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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions >> Finastra International Ltd v CRDB Bank PLC [2025] EWHC 509 (Comm) (07 March 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2025/509.html Cite as: [2025] EWHC 509 (Comm) |
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BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Rolls Building, Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
____________________
FINASTRA INTERNATIONAL LIMITED |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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THE CRDB BANK PLC |
Defendant |
____________________
Alex Charlton KC and Edward Meuli (instructed by Dentons UK and Middle East LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 21 February 2025
Draft judgment circulated to parties: 26 February 2025
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Henshaw:
(A) | INTRODUCTION | 2 |
(B) | PROCEDURAL HISTORY | 3 |
(C) | THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT | 12 |
(D) | PRINCIPLES | 16 |
(E) | APPLICATION | 17 |
(F) | CONCLUSION | 26 |
"A "Concurrent User" licence permits any representative (e.g. employee, consultant, contractor) of the Client or an Affiliate up to the cumulative stated number of Concurrent Users to simultaneously access the specified Software at any one time. Access to the Software means that the user is logged on to the Software, regardless of whether the Software is actually processing any data. The use of technology to allow multiple end users to share a single access point to the Software is prohibited."
"f. In respect of the services offered by Wakalas set out in paragraphs 2.8(a) to (d) of the Defence:
i. Could any of these services be provided by Wakalas if the User ID "TMS" was removed from FusionBanking Essence? If so, please describe how.
ii. Could any of these services be provided by Wakalas if FusionBanking Essence was taken offline? If so, please describe how."
g. If members of CRDB staff who can execute transactions do so directly within FusionBanking Essence using a User ID and password, why do presumably similar transactions performed by Wakalas need to be routed through TMS?"
"l. How does CRDB monitor Wakala activity, for example for the purposes of financial reporting, future programme planning, expansion, regulatory requirements, etc? What data does CRDB utilise? How does CRDB link transactions processed to Wakalas?"
"No. The interface user for TMS application "TMS" (User of type I in FusionBanking Essence, i.e. interface users)5 is required for establishing single sign-on (SSO) for the TMS profile using CAS authentication within the bank active directory services. CAS is a SSO protocol for the web, a session that allows an authorised user or application to access the server, resource, or service using a ticketing scheme (TGT) without multiple requests for credentials"
Further details were provided, including a table listing "some of the interface users in FusionBanking Essence". The answer to question (g) began:
"Bank customers visiting bank branches may be served over the counter by bank staff who execute transactions directly within FusionBanking Essence. Otherwise, customers may access banking services via bank alternative channels (channels that allow customers to access banking services without physically visiting a traditional brick-and-mortar bank branch) such as ATMs, banking agents (TMS / CRDB Wakala), Merchant POS in retail stores etc., or through digital channels (online platforms and technologies that enable customers to access banking services and perform transactions through the internet and electronic devices) such as mobile banking app (Simbanking), and internet banking."
The answer to question (l) was:-
"Transactions that are processed in FusionBanking Essence are initiated by:
• channels such as ATM and internet banking.
• interfaced FusionBanking Essence applications such as Branch Teller, SAP, TMS, BankWorld (ATMS), Sparrow (POS), etc.; and
• UXP screens of FusionBanking Essence (for example Bank Posting, business processes in forex, and lending).
Therefore, transactions in FusionBanking Essence are monitored through the channels from which the transaction originated (UBCHANNELID). Transactions processed through CRDB's Wakalas are posted under UBCHANNELID "TMS", as noted above.
The system channels posted to FBE along with their channel description are as follows: "
followed by a table which included an entry for "ESB Enterprise Bus Service" (sic.).
"G. New Agency Banking System
17. This is a system provided to CRDB by Panamax Inc, a supplier of banking IT solutions that is still in pilot phase since May 2022. It comprises a back-end server that connects with ESB (WS02) and an App that can be installed on a Smartphone or a Wakala POS Terminal. It allows a similar range of transactions to be carried out as the FH App, except that transactions requiring a customer card cannot be undertaken when using the smartphone App since the smartphone has no card reader. A Wakala can now choose whether to use the FH App or the New Agency Banking System App."
