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	England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges)
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Family Court Decisions (High Court Judges) >> RC v FP [2025] EWFC 123 (08 May 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2025/123.html Cite as: [2025] EWFC 123

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IN THE FAMILY COURT
SITTING AT THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		8th May 2025

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 8^th May 2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives. .............................

Nicholas Allen KC:

1. I am concerned with the following applications:

a) RC's ('F') application dated 9^th September 2024 to extend the Transparency Order ('TO') made by His Honour Judge Talbott on 14^th November 2023, and which would otherwise expire at the end of these proceedings, until 14^th May 2037 in order to preserve the anonymity of the parties' child in reports of these proceedings until their 18^th birthday; and

b) applications by the BBC and journalist Ms. Lucia Osborne-Crowley dated 25^th September 2024 to disapply the Administration of Justice Act 1960 ('AJA 1960') s12 so as to be able to report the identities of the parties, the parties' child, any other professional whom they consider to be relevant, and also report the contents of all documents in the proceedings. The two applications seek an order in the same terms and so I shall refer to both collectively as "the media's application".

2. FP ('M') opposes F's application to extend the TO and fully supports the media's application.

Background

3. F was born on [date]. He is a national of Country A. M was born on [date]. She is a national of Country B. The parties met and began a relationship in late 2016. In February 2019 M travelled to Country A on an unannounced visit whilst pregnant with the parties' child. There she discovered that, contrary to what she had been told by F that he was single and without children, he was in a relationship with another woman, already had one child with her (then aged [age]), and his partner was very shortly to give birth to their second child. M returned to the UK, communication between the parties ceased, and the relationship ended.
4. The parties' child ('C'), with whom I am concerned, was born on [date]. They are now aged [age].
5. On 22^nd September 2022 F applied for child arrangements and parental responsibility orders. On 30^th September 2022 he sought the appointment of an Independent Social Worker ('ISW') to meet and assist the parties on how best he be introduced to C, to assist with the introduction, and thereafter the progression of contact.
6. Her Honour Judge Robertson made an order by consent on 18^th January 2023, which included the appointment of Ms. Carol Edwards as an ISW for the purpose of advising the parties on how best to introduce C to F and their half-siblings and thereafter to assist with the introduction and progression of contact. The FHDRA listed for the following day was vacated.
7. Ms. Edwards' first report was dated 3^rd April 2023. On 18^th April 2023 His Honour Judge Talbott heard the DRA when the parties agreed to follow the ISW's recommendations to progress the 'spend time with' arrangements. F had his first contact with C in the same month. Ms. Edwards filed her second report on 10^th October 2023.
8. On 14^th November 2023 His Honour Judge Talbott heard a second DRA. An interim 'lives with' order was made in M's favour and an interim 'spends time with' order in F's favour. By now there was media interest in the case and accredited journalists from both the BBC and ITV attended. A TO was made which was to remain in force "until the cessation of proceedings or further order". It is this order which F now seeks to extend. The case was released to be heard by Her Honour Judge Roberts, then the Designated Family Judge at the Central Family Court. Ms. Edwards filed her third report on 31^st January 2024.
9. Her Honour Judge Roberts heard the next DRA on 8^th February 2024. The hearing was attended by a BBC journalist.
10. The judge gave an extempore judgment in relation to whether to list the case for a fact-finding hearing. Having set out at paragraph 2 the background to the parties' relationship and C's birth – saying M had been "grossly deceived" - she said even though she was expressly using as neutral terms as possible "there is no doubt that [F] behaved extremely badly, dishonestly and dishonourably". At paragraph 8 she stated:
    
    As I have said, the father's behaviour towards the mother was reprehensible and I have no doubt it comes under the heading of domestic abuse. It appears to me that some of it probably can be characterised as controlling behaviour, as by his deception he engineered the mother to behave in a way she would not have done otherwise ... I note that there are admissions by the father and much of the behaviour can be dealt with by way of admissions.
11. Thereafter she continued in the same paragraph:

What is unlikely to be agreed is the characterisation of the behaviour - perhaps best illustrated by Dr. Proudman's para. 9 in her position statement where she says:

"The mother seeks directions for a finding of fact hearing to prove her allegations of reproductive coercion, controlling behaviour including pathological lying, gaslighting, manipulative deception, all of which amounts to abusive behaviour pursuant to s.1 of the Domestic Abuse Act, and accordingly would have caused [C] harm."

12. The judge thereafter went on to refuse a separate fact-finding hearing on the basis that it was not necessary nor proportionate because there were sufficient factual admissions by F upon which (i) the court could evaluate risk under PD12J and determine child arrangements; and (ii) the ISW could address any risks posed having considered the admissions as well as dealing with the factors identified under PD12J paragraphs 35-37. F's behaviour would also be considered pursuant to PD12J in determining his application for parental responsibility.
13. Her Honour Judge Roberts therefore directed (i) F to file a schedule of admissions; (ii) a further DRA; and (iii) a final welfare hearing with a time-estimate of four days. She reserved the case to herself.
14. In her order the judge confirmed the TO of 14^th November 2023 remained in force. Her order also recorded as a recital that "The court determined that parts of [F's] behaviour can be characterised as domestically abusive and controlling towards [M] pursuant to PD12J" which reflected her extempore judgment.
15. F filed his Schedule of Admissions on 29^th February 2024. His admissions included that (i) he had led M to believe they were in a committed and monogamous relationship, discussed marriage, and he had expressed his wish to have a family together; (ii) he planned C's pregnancy with M; and (iii) during the course of this relationship his partner became pregnant with their second child. F accepted that M would have been deeply affected by his behaviour and this caused her emotional harm.
16. In April 2024 F had his last contact (to date) with C. Ms. Edwards filed her fourth report on 24^th May 2024.
17. The further DRA was heard by Her Honour Judge Roberts on 3^rd June 2024. The hearing was attended by accredited journalist, Ms. Osborne-Crawley. The judge confirmed the TO of 14^th November 2023 remained in force. As the judge was now shortly to retire, the four-day final hearing due to commence on 16^th September 2024 was reallocated to me. Her order recorded as a recital that "[F] accepts that the behaviour set out in that schedule [of admissions] constitutes domestic abuse of an emotional nature."
18. On 29^th August 2024 F applied for permission to withdraw his applications for a child arrangements and a parental responsibility order. On receipt of this application Her Honour Judge Roberts reduced the time-estimate from four days to one day. M considers that this "stymied me from putting my case in full, on the one remaining day" (statement of 8^th October 2024, paragraph 65).
19. On 9^th September 2024 F applied to extend the TO of 14^th November 2023 until C's 18^th birthday. On 10^th September 2024 M applied for a declaration of parentage so as to enable C to have a Country A passport.
20. On 16^th September 2024 M was represented by Mr. Vickers and F by Ms. Brereton KC. Accredited journalists from the BBC and ITV also attended. F had been given permission to attend the final hearing remotely but did not attend due (it was said) to medical reasons. The hearing proceeded on the basis of submissions only. I confirmed the 'live with' order remained in force. F's application to withdraw his parental responsibility application was not opposed on M's behalf and I granted the permission sought. I gave directions in relation to the declaration of parentage application.
21. F's application to withdraw the child arrangements order application was strongly opposed on M's behalf. Having heard submissions from the parties' counsel I gave an extempore judgment in which I granted F the permission sought. My reasoning for doing so was as follows:

[44] In determining this application, I go back to the test of rule 29.4, which makes it clear that this is a welfare determination. [C's] welfare is my paramount consideration; s1(1) of the Children Act 1989. Do I consider withdrawal of the proceedings would promote or conflict with [C's] welfare? Do I, in looking at this case on its facts, see that there is a solid advantage to [C] to be derived from continuing the proceedings?

[45] Having listened to everything that I have heard and read everything that I have read, my answer to whether or not there is a solid advantage to [C] to be derived from the continuing the proceedings is no.

