supremo interesse per tutti;

3—considera il Trattato non come un punto di arrivo, ma solo come un punto di partenza verso quei negoziati in materia di disarmo, di usi pacifici dell'energia nucleare e di benefici derivanti dalle applicazioni pacifiche dell'energia nucleare che il Trattato stesso contempla per il suo naturale completamento e per la sua efficace esecuzione;

4—firma il Trattato nella convinzione che nulla in esso fa ostacolo all'unificazione dei Paesi dell'Europa occidentale e alle giustificate aspettative che i popoli di tale regione ripongono negli sviluppi e nei progressi del processo unitario in vista della formazione di una entità europea;

5—è convinto che gli scopi del Trattato di non proliferazione sono compatibili con le norme del Trattato di Roma sull'Euratom;

6—prende atto della piena compatibilità del Trattato con gli impegni di sicurezza esistenti;

7—prende atto che le inderogabili necessità di libertà delle ricerche scientifiche e tecnologiche non sono in alcun modo ostacolate dal Trattato;

8—constata che i divieti degli articolo I e II del Trattato—anche nello spirito generale del TNP—si riferiscono solo ai congegni nucleari esplosivi che non si differenzino dalle armi nucleari; e che pertanto il giorno in cui il progresso tecnologico consentirà lo sviluppo di congegni esplosivi pacifici differenziati dalle armi nucleari, verrà meno l'applicazione del divieto sulla loro fabbricazione e impiego;

9—In relazione alle disposizioni di cui all'art. III par. 4 del Trattato, auspica che gli accordi ivi previsti, in materia di controlli, siano conclusi tra l'AIEA e l'Euratom sulla base del concetto di verifica. In attesa della conclusione dell'Accordo fra l'Euratom e l'AIEA, le intese intercorse, in materia di forniture, tra l'Euratom e i Governi firmatari del Trattato, continueranno ad essere in vigore;

10—prende atto che nella lettera e nello spirito del Trattato i controlli di cui all'art. III del Trattato stesso sono destinati ad applicarsi soltanto al materiale fonte ed al materiale fissile speciale. Ritiene che le parole "materiale fonte" e "materiale fissile speciale" impiegate nel Trattato vadano intese—salvo modifiche esplicitamente accettate dall'Italia—nel significato definito dall'attuale testo dell'art. XX dello Statuto dell'AIEA;

11—interpreta le disposizioni dell'articolo IX paragrafo 3 del Trattato, relativo alla definizione di Stato militarmente nucleare, nel senso che essa si riferisce esclusivamente ai cinque Paesi che hanno fabbricato o esploso un'arma nucleare o un altro congegno nucleare esplosivo prima dell'1 gennaio 1967. Nessuna pretesa all'appartenenza a tale categoria, ed a alcun titolo, verrà riconosciuta dal Governo italiano ad altri Stati, firmatari o non firmatari del Trattato;

12—dichiara sin d'ora che la firma e la ratifica del Trattato da parte del Governo di una unione di Stati copre la eventuale firma e ratifica che venisse effettuata da parte di Governi di Stati membri di tale unione: a quest'ultima firma e ratifica il Governo italiano non riconoscerebbe quindi effetti giuridici.

Ad integrazione delle suindicate dichiarazioni il Governo italiano unisce alla presente Nota i testi degli ordini del giorno sul Trattato contro la proliferazione delle armi nucleari approvati dal Senato della Repubblica e dalla Camera dei Deputati rispettivamente il 19 e il 26 luglio 1968.

Londra, 28 gennaio 1969.