Section VII was as follows:
"VII. NEW AGENCY BANKING SYSTEM
77. This is a new system whose implementation is planned to replace the current system that uses TMS and FH App. At present, while the new system is in the pilot phase, the two systems are being operated in parallel by Wakalas, who can choose which system to use. The New Agency Banking System can be used either via a smartphone App or via an App on the Wakala POS Terminal. The New Agency Banking System differs from the FH App in the following respects:
77.1. Wakalas log in to the App using their user ID and a PIN (plus a User ID for the initial login);
77.2. The New Agency Banking system does not interface with TMS but connects to its own designated back-end system. The Wakala POS Terminals connect to this via the private APN though the mobile phone network. The smartphone App is able to connect via Wi-Fi or the Internet. The New Agency Banking System back-end posts transactions to the ESB (WS02), which is interfaced with FBE via the FBE API.
78. The smartphone App can be used to perform similar types of transaction as could be performed through the Wakala POS Terminal, although it is limited to transactions not requiring a customer card.
79. The New Agency Banking System also provides functionality related to the management of the Wakala business."
(my emphasis)
"5 CRDB does take issue with the draft Technical Schedule provided by you on 11 January 2024. That draft was not a technical document but provided a high-level synopsis of one of CRDB's IT systems. Further, in certain respects, the language used in that document was vague and/or contentious. Put simply, this was not the form of document that we consider the Court had in mind at the Case Management Conference on 3 November 2023 and we do not consider that it materially advanced the presentation or understanding of the systems beyond what is set out in the parties' pleaded statements of case, particularly our client's Amended Defence.
6 Together with our client, we have spent a considerable amount of time preparing an accurate and detailed document, which we consider meets the objective of the Technical Schedule contemplated by the Court. In light of such work, we do not consider there is any merit in revisiting your old draft now. We fully accept that there may be aspects of CRDB's IT systems we have detailed that your client is unaware of. To the extent that you require further confirmation and/or clarification in that regard, we are very willing to provide that.
7 In relation to the scope of our client's draft Technical Schedule, we have sought to be comprehensive because it is necessary and useful for the Court to have regard to the entire IT ecosystem in which TMS and the Wakala POS Terminals operate in order to avoid any misleading impression generated by focus on particular aspects of it. Some of this is covered in CRDB's Amended Defence, we refer to paragraphs 2.4 and 2.9 of the Amended Defence, for example. For the avoidance of any doubt, CRDB does not intend to amend its pleaded Amended Defence in relation to the technical aspects of CRDB's IT systems, albeit we and our client are keeping under review the desirability of any other amendments more generally."
(my emphasis)
Once again, as the passages I have underlined make clear, the Claimant had a further opportunity to seek further information about the NABS system which, in the February 2024 document, it had been told was now in use by Wakalas alongside TMS.
"14. As to paragraph 12:
14.3. It is denied that all Wakala-related transactions are processed through TMS, although all transactions inputted via the FH App on a Wakala POS Terminal are processed through TMS.
15. As to paragraph 13:
15.2. It is denied that all Wakala-related transactions are processed through TMS, although all transactions inputted via the FH App on a Wakala POS Terminal are processed through TMS.
16. As to paragraph 14:
16.2. The second sentence is denied. Wakalas are now able to process certain transactions using an app downloaded on a smartphone.
17. As to paragraph 15:
17.1. The first sentence is admitted. For the avoidance of doubt, it is denied that the FH App is the only app installed on a Wakala POS Terminal.
"
Wakalas were able to access NABS using a smartphone.
"The paragraph reflects the fact that the FH App is not the only application on the Wakala POS terminal."
"CRDB has identified certain other logs and reports, beyond those being disclosed pursuant to Issues 4 and 5, which it considers it must disclose pursuant to its obligations. We are in the process of arranging extraction of these additional logs and reports and CRDB will disclose those as soon as it in a position to do so." (§ 3.3(b))
In response to an enquiry about what these additional logs were and why they were relevant, Dentons as part of a response on 16 September 2024 said:
"Further to paragraph 3.3(b) of our letter dated 21 June 2024, our client is now in a position to disclose the certain other logs and reports. Those logs and reports relate to the following systems: Fast Account Opening (FAO), TellerPortal and New Agency Banking (NAB) (together, the Further Logs and Reports). Annex A to this letter sets out the names of the Further Logs and Reports, a brief description of their function, and the time period for which they have been extracted. We are investigating with our client whether data dictionaries can be prepared.