[46] In my judgment, a fully contested hearing, the giving of evidence, the testing of that evidence, the making of findings, is not in [C's] best interests. It may well be what the mother seeks, and there are some cases where what a parent may seek may be consistent with what is in a child's best interests, but to my mind this is not one of those cases. The principle of contact is agreed. The fact that that contact is to be direct is agreed. The frequency of that contact is not agreed, but I see nothing in hearing oral evidence and making factual findings that is consistent with [C's] welfare in order to determine the issue of frequency of contact. The need for there to be support for the contact, at least for the foreseeable future, is also agreed, and again I see no solid advantage but only potential solid disadvantage to [C] when that issue is not a live issue between the parties.

[47] Whether the parties agree it quarterly or they agree it monthly, I do not know whether that contact will be taken up by the father. I hope it will be, but I am satisfied that taking the court ordered nature of that contact out of the equation at this stage is the right way forward and is consistent with [C's] welfare. The mother has offered dates, I hope the father takes them up. If he does not, he cannot apply to enforce because they are not court-ordered dates, but likewise the mother cannot return to court and complain about him not having taken up court-ordered dates. In my view contact not being court-ordered and the consequent inability of either parent to return to court is consistent with [C's] welfare.

[48] It is, in my judgment, far better in this case for these parents, having established and agreed the principle that contact is in [C's] best interests, to seek to agree that framework to be taken outside of the courts. I am not persuaded, notwithstanding the skilful submissions that Mr. Vickers has made, that removing that framework makes it likely to return to the chaos, to his word, prior to September 2022 because, and I agree with Miss Brereton in this regard, what is fundamentally different to the period prior to September 2022 is that the father has met [C], [C] has met [their] father and, importantly, both parents -- and in this sense most particularly the mother -- believe it is important for [C] to have a relationship with [their] father, and I take her at her word, in relation to that.

[49] I do not think, in that context, it is the role of the court to be showing [C] that the mother may not be the impediment to the father having a relationship with [them] and/or that the mother had done all that could be reasonably expected of her to place arrangements on a solid foundation. I do not think that is, in this case, the appropriate function of the court.

[50] I am also not satisfied that even if I did go forward and adjudicate on a full welfare hearing, that that may lead to the parties no longer being at loggerheads. I hope, for their sake, that they are not at loggerheads for much longer, but I am not persuaded that a judgment, whether it is a judgment in favour or against the mother in terms of the findings that she would seek against the father, means their relationship would be assisted and being at loggerheads resolved by such findings.

[51] Finally, dealing with the final submission made by Mr. Vickers, which I said he put perfectly properly on his client's behalf, that if I acceded to the request to withdraw, which I am acceding to, I would be derogating my responsibilities to determine arrangements in [C's] best interests in absence of the agreement between the parties, to my mind that is not the function of the court. The primary position in law is that the parties should take responsibility for agreeing arrangements between themselves because it is almost invariably the case that parties, mothers and fathers, know better than judges. If the parties cannot agree they can, if they wish, make an application to the court, and if the court is satisfied that an order needs to be made the court can make such an order. But in this case, given the history of the litigation, given the history of the parties' relationship, I do not accept that it would be a derogation of my responsibilities to determine the arrangements. To my mind, it would be acting contrary to [C's] best interests to be asked to make findings that in my judgment are unnecessary and disproportionate in order to determine the welfare issues between the parties which, given the father seeks to withdraw his application, the court will not be adjudicating upon.

22. At the conclusion of the judgment I stated as follows:
    
    [52] In reaching this judgment, I do not seek to minimise any of the schedule of admissions which the father has signed, dated 29 February 2024, nor do I seek to minimise the recital at paragraph 26 of the order of 3 June 2024 that the father accepts the behaviour set out in that schedule constitutes domestic abuse of an emotional nature.

[53] I have read, I accept, and I associate myself with everything HHJ Roberts said in her extempore judgment of 8 February 2024, but to go beyond that and make findings would not, in my judgment, be necessary and proportionate or consistent with [C's] welfare, which is my paramount consideration.

23. On 16^th September 2024 F was also represented by specialist media counsel (Mr. Wolanski KC) and counsel (Mr. Bunting KC) was instructed on behalf of the BBC and Ms. Osborne-Crowley.
24. There was insufficient time for me on that date to deal with M's application for costs (sought in the sum of £514,116), her application for a CA 1989 s91(14) order, F's application to extend the TO, and what I was told would be the media's application to vary the TO (and which was subsequently issued dated 25^th September 2024). I therefore case managed these applications which were listed with a two-day time-estimate on 25^th February 2025.
25. On 25^th February 2025, M was again represented by Mr. Vickers, F by Ms. Brereton KC and Mr. Wolanski KC, and the media by Mr. Bunting KC. Again F had permission to attend remotely but again did not attend (again (it was said) due to medical reasons).
26. At the outset of the hearing and after hearing brief submissions I gave a short extempore judgment in which I refused F's application dated 7^th February 2025 to file a statement in reply to M's statement dated 8^th October 2024. I permitted M's sibling to be present in court to provide her with emotional support.
27. Thereafter I heard and granted M's s91(14) application (which had been opposed by F on 16^th September 2024 but by the time of the hearing it was only its duration that was in issue) and made the declaration of parentage order (which was not opposed). I also heard M's costs application which was opposed on F's behalf. This application will be the subject of a separate judgment which will follow this one.
28. On the second day I heard the cross-applications in relation to the TO. Thereafter I reserved judgment.
29. On 3^rd April 2025, during the course of writing this judgment, I became aware of the judgment of Ms. Justice Harris in M v F and Another [2025] EWHC 801 (Fam) which was published on The National Archives the previous day. It seemed to me there were issues raised by M v F that were of potential relevance. I therefore raised this with the parties' respective counsel and invited written submissions in relation to the same making it clear there was no obligation (or expectation) on my part for counsel to do so.
30. Mr. Wolanski KC and Mr. Bunting KC both filed concise written submissions on 9^th April 2025. It was said on M's behalf that she adopted and endorsed the submissions made on behalf of the media. I also gave the parties the opportunity to respond to the additional submissions filed but neither Mr. Wolanski KC nor Mr. Bunting KC chose to do so.
31. I am very grateful to all counsel for the quality of their written and oral submissions.

The applicable law

32. The statutory restrictions on publishing reports of proceedings concerning children are:

a) AJA 1960 s12(1)(a) which states the publication of information relating to proceedings before any court sitting in private shall not of itself be contempt of court except inter alia where the proceedings (i) relate to the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court with respect to minors; (ii) are brought under the Children Act 1989  or the Adoption and Children Act 2002; or (iii) otherwise relate wholly or mainly to the maintenance or upbringing of a minor.

The section prohibits the publication of accounts of what has gone on in front of the judge sitting in private, of documents such as witness statements, position statements, skeleton arguments, or other documents filed in the proceedings, of notes or transcripts of the evidence or submissions, or summaries of such documents.

The section does not, however, protect the identity of anyone involved in the proceedings, not even the child (see Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) [2004] 2 FLR 142 per Munby J (as he then was) at [82], A v Ward [2010] 1 FLR 1497 per Munby LJ (sitting as a Judge of the Family Division) at [79], and Re X and Others (Children) (Morgan and Others Intervening), sub nom Re X, Y and Z (Expert Witness) [2011] 2 FLR 1437 per Sir Nicholas Wall P at [32]).

AJA 1960 s12 continues to have effect after the proceedings have concluded and is without limitation of time; and

b) CA 1989 s97(2) which prohibits the publication of any material which is intended, or is likely, to identify (i) any child as being involved in any proceedings before the High Court or the family court in which any power under this Act or the Adoption and Children Act 2002 may be exercised by the court with respect to that or any other child; or (ii) an address or school as being that of a child involved in any such proceedings.

This prohibition comes to an end once the proceedings have concluded (Clayton v Clayton [2007] 1 FLR 11 per Sir Mark Potter P at [49]-[53]).