Ordine del Giorno approvato dal Senato della Repubblica il 19 luglio 1968

" Il Senato,

udite le dichiarazioni del Governo, sul Trattato di non proliferazione delle armi nucleari;

consapevole della minaccia che le armi nucleari rappresentano per l'umanità;

convinto che solamente nella universalità del disarmo atomico sta la certezza che all'umanità saranno risparmiati gli orrori di una guerra atomica;

confida che tutte le potenze nucleari concordino una generale ed effettiva sospensione degli esperimenti nucleari, della produzione di nuove armi

nucleari e la progressiva distruzione degli stocks esistenti entro scadenze ravvicinate;

ritiene che alla attuazione del disarmo con la distruzione degli stocks esistenti debbano far seguito accordi sulla limitazione, sotto rigoroso controllo, delle armi convenzionali, così da rendere impossibile il ricorso alla guerra come mezzo per risolvere i conflitti fra gli Stati;

dà il proprio appoggio alla decisione del Governo di sottoscrivere il Trattato di non proliferazione e lo impegna ad agire perché gli obblighi assunti dalle potenze nucleari per il disarmo atomico siano attuati nel più breve termine possibile come primo passo verso il disarmo generale e completo;

impegna altresì il Governo a vigilare perché nella attuazione del Trattato sia assicurato l'equilibrio delle responsabilità e degli obblighi per le potenze nucleari e per le potenze non nucleari, auspicato nella risoluzione dell'ONU, perché siano assicurati alle potenze non nucleari il diritto all'equo approvvigionamento delle materie prime e speciali nucleari, il diritto alla illimitata informazione scientifica e tecnologica e in generale l'effettiva parità fra gli Stati nel settore dell'utilizzo dell'energia nucleare per scopi pacifici.

Considerati gli impegni nascenti per l'Italia dai Trattati di Roma e il valore della politica di unificazione dell'Europa;

invita il Governo ad operare, d'accordo con gli altri Stati membri delle Comunità Europee, perché nella attuazione del Trattato di non proliferazione siano salvaguardati la vita e lo sviluppo delle comunità europee."

Ordine del Giorno approvato della Camera dei Deputati il 26 luglio 1968

"La Camera,

udite le comunicazioni del Governo sul Trattato per la non proliferazione delle armi nucleari,

convinta che ogni avvicinamento al disarmo generale ed al disarmo atomico in particolare può essere utile al mantenimento della pace nel mondo,

ritenendo che un'ampia adesione al Trattato da parte di Stati non militarmente nucleari, possa far conseguire idonei negoziati per la cessazione della corsa alle armi nucleari e per il disarmo nucleare,

autorizza il Governo a sottoscrivere il Trattato di non proliferazione. Impegna il Governo stesso in modo che:

- 1) gli obblighi assunti dalle Potenze militari nucleari per il disarmo atomico siano attuati celermente;
- 2) sia assicurato alle Potenze non nucleari l'approvvigionamento, ad eque condizioni, per scopi pacifici, del materiale fonte e fissile speciale, nel significato definito dallo Statuto dell'AIEA, nonché il diritto alla illimitata informazione scientifica e tecnologica;
- 3) usi il diritto di iniziativa previsto dall'articolo VIII del Trattato affinché tutti gli Stati aderenti raggiungano una effettiva parità nella partecipazione al controllo ed allo sviluppo pacifico dell'energia atomica;

- 4) siano prese tutte le iniziative piú opportune al raggiungimento di tali fini, anche in occasione della conferenza degli Stati non nucleari che si aprirà nell'ambito delle Nazioni Unite a Ginevra nell'agosto 1968. Tali assicurazioni potranno essere ottenute eventualmente tramite convenzioni aggiuntive o dichiarazioni interpretative, sottoscritte al maggior numero di Paesi possibile;

invita il Governo

ad operare, d'accordo con gli altri Stati membri delle Comunità europee, perché nell'attuazione del Trattato siano salvaguardati la vita e lo sviluppo delle Comunità europee, sia garantita la possibilità di controllo collettivo nelle armi nucleari e sia concluso un accordo tra l'Euratom e l'AIEA in materia di controlli.”

[Translation provided by the Italian Government]

The Ambassador of Italy presents his compliments to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and has the honour to state the following:

The Italian Government, in signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, wish to confirm the statements made on the Treaty in various international fora and approved by the Italian Parliament in the debate that took place during the second half of July and at the end of August, 1968.