Without waiving privilege, Dentons was not aware of the nature of the Further Logs and Reports when preparing the initial list of logs and reports. In disclosing the Further Logs and Reports our client has had regard to all its obligations under CPR PD57AD. To the extent that your client considers such documents irrelevant, it can simply ignore them."
Dentons provided brief explanations of what each log contained, including as follows:
"CRDBELITE_TENGINE.TBLTransactionHistory
The table contains transaction and non-transaction requests processed in the new agent banking system (known as the CRDB Wakala System), such as check balance, login, cash withdrawal, bills payment etc."
"CRDBELITE_ADMIN.tblmservice
The table stores information about services consumed by new agency banking application such as cash deposit, cash withdrawal, bills payment, Airtime top up, Government bills payment, commission disbursement, agent account creation service etc."
"8. The Claimant is not entitled to the information sought. The Requests do not relate to a matter which is in dispute in the proceedings, the Claimant's case being limited to the use by the Defendant of TMS (as defined in the parties' statements of case). Without prejudice to the illegitimacy of the Request:
8.1. A Wakala that has been approved by the Bank of Tanzania but not yet issued and set up with a Wakala POS Terminal will not be able to facilitate transactions on behalf of customers. Further, a Wakala is able to operate more than one Wakala POS Terminal, such that there is not a direct correlation between the number of Wakalas and the number of Wakala POS Terminals. No reliance should therefore be placed on the Claimant's figure of 11,612. A Wakala is unable to facilitate transactions without either a Wakala POS Terminal, or the New Agency Banking System smartphone app. For the avoidance of any doubt, a Wakala can use the New Agency Banking System through their Wakala POS Terminal.
8.2. A Wakala is able to perform transactions through the New Agency Banking System. The relevant information has been provided in the Draft Schedule. Principally a Wakala will use a Wakala POS Terminal for the New Agency Banking System, although some (but not all) functionality is available through the New Agency Banking System smartphone app. The Defendant has disclosed logs and reports relating to the New Agency Banking System on 20 September 2024, as detailed in its Disclosure Certificate dated 4 October 2024.
8.3. A Wakala is unable to facilitate customer transactions without either a Wakala POS Terminal, or the New Agency Banking System smartphone app."
"New Agency Banking Logs and Reports
1. Your 16 September letter said that you were investigating whether data dictionaries could be prepared for the further logs and reports produced on 20 September, including those related to the New Agency Banking ("NAB") system. Finastra's experts are having difficulty in interpreting what each of the fields in the NAB logs and reports relate to, for example there appear to be multiple fields containing user identifiers, but it is not possible to determine which of these are relevant.
2. We therefore ask that CRDB provide a description, including any variations, of each of the fields, as well as the status codes and flags used in the fields, that appear in the NAB logs and reports as soon as possible. We understand that this is a relatively newly developed system and so assume that this information must be readily available. We also assume that CRDB's experts will have access to such explanations."
"2 We note the reference in your letter to your experts (plural) having trouble interpreting the data that has been disclosed in relation to New Agency Banking (NAB) as they seek "to confidently analyse the log data and fully understand the impact of the movement away from TMS". Given that NAB is not relevant to issues of liability (your client's claim being limited to the FH App and the Transaction Management System (TMS) as an alleged single access point), we understand the analysis of the NAB data is relevant only to issues of quantum and then only insofar as such data explains usage of the FH App. For the avoidance of any doubt, our expert is also analysing the NAB data to better understand the historical levels of concurrency via the FH App and TMS.
NAB logs and extracts
3 We enclose at Appendix A the data dictionaries provided by our client for the following NAB system logs and extracts."
The same letter stated that from May 2022, around 8,000 Wakalas had been entitled to use the NABS provided that they had had NABS installed on their POS terminal or had visited a CRDB branch to have the smartphone app installed.