33. The court has jurisdiction both to relax and increase these statutory restrictions (Re B (A Child) (Disclosure) per Munby J (as he then was) at [83], as subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal in Re W (Children) (Fact Finding Hearing: Evidence and Publicity) [2016] EWCA Civ 113 per McFarlane LJ (as he then was) at [35], Re C (A Child) [2017] 2 FLR 105 per Lord Dyson MR at [12], Griffiths v Tickle and Others (Rights of Women and Another Intervening) [2021] EWCA Civ 1882 per Dame Victoria Sharp P at [47], and (most recently) Tickle & Another v The BBC & Others [2025] EWCA Civ 42 per Sir Geoffrey Vos MR at [45]). The court may therefore, for example, extend the anonymity of the child beyond the point at which CA 1989 s97 would otherwise cease to have effect. That the family court, in particular, has jurisdiction to relax and increase these statutory restrictions is clear from Re K (Children) (Powers of the Family Court) [2024] 1 FLR 1261 per Sir Andrew McFarlane P and his reference to MFPA 1984 s31E(1)(a), the Act which created the family court in 2014.
34. As MacDonald J observed in Southend Borough Council v CO and Another [2018] 1 FLR 837 at [19]:

The foundation of the court's jurisdiction to relax or supplement the statutory restrictions is derived from rights under the European Convention and, accordingly, applications for orders restraining or permitting publication are determined by balancing the competing human rights engaged (Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restriction on Publication) … sub nom Re S (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2005] 1 FLR 591, at para [23]).

35. The rights that are engaged in this case are the parties' and C's Article 8 rights to respect for private and family life, M's right, under Articles 8 and 10, to tell her story, and the Article 10 freedom of expression rights of M and the media applicants.
36. Article 8 provides:

Right to respect for private and family life

1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

37. Article 10 provides:

Freedom of expression

1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2.  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

38. When conducting a balancing exercise between Articles 8 and 10 (and indeed any other rights engaged), the court applies the four propositions identified in Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restriction on Publication) [2005] 1 FLR 591 by Lord Steyn at [17] namely (original emphasis):

First, neither Article has as such precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two Articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test. This is how I will approach the present case. For convenience I will call this the ultimate balancing test.

39. In A Local Authority v W, L, W, T and R (By the Children's Guardian) [2006] 1 FLR 1 at [53] Sir Mark Potter P summarised the approach to the requisite balancing exercise as follows:

The exercise to be performed is one of parallel analysis in which the starting point is presumptive parity, in that neither Article has precedence over or 'trumps' the other. The exercise of parallel analysis requires the court to examine the justification for interfering with each right and the issue of proportionality is to be considered in respect of each. It is not a mechanical exercise to be decided upon the basis of rival generalities. An intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary before the ultimate balancing test in terms of proportionality is carried out. Having so stated, Lord Steyn strongly emphasised the interest in open justice as a factor to be accorded great weight in both the parallel analysis and the ultimate balancing test …

40. In undertaking the requisite balancing exercise, it is "necessary to measure the nature of the impact … on the child" of what is being proposed (Re S (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) at [25]). When balancing rights in this context, the best interests of the child concerned are a "primary" consideration which means they must be considered first but they may be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations (ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 1 FLR 2170 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at [33] and Re J (Reporting Restriction: Internet: Video) [2014] 1 FLR 523 per Sir James Munby P at [22]).
41. In Griffiths v Tickle and Others (Rights of Women and Another Intervening) Dame Victoria Sharp P explained at [48] that:

The "nature of the impact on the child" of a publication that interferes with their privacy rights is to be measured objectively; the mere fact that the child is too young to understand does not mean there is no such impact: Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176, [2016] 1 WLR 1541 [20] (Lord Dyson MR). But when measuring that impact the court should not simply assume, or treat it as inevitable, that publicity would have an adverse impact; in each case, the impact of publication on the child must be assessed by reference to the evidence before the court: Clayton v Clayton at [51]. This would seem to follow inescapably from the granular analysis required by the Re S approach.


42. The right to freedom of expression, protected by Article 10(1), encompasses a right to speak to others, including the public at large, about the events and experiences of one's private and family life. As Dame Victoria Sharp P stated in Griffiths v Tickle and Others (Rights of Women and Another Intervening) at [30], O (A Child) v Rhodes and another (English PEN and Others Intervening) [2015] UKSC 32 suggests that in circumstances such as these "the right to tell one's own story is likely to carry considerable weight". The public and the media have a corresponding right under Article 10(1) to receive such information.
43. Further, as Munby J (as he then was) noted in Re Roddy (A Child) (Identification: Restriction on Publication) [2004] 2 FLR 949 at [35]-[36], the right "as a human being, to share with others – and, if one so chooses, with the world at large – one's own story" is also a facet of the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8(1).
44. However, as was explained in Griffiths v Tickle and Others (Rights of Women and Another Intervening) (a case in which the father decided not to invoke any Article 8 rights of his own but to rely exclusively on the rights of the child) per Dame Victoria Sharp P at [29]:
    
    These are not absolute rights; they are qualified to the extent that is necessary in a democratic society for certain purposes. Those purposes include the need to protect the rights of others who are participants in the "story". As Eady J observed in McKennitt v Ash,

… if a person wishes to reveal publicly information about aspects of his or her relations with other people, which would attract the prima facie protection of privacy rights, any such revelation should be crafted, so far as possible, to protect the other person's privacy" [2004] EWHC 3003 (QB), [2006] EMLR 10 [77] (affirmed [2006] EWCA Civ 1714, [2008] QB 73 [50-51]).

45. Regarding the Article 8 privacy rights of others who are participants in the 'story', in X v Y (Restraining Abuse of Children's Guardian [2022] 2 FLR 334 MacDonald J explained at [62] (emphasis added):

… the ambit of the private life of a child is a wide one, encompassing not only the narrow concept of personal freedom from intrusion but also psychological and physical integrity, personal development and the development of social relationships and physical and social identity (See Botta v Italy (Application No 21439/93) (1998) 26 EHRR 241, at para 32 and Bensaid v United Kingdom (Application No 44599/98) (2001) 33 EHRR 10, [2001] INLR 325, at paras 46 and 47). Within this context, it is self-evidently important that, in the context of marital breakdown, the stability of the children's circumstances should be preserved to the greatest extent possible. This will extend to ensuring that the child is not adversely affected by publicity surrounding the breakdown and re-constitution of his or her family life. Within this context, I have regard to the fact that in determining this application, X's welfare is a primary consideration for the court.

46. Open justice, and the rights of the media to report on court proceedings, are always an important consideration. In Gallagher v Gallagher (No. 1) (Reporting Restrictions) [2023] 1 FLR 120, a financial remedies case, Mostyn J at [16] described the rule of open justice as "an ancient and deeply entrenched constitutional principle in this country and elsewhere in the common law world. It is a fundamental constituent of the concept of the rule of law." More recently in Rosemin-Culligan v Culligan [2025] EWFC 26, also a financial remedies case, MacDonald J at [41] referred to the "cardinal principle" of open justice.
47. As Mr. Bunting KC submitted, this principle "is applicable as much in family proceedings as in any other proceedings" (Tickle & Another v The BBC & Others per Sir Geoffrey Vos MR at [45]). The family court is not "another country" (ibid at [46]). Open justice is "a powerful argument in favour of publication" (ibid at [45]). Further, as Nicklin J stated in PMC v A Local Health Board [2024] EWHC 2969 (KB) (as approved in Tickle & Another v The BBC & Others by Sir Geoffrey Vos MR at [49]):
    
    [41] Whilst, in a very broad sense, in assessing the engaged convention rights on any application for a derogation from open justice, the Court is carrying out a 'balance' between them, the scales do not start evenly balanced. The Court must start from the position that very substantial weight must be accorded to open justice. Any balance starts with a very clear presumption in favour of open justice unless and until that is displaced and outweighed by a sufficiently countervailing justification. That is not to give a presumptive priority to Article 10 (or open justice), it is simply a recognition of the context in which the Re S 'balance' is being carried out.
48. When the court is considering whether to depart from the principle of open justice it will therefore require clear and cogent evidence on which to base its decision. However, in X v Y (Restraining Abuse of Children's Guardian) MacDonald J noted at [41] that:
    
    The courts have recognised that some of the evidence on which the requisite balancing exercise is undertaken will necessarily involve a degree of speculation (see Re W (Children) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2006] 1 FLR 1). The court should use its common sense and there is certainly no need for evidence from child psychiatrists or specific evidence, for example, of psychological harm to the child (see Re J (Reporting Restriction Order) at [75]). However, as Keehan J noted in Birmingham City Council v Riaz [2014] EWHC 4247 (Fam):

"There comes a point, however, where evidence is not merely speculative but is pure speculation, even from experienced professionals, with no sound or cogent underlying evidential basis. Given the Draconian and wide-ranging nature of RROs, I am of the view that evidence of this nature will not be sufficient or adequate to provide an evidential basis to justify the making of an order."