On the basis of the above mentioned statements the Italian Government:

- 1—re-affirm their firm belief that the Treaty—for which the Italian Government have made for years all possible efforts with a view to its early conclusion—is a milestone on the road to disarmament, international détente and peace, and represents a fundamental contribution for the establishment of a new international society, based on security of peoples and on the progress of humanity;
- 2—stress their persuasion that the principles set forth in the clauses of the Preamble to the Treaty on the engagement of the signatories, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, are an intransgressible presupposition of the Treaty itself, and that a scrupulous and general respect for such principles constitutes a supreme interest for all;
- 3—consider the Treaty not as a point of arrival, but only as a point of departure towards negotiations on disarmament, on peaceful use of nuclear energy and on benefits deriving from the peaceful use of nuclear energy which the Treaty itself takes into consideration for its natural completion and for its effective execution;
- 4—sign the Treaty in the firm belief that nothing in it is an obstacle to the unification of the Countries of Western Europe and to the justified expectations that the peoples of this area have in the developments and progress towards unity with a view to the creation of a European entity;

- 5—are convinced that the purposes of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are consistent with the provisions of the Treaty of Rome on EURATOM;
- 6—note the full compatibility of the Treaty with the existing security agreements;
- 7—note that the needs of freedom of scientific and technological research—that cannot be derogated from—are in no way hindered by the Treaty;
- 8—note that the prohibitions in Articles I and II of the Treaty—also in the general spirit of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation—refer only to nuclear explosive devices that cannot be differentiated from nuclear weapons; and consequently that when technological progress will allow the development of peaceful explosive devices differentiated from nuclear weapons, the prohibition relating to their manufacture and use shall no longer apply;
- 9—with reference to the provisions of Article III, par. 4, of the Treaty, express the hope that the agreements in the matter of controls foreseen in it will be reached between IAEA and EURATOM on the basis of the concept of verification. Pending the conclusion of the Agreement between IAEA and EURATOM, the understandings reached on the matter of supplies between EURATOM and the Governments which have signed the Treaty will remain in force;
- 10—note that in the letter and in the spirit of the Treaty the controls provided for in Article III of the Treaty are applicable only to source and special fissionable material. Consider that the words “source” and “special fissionable material” used in the Treaty should be understood—unless modifications are expressly accepted by Italy—in the meaning defined in the present text of Article XX of the Statute of IAEA;
- 11—interpret the provisions of Article IX, par. 3, of the Treaty, relating to the definition of a nuclear weapon State, in the sense that it refers only to the five Countries that have manufactured or exploded a nuclear weapon or another nuclear explosive device before 1st January, 1967. Any claim to belong to this category, and for any title, shall not be recognized by the Italian Government to other States, whether or not they have signed the Treaty;
- 12—state here and now that the signature and ratification of the Treaty by the Government of a Union of States covers the signature and ratification that might be carried out by Governments of States members of the said Union: the Italian Government therefore would not recognize legal effects to the latter signature and ratification.

To integrate the above mentioned statements the Italian Government attach to the present Note the texts of the *ordini del giorno* on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, approved by the Italian Senate and the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the 19th and 26th July, 1968.

London, 28 January, 1969.

[*Translation by the United Kingdom Government*]

Agenda approved by the Senate of the Republic on 19 July, 1968

“ The Senate,

having heard the Government's statements on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

conscious of the threat which nuclear weapons constitute to mankind;

convinced that without universal nuclear disarmament there is no certainty that mankind will be spared the horrors of a nuclear war;

trusts that all the nuclear-weapon Powers will agree to the general and effective discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and of the production of new nuclear weapons and the progressive destruction of existing stockpiles at an early date;

considers that the implementation of disarmament by means of the destruction of existing stockpiles should be followed by the limitation of conventional weapons under strict control so as to make it impossible to resort to war as a means of settling disputes between States;

lends its own support to the Government's decision to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and directs it to act in such a manner that the obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon Powers in respect of nuclear disarmament may be implemented as soon as possible as the first step towards general and complete disarmament;

likewise directs the Government to ensure that the implementation of the Treaty secures the balance between responsibilities and obligations for the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Powers envisaged in the U.N. resolution, so that the non-nuclear-weapon Powers are assured of the right to fair supplies of source and special fissionable materials, of the right to unrestricted scientific and technical information and in general of effective equality between States in the sphere of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Having considered Italy's obligations under the Treaty of Rome and the value of the policy of European unification,

calls upon the Government to act in agreement with the other members of the European Communities in such a way that the existence and development of the European Communities may be safeguarded during the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