"21. Wakalas connect to the CBS [Core Banking System] via either of the following means:
21.1 a physical Point of Sale terminal which connects to CRDB's digital Transaction Management System ("TMS"). The TMS in turn connects to the CBS via a single access point. The TMS was decommissioned in respect of Wakala usage on 26 June 2024.
21.2 the New Agency Banking System ("NABS"), which connects to the CBS via a single access point. A Wakala accesses NABS either via a smartphone app or via an app installed on a physical Point of Sale terminal. NABS was made available to Wakalas as a pilot in May 2022 and has since been fully rolled out by CRDB over 2 years. Since 26 June 2024 NABS has been the only means by which Wakalas can carry out their banking activities.
22. While there are multiple connections between Wakala Point of Sale terminals or smartphones and each of the TMS and NABS, reflecting the actual number of Wakalas providing services underpinned by the CBS at any one time, thereiswas only one connection between the TMS and the CBS and only one connection between the NABS and the CBS.
23. This amounts to a breach of the multiplexing prohibition, in that the TMS and the New Agency Banking System each providesa single point of access to the Software for multiple end users.
28. Finastra's best estimate of its loss under the multiplexing head is between USD 23,280,000.00 and USD 46,697,000.00USD 23,065,912.30. The calculations and assumptions supporting this estimate are set out in the Part B of the Confidential Schedule of Loss and the expert report of Mr. David Eastwood dated 15 January 2025 filed on behalf of the Claimant."
"Part B: Multiplexing
10. So far as relevant, the FusionBanking Essence Software is licensed on a Concurrent User basis (see paragraph 10.2 of the Particulars of Claim).
11. Finastra can license any number of Concurrent Users for FusionBanking Essence, down to a single user.
12. As CRDB agreed the Concurrent User basis for licensing the FusionBanking Essence Software, each module of this program is licensed on that basis. That means CRDB must have the requisite number of Concurrent User licences for each module in the program. Additional Concurrent User licences are charged as an increase in the Annual Fee.
13. Additional Concurrent User licences, like a transaction volume upgrade, apply in the year in which they are purchased and each remaining year of the Licence Term.
14. The table below sets out the numerical assumptions on which Finastra relies in calculating the increase in the Annual Fee which was lost as a result of CRDB's breach of the multiplexing prohibition. "
That is followed by a series of assumptions, and then a table setting out the figures leading to the claimed additional fee of US$23,065,912.30.
"For the reasons set out in the expert report of Mr. David Eastwood dated 15 January 2025, Finastra's best estimate of the additional Annual Fee which it lost as a result of CRDB's breach of the multiplexing prohibition is between USD 23,280,000.00 and USD 46,697,000.00, depending on the assumption made regarding timeout duration, which is explained in detail in the expert report of Mr. Eastwood."
i) The Claimant to serve its Amended Particulars of Claim by 24 February 2025;
ii) CRBD to make consequential amendments to its Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim by 28 February (or 7 March) 2025;
iii) CRBD to provide additional Extended Disclosure by 28 February 2025 (14 March 2025, according to the Claimant's previous proposal); and
iv) Experts' further reports to be served by 7 March 2025 (21 March according to the Claimant's previous proposal) i.e. 7 days after the further Extended Disclosure.
"i. Technical user manuals for NABS (or similar).
ii. Documents recording the process by which users are added to, and can be identified within, NABS.
iii. Architecture diagrams showing detailed data flows into and out of NAB, including between NABS and TMS.
iv. Documents recording the process by which Wakalas log onto NABS, execute transactions and log off again.
v. Wakala guides relating to NABS."
"(i) Technical user manual for NABS (the NABS equivalent of document CRDB_009093 already disclosed by CRDB in relation to TMS).
(ii) High-level architecture diagram of NABS showing the systems with which it integrates (as would have been provided by CRDB to the developer or vice versa).
(iii) Documents recording the process by which Wakalas log onto NABS, authorize and execute transactions and log off again.