49. The Human Rights Act 1998 s12(4) makes special provision regarding freedom of expression. It provides that, when considering whether to grant relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression, the court must have particular regard to the importance of the right. Where the material in question is journalistic in nature, the court must also have regard to the extent to which that information is already or is about to come into the public domain, and the extent to which it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published, and any relevant privacy code.
50. In this context, as Dame Victoria Sharp P observed in Griffiths v Tickle and Others (Rights of Women and Another Intervening) at [40]:

It is obvious that where disclosure of the same information has already taken place, or is imminent, the case for keeping information private is weakened.

51. By way of example, as His Honour Judge Hess stated in Goodman v Walker [2024] EWFC 212 (B) at [93] when quoting from the submissions of Ms. McNeil-Walsh for Associated Newspapers, the "dominant feature" in that case was that "The parties are well-known celebrity figures and there has already been substantial reporting of the long-running dispute between them. Much of this reporting has been the result of one or both of the parties themselves putting information into the public domain." He therefore made a final transparency order which (save for a few targeted items) allowed reporting of the judgment unanonymised and unredacted.
    
52. In relation to M v F and Another it was common ground between Mr. Wolanski KC and Mr. Bunting KC that the decision did not directly affect the issues I have to decide. It was noted on F's behalf, however, that in M v F the mother applied for an order permitting her to discuss her experiences of the family justice system, but not for permission to identify the child or the parties. The parties and the court were concerned to ensure that, whatever order was made, the child's anonymity was effectively protected. As Harris J stated at paragraph [64] (original emphasis):

In this case, C is a victim of domestic abuse in their own right. They too have suffered trauma as a result of exposure to their father's behaviours. They have a strong and weighty interest in the details of those distressing experiences remaining private. In applications of this nature, safeguarding C will always be at the forefront of the Court's mind. However, given the position of Ms M that she does not seek for C's identity to be disclosed, the extent of any interference with C's Article 8 rights is considerably reduced - provided C's ongoing anonymity can be effectively secured.

53. As such it was recognised by Mr. Bunting KC on behalf of the media that the Article 8 factors in M v F and Another were different to those in this case. The mother would not identify the father or the child. This meant the Article 8 factors did not weigh significantly in the balance. This is in contrast to this case where M is willing to waive her and C's anonymity as a victim of domestic abuse (I should note that neither the BBC journalist nor Ms. Osborne-Crowley seek to identify the child directly).
54. It was said by Mr. Bunting KC, however, that although that the factual circumstances in M v F and Another were not identical, these factual findings, and the weight attached to the mother's rights, provided me with a useful steer for how this court should approach the Article 8/10 balancing exercise in what was said to be this "broadly analogous" case. It was therefore said to be of note that Harris J concluded at [61] that any interference with the mother's rights would "require particularly careful justification". The same it was said applies in this application.
55. I do not accept that M v F and Another provides me with a "useful steer" for how I should approach the requisite balancing exercise. I must apply an intense focus on the comparative importance of the Article 8 and 10 rights in this case. Given the mother in M v F and Another did not seek for the child's identity to be disclosed, the extent of any interference with the child's Article 8 rights was considerably reduced and did not weigh significantly in the balance. This is very different to the present case.

The Transparency Reporting Pilot

56. The Reporting Pilot ('RP') began in the family court at Leeds, Cardiff, and Carlisle on 30^th January 2023, was extended to the Central Family Court and a number of other DFJ areas from 29^th January 2024. On 27^th January 2025, with the coming into force of FPR 2010 Practice Directions PD12R and PD14G (which converted the RP into permanent provisions) the RP – now formally the "open reporting provisions" – it was extended to cover public law proceedings in all courts. From 1^st May 2025 PD12R extended the regime to all proceedings for orders in private law proceedings, and proceedings to discharge, vary or enforce existing orders in such proceedings. From 29^th September 2025 it will extend to the magistrates' tier.
57. The President of the Family Division issued accompanying Transparency Reporting Pilot Guidance on 18^th January 2023 and The Reporting Pilot Guidance (August 2024) on 20^th September 2024.
58. The model order under the RP and the 'template' TO referred to in PD12R essentially reverse the statutory position: they permit wider reporting of the case by accredited journalists and 'legal bloggers' (i.e. "duly authorised lawyers" for the purposes of FPR 2010 r27.11), who are present in court, during the currency of the proceedings thus relaxing the provisions of AJA 1960 s12; whilst at the same time extending the statutory privacy protections of CA 1989 s97 until the 18^th birthday of any children concerned in the proceedings.
59. This was explained at paragraphs 24 and 25 of the President's Guidance of January 2023 (and paragraphs 31 and 32 of the President's Guidance of August 2024) as follows:

24. Through the means of the Transparency Order the restrictions on publication contained within s.12 Administration of Justice Act 1960 are varied. No contempt of Court will be committed so long as the terms of the Transparency Order are complied with.

25. In any event, s.97 Children Act 1989, protecting the anonymity of the child, will continue to apply for the duration of the proceedings. The effect of the transparency order, where made, is to extend that protection until the child's 18^th birthday.

60. Under the heading 'Aims and principles' PD12R states:

3.3 Any reporting must be subject to the principles of protection of the anonymity of any children involved in the proceedings, unless the court orders otherwise. In particular, it should be noted that section 97 of the 1989 Act protects the anonymity of the child for the duration of the proceedings, and that a Transparency Order may extend that protection for a further period.

61. The provisions of the standard Transparency Order reflect the recommendations of the President's paper Confidence and Confidentiality: Transparency in the Family Courts dated 28^th October 2021. Paragraphs 33 and 34 stated (emphasis added):

33. On one issue I wish to be both clear and firm. Greater openness must not be at the expense of the interests of children. All the changes I am setting out below must be subject to the proviso that the anonymity of individual children needs to be preserved. The welfare of children is what much of family justice is about. There is no doubt that the vast majority of children involved in these cases do not want to be identified and want to maintain their complete anonymity. Some of those children gave evidence to this effect, and their voices must be heard and respected. The rise of social media has undoubtedly contributed to a fear that they will be identified and then that will spread on the internet. It is, however, of note that there is no evidence of children actually being harmed in this way. In any event, in my view it is possible to maintain the privacy of those children, whilst at the same time operating a much more open justice system.

34. There is a view, which I accept, that, in the long term, holding the system up to greater transparency will benefit children by driving up standards and increasing public confidence. But the children going through litigation are unlikely to see that wider picture. Therefore it is critical that full protection is in place for them, and where possible the scope of transparency is explained to them.

62. Whilst I quote from this general guidance the decision of course must be made on the facts of the particular case.
    
63. In Vince v Vince [2024] EWFC 406, a financial remedies case, Cusworth J considered whether documents which had been provided to reporters who attended a hearing under a transparency order could be provided to other reporters who had not attended the hearing. He decided it was unobjectionable for reporters to share such documents with other reporters, as long as those other reporters were properly 'accredited' and as long as those other reporters were made aware of the transparency order in place.
64. Cusworth J said at [9] referring to The Transparency Reporting Pilot for Financial Remedy Proceedings: Guidance from the President of the Family Division dated 11^th December 2023 then in place:

Whilst that guidance was plainly drafted in anticipation of the dissemination of documents to actual attendees, it cannot have been its intention that once any such documents were in the hands of a particular reporter, no other would ever have sight of their contents unless the first reporter chose to publish them. I acknowledge that the media world simply does not operate in that way, and that journalistic resources to do not permit that each paper will send a reporter to court for all or most of every case the progress of which it wishes to report.

65. On the basis that this view is of general application rather than restricted solely to financial remedies cases (and although the transparency reporting pilot in such cases was a separate one which commenced on 29^th January 2024 I cannot see why it ought to be so restricted) there is therefore nothing to stop the journalists who have attended the current case from sharing documents they obtain with other journalists.
    