Agenda approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 26 July, 1968

“ The Chamber,

having heard the Government's statements on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

convinced that any approach to general disarmament and nuclear disarmament in particular can be of use for the maintenance of peace in the world;

considering that adherence to the Treaty by a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States may lead to appropriate negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament;

authorizes the Government to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Directs the Government itself to ensure that:

- 1) the obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon Powers in respect of nuclear disarmament are swiftly implemented;
- 2) the non-nuclear-weapon Powers are assured of supplies, of non-discriminatory conditions, of source and special fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, within the meaning laid down by the Statute of the IAEA, and also the right to unrestricted scientific and technical information;
- 3) it avails itself of the right of initiative provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty in order that all the States acceding thereto may achieve effective equality in participation in the control and peaceful development of nuclear energy;
- 4) all such initiatives are taken as are most suitable for the attainment of these objectives on the occasion, too, of the conference of non-nuclear-weapon States which will open under the auspices of the United Nations at Geneva in August, 1968. Such assurances may well be obtained by means of additional agreements and explanatory declarations signed by as many countries as possible; and

calls upon the Government

to act in agreement with the other Member-States of the European Communities to ensure that, when the Treaty is implemented, the existence and development of the European Communities is safeguarded, the possibility of collective control over nuclear weapons is guaranteed and an agreement concerning safeguards is concluded between EURATOM and the IAEA."

JAPAN

English translation communicated to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by the Ambassador of Japan

Statement of the Government of Japan on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

3rd February, 1970.

The Government of Japan, believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase the danger of nuclear war, has always been in favour of the spirit underlying this Treaty, since the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in accord with its policy with regard to the maintenance of world peace.

The Government of Japan is signing this Treaty on the basis of its fundamental position which is stated below.

The Government of Japan is convinced that this Treaty will serve as a first step towards nuclear disarmament and hopes that as many States as possible will adhere to this Treaty to make it effective. The Government of Japan hopes, especially, that the Governments of the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China which possess nuclear weapons but have yet to express their intention of adhering to this Treaty will become parties thereto at an early date and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament and that they will refrain, even before that, from taking such actions as are contrary to the purposes of this Treaty.

This Treaty permits only the present nuclear-weapon States to possess nuclear weapons. This discrimination should ultimately be made to disappear through the elimination of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States from their national arsenals. Until such time the nuclear-weapon States should be conscious of the fact that they have special responsibilities as a consequence of this special status.

The prohibition under this Treaty applies solely to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and of control over them. Therefore, this Treaty must in no way restrict non-nuclear-weapon States in their research, development, or implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or in their international co-operation in these fields, nor must it subject them to discriminatory treatment in any aspect of such activities.

The Government of Japan wishes to state that it has a deep interest in the following matters in the light of its basic position stated above.

This Government stresses that it will also concern itself most vigorously with these matters when it decides to ratify the Treaty as well as when it participates in the review of its operation in the future as a party to the Treaty.

I. Disarmament and security

1. Under Article VI of the Treaty each State Party "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". The Government of Japan believes it essential for the attainment of the purposes of this Treaty that, above all, the nuclear-weapon States should take concrete nuclear disarmament measures in pursuance of this undertaking. As a member of the Committee on Disarmament, Japan is also prepared to co-operate in the furtherance of disarmament.

2. The Government of Japan deems it important that in the preamble to the Treaty there is a provision stating that "in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". It also wishes to emphasise that the nuclear-weapon States must not have recourse to the use of nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

3. The Government of Japan also attaches great importance to the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union affirming their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, and hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will continue their studies with regard to effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

4. The Government of Japan, pending its ratifications of this Treaty, will pay particular attention to developments in disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation of the Security Council Resolution on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and continue to make a close study of other problems which require consideration for the safeguarding of her national interests.