(iv) Confirmation that NABS transactions are recorded in FusionBanking Essence under an interface user ID, like TMS.
(v) Wakala guide relating to NABS (the NABS equivalent of document CRDB_009083 already disclosed by CRDB in relation to TMS)."
"(i) Technical user manual for NABS (the NABS equivalent of document CRDB_009093 already disclosed by CRDB in relation to TMS).
(ii) Not required.
(iii) High-level architecture diagram of NABS showing the systems with which it integrates (as would have been provided by CRDB to the developer or vice versa).
(iv) Documents recording the process by which Wakalas log onto NABS, authorise and execute transactions and log off again. In particular, Mr Eastwood would expect there to be a few documents from Panamax on this. He has pointed out that he cannot see these activities in the NABS logs already disclosed and he infers that there may therefore be one or possibly two additional logs that record the initial authentication of a Wakala initiating a transaction and any customer authorisation.
(v) Confirmation that NABS transactions are recorded in FusionBanking Essence under an interface user ID, like TMS.
(vi) Wakala guide relating to NABS (the NABS equivalent of document CRDB_009083 already disclosed by CRDB in relation to TMS)."
(D) PRINCIPLES
i) Under CPR 17.1(2)(b), the court has discretion to allow or refuse the proposed amendments. In exercising its discretion, the overriding objective is of the greatest importance. Under CPR 1.1(2), dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost means ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing and can participate fully in proceedings, and that parties and witnesses can give their best evidence; saving expense; ensuring the case is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; and allocating to each case no more than a fair share of the court's limited resources.
ii) The court must strike a balance between the interests of the applicant and those of the other party and other court users, having regard to the injustice if the amendments are refused and the injustice if the amendments are allowed.
iii) It is relevant to consider to what extent the case sought to be advanced by the amendment is one the parties have already been considering. However, the mere fact that the issue has received some attention in the preparation of the case and the experts' reports is not necessarily sufficient to make permission to amend appropriate.
iv) Consideration of whether the amendments should be allowed takes place as at the date of the hearing. There is no reason for a responding party to take steps to meet the case advanced in a contested amended pleading for which permission has not been granted.
v) The lateness of the amendment is a relevant factor. Lateness is a relative concept. An amendment is late if it could have been advanced earlier, or involves a duplication of cost and effort, or if it requires the opposing party to revisit any of the significant steps in the litigation (e.g. disclosure, witness statements and expert reports). There will need to be a fair appreciation of the consequences in terms of the work wasted and consequential work to be done if the amendment were to be allowed.
vi) An application to make substantive amendments in the lead up to trial is a late amendment, and if it threatens the trial date, it is a very late amendment. There is a heavy burden on the applicant to justify a very late amendment. Parties have a legitimate expectation that trial dates will be met and not adjourned without a good reason. The applicant must explain the lateness of the amendment and have a good reason or explanation for any delay. The prejudice to a respondent by virtue of the disruption and additional pressure on parties and lawyers and experts in the run up to trial is a relevant factor. If the amendment would necessitate the adjournment of the trial that may be an overwhelming reason to refuse permission. By contrast, where the prejudice to an applicant in not being able to advance the amended case is attributable to their own conduct, that is a much less important factor.
vii) In considering the impact on the trial, the court is not concerned just with the ability to complete all necessary consequential steps but also with the impact on the overall ability to prepare properly for trial. Additional pressure on a party preparing in the intense run up period to trial is a substantial reason not to allow amendments.
viii) Where a very late application to amend is made, the correct approach is not that the amendments ought, in general, to be allowed so that the real dispute between the parties can be adjudicated upon. Rather, a heavy burden lies on a party seeking a very late amendment to show the strength of the new case and why justice to the applicant, the respondent and other court users require the applicant to be able to pursue it. The risk to a trial date may mean that the lateness of the application to amend will of itself cause the balance to be loaded heavily against the grant of permission.
ix) The particularity and/or clarity of the proposed amendment then has to be considered, because different considerations may well apply to amendments which are not tightly-drawn or focused.