66. It goes without saying that although the model order under the RP and the 'template' order referred to in PD12R essentially reverse the statutory position, the balancing exercise I must conduct between Articles 8 and 10 as identified in Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restriction on Publication) by Lord Steyn at [17] remains the same.

Discussion

67. M wishes to "tell her story" publicly. This would be an exercise of her Article 10 rights. She also has Article 8 rights to tell her own story and thus have autonomy as explained by Munby J in Re Roddy. However if the AJA 1960 s12 is not relaxed in the way M seeks and the TO is extended M will be unable openly to discuss her experiences of this litigation in a way which identifies her and C. This will be a restriction on these rights.
68. In Tickle v Farmer and Others (Rights of Women Intervening) [2021] EWHC 3365 (Fam), Lieven J recognised the importance and weight to be afforded to the Convention rights of survivors of domestic abuse at [52]:

The level of the interference in the Mother's rights should not be underestimated. The Mother says that she feels that, having been subject to coercive control by the Father, she is now being silenced by his resistance to the Judgment being published. For women who have been the subject of domestic abuse to be unable to speak about their experiences, including their experiences through litigation, must often be extremely distressing. And may in some cases be re-traumatising.

69. In M v F and Another Harris J stated at [61] that "I wholly endorse those observations". I do likewise.
70. In carrying out the balancing exercise between this right, its potential interference under Article 10(2) by reason of C's interests and F's own Article 8 rights, I bear in mind that M is already able to "tell her story" to some extent with the TO in place. She has already discussed F and C with her many followers on social media. She has discussed her experiences with F in a media interview. What she cannot do is discuss what happened in the proceedings (although she would be able to do this anonymously, as long as she said nothing which could link what she said to her or F).
71. In saying this I am conscious that in Application by Guardian News and Media Ltd and Others in Ahmed and Others v HM Treasury [2010] UKSC 1 Lord Rodger stated at [63] "What's in a name? 'A lot', the press would answer" because "stories about particular individuals are simply much more attractive to readers than stories about unidentified people. It is just human nature" (dicta with which Sir Geoffrey Vos MR confirmed his agreement in Tickle & Another v The BBC & Others at [27]). Further, the European Court of Human Rights has held that Article 10 protects not only the substance of ideas and information but also the form in which they are conveyed (News Verlags GmbH & Co KG v Austria (2000) 31 EHRR 246).
72. I fully acknowledge that M complains about the injustices she feels she has suffered in the court process. She feels "let down by the family court" (paragraph 53 of her Statement of 8^th October 2024). I know she was unhappy with my judgment of 16^th September 2024. She feels she has nothing to show for two years in court proceedings and over £500,000 in costs. However, this does not in my view add much weight to this argument not least because one party often feels "let down" by the court and, if they feel the court reached an incorrect decision on the law and/or the facts, that party may appeal (or at least seek permission to do so). There have been no such applications in this case.
73. I have already observed that the balancing exercise was a very different one in M v F and Another. Although I accept that it might be said that the backdrop of allegations of coercive control was similar, I therefore glean no meaningful assistance in this case from the fact that Harris J described at [59] the mother's "clear rights under articles 10 and 8 ... to be able to tell her story in her own words" as "particularly weighty and important". I therefore do not consider that (without more) it can be said, as Mr. Bunting KC seeks to do, that "[t]he same therefore applies to [M's] rights in this application".
74. When considering C's Article 8 rights to privacy I do not have the benefit of a Guardian having been appointed. I therefore have no independent voice to assist in articulating their rights (and considering their welfare) as part of the balancing exercise.
75. It is clear from the authorities I have cited that (i) C's rights are a primary consideration but are not the primary or paramount consideration; (ii) the ambit of C's private life is a wide one, encompassing not only the narrow concept of personal freedom from intrusion but also psychological and physical integrity, personal development and the development of social relationships and physical and social identity; and (iii) I must measure objectively the nature of the impact on C of a publication that interferes with their privacy rights and I must assess the same by reference to the evidence before the court.
76. It is relevant as part of this objective measurement and the balancing exercise with which I am engaged that M previously appears to have recognised the risk that harm will come to C if the world around her learns of these matters through reports of these proceedings:

a) M told the ISW that she "has always tried to keep the extreme turmoil she experienced by the ending of her relationship with [F] away from [C]" ... ISW Report dated 3^rd April 2023, paragraph 15); and

b) "As far as I am aware [M] has done her part to support this process of building a relationship between father and [C] by stopping her use of social media and other outlets to talk about past issues between her and [F]" (ISW Report dated 10^th October 2023, paragraph 22).

77. Mr. Wolanski KC submitted the potential risk of harm to C arises in at least three ways.
78. First, a risk to C from those around them knowing of their place at the heart of the conflict between F and M.
79. C is now at school. If the TO is lifted parents and teachers at their school, as well as others in their family's circle, will inevitably learn of the conflict between their parents. As they get older their peers too may learn of the story. This story risks defining their childhood.
    
80. Mr. Wolanski KC submitted that if the TO is lifted, very extensive publicity is likely to be given to the case. This is because:

a) M is famous. She has stated in her position statements that she is "world famous" and her statement of 19^th December 2023 (at paragraph 1) confirms she has an "international profile". She is a "public person" (statement of 28^th August 2024, paragraph 16). She lives in the public eye, vigorously promoting her public profile to her many followers and is active on social media;

b) M wants the maximum possible publicity so as to explain she is a "survivor of reproductive domestic abuse" (statement of 8^th October 2024, paragraph 97). She does not hold back in her account of F's conduct in the published media article. She explains she wants to "fully speak out on the issues which I have raised in the case" (statement of 8^th October 2024, paragraph 42);

c) the BBC has invested significant resources, not just in having a journalist attend the case, but in making an application to disapply AJA 1960 s12. It can therefore be assumed that if the TO is lifted the BBC will not want its investment wasted: reporting will be prominent and extensive. Although Mr. Bunting KC submitted that F doesn't know what the BBC has invested in this application, and I accept this is technically true, I consider this to be a common sense conclusion; and

d) it will likely be picked up and reported on by other media. Publicity will be intense and, because of the BBC's international reach, global. Ms. Osborne-Crowley will no doubt seek also to give prominence to her reports of the case.

I agree with this analysis.

81. Against this background I must consider the matters which will be reported if the TO is lifted and AJA 1960 s12 disapplied. In doing so I must assume (and do assume) that the mainstream media will report this material fairly and accurately - i.e. it will not distort the accusations and disclosures within the evidence, and will include any rebuttal that F chooses to provide. In Re British Broadcasting Corporation (R v Sarker) [2018] EWCA Crim 1341 (approved in Tickle & Another v The BBC & Others per Sir Geoffrey Vos MR at [27]) Lord Burnett CJ said at [32] iii) b) the court must proceed on the basis that any reporting of the proceedings would be "responsible, fair and accurate" (in turn quoting R v Sherwood (ex parte Telegraph Group) [2001] 1 WLR 1983 per Longmore LJ at [9])). I readily accept that in the BBC journalist and Ms. Osborne-Crowley this application involves the rights of two experienced, award-winning, and responsible accredited journalists who would so report these proceedings.
82. I cannot, however, make the same assumption that the information will thereafter be reported fairly and accurately on social media. As Henke J observed in Tortoise Media Ltd v A Local Authority and Others (Reporting Restriction Orders: Transparency: Duration) [2024] 2 FLR 1048 at [66] "all children, have a strong interest in ensuring the public's view of their parents is one that is balanced, informed and fair."
83. Further, the reality is, however, that even though I make the assumption that the mainstream media will report this material fairly and accurately, this in no way dilutes the sensational and extremely intrusive nature of the information which will be reportable.
84. A significant amount of highly inflammatory material, as well as sensitive and delicate evidence, has been put before the court in these proceedings. The material which has already been ventilated in the presence of journalists can already be reported because of the TO. If the TO is lifted, and the BBC's application granted, then all of these matters could be reported alongside pictures of M, F and C. In my view this is something to which I must give weight in considering F and C's Article 8 rights and whether the proposed restrictions on M's Article 8 and 10 rights are proportionate ones.
85. M has made many serious factual allegations against F. I shall not unnecessarily lengthen this judgment by setting out all those that Mr. Wolanski KC set out in his position statement. They are disputed by F. However, by way of some illustration they include:

a) M's accusation against F of rape: "His manipulation, lies and deceit are cruel, calculated, sophisticated abuse. I feel it is rape through deception, emotional and psychological abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour. [F's] deceit meant I was not in a position to give free, informed consent to the sexual acts I engaged in with him; it is reproductive control and coercion" (statement of 19^th December 2023, paragraph 44);

b) her characterisation of F's conduct as "narcissism, persistent pathological lying, years of grooming, manipulation, future-faking, and the emotional abuse endured, including reproductive coercion" (statement of 19^th December 2023, paragraph 2); and

c) M's sibling says of F that he "actually likes to torment and torture people" (statement of 19^th December 2023, paragraph 56) and that he "frightens me and I think he enjoys this" and she describes him as a "pathological predator" (statement of 19^th December 2023, paragraph 85).