5. The Government of Japan takes note of the fact that Article X of the Treaty provides that : "each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country".

II. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

1. The safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Article III of the Treaty must not be such as would subject her to disadvantageous treatment as compared with the safeguards agreements which other States Parties conclude with the same Agency, either individually or together with other States. The Government of Japan intends to give full consideration to this matter before taking steps to ratify the Treaty.

2. The Government of Japan greatly appreciates, as a measure supplementing this Treaty, the declarations of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which are both nuclear-weapon States, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all their nuclear activities, excluding only those directly related to their national security, and earnestly hopes that these assurances will be faithfully implemented. It also hopes most earnestly that the other nuclear-weapon States will take similar action.

3. Safeguards should be subject to the principle that they should be applied at certain strategic points of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the procedure for their application must be rational when considered from the point of view of cost-effectiveness and made as simple as possible by making the maximum use of material control systems of the respective countries. Furthermore, adequate measures must be taken to ensure that the application of safeguards does not cause the leakage of industrial secrets or otherwise hinder industrial activities. The Government of Japan hopes that the International Atomic Energy Agency will make constant efforts to improve safeguards in the light of technological developments with the above aims in mind. This Government is prepared to co-operate in such efforts and hopes that the States concerned will also co-operate to achieve this end.

4. The Government of Japan understands that no unfair burden in connection with the cost of applying safeguards will be imposed on the non-nuclear-weapon States to which such safeguards are to be applied.

5. The Government of Japan considers that, when safeguards are applied in accordance with the safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency under Article III of this Treaty, steps should be taken to arrange that such safeguards supersede the existing safeguards which are being applied in connection with Japan's co-operation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the peaceful use of nuclear energy

6. Concrete measures should be taken to promote the implementation of the provisions of Articles IV and V of the Treaty relating to International Co-operation for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and for the Peaceful Application of Nuclear Explosions. In particular, no peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited or restricted, nor shall the transfer of information, nuclear materials, equipment, or other material relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy be denied to non-nuclear-weapon States, merely on the grounds that such activities or transfers could be used also for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

MEXICO

The Ambassador of Mexico to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Londres,

Señor Secretario Principal de Estado:

a 26 de julio de 1968.

Al firmar el Tratado sobre la No Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares anexo a la Resolución 2373 (XXII) aprobada por la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas el 12 de junio de 1968, tengo el honor de declarar que el Gobierno de México entiende:

1.—Que, en virtud de lo que se estipula en el Artículo Séptimo del Tratado, ninguna de las disposiciones del mismo deberá interpretarse en el sentido de afectar en manera alguna los derechos y obligaciones de México en su carácter de Estado Parte en el Tratado para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina (Tratado de Tlatelolco), abierto a firma el 14 de febrero de 1967 y sobre la cual la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas adoptó la Resolución 2286 (XXII) de 5 de diciembre de 1967;

2.—Que actualmente todo explosivo nuclear es susceptible de usarse como arma nuclear y que no hay ningún indicio de que en un futuro próximo se puedan fabricar explosivos nucleares que no sean potencialmente armas nucleares. Sin embargo, si los adelantos tecnológicos llegaran a modificar esa situación, habría que enmendar las disposiciones pertinentes del Tratado, de acuerdo con el procedimiento que el mismo establece.

Mi Gobierno desea que el de Vuestra Excelencia, en su carácter de Gobierno depositario del Tratado, al informar a los Estados facultados para llegar a ser partes en el Tratado de la firma del mismo por el Gobierno de México, tenga a bien comunicarles igualmente el texto de la presente declaración.

Aprovecho la oportunidad para reiterar a Vuestra Excelencia las seguridades de mi más alta consideración.

EDUARDO SUÁREZ

Lic. Eduardo Suárez

Embajador

[*Translation provided by the Mexican Government*]

London.