i) would require CRBD to plead to the new case on NABS within at most 11 days of the Amended Particulars of Claim;
ii) would require CRBD to plead simultaneously with, or only a few days after, the further Extended Disclosure;
iii) makes the highly optimistic assumption that the further Extended Disclosure could be produced within 7 days of the hearing;
iv) makes no provision for any further witness evidence about NABS (over and above a short summary given in the witness statement for trial of Mr Daudi of CRDB);
v) makes no provision, in relation to the new NABS material, for the experts to meet, produce a joint memorandum or produce supplemental reports;
vi) as previously framed (based on the original draft order read with the Claimants' letter of 29 January 2025) would seemingly have required the experts to report only 7 days after the further Extended Disclosure, and on a date (21 March) only about 10 days before skeleton arguments for trial became due; and
vii) as revised at the hearing, would still require the experts to report only 7 days after the further Extended Disclosure, even assuming that such disclosure could be produced within 7 days of the hearing.
"There is an additional complication that, whereas TMS was a system that the Defendant built, NABS was developed by a third party. It may take additional time to seek the third party's cooperation, identify relevant individuals and/or consult with those individuals to fully understand the nature and operation of the systems. None of this work has begun and nor should it until the Application has been ruled on. Further, I do not know who was responsible for creating the WS02 ESB (the system that NABS interfaces with, and which is itself interfaced with FBE). There is a tendency on the part of the Claimant (perhaps the result of understandable ignorance on its part) to speak of NABS as though it was a single system. As DSATF1 made clear, NABS comprises an app, a back-end system, which connects to an 'enterprise service bus' WS02 ESB that itself is connected with FBE. It may therefore be necessary to liaise with more than one third party about these component systems."
"Even with the limitations in the data provided set out in the relevant subsections below, the volumes of data that have been provided are far too large to be practical to analyse using Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access or equivalent tools from other sources. The FBE Transactional Journal extract has, for example, over 180 million records. I have therefore made use of a database management system that is capable of processing larger amounts of data in order to pre-process the data extracts. The database management system I have chosen is called "MySQL", which an open source "relational" database management product that is freely available and essentially the same as that used to support many commercial systems." (§ 214)
However, the amendment would still require CRBD's expert (a) to gain a secure understanding of how the NABS works, including as regards concurrency of use and (b) to perform new data analysis, in the light of that understanding, on a large volume of data.
"If Wakalas are Concurrent Users within the meaning of that term under the Licence Schedule, the extent, if any, to which it is possible to determine whether the 2,000 Concurrent User licence was exceeded in the period (a) from 31 August 2017 to the date when proceedings were issued and (b) from the date proceedings were issued to the date of trial. In particular:
i. What are the means and/or modelling by which it is possible to determine the same?
ii. With what results?
iii. With what degree of accuracy and/or reliability?"
Mr Britton in his report goes on to address that issue using two methodologies, based on his understanding of how the TMS system works.
"[44] (d) Mr Britton's knowledge of NABS is limited to Section VII in DSATF1. Further, Mr Britton has confirmed to me that it is not possible for him to reverse engineer how NABS works from the NABS-related data that has been provided, because the data provided to date comprises lists of users and transactions (which amount to point in time activity). This is in marked contrast to the data that has been provided in respect of TMS, which allow the experts to model and count Wakala sessions. Mr Eastwood has rejected any approach to concurrency that looks at transactions. Beyond this, neither expert has information as to the nature of interactions between the Wakala and POS terminal/smartphone (which is an entirely novel feature of NABS), or POS terminal/smartphone and the backend system, or between the backend system and the WS02 ESB, or between WS02 ESB and FBE, that might allow him to model a proxy for when a Wakala using NABS should be counted as a concurrent user (assuming they are to be treated as concurrent users at all), nor do they have the full set of data logs that might become available if NABS became a pleaded issue.
(e) The reality is that both parties' experts, and ultimately the Court, require a level of detail before they can begin to consider NABS. The information would need to be more detailed than the short Section VII, if the Application were to be allowed, to allow the Court a full understanding of NABS. Mr Eastwood has confirmed the inadequacy of the description of NABS in DSATF1 in his first report. It is plainly sensible for all systems to be covered the Technical Schedule.