86. M also accused Ms. Brereton KC of having "confidently told the judge outright falsehoods" and of telling "blatant lies" (M's statement of 8^th October 2024, paragraph 75). I wholly absolved Ms. Brereton KC of this accusation at the conclusion of the hearing.
87. M also discloses other obviously highly private information about F and his family members, including his other children, in her evidence. Some of that information was, as she explains, given to her in confidence by F's partner. F's evidence also contains many sensitive and intimate details of his own life and relationships. Again, I shall not list the same in this judgment. Other evidence given in the case of an obviously private and sensitive nature includes the instructions to the ISW, containing details of the relevant background of C, and her reports which explain in some detail what happened during contacts between C and F, including her descriptions of C's behaviour.
88. In his response to Mr. Wolanski KC's submissions, Mr. Bunting KC went through the various factual allegations and private information he (Mr. Wolanski KC) had listed and identified those which the media would agree not to publish. Although this was helpful as far as it went, I accept, as Mr. Wolanski KC said, that he had not prepared those paragraphs of his submissions on that basis. In other words, they were not an exhaustive list of such matters.
89. It is relevant in this context that a party seeking a relaxation of the restrictions in AJA 1960 s12 should define in clear terms the scope of the relaxation which they are seeking. In Re K (A Child: Wardship: Publicity) (No. 2) [2013] EWHC B21 (Fam) His Honour Judge Clifford Bellamy (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) said at [42]:

I am not unsympathetic to the parents' concern to know what they can and cannot say to the media. However, I also accept the point made by [counsel for the child] that since the court does not know the words the parents will use or the context in which they will be used it is difficult for the court to define in clear terms the scope of any further relaxation of the restrictions imposed by s.12. Any relaxation must be clear and specific. It cannot amount to a blank cheque.

90. The media have not identified the precise documents which they are seeking and whether the same ought to be redacted in any way. The media simply seek an order to be able to publish everything: including from a raft of documents from the case which were not read out in court. As Mr. Wolanksi KC observed, such a blanket ability to publish goes far beyond anything contemplated by the Transparency Reporting Pilot. In my view this adds weight to F and C's Article 8 rights in the balancing exercise.
91. The second area of potential harm to C is their alienation from the paternal family.
92. The ISW made several references to the harm that M's use of social media had already done to the relationship between C and the paternal family. She said that "Any new releases [by M on social or other media) would be harmful to trust building with [F] but would also be devastating to the process of building a future relationship with [C's] extended paternal family" (report of 3^rd April 2023, paragraph 17).
93. In her report of 31^st January 2024, the ISW explained the lack of trust between F's family and M arising from M's use of social media – "I am told there is no trust on the paternal said [sic] of the family that materials or events or shared experiences will be kept confidential. Without trusted confidentiality, the paternal family are of the view that the privacy of their children will be compromised" (paragraph 16).
94. To the same effect, the ISW said that F's partner wrote to her telling her "she had written to [M] about this matter. She said that [M's] social media postings and her on-line publications amount to a breach of her privacy rights and the privacy rights of her [children]. Given [M's] actions [F's partner] said she cannot allow contact with [M] and [C] for herself or her [children], for the foreseeable future" (report of 24^th May 2024, paragraph 36).
95. F explained in his evidence that it is the fear of publicity which makes his family so reluctant to become involved with C: his mother and his partner were worried about the impact of M's public statements on their children (statement of 31^st January 2024, paragraph 39). He is also concerned that as a result of M's public statements the risk arises that the public will discover where he and his partner live (statement of 31^st January 2024, paragraph 40).
96. In his oral submissions Mr. Bunting KC sought to characterise this evidence as a "threat" by F to M – if she speaks out he will not develop relationship with C and he (and his family) will choose not to engage. He described this as being a "punitive approach to parental relationship" and hence one that should not weigh in the best interests analysis. I do not share Mr. Bunting KC's characterisation. Further, although I am conscious that Ms. Edwards was not questioned thereon, I do not take from her reports that she shared this view either.
97. I express this view conscious that M considers Ms. Edwards to have been biased against her, that her actions "undermined the fairness of the proceedings", and she is an "apologist" for F who fails to hold him accountable (statement of 28^th August 2024, paragraphs 33 and 34).
98. It is in part due to F's fear of publicity that the ISW repeatedly emphasised the need to avoid media intrusion in order to help a relationship develop between C and F and his family:

a) in her report dated 3^rd April 2023 she says there is a need "to create a calm and private space for this new relationship [between [C] and [F]] to be established" (paragraph 17);

b) in the same report she says that "the time for critical attack of [F] has passed, especially by [M] using widely accessed social media or other filmed or voiced products" (paragraph 17); and

c) she also says in the same report "there must be an end to recriminations – however these are conveyed. If such actions are not suspended, then the whole process is at risk of derailment and [C] will be the person primarily harmed" (paragraph 20).

99. There is therefore unchallenged evidence that M's desire for publicity has already damaged the prospect of C building a relationship with their paternal family. If the TO is lifted, this will put at severe risk any prospect of C ever having such a relationship including with their half-siblings. This will do them considerable harm. This weighs in favour of C's Article 8 rights. Therefore although M says "[p]ublication will avoid the risk of [C] being publicly denied or shunned by her father and the paternal family" (statement of 8^th October 2024 paragraph 35) I agree with Mr. Wolanski KC that the opposite is true as far as C's relationship with the paternal family is concerned.
100. The third area of potential harm is C reading the reports herself. There is an obvious welfare risk to C if, as is likely, they come to read the reporting of this case in future. The reporting is likely to remain accessible online for years to come.
101. I therefore disagree with the view expressed by Mr. Bunting KC that there is no evidence (still less any clear and cogent evidence) that C will suffer any harm by way of publication or that the only evidence as to this harm is "general and speculative". Whilst I accept that M's ability to assess and provide for C's best interests has not per se been put in doubt by the ISW, and that M, as the sole parent with parental responsibility, considers that allowing this application is in C's best interests (and hence will cause them no harm), I do not consider this stands up to objective scrutiny.
102. In expressing this view and mindful of the observations made in X v Y (Restraining Abuse of Children's Guardian) by MacDonald J I am satisfied that it is one based on clear and cogent evidence and if and to the extent it is based on a degree of speculation on my part it is one based on common sense.
103. I also note in this context that in Griffiths v Tickle and Others (Rights of Women and Another Intervening) it was said by Dame Victoria Sharp P at [60] that "[w]hilst weight and respect must be given to the views of the mother as the holder of parental responsibility, that parental responsibility is not a trump card". This follows from the fact that an "intense focus" must be brought to bear on the particular facts of the case and, as stated in A Local Authority v W by Sir Mark Potter P at [53], the Re S approach "is not a mechanical exercise to be decided on the basis of rival generalities".
104. A second argument raised on both the media and M's behalf and which is relevant to the necessary balancing exercise is the public interest in open justice with the public being able fully to understand the proceedings and the issues that arose.
105. Lord Steyn rightly emphasised in Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restriction on Publication) that the interest in open justice is a factor to be accorded great weight. However it is important to assess the particular value of reporting in a given case as part of the "intense scrutiny" exercise which is being undertaken and whether the restrictions that are being sought are proportionate.
106. It is said on behalf of the media representatives that the way in which the family court "has resolved (or decided not to resolve) the very serious allegations made in these proceedings is a matter of legitimate public concern" (as set out in paragraph 3.5 of Mr. Bunting KC's document of 25^th September 2024). But the family court did not "resolve" the application in the traditional sense of applying the law to the facts as found (on the balance of probabilities) or as admitted. F sought permission to withdraw his application for a child arrangements order and I allowed this application for the reasons I have set out above.
107. Moreover there has been no fact-finding in the case. M's application that there be a separate fact-finding hearing was refused by Her Honour Judge Roberts on 8^th February 2024. The closest the court got to a determination of any issue was contained within the recital to the order of that date which reads "The court determined that parts of the father's behaviour can be characterised as domestically abusive and controlling towards the mother pursuant to PD12J". This recital reflects what was said by the judge in her extempore judgment, one which (at paragraph 2) she was careful to describe as a "mini-judgment" and (at paragraph 5) that the case had been listed as a "one-hour directions hearing". That admitted behaviour was then set out in a schedule of admissions dated 29^th February 2024.
108. When one considers what Dr. Proudman sought a finding of fact hearing to prove (as set out at paragraph 11 above) Mr. Bunting KC's description of Her Honour Judge Roberts' judgment ("even if her former counsel's characterisation of those allegations was not fully determined") might be said slightly to underplay the same. It is of note that in her judgment, Her Honour Judge Roberts after setting out the allegations that M sought to prove stated at [9] that "When I consider the law, I do not think it is necessary for the father to concede such terms as part of his admissions."
109. In so far as there have been any 'findings' in this case, they are therefore limited in scope. F admitted his deceptive conduct towards M. Her Honour Judge Roberts applied a label to this admitted behaviour stating that "parts of the father's behaviour can be characterised as domestically abusive and controlling" and describing that behaviour as dishonest and dishonourable. F has admitted his conduct towards M before C's birth was dishonest.
110. The family court therefore never "resolved" the numerous allegations made by M, save to the very limited extent of the judge applying a label to F's admitted behaviour.
111. Further, the way in which the family court did determine the applications is contained within this judgment (which could be published). It can be seen that although the concessions by F were limited in scope, they were relevant to the just determination of the case and pertinent to C's welfare. In other words, the concessions whilst limited were not without value as they added something to the eventual welfare outcome. It can also be seen that the view was taken that litigating M's allegations would not change this outcome. 
112. The proportionality of the restrictions sought on M's rights under Article 10 must be considered in this context.
     