26 July, 1968.

Your Excellency,

On signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons annexed to Resolution 2373 (XXII) approved by the United Nations General Assembly on 12 June, 1968, I have the honour to declare that the Government of Mexico understands:

1. that, in accordance with what is laid down in Article VII of the Treaty, none of the provisions of the said Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting in any way whatsoever the rights and obligations of Mexico as a State Party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), opened for signature on 14 February, 1967, and concerning which the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December, 1967;
2. that at the present time any nuclear explosive (device) is capable of being used as a nuclear weapon and that there is no indication that in the near future it will be possible to manufacture nuclear explosive (devices) which are not potentially nuclear weapons. However, if technological advances succeeded in modifying this situation, it would be necessary to amend the relevant provisions of the Treaty in accordance with the procedure established therein.

My Government requests Your Excellency's Government, as a Depositary for the Treaty, when informing the States eligible to become Parties to the Treaty of its signature by the Government of Mexico, to be so good as to communicate to them the text of this declaration as well.

I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

EDUARDO SUÁREZ

Dr. Eduardo Suárez

Ambassador.

SWITZERLAND

The Embassy of Switzerland to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

L'Ambassade de Suisse présente ses compliments au Foreign and Commonwealth Office et, sur instructions du Conseil Fédéral, a l'honneur de Lui communiquer ce qui suit :

A l'occasion de la signature apposée en ce jour sur le Traité de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires, le Gouvernement suisse déclare expressément qu'il ne soumettra le Traité à l'approbation du Parlement que lorsqu'il considérera comme suffisant le degré d'universalité atteint.

Le Gouvernement suisse se réserve au surplus de faire au moment du dépôt de l'instrument de ratification les déclarations qui lui paraîtront nécessaires.

L'Ambassade de Suisse saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Foreign and Commonwealth Office l'assurance de sa plus haute considération.

Londres, le 27 novembre 1969.

[Translation by the United Kingdom Government]

The Embassy of Switzerland presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and, on the instructions of the Federal Council, has the honour to communicate the following :

On the occasion of the signature today of the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Swiss Government expressly declare that they will not submit the Treaty to Parliament for its approval until such time as they consider that a sufficient measure of universal support has been obtained by the Treaty.

The Swiss Government also reserve the right to make such declarations as they shall deem necessary at the time of the deposit of their instrument of ratification.

The Embassy of Switzerland avails itself of the opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

London, 27 November 1969.

UNITED KINGDOM

*Statement communicated by Her Majesty's Government on 3 July, 1968,
to all States recognised by the United Kingdom*

The Government of the United Kingdom wish to recall their view that if a régime is not recognised as the Government of a State, neither signature nor the deposit of any instrument by it, nor notification of any of those acts will bring about recognition of that régime by any other State.

STATEMENT MADE ON RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY

UNITED KINGDOM

Statement communicated by Her Majesty's Government on ratification of the Treaty by the United Kingdom on 27 November, 1968, to all States recognised by the United Kingdom

The provisions of the Treaty shall not apply in regard to Southern Rhodesia unless and until the Government of the United Kingdom informs the other depositary Governments that it is in a position to ensure that the obligations imposed by the Treaty in respect of that territory can be fully implemented.