(f) To date, in respect of the FH App/TMS claim, the experts have had the benefit of the Technical Schedule, supported by a Statement of Truth on behalf of the Defendant and corroborating witness statements.
(g) Mr Eastwood relies heavily on the Technical Schedule in his report, commenting that "it does provide a useful overview of the main elements of the technical landscape and the way in which the transactions take place". He relies on the information in the Technical Schedule in paragraphs 4.27, 5.37, 5.38, 5.64-5.65, 5.73-5.99 and 8.7. He also engages closely with areas in which he considers it may be incorrect, which suggests the importance of the document's accuracy and, therefore, the importance of ensuring it is accurate vis-ΰ-vis NABS. By way of illustration, Mr Eastwood assumes from the Technical Schedule, that tokens expire based on the time of the transaction rather than the time they are granted. It appears this is an error based on an inaccurate summary of paragraph 5.38 of the Technical Schedule.
(h) The importance of amending the Technical Schedule to include NABS is evidenced by the inability of Mr Eastwood to set out any analysis on NABS. His report assumes that it operates in the same way as the FH App, although it is clear that he is expecting to revise his analysis once he gains a full understanding of the NABS system. That process, as a matter of logic and fairness, has to happen before the experts begin their analysis, and not, as the Claimant suggests, simultaneously while the experts are preparing further reports.
(i) the impact of the NABS claim is alleged to increase the quantum significantly. It is therefore important that the Court has full sight of the relevant technical matters and the Defendant has time to consider, with its expert, and plead back." (footnotes omitted)
"1.9 There are important gaps in the information which has been made available to me, either because it has not been able to be produced or because it does not exist at all or in an accessible form. These gaps include, for example:
(3) Information as to the operation of the New Agency Banking System ("NABS") which progressively replaced TMS from May 2022, and entirely superseded TMS from June 2024.
2.4 The architecture of the IT systems supporting CRDB's Wakala network is described in a Technical Schedule attached to the Re-Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim. Whilst in my view the Technical Schedule is helpful as far as it goes, there are important omissions and inaccuracies. These include:
(1) The Technical Schedule is incomplete and omits significant Wakala activity outside TMS which affects the level of concurrent use of FBE, in particular the use of NABS.
2.10 The agency banking channel of TMS was decommissioned in June 2024 and all Wakalas now conduct CRDB's agency business through NABS. This switchover took place progressively from May 2022 to June 2024. Only the briefest of information has been provided in relation to this system and this is not sufficient for me to properly understand how, if at all, this differs from TMS. I have therefore had to assume that it operates in essentially the same way and that concurrent usage of FBE by Wakalas via NABS will have the same characteristics as concurrent usage via TMS.
7.1 In my First Report I estimate the concurrent use of FBE by Wakalas via NABS. The information available on the way in which NABS operates was, and remains, very limited. I therefore make an assumption that NABS operated in broadly the same way as TMS operated in March 2024 (i.e. with a 5-minute timeout). I continue to make the same assumption in this Supplemental Report. I consider this to be a reasonable assumption for the following reasons:
(1) CRDB was clearly comparing the way in which the two systems operated when considering changes to authentication and timeout processes in December 2023;
(2) CRDB would seek to maintain a consistent customer experience and, as best it could, a consistent experience for Wakalas in order to minimise the time and costs of migrating Wakalas to NABS, especially with an extended period when both systems were operating; and
(3) The logs suggest that transactions are processed in a similar way with comparable records retained.
7.2 There are however significant differences between TMS and NABS which might affect the extent of concurrency but which I do not have the information to assess. These are:
(1) The greater variety of transactions apparently available via NABS. This appears because there are 168 active services provided by NABS59 and 29 categories of transactions (including administrative ones) in TMS. It may however be that that these are simply different categorisations of essentially the same services (which are largely defined by regulation).