113. Further, F is not a public figure. He is from a wealthy family, but he is a private person. This case is very different from Goodman v Walker in this important respect.
114. F gave only a very limited statement when approached by the Country A media for comment on M's allegations about him saying he could not comment in detail because he wished to respect the privacy and safety of his children (statement of 31^st January 2024, paragraph 41). He has made almost no public comments at all in relation to M and C, beyond stating when approached by the Country A media that the rumours were unwarranted and speculative which left him "disappointed". I accept, however, that this comment is misleading in light of the court's findings and F's admissions and, as Mr. Vickers submitted, there would be a public interest in setting the record straight. This therefore goes into the balancing exercise.
     
115. F is, however, not a public figure. The four propositions distilled by Lord Steyn in Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restriction on Publication) were derived from the earlier decision of the House of Lords in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22. There, the House explored the interplay between Articles 8 and 10 in the context of a complaint about press disclosure of the claimant's drug taking and rehabilitation. The claimant had falsely denied taking drugs. As Lord Hope put it at [82] "where a public figure chooses to make untrue pronouncements about his or her private life, the press will normally be entitled to put the record straight" (and see to similar effect, Lord Hoffmann at [58] and Baroness Hale at [151]). This principle therefore does not apply to this case and therefore reduces the weight to be given to the public interest justification.
116. This case is distinguishable from Griffiths v Tickle and Others (Rights of Women and Another Intervening) on this basis. Lieven J considered one factor favouring publication under Article 10 was the inconsistency between the father's public statements about his sexting in 2018 and the findings of HHJ Williscroft gave the media a strong Article 10 right to set the record straight; the case was stronger than Campbell given the father's role as an MP, the fact that his untrue statements were made to protect his political career, and the gravity of the facts as found. Dame Victoria Sharp P observed at [69] that this factor was plainly relevant, Lieven J was entitled to place "real weight" on the same, and her conclusion that the public interest called for correction of the false public statements the father had made in 2018 was "clearly right". In contrast, save for what I have set out above, F has not put anything into the public domain that would require alteration of the record to correct a false narrative.
117. A third argument put forward by M is that she says she wishes to share with C what she calls the "truth" about F. I do not consider that this carries much weight. This can be satisfied by private conversations within the family, without lifting the anonymity of these proceedings. The TO does not prevent M from discussing F and his dealings with M and with C, if she considers that appropriate.
118. It is said by the BBC journalist (statement of 25^th September 2024, paragraphs 8 and 9) that in recent years, she has reported on cases involving allegations of deliberate attempts to control a person's reproductive choices or to interfere with their reproductive autonomy and there are women for whom this has resulted in children they otherwise would not have chosen to have. She states that whilst this is a recognised form of domestic abuse in the UK, research suggests it is not well understood. Hence there is "significant public interest in advancing public understanding of this matter", that a better understanding "would also contribute to the wider public interest debate around consent in relationships, and that "[i]t is also possible that, with a greater awareness, more women may be protected from this type of abuse and potential perpetrators may be deterred from engaging in it."
119. I agree with all of these statements as general propositions. However, it is difficult to see how deanomymised reporting of these proceedings will enhance this. The 'abuse' in question was not explored in the proceedings at any point. The same goes for (as set out in paragraph 3.4 of Mr. Bunting KC's document of 25^th September 2024) "the public interest in understanding the harm caused to victims of abuse of this kind". Deanonymised reports of these proceedings will not enhance the public to understand such harm at all, since the court did not decide any issues relating to the harm to M. Again, the proportionality of the restrictions sought on M's rights under Article 10 must be considered in this context.
120. The BBC journalist says there is a "significant public interest in reporting on the father's behaviour towards the mother fairly and accurately" (statement dated 25^th September 2024, paragraph 9). However (i) the BBC journalist can already do this without reporting the proceedings (subject to the laws of libel and privacy); (ii) there have been no factual findings in the case as to F's alleged behaviour (although he has made admissions); and (iii) there is little if any public interest in reporting F's conduct, which does not in any way illuminate an understanding of the family justice system, nor elucidate issues of 'reproductive autonomy'.
121. The BBC journalist also states there have been "calls" to "create a new offence of 'intentionally deceiving a person into engaging in sexual activity" (statement dated 25^th September 2024, paragraph 10). In my view is difficult to see how a debate about the advantages and disadvantages of criminalising such behaviour will be assisted by reports of these proceedings, in which there was no analysis of the consequences of F's admitted behaviour, let alone of the relevance to that behaviour of the fact that it is not currently criminalised. There was also never any exploration of legal issues that may arise in cases of such a kind.
122. The BBC journalist also states at paragraph 20 of her statement of 25^th September 2024 that the case "raises questions about the fees involved in private family law more widely". Maybe so: but this too can be done equally effectively without identifying the parties.
123. In M v F and Another Harris J observed at [9] that "The Court fully appreciates that the inability to be able to speak openly about how, as a victim of rape and domestic abuse she was dealt with by the family justice system, compounds the trauma she has suffered, and is experienced as a further means of coercion and control. Ms M clearly has an invaluable contribution to make to current debates about domestic abuse, parental alienation and contact with children within the family justice system". It was said on M's behalf that in much the same way, she is well-placed to comment on the public debate surrounding the resolution of issues of coercion and control in the family justice system. Her evidence suggests that her experience of these proceedings has compounded the trauma that the initial abuse had caused. She is, as this court has found, a victim of domestic abuse. However, for the reasons I have already set out it is difficult to see how de-anomymised reporting of these proceedings will enhance this.
124. M and the BBC rely on the fact that there is already a very considerable volume of material about the dispute between F and M in the public domain. I have said above that relevant to the assessment of the comparative importance or weight of the specific rights in play in the Re S balancing exercise is the extent to which the information, the disclosure of which is under consideration, has or is about to become available to the public.
125. The material which M and the BBC (rightly) state is already in the public domain is (i) the fact of the relationship between the parents; (ii) the fact of the existence of a child; (iii) C's name, gender and image; (iv) the fact of F's other family; (v) M's allegations against F made in the media article; and (vi) reference to the fact that F has applied for parental responsibility (albeit as Mr. Wolanski KC observes this last matter may contravene CA 1989 s97 and the TO). It was said by the BBC journalist in her statement dated 25^th September 2024:
     