**SIGNATURES, RATIFICATIONS AND ACCESSIONS IN
LONDON, MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON**

| State | Date of Signature | | | Date of Ratification or Accession (A) | | |
|---|-------------------|----------|------------|--|------------|------------------------------|
| | London | Moscow | Washington | London | Moscow | Washington |
| Afghanistan | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 5.3.70 | 5.2.70 | 4.2.70 |
| Australia* | 27.2.70 | 27.2.70 | 27.2.70 | | | |
| Austria | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 27.6.69 | 27.6.69 | 27.6.69 |
| Barbados | | | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Belgium | 20.8.68 | 20.8.68 | 20.8.68 | | | |
| Bolivia | | | 1.7.68 | | | 26.5.70 |
| Botswana | | | 1.7.68 | 28.4.69 | | |
| Bulgaria | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 3.11.69 | 18.9.69 | 5.9.69 |
| Cameroon | | 18.7.68 | 17.7.68 | | | 8.1.69 |
| Canada | 23.7.68 | 29.7.68 | 23.7.68 | 8.1.69 | 8.1.69 | 8.1.69 |
| Ceylon | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Chad | | 1.7.68 | | | | |
| China† | | | 1.7.68 | | | 27.1.70 |
| Colombia | | | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Congo, Democratic Republic of | 17.9.68 | 26.7.68 | 22.7.68 | | | 4.8.70 |
| Costa Rica | | | 1.7.68 | | | 3.3.70 |
| Cyprus | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 5.3.70 | 10.2.70 | 16.2.70 |
| Czechoslovakia | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 22.7.69 | 22.7.69 | 22.7.69 |
| Dahomey | | | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Denmark | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 3.1.69 | 3.1.69 | 3.1.69 |
| Dominican Republic Ecuador | | | 1.7.68 | | | 7.3.69 |
| El Salvador | | | 9.7.68 | | | |
| Ethiopia | 5.9.68 | 5.9.68 | 5.9.68 | 5.3.70 | 5.2.69 | 5.3.70 |
| Finland | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 5.2.69 | 5.2.69 | 5.2.69 |
| Gambia, The | 4.9.68 | 24.9.68 | 20.9.68 | | | |
| German Democratic Republic‡ | | 1.7.68 | | | 31.10.69 | |
| Germany, Federal Republic of* | 28.11.69 | 28.11.69 | 28.11.69 | | | |
| Ghana | 24.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 4.5.70 | 11.5.70 | 5.5.70 |
| Greece | | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | | | 11.3.70 |
| Guatemala | | | 26.7.68 | | | |
| Haiti | | | 1.7.68 | | | 2.6.70 |
| Honduras | | | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Hungary | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 27.5.69 | 27.5.69 | 27.5.69 |
| Iceland | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 18.7.69 | 18.7.69 | 18.7.69 |
| Indonesia* | 2.3.70 | 2.3.70 | 2.3.70 | | | |
| Iran | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 5.3.70 | 10.2.70 | 2.2.70 |
| Iraq | | 1.7.68 | | | 29.10.69 | |
| Ireland, Republic of | 4.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 4.7.68 | 2.7.68 | 1.7.68 |
| Italy* | 28.1.69 | 28.1.69 | 28.1.69 | | | |
| Ivory Coast | | | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Jamaica | 14.4.69 | 14.4.69 | 14.4.69 | 5.3.70 | 5.3.70 | 5.3.70 |
| Japan* | 3.2.70 | 3.2.70 | 3.2.70 | | | |
| Jordan | | | 10.7.68 | | | 11.2.70 |
| Kenya... .. | | | 1.7.68 | | 11.6.70 | |
| Korea, Republic of | | | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Kuwait | 22.8.68 | 15.8.68 | 15.8.68 | | | |
| Laos | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 5.3.70 | 20.2.70 | 5.3.70 |
| Lebanon | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 15.7.70 | 15.7.70(A) | 15.7.70 20.11.70* |
| Lesotho | | | 9.7.68 | | | 20.5.70 |

* For text of statement made on signature see pages 52 to 74.

† Signature and ratification by the Nationalist authorities not recognized by the United Kingdom.

‡ Not recognized by the United Kingdom.

** See T.S. 110/70, p.6.
Fourth Supplementary List
for 1970.*

TREATY SERIES No. 88 (1970)

**TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

Cmd. 4474

CORRECTION

Page 78. Under "Date of Ratification or Accession (A)" in the right hand column under "Washington" insert the date "15.7.70" against Lebanon.

Page 79. Under "Date of Ratification or Accession (A)" in the right hand column under "Washington" amend the date "31.8.70" against San Marino to read "31.10.70".