(2) Potential use of NABS by CRDB staff in addition to Wakalas. Some of the additional transaction types appear to relate to management of Wakala activity and it seems likely that some CRDB staff are able to log on to NABS. Whether they then access FBE and therefore ought to be considered for concurrency is unclear. I assume for present purposes that if they do the extent of this use is limited in comparison to use by Wakalas.
7.6 As with the TMS Log, the NABS data does not appear to directly record the start and finish of a session. I have no information as to the log-in process for NABS other than a reference in passing in an email concerning adjustments to the timeout in TMS. This states:
"After conducting a thorough review, we have identified that the newly implemented agency banking solution follows a similar approach in utilizing a username (as agent code) and a password (as PIN)."
7.7 I assume therefore that a session will commence on NABS with entry of a password and PIN, equivalent to the POS Terminal initialisation step in TMS. I expect that this will take the same length of time that initialisation takes, roughly 10-20 seconds.
7.17 For the purposes of my calculations of overall concurrency, and therefore quantum, I take the three-minute duration as the most appropriate estimate because it is consistent with the three-minute transaction cycle time I propose in Section 6 above in considering the average number of transactions that could be dealt with by a Wakala in an hour. I do not apply a timeout in the same way that I did for TMS because I do not know that NABS works in that way. An overall duration of three minutes is therefore shorter than a TMS session which ends in a timeout. If further information on NABS becomes available I may need to adjust this assumption.
Estimating concurrency
9.8 Given the available information, I have estimated concurrency via NABS by comparing the number of Wakalas active on TMS and on NABS and using this to scale my estimate of the FBE concurrency via TMS. This assumes that the behaviour of Wakalas on the new system is the same as on TMS and therefore that Wakalas are logged-on for the same proportion of their time whichever system they use.
9.9 This assumption may well be incorrect because of, for example, additional functionality in the new system. I note in particular that the new system enables the Wakalas to conduct account management activity which may require them to be logged in to FBE. NABS has 168 different active transaction types. This is significantly more than the 29 transaction types in TMS."
(footnotes omitted)
"a) First, how NABS interacts with FusionBanking Essence and, in particular, whether it (or the EBS Bus [sic.] which it uses) authenticates to FBE in the same way as TMS, namely through a single interface ID (a process described in a few lines of Mr Daudi's statement), at paragraph 25). Mr Eastwood has to date assumed, based on things that CRDB has already said, that it does. Whether that is indeed so should be very straightforward for CRDB to answer, particularly when the description of NABS included in the draft Technical Schedule originally produced by CRDB and described by Dentons as being "accurate and detailed" (CAH2/24), states that NABS "differs from the FH App" in only two respects (CAH2/19).
b) Secondly, for the purposes of assessing how many Wakalas were concurrently using FBE, he requires to know more detail about the manner in which Wakalas authenticate themselves to NABS when they conduct transactions (noting that CRDB has already produced detail of those transactions) and how, if at all, customers authorise those transactions. Mr Eastwood as already started looked at the issue of concurrent usage via NABS. Mr Britton has considered the volume of relevant transactions carried out via NABS and Mr Eastwood has advised that the additional work to convert this analysis into a concurrency analysis is very small (essentially the application of a similar logic to the approach taken in respect of TMS). Again, any additional information required by the experts to complete this analysis ought to be relatively straightforward to obtain.
12 The technical documentation held on CRDB's behalf by Panamax will no doubt answer these questions. On no view will there need to be the wholesale investigation of the inner workings of the NABS system which Mr Leyland appears to envisage, but, even then, the Panamax documentation will cover those points. There is no reason why Mr Eastwood and Mr Britton could not jointly approach Panamax for answers to appropriate questions in the next few days. Mr Eastwood considers that could be done swiftly and cheaply, and the need for additional disclosure might be avoided entirely as a result."
i) it would be highly unsatisfactory for a substantial additional claim to be addressed without any opportunity for further witness statements and without the experts having the time, sufficiently in advance of skeleton arguments and trial, to take the usual steps of meeting to consider their provisional conclusions, producing a joint memorandum and serving supplemental reports on points of disagreement; and
ii) the process would in any event place entirely unfair additional burdens on CRBD, its legal team and its expert at a time when they are already occupied with final preparations for trial.