     [14] We can report all of this information (save any report of the court which identifies the parents or child). If the order falls away at the end of the proceedings as is currently envisaged, we would then also be able to report the fact of the case, the nature of the dispute and the outcome of the case whilst identifying the parties. What the current order prevents us from doing is reporting the detail of the hearings and documents created for them after the proceedings have ended (which is imminent). As a result of the restrictions, an important part of the mother and child's story has not yet been revealed.
126. The material in the public domain also includes a response from F to the dispute in the Country A media by which he referred to the rumours as being unwarranted and speculative. I have commented on this above.
127. It is said on the media's behalf that reporting these proceedings will add to that public domain material by ensuring that the court's conclusions on this dispute will also be brought to public attention. There is a strong public interest in those circumstances in reporting Her Honour Judge Roberts' findings on this dispute and in reporting M's reaction to these proceedings.
128. In M v F and Another Harris J noted at [62] that "[i]t is also relevant in evaluating the weight of the competing Convention rights to note that there is already very considerable information about this case in the public domain due to the publication of the judgments and permitted media reporting under the transparency pilot."
129. I agree with Mr. Wolanski KC that in this case far from supporting the position of M and the media, the fact that these matters are in the public domain illustrate that it is already possible for M to tell her story, and for the BBC to report it, without referencing the proceedings. I also disagree that this means that any Article 8 right asserted by F is weak. Yes, the dispute is in the public domain; yes, his deception is in the public domain; and yes, his and C's identities are in the public domain. However this does not mean that fully reporting these proceedings will not add meaningfully to the Article 8 interference that has already occurred.
130. Importantly in this context, there can be no doubt at all that, if the TO is not extended, and particularly if the BBC's application is granted, publicity will be on a materially greater scale than anything that has appeared in the public domain to date. For example, the media article to which I have referred was published in a specialist rather than a general interest publication. That publicity will also include reference to a much wider range of information than the matters already published, and likely extend to very delicate information about C and F's family. In my view this is of considerable importance in the balancing exercise.
131. In M v F and Another Harris J further stated at [59]:

In this case there is a strong public interest in there being an open and informed public debate about the way in which the family justice system approaches disputed allegations of rape, domestic abuse and parental alienation in private law proceedings involving contact with a child. Whilst the media plays an important role in reporting these issues, hearing directly from victims as to how they have experienced the system and the impact the proceedings have had upon both them and the child can be particularly powerful. Those direct voices can often prove invaluable in ensuring informed discussion and debate.

132. However, contrary to Mr. Bunting KC's submission, this conclusion does not apply with equal force on the facts of this case. Yes, there is a strong public interest in there being an open and informed public debate about the way in which the family justice system approaches disputed allegations of domestic abuse, coercion, and control. However the role of the court in the current case was limited. The hearings were largely of a procedural nature only. There was never any fact-finding hearing and no determination of disputed factual or legal issues. It is therefore not a case which sheds any light on the manner in which courts deal with issues of (as M describes them) "consent, sexual autonomy, and gender-based violence" (statement of 8^th October 2024, paragraph 11).
133. I therefore disagree with Mr. Bunting KC that hearing directly from M about how she has experienced this system, the impact it has had on her and on her child, would be particularly powerful.

Conclusion

134. In my view when carrying out the ultimate balancing test, the appropriate balance to be struck in relation to the competing rights in this case falls squarely in favour of maintaining the reporting restrictions that are presently in force until C's 18^th birthday. It is inappropriate for the media to be able to report the identities of the parties, the parties' child, any other professional whom they consider to be relevant, and the contents of all documents in these proceedings.
135. In Griffiths v Tickle and Others (Rights of Women and Another Intervening) (which was not a TO case and was one where the child's Guardian considered the parent's names should be published) Dame Victoria Sharp P framed the "critical question" in the following way at [71]:

… whether the best interests of the child, treated as a primary consideration, are weighty enough to justify maintaining that fetter, during the course of the proceedings under s 97(2) Children Act, and indefinitely as a consequence of s12 AJA. Put another way, do the child's best interests make it necessary and proportionate to impose those restrictions on the Article 8 and 10 rights relied on by the applicants and the mother?

136. My answer to this question is "yes".
137. There are obvious and serious risks to C's welfare from full, deanonymised reporting of these proceedings. The public interest in reporting this case is insufficient to warrant taking this step.
138. In my view there is no reason in this case to depart from the presumptive privacy afforded to parties and, more importantly, children, within the Transparency Pilot regime. In saying this I should not be taken as saying that the President's Guidance, which suggested that children should generally be anonymised until their 18^th birthday, suggests an order should always be made in those terms (and indeed His Honour Judge Talbott did not strike the balance in this way in his TO on the basis (as I understand it) that this could be considered further at the final hearing).
139. However in this case it is appropriate for the media to continue to be able to report in accordance with the TO but with M and C's anonymity remaining. There is every reason for such anonymity to continue to apply here: there are very obvious risks to C, who has started school, from the reporting of the very acrimonious dispute between their parents and where the findings made are limited. If the TO was not extended, and the BBC's application granted, this will significantly increase the publicity given to this matter in a way which I am satisfied can only harm C, including harming their relationship with their paternal family.
140. The TO permits anonymised reporting of the proceedings, and permits M to discuss the case publicly, as long as she does so anonymously. As demonstrated by the media article M is already able to tell the story of her experiences with F without referencing these proceedings.
141. The reporting regime under the TO therefore represents in this case the appropriate balance between transparency and the privacy interests of C. The consequent restrictions on M and the media's Convention rights are proportionate ones.
142. I do not accept, as Mr. Bunting KC submitted on M's behalf, that F's attempts to extend the TO "are a clear attempt to further coerce and control M" and that together with F's concern as to the impact upon himself of publication "are the real drivers here rather than any potential harm to [C]". Likewise I do not accept that extending the TO "will serve to further silence M and be tantamount to post separation abuse and ongoing control of her". These general statements are not supported by a granular analysis.
143. I shall therefore extend the TO until C's 18^th birthday, in line with the model transparency order and the guidance of the President. Accredited reporters (i.e. those who have attended hearings to date) shall therefore be permitted to report what they have heard in court, but without identifying the parties, with anonymity enduring until C's 18^th birthday. I therefore also dismiss the media's application to relax AJA 1960 s12.
144. In reaching my decision I have taken no account of F's belief that, following a change of legal representation (both solicitors and counsel) in September 2023, it became clear from the DRA on 14^th November 2023 onwards that M's aim in these proceedings had changed to focusing almost exclusively on her past relationship with F instead of F's future with C. This was reflected in Her Honour Judge Roberts' judgment of 8^th February 2024:

[4] The mother had set out, right at the start of the proceedings, many of the allegations she wished to make about the father, but the case proceeded on the basis that it was not necessary - and was not desired by the parties - for the court to go into them, as it was agreed that the father should become part of [C's] life and that contact should start …

[5] For reasons which I am unclear about, this approach of not needing to go further into the past and its impact on the present, and that contact should just progress, changed in November 2023, well over a year after the start of the proceedings. That is when the mother first said that she wanted her allegations considered and directions were made for each party to prepare statements.

145. Any change of approach is denied by M. Whether or not there is any truth in F's belief it was not, however, relevant to the issues I have had to decide.

Addendum

146. I circulated this judgment to the parties' counsel in draft on 17^th April 2025 and requested suggested editorial corrections and any requests for clarification and/or amplification in the usual way. Thereafter I received suggested editorial corrections which I have mostly incorporated (I should note that some of the amendments proposed on F's behalf were not agreed to by M but I have made the same as I consider they assist with the anonymisation of the judgment). There were no requests for clarification and/or amplification.
     
147. That is my judgment.

NICHOLAS ALLEN KC