*See correction slip on
rth page.*

November 1970

LONDON: Her Majesty's Stationery Office

| State | Date of Signature | | | Date of Ratification or Accession (A) | | |
|--|-------------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| | London | Moscow | Washington | London | Moscow | Washington |
| Liberia | | | 1.7.68 | | | 5.3.70 |
| Libya | 18.7.68 | 23.7.68 | 19.7.68 | | | |
| Luxembourg | 14.8.68 | 14.8.68 | 14.8.68 | | | |
| Madagascar | | | 22.8.68 | | | |
| Malaysia | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 5.3.70 | 5.3.70 | 5.3.70 |
| Mali | | 15.7.69 | 14.7.69 | | 10.2.70 | 5.3.70 |
| Maldives | | | 11.9.68 | | | 7.4.70 |
| Malta | | | 17.4.69 | | | 6.2.70 |
| Mauritius | | | 1.7.68 | 14.4.69 | 25.4.69 | 8.4.69 |
| Mexico* | 26.7.68 | 26.7.68 | 26.7.68 | 21.1.69 | 21.1.69 | 21.1.69 |
| Mongolia | | 1.7.68 | | | 14.5.69 | |
| Morocco | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Nepal | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 3.2.70 | 9.1.70 | 5.1.70 |
| Netherlands | 20.8.68 | 20.8.68 | 20.8.68 | | | |
| New Zealand | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 10.9.69 | 10.9.69 | 10.9.69 |
| Nicaragua | 1.7.68 | | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Nigeria | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 27.9.68 | 14.10.68 | 7.10.68 |
| Norway | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 5.2.69 | 5.2.69 | 5.2.69 |
| Panama | | | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Paraguay | | | 1.7.68 | 5.3.70 | | 4.2.70 |
| Peru | | | 1.7.68 | | | 3.3.70 |
| Philippines | | 18.7.68 | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Poland | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 12.6.69 | 12.6.69 | 12.6.69 |
| Rumania | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 4.2.70 | 4.2.70 | 4.2.70 |
| San Marino | 29.7.68 | 21.11.68 | 1.7.68 | 10.8.70 | | 31.8.70 |
| Senegal | 26.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Singapore | 5.2.70 | 5.2.70 | 5.2.70 | | | |
| Somalia | 1.7.68 | | 1.7.68 | 5.3.70 | | |
| Southern Yemen | | 14.11.68 | | | | |
| Sudan | | 24.12.68 | | | | |
| Swaziland | 24.6.69 | | | 11.12.69 | 12.1.70 | 16.12.69 |
| Sweden | 19.8.68 | 19.8.68 | 19.8.68 | 9.1.70 | 9.1.70 | 9.1.70 |
| Switzerland* | 27.11.69 | 28.11.69 | 27.11.69 | | | |
| Syria | | 1.7.68 | | | 24.9.69 | |
| Togo | | | 1.7.68 | | | 26.2.70 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 22.8.68 | | 20.8.68 | | | |
| Tunisia | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 26.2.70 | 26.2.70 | 26.2.70 |
| Turkey | 28.1.69 | 28.1.69 | 28.1.69 | | | |
| Union of Soviet Socialist Republics | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 5.3.70 | 5.3.70 | 5.3.70 |
| United Arab Republic | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | | | | |
| United Kingdom† | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 27.11.68† | 29.11.68† | 27.11.68† |
| United States of America | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 1.7.68 | 5.3.70 | 5.3.70 | 5.3.70 |
| Upper Volta | | 11.8.69 | 25.11.68 | | | 3.3.70 |
| Uruguay | | | 1.7.68 | | | 31.8.70 |
| Venezuela | | | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Viet-Nam, Republic of | | | 1.7.68 | | | |
| Yemen | | 23.9.68 | | | | |
| Yugoslavia | 10.7.68 | 10.7.68 | 10.7.68 | 5.3.70 | 5.3.70 | 4.3.70 |

* For text of statement made on signature see pages 74 to 76.

† Ratification by the United Kingdom is in respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Associated States (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla and Saint Lucia) and Territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom, as well as the State of Brunei, the Kingdom of Tonga and the British Solomon Islands Protectorate.

‡ For texts of statements made on signature and ratification see pages 76 and 77.

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